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This thesis attempts to account for post-Soviet Russian national 
identity and nationalism ‘from below’, employing the ‘thick 
descriptions’ of the nation reproduced by ordinary Russians across 
social and generational lines. It examines the current equilibrium in 
mainstream nationalist hegemonic discourse, shedding light on the 
vitality of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. In doing this, 
nationalism is viewed as a set of discursive formations that make 
claims about how or what the nation is or should be. A central aim in 
this research is to highlight what discursive constructions are shared or 
contested across a representative sample of the Russian population.  
 
In order to offer a meaningful assessment of nationalist discourse, this 
research employs ethnographic fieldwork driven by a grounded theory 
approach. With fifteen months of fieldwork in three Russian cities, 
this permitted room for exploration and siginificant redirection of the 
research focus. This helped reveal the interconnections between 
certain common, foundational elements of national identity and the 
structure of a dominant nationalist discourse. Previous research has 
often focused on the challenges of Russian nation-building given the 
complicated heritage bestowed by the Romanov and Soviet empires. 
This research has identified certain historical and cultural factors vital 
to the shaping of Russian national identity today. It also identifies a 
current hegemonic nationalist discourse and unpacks how it is relevant 
to the majority. This dominant discourse is built on certain myths and 
versions of normality, much of which takes the late Soviet as ‘normal’ 
and the wild nineties as ‘abnormal’. 
 
This research also explores how the above is contested. The thesis 
argues that, at the current moment, the challenge of anti-hegemonic 
nationalist discourses is, for many people, neutralised by the appeal of 
a particular geopolitical vision. This research outlines how visions of 
the nation are weaved into commonly shared notions of identity and 
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Russia stands out as a fascinating case in studying national identity; not only is 
she the largest country on earth, but has historically played a changing role in 
world affairs, at times part of the developed core of Western nations, at times 
excluded to the periphery. In Trotsky’s term, the West acted as a ‘whip of 
external necessity’ on nineteenth century Russia, forcing the country down a 
development path determined elsewhere (Trotsky 1980: 4). Soviet 
modernisation sought to overcome this historic backwardness and even surpass 
the West. With the closing of a phase of disorder following the collapse of the 
USSR, Russia has experienced relative stabilization under President Vladimir 
Putin.  A new environment, which combines older Soviet-born and younger 
post-Soviet-born people, has provided the space for a post-Soviet Russian 
national identity to germinate and blossom.  
Today, the Russian leadership is faced with multiple challenges related to 
national identity and nationalism. Unlike the Soviet state, the Russian 
Federation has an ethno-cultural core with an outright majority (‘ethnic’ 
Russians make up 80% of the population). Integrating the remaining ‘non-
Russian’ twenty percent remains an important challenge; can a form of national 
identity be found to encourage both the idea of Russia as a multi-ethnic state 
and a Russia as a state for the ethnic Russians? As was the case historically, 
nationalism remains both a resource and a threat to the Russian state. Russia’s 
post-Soviet leaders have not been shy to employ nationalism as a resource to 
achieve popular legitimacy and consolidate support among the population. At 
the same time, nationalism is a threat to the Russian authorities in a variety of 
ways. This includes liberal and nationalist demands for democratic reform and 
an end to corruption, nationalist separatist movements within the Russian 
Federation demanding independence or autonomy, and xenophobic sentiment 
in the population that contradicts state efforts to promote multi-ethnic peace. 
Recent shifts in Russian foreign policy initiatives in Syria and Ukraine should 
also be understood within a context of changing nationalist discourse and 





phenomenon of the post-Soviet Russian nation. It is important from the outset, 
however, to elaborate on the adjective ‘post-Soviet’.1 
Unpacking the ‘post-Soviet’ 
In this thesis, ‘post-Soviet’ refers to three ‘postings’ that have been on-going 
since the collapse of the USSR. Firstly, there is ‘post-communism’ or ‘post-
socialism’, the ambiguous social reconfiguration that occurred ‘once the means 
of production were privatized and the Party’s political monopoly 
disestablished’ (Chari, Verdery 2009:11). Central to this is the progress of 
Russia’s ‘first post-socialist generation’, who grew up in conditions where 
‘traces of Soviet life’ ‘still abound (Buckler 2009: 260). Thus, post-socialism 
explores how Soviet legacies play out in Russian society (Stenning 2008: 325). 
In searching for the footprints of the fabled ‘Soviet man’, we look for evidence 
of his eradication or reproduction across the transmission belt of Russian 
generations, attempting to determine what kind of transition is underway. 
The second key element of ‘post-Soviet’ concerns Russia’s post-imperial 
transitions. Following the collapse of the USSR, much of the post-Soviet space 
experienced a form of ‘de-colonisation’ in the move to national independence. 
The fall of the imperial centre was also, in some ways, an ‘escape’ for Russians 
themselves, albeit a rather tortured and ambiguous one. The key question here 
is how the demise of a large imperial unit affects the identity of the ‘imperial’ 
nation. The focus of much postcolonial literature is on the ‘colonized nations’ 
of the Tsarist empire and the Soviet Union. This, however, neglects tracing the 
potential ‘decolonisation’ of the ‘imperial centre’, which can be a long-term 
process requiring generations. Vyacheslav Morozov (2013, 2015) has argued 
that today’s Russia possesses a ‘hybrid identity’ that is both ‘imperial’ in its 
efforts to dominate the post-Soviet space and ‘anti-imperial’ in its opposition to 
American unilateralism on the global stage. In this sense there is strong 
continuity with the Soviet empire, which integrated ‘brother nations’ into one 
space while combating American imperialism. The end of the Soviet project 
has not necessarily brought with it a corresponding revolution in the Russian 








acceptance of the ‘end of empire’ and reduced great power status is no 
straightforward matter.  
The third element concerns how the world has evolved since the breakdown of 
the ‘three worlds system’ of the Cold War (Stenning, Horschelmann 2008: 
320). For some, the collapse of the ‘second’ world has removed the non-
Western alternative to modernity, leading Francis Fukuyama (1992) to declare 
the ‘end of history’ and the triumph of democratic and liberal value systems. 
This has led to a research paradigm of ‘transition’ that views the post-Soviet as 
gradually being absorbed into a neo-liberal order in conditions of globalization. 
Yet, for post-Soviet Russia, neo-liberalism has involved ‘impoverishment and 
degradation’ as ‘entitlements are withdrawn, bodies are commodified and then 
devalued, and the former socialist welfare states abandon all pretences at 
providing a social wage’ (Chari, Vedery 2009: 15). Thus, an important part of 
the ‘post-Soviet’ is the experience of marginalisation and disintegration 
alongside the imposition of neo-liberalism and the end of the Cold War. 
Russia’s new assertiveness in today’s global politics and her return to the role 
of America’s main protagonist suggest certain post-Cold War transitions have 
failed and previous pathways reactivated. 
Keeping the above three ‘postings’ in mind, this study examines the changing 
meanings and appeal of mainstream Russian nationalism and national identity 
through a cross-generational data sample. In considering change and continuity 
between the last Soviet-Russian youth generation and the first post-Soviet 
youth generation, I look to reveal the complexities of being Russian in today’s 
world. Today, Russia faces demographic crisis, rising immigration and 
economic pressures, as well as the battle to retain a great-power role in world 
affairs. Thus, the question of which vision of the Russian ‘nation’ acheives 
hegemonic status is vital. With a shift at both the level of leadership, and at the 
level of the public, from a generation born in the Soviet Union to one 
increasingly with no lived experience of socialism, there are serious questions 
as to how Russian national identity will be defined over the next twenty-five 





Theoretical approach and main argumentation  
This thesis studies how the nation is reproduced and contested in contemporary 
Russia. Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 10) asserted that, although nationalism is 
constructed from above, it must be studied ‘from below’ as this is where it 
takes root and is most powerful, volatile and significant. This thesis takes the 
position that the ‘nation’ is absorbed, reproduced and transmitted in the form of 
discursive formations. A large part of this work is done by ‘myths’: emotional, 
dramatic and simplified narratives that reveal much about ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
They also reveal what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. Thus, the ‘nation’ can be 
understood as a way of thinking and talking that is shared across a large space 
by people of diverse backgrounds. This thesis makes an important contribution 
literature on Russia national identity and nationalism by shedding light on the 
picture ‘from below’, utilising ‘thick descriptions’ of the nation as it exists in 
the minds of ordinary Russians. In order to do this I employ an ethnographic 
approach involving fifteen months of fieldwork in three Russian cities and 
almost one-hundred interviews. In essence I was driven by three research 
questions.  
• What are the important shared components of Russian national identity 
between different social and age groups? 
• Can a dominant mainstream form of nationalism be identified, what are its 
key elements and how does it relate to national identity? 
• What are the proportions of civic, ethnic and imperial in mainstream 
Russian nationalism and what role do Soviet legacies play? 
Offering answers to these research questions demanded a number of things. 
Firstly, it was important to find a valid way to access national identity in the 
thoughts and feelings of ordinary people. Secondly, efforts must be made to 
trace state-led discourse in terms of key speeches, policies and media output, 
partly so that it is possible to recognise what elements are reproduced, 
transformed, ignored or contested. Thirdly, the direction of this research is 
highly explorative; no narrowly pre-determined hypothesis was established 





‘speak’ and redirect the research focus in important ways that will be explored 
below.  
In examining Russian national-feeling, I argue that Russian national identity, 
which is shaped by historical, cultural and social factors, interacts with 
dominant ways of talking about the nation, in other words, a hegemonic 
nationalist discourse. In examining this dynamic, it is important to underline 
that discourses about the nation are fluid and contested; the central challenge of 
this thesis was to explore what kind of equilibrium exists in Russia today. This 
thesis has discovered that, to a large degree, Russian national identity is 
strongly shaped by three key elements. These are Soviet legacies, refashioned 
pre-Soviet trends and the experience and memory of Russia’s traumatic 
transition (1988-1998). The sentiments emerging from these three elements are 
managed and manipulated ‘from above’ and reproduced ‘from below’ to 
produce a dominant nationalist discourse that is acceptable to a majority of the 
population. This discourse can be characterised as fundamentally conservative 
with important neo-Slavophile and Soviet-infused elements. It revolves around 
the restoration of ‘normality’ in both socio-economic conditions and foreign 
relations. While the discourse of the majority is stable and successfully 
reproduced across generational and social lines, we cannot view Russian 
society as a monolithic entity. Hegemonic discourse is effectively challenged 
by a large and diverse minority that holds fundamentally different versions of 
what is ‘normal’ for Russia. The elements to this anti-hegemonic discourse are 
diverse, ranging from liberals and Westerniser sentiment to populist ‘Put 
Russia first’ nationalism and isolationism. This thesis argues that what 
ultimately keeps the anti-hegemonic discourses in check is not any new 
ideology, religion or neo-traditonalism but the powerful mobilising effects of 
geopolitical visions combined with the persistent survivial of Soviet ways of 
thinking in the population at large.  
Structure of the thesis  
In order to unpack the above argument, the thesis will employ the following 
structure. Chapter One will examine some of the theories behind nation-ness 





discourses. This involves a careful review of how nation, nationalism and 
national identity can be defined and, more importantly for this thesis, how they 
are interrelated. One of the theoretical lynchpins of this thesis is that nationalist 
discourse is comprised of a series of interlinked but distinct claims that are 
mainly transmitted through the vehicles of myths and visions of ‘normality’. In 
accounting for the reproduction and transmission of the nation ‘from below’ I 
examine the role of emotion and the fundamental urges the human mind 
displays to categorise into ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’.    
Chapter Two builds on this theoretical discussion by outlining the logic behind 
my methodological approach. After clarifying the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions behind the research, I how discuss how I 
employed grounded theory as part of an ethnographic approach. Validity in 
qualitiative research is largely grounded in transparency and openness in the 
path taken by the researcher. In this chapter I also reveal some of the 
challenges in conducting fieldwork in a foreign language, both in terms of 
linguistics, logistics and one’s own identity. In doing this I shed light on how 
the researcher and the research evolved before, during and after fieldwork, 
leaving an accessible account for those considering similar avenues in the 
study of identity and nation.  
Chapter Three considers the specific historical circumstances behind the 
formation of the modern Russian ‘nation’, covering pre-Soviet and Soviet 
nation-building and outlining important trends and tendencies within this. 
These, in turn, are important to the overall argument of the thesis and are 
referred to in the empirical chapters. This is particularly the case with the 
creation of Homo Sovieticus (The Soviet person), a sociological entity of some 
importance to this thesis. The second part of the chapter will turn to post-
Soviet nation building, offering a review of state policy and discourses from 
1991 to the present. Elements of Russian mainstream nationalism promoted 
‘from above’ will be examined, underlining the shift toward neo-Slavophile 
narratives, the dominance of statist (gosudarstvennik) 2  language and 








ideology and a strong reliance on using the West as the constituent ‘Other’ for 
Russian identity.  
Following this, there are four empirical chapters in this thesis, each of which 
consider a distinct nationalist claim-making area. In Chapter Four I focus on 
historical memory, revealing that yearnings for stability and order tend to 
predominate in selecting positive periods of Russia’s past. A popular longue 
durée version of Russian history was uncovered that is connected to cycles of 
relative peace and progress followed by downward trajectories of collapse and 
chaos. Elements of this longue durée clearly connect to national identity today 
and justify certain political stances. Above all, the period of 1988-1998 is 
clearly important in shaping these views and influencing how people 
conceptualise the past. This chapter also offers an examination of Soviet 
periods, revealing strong contestation of the Stalin and Brezhnev periods due to 
strong splits in normative standards when looking at these periods.  
Chapter Five turns to how the lines of inclusion and exclusion into the Russian 
‘we’ are formed and maintained. This examines how far state-driven rhetoric 
on citizenship, nationality and patriotism have penetrated through to ordinary 
people, revealing some key elements of what being Russian means today. This 
includes ways of thinking from the Soviet period that have not been seriously 
challenged, leaving Russia with a very distinctive kind of ‘multiculturalism’. 
Exploring the lines of contention in this, the chapter also examines who tends 
to be excluded from the Russian ‘we’ and what this entails for mainstream 
nationalism. Here the proportions of ethnic, civic and imperial nationalism in 
Russian national identity are examined in some detail, leading to conclusions 
on the current status quo. 
Chapter Six moves the focus to how people understand the political system in 
which they live, exploring how trust in and legitimacy of the leader 
compensate for widespread dissatisfaction with socio-economic conditions and 
corruption. Vladimir Putin’s powerful appeal is examined with reference to 
myths about his character and image. These in turn are linked to certain 
representations of Russians as a people being ‘enduring’, ‘passive’ or 





change in the reform period (1988-1998) informs stances today, making 
detachment from politics ‘normal’. The chapter also reveals how differing 
frames of normality emerge in those respondents who reject, criticise or 
lampoon the pro-Putin consensus. Attitudes to the ‘Information War’ reinforce 
the impression that, behind the façade of ninety percent approval ratings, 
serious polarisation and divisions exist in Russian society over a range of 
political, social and cultural issues.  
In Chapter Seven, I account for the powerful appeal of geopolitics in Russian 
national identity. Here it will be argued that great power nationalism allows 
Russians to ‘live’ the nation in real-time. The state-promoted narrative of 
Russia locked in a just struggle for basic recognition of rights with the West 
clearly appeals to a large number. The chapter explains why this is the case, 
highlighting the centrality of an emotional narrative of ressentiment alongside 
the continued appeal of Soviet-influenced markers of greatness. In addition, the 
role of certain mobilising events is examined, revealing how it can pull 
together people who would otherwise waver in their support for the current 















Theoretical Approaches to Understanding the Nation, 
National Identity and Nationalism. 
A man does not have himself killed for a half-pence a day or for a petty 
distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify the man. 
Napoleon Bonaparte.3 
Introduction  
In our daily lives we are surrounded by a plethora of national symbols and 
images; the language of the nation is reproduced and transmitted in a multitude 
of diverse ways on a daily basis. In researching the ‘nation’, a number of 
pitfalls face the intrepid explorer. One is the tempation to hunt for the Holy 
Grail: a singular, graspable, essential and ‘true’ national identity. Another is 
the tendency to talk of clean, distinct typologies of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. 
This thesis does not wish to offer an essentialist account of the nation, 
examples of which abound in history, from Herodotus’s depiction of an 
effeminate Egypt, to Huntington’s claims of an immutable Islamic 
civilizational identity (Roberts 2011; Huntington 1996). National identity is 
made up of components that are, at any given time, subject to a variety of 
competing or reinforcing identity projects that talk in terms of ‘nation’ and 
‘country’. Nationalism is more than just a political doctrine; it is a force that 
influences lives far beyond this, shaping the very social reality in which we 
live. Given this multiplicity, the challenges of attempting to reveal the essence 
of nation-ness is a daunting prospect. Academic work on nationalism often 
produces rather dry standard definitions, equating nationhood with a checklist 
including common language, territory, past, as well as the common acceptance 
of rituals, symbols and national tradition (Hastings 1997, Smith 1991). The 
problem with these definitions and the debates emerging from them is that they 
do little to help us understand the intense passions produced by nationalism, 







That is not to say nationalism should be purely viewed in terms of the frenzied 
and fanatical states it can inspire. As Michael Billig (1995) convincingly 
argued, nationalism can be a ‘banal’ and barely noticeable force, reproduced in 
everyday manifestations. Ernest Gellner (1994: xi) viewed nationalism as ‘like 
gravity, an important and persuasive force, but not, at most times, strong 
enough to be violently disruptive’. To understand the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ phases of 
nation-feeling, we need to examine how it is experienced in everyday life. As 
the historian Eric Hobsbawm (1983: 10) pointed out, nationalism ‘cannot be 
understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the 
assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are 
not necessarily national and still less nationalist’. Nation-feeling is both a result 
of the conscious intellectual and political labour of a variety of actors ‘from 
above’, and the reflection of sentiments and aspirations of ordinary people 
‘from below’.  
This thesis aims to remedy a certain defect in studies of nationalism, namely 
the preference in much constructivist research for examining the nation ‘from 
above’ through the study of ‘elites’. This tendency to focus on the nation’s 
plainly visible actors such as political entrepreneurs, high-level state figure or 
public intellectuals, entails the neglect of the picture ‘from below’: how 
ordinary people absorb and reproduce the ‘nation’. This concerns how people 
live the ‘nation’; how they think, talk and feel about themselves, both as 
individuals and as part of a wider community. Central to the nation’s appeal is 
the way it engages the heart and the head, reason and emotion, passion and 
pragmatism.  
In accounting for the transformative power of nation, national identity and 
nationalism we must uncover ‘the processes and mechanisms’ behind those 
moments when nation-ness can ‘crystallise as a powerful, compelling reality’ 
(Brubaker, Cooper 2000: 5). In order to examine how national-feeling works 
‘from below’, this chapter has two main sections. Firstly, I will argue claim-
making is central to building the dominant, hegemonic discourse on the nation. 
Viewing ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’ as interlinked, I will 
underline the salience of discursive formations in ensuring nationalism is fluid 





two typologies in nationalism that cause confusion and clarify my own position 
on these questions. In the second section, I will argue that three important 
factors should be considered in the reproduction of nationalism’s discursive 
formations. Firstly, social psychology reveals how different members of a 
disparate group can share emotional states, something referred to as the 
‘collective self’. Secondly, I examine two essential means of transmitting 
discursive formations: myths and visions of normality. Thirdly, I outline why 
the generational factor should be kept in mind as a key driver in the evolution 
(and potentially rapid change) of nationalist discourse. 
Part one: Defining the nation, national identity and nationalism 
Defining the nation 
A large amount of ink has been spilled in answering two interlinked questions: 
‘What is the nation?’ and ‘When is the nation’. Competing schools have 
offered convincing answers. One the one hand, ‘perennialists’ or ‘ethno-
symbolists’ such as Anthony Smith (1991) and Liah Greenfeld (1992) 
presented the nation as something with deep roots that has been renewed over 
the centuries. According to this version, the nation is the product of welding 
various peoples into one unit ‘based on the cultural heritage of the dominant 
ethic core’ (Smith 1991: 68); a process that in some cases can be traced back to 
the early Middle Ages.4 On the other hand, ‘modernists’ or ‘constructivists’ (E. 
Gellner, E. Hobsbawm, B. Anderson) view the nation as a social construct 
emerging from modernisation. Gellner (1983: 48) rejected the idea of  
‘sleeping-beauty nations’: that the nation-state is the reawakening of the 
‘eternal’ national unit. Instead, he viewed it is a patently new form of social 
organisation that replaced pre-existing cultural, social and religious structures. 
In this sense the nation is an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) that 
emerges to replace the old, fractured ‘real’ communities of the pre-industrial 
eras. It is an invented community as it is based on shared beliefs of common 









For the purposes of this thesis, the modernist/perennialist debate is not of 
central importance. Regardless of whether the nation has endured throughout 
time or only the modern era, the challenge remains to account for the nation’s 
enduring appeal today. In any case, a consensus has emerged that views the 
nation as both ‘constructed’ and ‘historically contingent’.  As Rogers Brubaker 
(2009: 28) noted, ‘few if any scholars would argue that ethnic groups or races 
or nations are fixed or given; virtually everyone agrees that they are 
historically emergent and in some respects mutable’. Yet, attempting to 
compile an exhaustive list of criteria for what constitutes a nation is perhaps 
impossible. Given the vast diversity of ‘nations’ and the constantly changing 
conditions of societies across the globe, national identity and nationalism 
constantly take new forms, often in ways that invalidate carefully elaborated 
definitions. One reason for this is the nation is always up for debate. As Rosa 
Luxemburg pointed out, the nation consists of a series of questions that can 
never be definitively answered, such as:  
Who is the ‘nation’ and who has the authority and the ‘right’ to speak for 
the ‘nation’ and express its will? How can we find out what the ‘nation’ 
actually wants? Does there exist one political party which would not claim 
that it alone, among all others, truly expresses the will of the ‘nation’ 
whereas all other parties give only perverted and false expressions of the 
national will? (Luxemburg 1976: 141) 
Rather than searching for Stalin’s primordial nation of ‘real’, ‘common’ 
features, we are better served to hunt for the key components of how ordinary 
people ‘imagine’ and talk about the nation. This, as Luxemburg suggests 
above, means putting the nation in inverted commas and admitting the plurality 
of forces attempting to interpret, hijack, exploit or reflect the ‘nation’. Our key 
task is to evaluate how the general population responds to these efforts. 
According to Craig Calhoun (2007: 123), the goal is to unveil the ‘factors that 
lead to the continual production and reproduction of nationalism as a central 
discursive formation in the modern world’. Such an approach allows us to 
define the nation as ‘a particular way of thinking about what means to be a 
people’ (Calhoun 1997: 6). Thinking about ‘how we are as a people’ is a fluid 





hegemony within any specific context. The nation as a ‘way of thinking’ is 
heavily shaped by nationalist discourse, which produces a series of claims 
about what the nation is or should be. This is, in turn, linked to national 
identity: a way of conceptualising the self and others within an imagined 
national community. It is to this we will now turn in more detail.  
 National identity  
Thus, national identity is both a changing entity subject to much construction, 
and also contingent to certain historical, cultural and social factors. Rogers 
Brubaker (2004: 31) warned against assuming the salience of national or ethnic 
identities, which he called ‘groupism’. Instead of treating nation-ness and 
ethnicity as a ‘category of analysis’, he advocates tracing certain ‘categories of 
practice’ of the nation emerging from ‘everyday social experience, developed 
and deployed by ordinary social actors’. In this the sense of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
is vital to national identity, as the ‘very notion of identity presumes an other 
from whom one is different’ (Spencer, Wollman 2002: 57). The formation of 
group identity includes a categorising of those close enough to be included and 
those so different they should be excluded. In this ‘external identification’ it is 
clear the modern state is hugely influential; it has the wherewithal to create and 
support key categories in classifying groups (Brubaker 2004: 42). Yet, at the 
same time, the state is not an all-powerful deity; implementation can be messy 
and ordinary people can resist, ignore, transform or subvert the messages 
transmitted from above.   
For the purposes of this thesis, having a national identity ‘is to possess ways of 
thinking about nationhood’ (Billig 1995: 8) and community, including how we 
conceive of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘our destiny’ versus that of the ‘outside world’ 
(ibid: 4). R. G. Suny (1999: 144) developed this further claiming ‘identities are 
embedded in the stories we tell about ourselves individually and collectively 
(…) the way individuals and groups talk and give meaning to their being, their 
selves, their roles’. These stories are full of claims that, when taken together, 
form the basis of national identity. Thus, national identity can be defined as 
ways of connecting the self and wider groups to the nation as an ‘imagined 





historical experience and shared cultural repertoires within a population. On 
the other hand, national identity is also strongly influenced by the successful 
production and absorption of nationalist discourse. This brings us to 
nationalism, which can be understood as a bridge that links national identity to 
politics by seeking to reduce the gap between the imagined, ideal of the nation 
and the actual reality (Smith 2007:18).  
Nationalism  
Nationalism is often defined as a political ideology that prioritises the nation 
over other collective identities and whose principle aim is to seek political 
power in the name of the nation (Spencer, Wollman 2002: 2). In the view of 
Yitzak Brudny (1998: 5), nationalism as a political ideology aims to define 
three things: (i) who belongs to the nation (ii) the territorial boundaries of the 
nation and its relations with the outside world (iii) what social, cultural, 
economic set-up is best for the nation. Nationalism resembles an ideology in as 
far as it provides a rudimentary map that ‘provides people with the means to 
identify their own position in the world’ (Breuilly 1982: 365). On the other 
hand, nationalism is more than a search for political power; it also contains a 
quasi-religious element in appealing to the hearts of men. What differentiates 
nationalism from ideology is its flexible and fluid nature: it is able to morph 
and tap into existing identities, using modern mass communication to condense 
complex and diverse national identity into a simplified discourse of texts, 
myths, symbols and ceremonies, all of which appeal to the idea of ‘nation’ or 
‘who we are as a people’.  
In other words, what explains the power and diverse appeal of nationalism is 
its ability to mutate according to the apparent ‘needs’ of the national 
community and, thus, speak the ‘language of the masses’. This brings us to a 
key point: it is very difficult to offer a universal theory of nationalism, instead 
‘grasping nationalism in its multiplicity of forms requires multiple theories’ 
(Calhoun 1997: 8). The diverse forms of nationalism have led researchers to 
offer a dazzling array of typologies and theories to describe certain kinds of 





the Russian case: the relationship between nation and empire and the question 
of ethnic and civil nationalism.  
Disputing the division of national and imperial, ethnic and civil  
A central challenge in nationalism studies is the diverse range of movements 
that can be called ‘nationalist’. As Anderson pointed out, nationalism is ‘Janus-
headed’; alongside ‘national liberators’ such as San Martin and Garibaldi 
seeking liberation from foreign imperial or monarchical rule, we must also 
include imperial statesmen such as Sergei Uvarov and Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, both of whom promoted an ‘official nationalism’ (Anderson 
1991:159). Historically speaking, one essential distinction can be made 
between nationalism aiming at ‘liberation from hegemonic rule’ (Condee 2012: 
37) and the ‘official nationalism’ of a large state that is a ‘conscious, self-
protecting policy, intimately tied to the preservation of imperial-dynastic 
interests’ and ‘serving the interests of the state first and foremost.’ (Anderson 
1991: 159). Another way to put this division is that of ‘Empire-preserving 
nationalism’, which seeks to retain the unity of the existing state while often 
pursuing imperial or great power objectives abroad, and ‘Empire-dismantling 
nationalism’, which seeks to liberate a putative ‘nation’ from imperial or 
foreign domination (Condee 2012: 40).  
The use of the word ‘empire’ to describe any form of nationalism may puzzle 
those who understand ‘empire’ and ‘nation-states’ as fundamentally different. 
Empire is often portrayed as hierarchical and part of the old world, while the 
nation is modern, egalitarian and ‘conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship’ 
across one national group (Anderson 1991: 7). In her two-volume study of the 
origins of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt concluded that imperialism was used 
to direct nationalism away from internal social and political reform and 
outwards to the colonial realm (Arendt 1951). This ‘imperial’ or ‘official’ 
nationalism was supported by the upper classes and the establishment in 
reaction to the threat of ‘popular vernacular nationalism’ (Anderson 1991: 
150). The important point to make here is that some of the most ‘successful’ 
nation-states were also empires at the same time and, as Krishan Kumar (2010) 





those nations today. Countries like Spain, France and England have an 
‘inescapably imperial dimension’ to their nation-building that was ‘the result of 
more or less forcible integration of neighbouring lands’ with often differing 
institutions and cultures (Kumar 2010: 128). Alexei Milller (2015: 309) has 
termed these states, including Tsarist Russia, ‘nationalising empires’, which 
combined imperial and national forms into one body. Despite shedding their 
‘outer’ empires in the twentieth century, these states still face the challenge of 
preserving nation-states with constituent ‘national units’, be they Scottish, 
Catalan or Corsican (Smith 2007: 26).  
Russia stands out in two important ways from the ‘post-imperial’ states of 
Europe. Firstly, the USSR cannot be straightforwardly labelled as an ‘empire’. 
Frederick Cooper (2005: 27) defines empire as ‘a political unit’ that 
‘reproduces differentiation and inequality among people it incorporates’ 
(Cooper 2005: 27). Yet, the Soviet political centre was not driven by capitalist 
profit motives and, rather than suck resources and capital from periphery to 
metropole, more often redistributed these resources to spread the results of 
Soviet modernisation as evenly as possible across the whole union (Chari 
Vedery 2009: 15). On the other hand, the Soviet state was ‘imperialist’ in the 
sense that it imposed repressive systems upon ‘subject’ nations such as forced 
industrialisation, collectivization, as well as carrying out mass purges and 
arrests across the population.  
The second point to consider is Russia’s semi-peripheral position on the edge 
of what post-Colonial and Critical theorists term the ‘global hegemonic core’ 
of Western nations. As J. Buckler (2009: 254) noted, Russia stands out as 
perhaps ‘the only non-western power to defend itself against Western 
imperialism for centuries, a powerful state that represented the only non-
western path to modern society’. These two elements make Russia’s ‘post-
imperial’ condition distinctive. While the Tsarist and Soviet ‘empires’ may 
have gone, the after-life of ‘imperial’ ways persists. While a large body of 
post-colonial research has explored how former colonial countries adapt to 
their new status ‘after empire’, less work has been done on how the former 
imperial metropole evolves post-imperium. Imperial legacies and themes can 





Emil Pain (2009, 2016) argues that an ‘imperial nationalism’ dominates Russia 
today, important components of which include the desire to curb separatism 
and hold the ‘imperial body’ together, efforts to integrate citizens into the 
common ‘imperial’ culture and follow a civilizational purpose in global terms. 
Thus, instead of expecting nationalism to be incompatible with imperial 
longings, we should be ready for nationalist discourses that are infused with 
imperial and civilizational themes.  
Civic and ethnic nationalism: A false dichotomy? 
Apart from ‘empire-nation’, another problematic dichotomy in nationalism 
studies is the ideal types of civic and ethnic nation-states. Hans Kohn (1994) 
viewed the Western ‘civic’ model as a positive product of ‘civic culture’: 
democratic participation, rule of law, free elections, universal suffrage and the 
right to run for office. Meanwhile, ethnic nationalism was presented as 
xenophobic, pregnant with potential violence and likely to lead to the exclusion 
and disenfranchisement of national minorities. As Brubaker (2004: 134) noted, 
this dichotomy is one that runs deep in everyday thinking; some nationalist 
movements are labelled ‘bad’ (xenophobic and dangerous), others ‘good’ 
(tolerant, progressive and inclusive). The constant reproduction of this type of 
thinking can tempt those studying nationalism to frame questions in terms of 
‘transition’: is their case study heading more towards a ‘desirable’ civic or an 
‘ugly’ ethnic nation-state type? Yet, the key problem with this is that the word 
‘civic’ is as ambiguous as the word ‘ethnic’; in both cases it can be used to 
legitimize or stigmatize nation-building policies or nationalist movements. 
While Kazakhstan’s leaders attempt to legitimize their post-Soviet state as 
civic and multi-ethnic, Russia can stigmatize the Baltic States by attacking the 
‘ethnic’ basis of their states. In the international arena we should expect most 
states to pay lip service to civic inclusiveness and tolerance, rather than 
emphasise the dominance of a single ethno-cultural group (ibid: 134).  
Taras Kuzio (2002) argued the ethnic and civic typologies were useful mainly 
in Weberian terms as ‘ideal types’. In the real world all states contain ethnic 
and civic aspects as ‘all civic states (…) are based on ethno-cultural core(s)’ 





moved to more clearly civic all-inclusive nations and ended policies of ethnic 
discrimination to protect, for example, the WASP ethno-cultural core of the 
American nation (ibid: 27). Furthermore, the Western states have not 
succeeded in creating ‘ideal’ or ‘pure’ civic states today; ethnic identities 
persist and play a role in anti-migrant sentiment. In addition, civic-nation 
language can be employed in populist ‘put our people first’ stances that 
excludes certain groups from membership of the nation. It is important to avoid 
the myth of the absence of ethnic feeling or conflict in the West. Consider 
Catalan and Basque nationalism, which is based on ‘ethnicity’ in as far as it 
proposes that ‘“we”– the Basques, Catalans, Scots, Croats, or Georgians are a 
different people from the Spaniards, the English, the Serbs, or the Russians’ 
(Hobsbawm 1996: 256). Every nation-state, historically and today, is 
‘composed of both civic and ethno-cultural criteria’; what changes is the 
proportions of the mix (Kuzio 2002: 29).  
Thus, ‘racist views can sometimes go together with strong support for 
democracy, an inclusive state and respect for fundamental civic and social 
rights and freedoms’ (ibid). In other words, ‘if one combines a broad 
understanding of civic and a broad understanding of ethnic nationalism, one 
confronts a large middle ground that could be classified either way, and one 
can no longer think of the civic-ethnic distinction as mutually exclusive’ 
(Brubaker 2004: 139). Thus, it is unreasonable to expect imperial, nationalist, 
ethnic, and civil to operate as distinct categories, undiluted by cross 
contamination. In the minds of ordinary people, it is entirely possible that 
imperial longings, ethnic feelings and a commitment to the civic nation can all 
coexist. This is possible because nationalism is essentially a project that 
attempts to process elements of national identity into a simplified and clear set 
of discourses that all co-nationals can absorb. This process of simplification 
and combination can easily lead to contradictory positions being submerged 
into one nationalist discourse.  
Ultimately, nationalism is best understood in Craig Calhoun’s terms, emerging 
from ‘discursive formation’, ‘a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness’ 
(1997: 3). This is a discourse made up of more than words and ideas; it is also 





terms, this discourse shapes how people perceive of objects and events. This 
‘discursive formation’ imposes constraints on action and establishes the 
boundaries of what we can and cannot see. This ‘way of speaking’ produces 
debate and discussion that helps form a nationalist self-understanding. It is 
clear that a large part of this ‘way of speaking’ is about claims. As Mark 
Beissinger (1995: 156) noted, ‘a nation refers to a community of people 
deserving their own state. It is a claim, not a condition’. While Calhoun (1997: 
4-5) prefers to group ‘nationalist rhetoric’ into ten discrete categories, this 
thesis follows the three main areas of nationalist claim-making proposed by 
Umut Özkirimli (2017: 220-21).  
Özkirimli’s first category is ‘temporal claims’ that peer back and forward in 
time across the ‘linear time of nation’ (ibid: 220). Here certain elements of the 
national past are ‘remembered’ and ‘forgotten’ to fit a nationalist agenda in the 
present. Secondly, we have ‘identity claims’: nationalist discourse that divides 
social world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ where the ‘nation’ is juxtaposed with the 
‘other(s)’. Thus, devotion to ‘we the nation’ attempts to override all other 
loyalties. Thirdly, we have spatial claims: the heavy focus on territory, land 
and soil, the homeland that is reconstructed through imagining her relationship 
with the wider world. These claim categories provide the materials that 
eventually come together to form a hegemonic nationalist discourse that 
presents certain courses for the ‘nation’ as ‘natural’ ‘normal’ and ‘better’, 
effectively side-lining alternative visions (ibid: 222). As the concept of 
‘nationalist claims’ is central to the structure of this thesis, I will now turn to 
the content of these claim categories in more detail. 
Temporal claims 
Temporal claims are essentially about the ‘idea of a nation extending from the 
past to the future’ (Calhoun 1997: 4).  This imagines the nation as on a journey 
through the past to the current day. In order for this story to be transmittable 
certain myths and symbols about the past must be internalized and reproduced 
by large numbers. Anthony Smith (1991) referred to the ‘myth-symbol 
complex’ of nation that outlines the common origins and trajectory of the 





Central to this is the creation of a ‘national story’ or ‘useable past’ that 
incorporates myths of the nation’s linear and continued progression through the 
ages. Examples can be found in England’s myths of Anglo-Saxon liberty, the 
heroes of Dunkirk or the British boast of having the ‘Mother of Parliaments’ or 
being exponents of ‘fair play’ (Smith 2007: 22). This ‘national past’ 
demonstrates a common fate, a common way of life and a sense of the nation 
as a family of shared kinship. For Billig (1995: 38), this involves a ‘double 
neglect’;  ‘collective amnesia’ must prevail with regards to inconvenient 
aspects of the national past, while at the same time, certain consensual 
positions on more ‘positive’ aspects of the national past may emerge. The role 
of the state in ‘forgetting’ and ‘remembering’ is important, as well as certain 
actors in society able to influence social memory (Rothstein 2000: 497).  
Identity claims  
At the heart of identity claims are discussions about ‘direct membership’ of 
nation, ‘where an individual is a part of the nation and categorically equivalent 
to other members’ (Calhoun 1997: 4-5). The key claim here is that all members 
of a national community belong together. The drive to encourage a feeling of 
oneness between members of the nation is often taken up by the state, which is 
central to the creation and dissemination of a ‘public culture’, through 
education, institutions and public rituals (Smith 2007: 19). This often involves 
attempting to win the allegiance of diverse ethnic groups to the wider national 
community. If this is not achieved then ‘the imagined community will not 
include large numbers of people who do not belong to the ethnic core’ (Kuzio 
2002: 31). At the heart of this challenge is the debate on what it means to be a 
national citizen, and what policies on citizenship and immigration are needed. 
In attempting to steer their course through these difficult waters, states are 
faced with deviant everyday practices from the population as a whole that 
complicates efforts to create a more ‘unified’ national identity (Smith 2007: 
21).  
This brings us to the second part of identity claims, those made in relation to 
the legitimacy of the state and the political leadership in leading the nation. 





managing the nation, often in terms of achieving the kind of political and 
economic configuration desired by the ‘nation’. A large part of this revolves 
around trust and legitimacy, the feeling that the policies of the political 
leadership are congruent with national aspirations. Thus, the identity link 
between people and state is based on an ‘ascending notion of legitimacy, or the 
idea that government is just only when supported by popular will’ (Calhoun 
1997: 4-5). Even in an authoritarian context, governments, parties and leaders 
strive to avoid alienating citizens, and, in acting in the ‘name of the nation’, 
seek to close down the ever-present (and at times widening) gulf between ‘the 
nation’ (or the ‘people’) and ‘the state’ (Smith 2007: 25).  
Spatial claims 
The final set of claims relates to how the nation is imagined as a territorial 
entity. This includes attachment to the historic homeland and certain 
landscapes, something that can be termed ‘territorialisation’ (Smith 2007: 19). 
In some cases territory can be central to nationalist claims; consider the 
Nagorno-Karabakh question for Azerbaijan or Alsace Lorraine for France 
(1870-1914). Spatial claims also involve relations with forces beyond the 
nation’s borders, whether they are understood to be ‘globalist’ interest groups 
(bankers, international organisations), other nation-states, regional alliance 
blocs, or even civilizational entities. What is of interest here is how images of 
the ‘imagined nation’ in foreign affairs can be used to shore up national 
identity, filling ideational voids and, at times, mobilizing the population behind 
the flag. Events can be of real importance in consolidating people behind the 
nation, such as exploiting the theme of foreign ‘Other’ to demand patriotism on 
certain post-imperial sentiments and great power longings to produce powerful 
visions of the nation seeking to regain or secure a place in the world order.  
Thus, the three claim categories above involve an impressive and rich range of 
nationalist discourse that can both reinforce and contradict one another. 
Examinations of nationalist discourse from above and below can reveal what is 
the ‘the dominant nationalist project’ in any national context and expose how it 
‘consolidates its hegemony by reproducing and naturalizing itself’ (Özkirimli 





up with power and hegemony, transmitted across population until it becomes 
hegemonic common sense in Gramscian terms (Gramsci 1971). As Calhoun 
(1997: 5) noted, ‘nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves, by 
the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to 
produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to 
evaluate peoples and practices’. This thesis looks to identify the key 
components of hegemonic nationalist discourse in Russia today. In the next 
part of this chapter I will offer a discussion of how this discourse is absorbed, 
internalised and reproduced ‘from below’.  
Part Two: Studying the nation ‘from below’: emotions, myths, 
normality and generations 
A natural order is a stable order. There is no chance that gravity will cease 
to function tomorrow, even if people stop believing in it. In contrast, an 
imagined order is always in danger of collapse, because it depends upon 
myths, and myths vanish once people stop believing in them. In order to 
safeguard an imagined order, continuous and strenuous efforts are 
imperative. 
Yuval Harari (2014: 259) 
Studies of national identity and nationalism often focus on the activities of 
high-level actors in constructing the nation ‘from above’. Yet, as Heinrich Best 
(2011:996) noted, we cannot put elites ‘in the position of a sorcerer’s 
apprentice’ or ‘assume they can manipulate populations at will’. Nation-
building ‘from above’ is ‘constrained and directed by specific historical givens 
and experiences shaping the collective memories and living conditions of the 
general population’ (ibid). The aspiration is to bring the macro- and micro-
level of analysis of nationalism together, one that includes the ‘masses’ or 
‘ordinary people’ as well as the activities of ‘elites’, ‘intellectuals’ and the 
‘state’. Thus, I do not treat nationalism as a system of ideas akin to Marxism or 
neo-liberalism; its appeal is heavily tied up with emotions and the making of 
‘us’ and ‘them’. This brings us to the field of social psychology, which 
explores how emotions can be jointly felt across a group. The merging of 





nation is a powerful dynamic, one that allows nationalist discourse to appeal to 
diverse segments of a population. 
The collective self? Group identity, commonality and othering 
Examining nationalism ‘from below’ brings us into direct contact with the 
discursive practice of ‘group-making’, which is largely achieved through the 
creation and maintenance of boundaries of group inclusion and exclusion 
(Wimmer 2013). Ordinary people do not passively accept the boundaries laid 
down by the state or media; feelings of belonging and alienation are at least 
partly driven by everyday experience of the social environment, which 
Lawrence Hirschfeld (1996) termed ‘folk sociologies’ or ‘commonsense ways 
of carving up the social world’ (Cited in Brubaker 2004: 9). In thinking of how 
they ‘belong’ within a group, a certain ‘categorical communality’ is imagined 
(Brubaker 2004: 47) that allows diverse people to feel part of a collective 
nation. On the other hand, the language of exclusion is also important; this 
expresses hostility to an out-group and underlines their incompatibility with the 
nation. Research from social psychology suggests languages of commonality 
and exclusion exist side by side in stable group identities (Taifel 1982: 15). In 
this sense, it is hard to argue that people adopt or reject certain identities by 
matter of pure rational and logical reasoning; as Brubaker (2004: 45) pointed 
out, ‘Self-understanding is never purely cognitive; it is always affectively 
tinged or charged’.  
Thus, the way people understand themselves in the social world is both 
cognitive and emotional. One way people share ‘common sense knowledge’ is 
through commonly expressed collective emotions. A number of authors have 
highlighted the need to trace longer-term emotional language in national 
identity (Clunan 2009, Malinova 2014a, Tsygankov 2014), suggesting national 
communities can share certain emotional states, be it optimism, frustration, 
dissatisfaction or fear. Liah Greenfeld (1992) offered a historical portrait of 
how Russia perceived the West from 1700 to 1850, highlighting the salience of 
a psychological state called ressentiment. Olga Malinova (2014a) has built on 
this, defining ressentiment as a long-term and deeply-rooted form of 





the object of malice and envy, although they argue the intensity of this state has 
waxed and waned across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to 
Malinova (2014a: 293), this ressentiment is driven by the failed aspiration to 
gain ‘equal status’, which ‘was perceived as a matter of security and honour’.   
It is important to note that emotions surrounding the nation are far from always 
negative. Antipathy and hostility to the Other, even racism and imperialism, 
are only part of the story. As Anderson (1991: 141) noted, we must remember 
that ‘nations also inspire love (…) the cultural products of nationalism – 
poetry, prose fiction, music, plastic arts – show this love very clearly in 
thousands of different forms and styles. On the other hand, how truly rare is it 
to find analogous nationalist product expressing fear and loathing.’ Anderson 
views nationalism as a form of ‘political love’ expressed in the ‘vocabulary of 
kinship’. Thus, if national identity contains powerful positive and negative 
emotions, the question is how these feelings are transmitted across a 
population? In this research the two most important vehicles of transmission to 
emerge came in the form of story-telling about the nation (myths) and 
normative claims about what the nation should be (normality).  
Narrative and Myth in the nation  
Mythical narratives about the nation use emotion and simplification to package 
the nation in such a way as to deepen its appeal to citizens of various ages and 
backgrounds. The prolific theorist of nationalism, A. D. Smith, placed special 
emphasis on the role of myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols as 
powerful differentiators and reminders of the unique culture and fate of the 
national community (Smith 1998: 191). Narratives on the ‘golden age’ of the 
nation can result in a dominant nationalist discourse on how to achieve the 
‘restoration of the community to its former high estate and true mission’ 
(Smith 1997: 48–51). Here we need not linger too long on the point that many 
of these narratives involve distortion of historical fact or outright falsehood; 
applying standards of scientific scrutiny to myths is ‘a modernist conceit’ that 
fails to understand the ‘narrative dimensions of the human experience’ and the 
role myths play in supporting ‘a given collective identity’ and ‘legitimating a 





myths are not lies and fabrications; they are inspiring narratives, stemming 
from human imagination, in which we tell ourselves who we are or want to be’ 
(ibid).  
Jordan Peterson (2002: 25) has done much to demonstrate how myths operate 
as ‘Narratives of the known’ that, with the assistance of ‘patriotic rituals, 
stories of ancestral heroes, myths and symbols of cultural or racial identity’, 
help ‘describe established territory’. Peterson offered four classes of myth that 
help answer three fundamental questions of human life: ‘what is the nature 
(meaning, the significance) of current being?, to what (desirable) end should 
that state be moving? and, finally, what are the processes by which the present 
state might be transformed into that which is desired?’ (ibid: 26). These four 
classes of myth revolve around the themes of stability, change, collapse and 
regeneration. Thus, narratives about the nation often mediate between 
cognitive-based rational positions and emotion. Peterson also argues that 
narratives about normality are of central importance as they ‘tell us where we 
are, where we are going, and how we are going to get there’ (ibid: 30). 
‘Revolutionary’ narratives, on the other hand, ‘describe the process by which 
“normal” narratives are transformed, when that becomes necessary.’ We will 
now turn to a sociological treatment of the role normality narratives play in 
everyday conceptions of the nation.  
Visions of the ‘normal’ nation  
Building on Erving Goffman’s work on normality and abnormality as a means 
of reinforcing social order, Barbara Misztal (2001, 2015) highlighted the close 
relationship of normality and trust, which both act ‘as a protective mechanism 
that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, 
certainty, and familiarity’ (Misztal 2001: 312). Thus it is ‘the feeling that order 
is “normal” or “natural” that allows us to trust others around us’, a dynamic 
that is important in reducing the ‘deficit of trust’ between rulers and ruled 
(ibid: 322). Normality is vital to the existence of a ‘feeling of continuity and a 
sense of prospects for the future.’ In other words normality offers us a set of 
rules for playing the game that make our social world more ‘predictable, 





‘taken-for-granted values in normal life’ (ibid); it is clear that normality is 
something people aspire/refer to in order to make sense of everyday life, the 
feeling of being on the road to ‘normalisation’ is something that makes life 
more liveable and tolerable. At the same time we must acknowledge the 
powerful ‘stigma’ of abnormality – ‘deviant acts’ that ‘are improper because 
they undermine the intelligibility of everything else’ (ibid: 316).  
The question of normality recurs repeatedly in questions of nationhood. In the 
Russian case it is sufficient to think of discussions of her ‘normal’ past before 
the October 1917, visions of the ‘normal’ interethnic relations of the USSR, the 
‘abnormal’ political behaviour in the Bolotnaya protests, or the country’s quest 
to be a ‘normal’ great power. In all these questions we must understand 
normality as something that is contested; it is a ‘struggle (…) to determine 
what the basic units are which compose a given society’ and ‘shore up a 
specific vision of the social world’ (Croce, Salvatore 2017: 227). In the 
‘everyday routine’ of a national or political community, ‘specific instances of 
reproducing normality (…) help buttress a political order’ (ibid 283). It is 
important to note that differing versions of normality exist in any population; 
generational, social and cultural differences between certain groups in society 
make it likely they will have differing ideas about what is ‘normal’ and 
‘natural’. In order to make ‘normality’ an understandable and ‘legible’ thing to 
follow, Goffman discussed the importance of ‘frames’, which make ‘what 
would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is 
meaningful’ (Goffman 1974: 21 cited Misztal 2001: 320). Normality is made 
up of a series of frames ‘through which people see and interpret their particular 
historical circumstance’ (Misztal 2015: 1). Frames are made up of various 
things people can use to interpret social reality, such as symbols, rhetoric and 
claims. In this thesis one of the key divisions in frames of normality is between 
Soviet and non-Soviet frames in determining what is ‘normal’ in a variety of 
questions. One likely factor in determining splits in normative standards is the 
question of differing age groups within a society and the question of inter-






In terms of sociologists, Karl Mannheim was one of the first to ask if we can 
understand changing patterns of social and intellectual progress ‘based on the 
biological law of the limited life-span of man and the overlap of old and new 
generation’ (Mannheim 1952: 353). He did not view generations as neat, 
biological units but messy and fragmented: Mannheim saw the biological cycle 
of birth and renewal occurring alongside the transmission of social constructs 
across generations. In searching for the socio-historical structure of generation 
alongside biological rhythms, Mannheim argued that ‘not every generation will 
develop a distinctive consciousness,’ the tempo of social change in a given era 
will be an important determining factor (Pilcher 1994: 491).  
Central to whether a distinct generational consciousness will emerge is whether 
certain memories of the generation are installed in youthful years. This could 
include watershed events (Watergate), connections to ‘privileged intervals’ 
(such as the Great Depression), identification with ‘political and cultural 
mentors’ opposing the ‘dominant culture’ and connection to sacred spaces 
(such as Greenwich Village or Woodstock), especially when all of the above 
are clearly fixed in one’s formative adult years (18-30) (Eyerman, Turner 
1998: 96). Schuman and Scott (1989: 360-361) found supporting evidence for 
the thesis that one’s younger years determine a political worldview within a 
generation, with those events occurring after youth being assigned less 
relevance by respondents. While a large proportion of respondents choose 
events occurring in their early twenties as epoch-defining, the study also 
showed changing meaning for events; a far higher number of people from the 
60’s generation described World War II as a ‘good war’ than those who had 
actually lived through it (Schuman, Scott 1989: 378). Thus, it appears 
‘generational consciousness, when it is forged by a major traumatic event such 
as mass warfare, can overcome and transcend the barriers of social class to 
produce a powerful, solidaristic force in social relationships’ (Eyerman, Turner 
1998: 103). 
For this study, the question of how myths and visions of normality are 





as a discursive entity cannot expect to survive unless a set of ideas, values are 
passed on to younger generations. The emergence of a generation with a 
distinctive consciousness, or a ‘political generation’, may be significant in 
explaining national identity ‘from below’.5 In many ways a generation seeks to 
affirm oneself and find its own validity in a historical sense. Political 
generations are ‘more or less consciously imagined social networks that reveal 
a great deal of information about the groups that describe themselves’ 
(Kansteiner 2012: 112). The emergence of vigorous and distinct political 
generations is a recurring theme in recent Russian history; consider the role of 
the shestdesyantiki in driving the Khrushchev thaw or how the children of 
stagnation sailed the perestroika winds of change (Yurchak 2006: 31).6 In this 
study, the tentative ‘political generations’ are the ‘children of reform’ (40-55) 
and the first post-Soviet youth generation (18-30). Both have rather different 
environments in their formative years (18-30). The first group came of age at 
the height of perestroika and witnessed the end of the USSR, experiencing the 
transition years as young adults. The second group came of age around the 
time Vladimir Putin came to power in an age of relative stabilization and are 
young adults at the time of the research.  
Thus, the dynamics of generational transmission are of importance to how 
nationalist discourse is reproduced. Expanding on the ideas of Mannheim, 
DeMartini (1985) highlighted two vital components in intergenerational 
interaction. Firstly, we have transmission within a rough age cohort, between 
people of similar age. The second component is ‘Lineage’, which emphasises 
relations between generations, that parents and children can have a shared bond 
of consciousness, transmitting memories and values across the age groups. 
Thus, as Alexei Yurchak put it, ‘generations are not natural, they are produced 
through common experience and through discourse about it.’ (Yurchak 2006: 
30). Thus, the challenge is to seek out evidence of nationalist discourse, in 
particular myths and versions of normality, that transcends certain generational 












In summation, there are number of key points to consider for those attempting 
to explain the resilience of nations and nationalism in the contemporary world.  
Firstly, much of the theoretical work on the ‘nation’ has been part of an 
academic debate between perennialists or modernists that is not of central 
relevance for those attempting to study the nation today. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the nation is primarily a way of talking; it is ‘imagined’ by large 
groups of people through the conversations they have about ‘who we are as a 
people’. It is a fluid entity that is contingent on changing discourse about the 
national community: ‘nationalism’. Thus, nationalism can be thought of as the 
product of discursive formation. It is comprised of claims about the desired 
nature of the ‘nation’. Some of these temporal, identity and spatial claims may 
converge into a dominant and hegemonic ‘discourse of the nation’.  
In order to achieve hegemony, the dominant nationalist discourse must be 
acceptably synchronised with ‘national identity’, which is essentially a diverse 
range of ways of conceptualising ‘us’ and ‘them’ with reference to ‘our’ shared 
traits and desires as opposed to the ‘rest’. While, national identity is subject to 
multiple and competing forces from above and below, certain historical, social 
and cultural factors also shape it. The complex interplay between nation, 
nationalism and national identity ensures that nation-ness is adaptable to ever-
changing conditions. Attempting a more detailed mapping of how these three 
elements interact is an important goal for future theoretical work.  
Accepting the fluid and discursive nature of nationalism does have important 
implications for certain typologies commonly used both in academic work and 
everyday journalism. Nationalism cannot be divided into neat types; nationalist 
discourse can absorb imperial, ethnic and civic influences. The ‘nation’ has 
shown through the centuries its ability to coexist with imperialist claims to 
supremacy, liberal doctrines of civic rights and dreams of ethnic and cultural 
unification. As a result, we must avoid labels of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism 
and treat each case accepting no pure type can be found; all nationalisms are 





task of the researcher is to trace and explain how and where this manifests 
itself, highlighting the diverse constituent parts of nation-feeling.  
Above all, ‘imagined’ nations are in a constant battle to survive and reproduce. 
In examining nationalism ‘from below’ a central concern is how the nation is 
reproduced in the minds of people. One of the important ways this occurs is 
through simplification and condensation of certain themes and lessons into 
mythological form. These myths play into ways of thinking that differentiate 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in national terms. They also buttress a variety of 
normative standards for understanding ‘life in our country’ and ‘what we are 
like as a people’. Nationalist myths, be they about historical golden ages, 
Soviet stability or Putin’s performance as leader, all serve to help people locate 
themselves in a particular nation at a particular time.  
Consistent references to what is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ play a vital role in 
nationalist discourses. The challenge for the researcher is to trace points of 
consensus, and those areas where certain myths and conceptualisations of 
normality start to break down; it is at these fracture lines that the nation’s 
condition as a discursive entity can be evaluated. Ultimately we can interpret 
the ‘nation’ as something that is constantly re-imagined in response to certain 
external pressures. This could be ‘threats’ such as immigration, austerity, 
security or the European Union. Yet, the ‘nation’ also has its internal dynamic 
of reproduction across generations and time; the events and cultural influences 
that define a particular generation may be sufficiently distinct to bring out 
serious changes in national identity and the particular, dominant form of 
nationalism in the country. Given the above conceptualisation of national 
identity and nationalism, I will now proceed to outline the methodological 
basis of this research, exploring how my approach is congruent with this 









            Chapter Two: Methodology  
Introduction   
This chapter reviews the methodological considerations of this research as it 
evolved through its various stages. The rationale behind selecting a qualitative 
and ethnographic approach for this research is outlined, as well as an 
examination of the fundamental theoretical positions underpinning this choice. 
I will then retrospectively reflect on how research questions were developed, 
through textual analysis and interaction with respondents, as well as how 
working in a second language affected fieldwork. Following this, I will 
examine how I conducted the research, including selection of data sites, 
recruitment of respondents, and the conducting of interviews. In addition I will 
consider how my own identity influenced my positionality in fieldwork. 
Finally, I will outline how data analysis and coding was conducted. In 
conclusion, I will analyse how far the chosen methodology permitted or 
restricted the exploration of modern Russian national identity.  
It is worth underlining that this methodology chapter should not be taken as a 
superfluous departure from the main body of this thesis; on the contrary it is a 
central part of research, effectively revealing the limitations, preferences and 
drivers at the heart of this research project. This entails an acknowledgement of 
the humanity of the researcher, who cannot claim for anything approaching 
emotionless, mechanical objectivity (Seale 2004: 259). The main method for 
reducing the impact of this subjectivity is being reflexive on the role of the 
researcher and transparent and open about how this research was conducted. In 
agreement with other researchers, in order to avoid distancing myself from an 
interpretive process that was driven, in very fundamental ways, by my 
decisions and outlook, I have employed the first person to underline the 
challenges inherent to this research (Pilkington 1994; Kay 2011).  
Research aims and approach 
Research cannot provide the mirror reflection of social reality that 
positivists strive for, but it may provide access to the meanings people 





(Miller, Glasner 2004: 126) 
The aim of this research is to examine aspects of modern Russian national 
identity and ‘everyday’ nationalism, demonstrating how this operates in 
different generational, social and regional groups. This entails accessing the 
collective imagining of the Russian nation and state, which is built, in part, 
through the discursive activities of the state, the media and the various actors 
who act as conduits of this imagined reality to the larger mass of people. This, 
however, is a two-way conduction process; forces ‘from below’ also constrain 
and limit projects driven ‘from above’. Rather than employing quantitative 
survey data that involves large numbers of respondents answering a set of pre-
ordained questions, this research employed an inductive ‘grounded theory’ 
approach, using qualitative in-depth interviews and the ethnographic 
experience of a year in the field to examine the ideas, narratives and arguments 
active in modern Russian national identity. In doing this, I did not rigidly 
follow ‘an original hypothesis which had been generated by a reading process 
very distant from the social reality’ that I sought to examine (Pilkington: 202). 
While I started with research questions influenced by academic and other 
studies, I understood these as ‘sensitising concepts’ providing ‘questions to 
pursue, angles to follow, or avenues to go down, without restricting’ the 
researcher in an unreasonable manner (O’Reilly 2012: 32).  
It was hoped that using open questions in a flexible interview format would let 
the respondents determine what is important to them, permitting ‘the 
interesting issues raised in conversation to be pursued and irrelevant questions 
to be dropped’ (Pilkington 1994: 203). This would remove a potential 
straightjacket on the data, giving respondents agency in building the narratives 
while demanding that the researcher remain flexible and open to what emerges 
and avoid reaching conclusions prematurely (Silverman 2004: 11). My 
‘grounded theory’ approach meant empirical evidence was collected at 
different stages and, after periods of evaluation and stock-taking, data 
collection was resumed (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Flexibility in this matter allowed the interview questions to evolve in response 
to increased contact with the culture and society involved, leading to 






The essential epistemological position of this research is that the ‘positivism’ 
of the natural sciences is poorly suited to the study of identity formation and 
change. Identity and nationalism cannot be measured objectively like a 
quantity of water; they must be sought in the practices, lives and discourses of 
people. There are two pillars to this research’s epistemology (Bryman 2012: 
27-37). The first is based on an anti-Positivist Interpretivism (also known as 
the Verstehen approach of Max Weber) that claims that to understand human 
behaviour you must understand the meaning of the action from the actor's point 
of view. The second pillar is Constructionism, the view that all social 
phenomena is in flux and that knowledge of it is subjective. The most sensible 
way to understand social groups and organisations is to study the various 
patterns of behaviour of the various actors within them, in an attempt to locate 
the constant negotiation between them and the processes that bring change. 
Thus, it is impossible to provide one single absolute account of social reality; 
we cannot treat a social scientist as a precise instrument capable of revealing 
absolute truths about the social world. In fact, there can be several very valid 
accounts of the social world that, taken together, enrich our knowledge and 
understanding. In taking this position, I do not wish to attach myself to an 
extreme post-modern position that absolutely rejects the possibility of absolute 
truth in social science and claims everything is a construction. Instead I 
advocate what Steinar Kvale (1995: 21) called a ‘moderate post-modernism’ 
that ‘accepts the possibility of specific local, personal, and community forms of 
truth, with a focus on daily life and local narrative’. Thus, the central claim to 
validity and truth in this research is that the data adequately and fairly 
corresponds with the discourse of a community, in this case the ‘national 
community’ of Russia.  
Research design: Interviews and the ethnographic approach 
The main tool employed in this research was semi-structured interviews with 
individuals, either on a one-on-one basis or in groups of two or three. From the 





justify the positions and opinions behind identities related to being ‘Russian’ 
today.  The two main advantages of interviews can be surmised as: 
(1) Face-to-face interaction is the fullest condition of participating in the mind 
of an another human being  
(2) You must participate in the mind of another human being to acquire social 
knowledge 
 (Loftland, Loftland 1995: 16) 
The ethnographic researcher tends to conduct all the interviews in their 
research. Thus, the data collected ends up being put through the very subjective 
and unique interpretive mill of each individual researcher. If this process is 
accounted for openly, then qualitative research can undoubtedly bring fresh 
insights and analysis to a subject. Thus, reflexivity in qualitative research is 
vital. This is, however, demanding; it entails constant revision of methods and 
self-scrutiny. As long as there is transparency in methods, qualitative research 
can disclose a far richer picture than a standard set of answers on a survey, the 
results are the product of a unique fusion between the given researcher and the 
particular set of respondents involved. It is this fusion that can help generate 
fresh empirical findings, while contributing to the common body of knowledge 
in a subject area. 
The ethnographic method 
Instead of collecting ‘data’ about people, the ethnographer seeks to learn 
from people, to be taught by them.  
(Spradley 1979: 4) 
After successfully obtaining additional funding to conduct fieldwork in Russia, 
I spent fifteen months collecting data. This extended stay made an 
ethnographic approach possible, which has the advantage of making the study 
‘resolutely grounded in a specific context’ (Baszanger, Dodier 2004: 12). I 
collected extensive fieldwork notes across this period on two points. The first 





the year, usually in response to things I heard, read, saw personally and 
reactions or comments to the interviews I had conducted. The second aspect of 
field notes was to reflect on methodological matters; this included comments 
on how the interviews had gone, ideas for revising the questions, thoughts on 
my interview style and how to link parts of the interview together. These notes 
were instrumental in guiding the research process and led to significant 
changes in how interviews were conducted. This approach can be termed 
‘iterative-inductive’, meaning that data analysis, collection and write-up occur 
together in an interlinked manner over a sustained period rather being carried 
out in discrete phases. This is best understood as ‘an ongoing simultaneous 
process of deduction and induction, of theory building, testing and rebuilding’ 
(Ezzy 2002: 10 cited in O’Reilly 2012: 30). Having outlined the 
methodological approach, I will now turn to the parameters I established for 
my data pool. 
The pool of data 
Initially, in line with theories on nationalism, this research sought to collect 
data from two layers. The first layer is the ‘view from below’; my interviews 
(occasionally in a group) with ordinary Russians from different socio-
economic groups and occupations in two age groups of European Russia (St. 
Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod, including the surrounding regions of these 
cities). The second layer was the ‘view from above’; where I would interview 
Moscow-based ‘experts’ in the themes being studied, including journalists, 
writers, intellectuals, academics, politicians, those conceptualising or 
implementing state policy and those figures deemed to be influencing the 
discourses of the ‘Russian nation’. In some cases this would involve a direct 
interview, in others an analysis of the written and spoken output of the state, 
including state policy documents, presidential speeches and transcripts of state 
media content such as interviews, talk shows and radio programmes. 
Ultimately, it proved beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively 
analyse all three layers and systematically account for their interactions. 
Instead, a few months after returning from fieldwork, after consulting with my 
supervisors, I took the decision to focus more extensively on the picture ‘from 





the serious time constraints involved in conducting coding and analysis of all 
three layers. Nonetheless, preparing and examining materials of the state and 
media, along with conducting elite interviews, undoubtedly improved my own 
understanding of the context within which the nation is lived ‘from below’ and, 
thus, helped improve the depth and quality of my analysis.  
I divided respondents into two rough generational groups and looked for 
representative slices in terms of social groups. This generational approach was 
central to the uniqueness of the original research proposal and intended to offer 
a picture of generational change in two age cohorts. Research has indicated the 
foundations of one’s political preferences, social attitudes and views of history 
were largely fixed over the period 18-30 (Schuman and Scott 1989; Eyerman, 
Turner 1998). As a result, the two groups selected were those currently 
between 18 and 30 and those who were this age in 1991, the year of the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution. The first group have grown up and come of age in a post-
Soviet Putin-era Russia, while the latter had their formative period in the late 
Soviet era, with at least part of their youth in the new Russian Federation. This 
approach hoped to shed light on the evolution of Russian identity from 1991 
and shed light on how Soviet and post-Soviet life experience influence identity 
formation. Respondents in both groups covered a wide range of social groups 
and professions, and came from families with both urban and rural 
backgrounds. (See appendix 6).  
In order to collect my data sample I employed three forms of purposive 
sampling. Firstly, I conducted theoretical sampling in the pilot project in 
Moscow (summer 2014). This involved doing one or two interviews, 
transcribing and coding, ‘taking stock’ and then moving to new interviews 
having made alterations to the interview approach. A similar process occurred 
in the transitions between fieldwork in Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Secondly, I carried out generic purposive sampling in groups 
selected in advance to ensure a fair balance of gender, age groups, occupation 
and social background. Finally, I employed snowball sampling to set up 
referral chains in harder to access groups (i.e. working class or state employed 





In terms of respondent recruitment, I was ready to interview any citizen of the 
Russian Federation regardless of ethnic background with two exceptions. 
Firstly, I excluded those who had migrated to Russia fairly recently and had 
not gone through the education system, been ‘normalised’ as Russian citizens 
or underwent the majority of their formative years outside of Russia proper. 
Secondly, I excluded Russian citizens with a strong non-Russian ethnic or local 
identity indigenous to the Russian Federation such as Tatars, Chechens and 
Bashkirs. The main reason for these exclusions is that both of these groups are 
very interesting and worthy of a separate study that could, for example, 
consider adaptation into the host society or how a non-Russian ethnic identity 
interacts with a Russian civic identity (rossiyskii). 
 Originally, I had intended to follow the framework of the Russian 
demographer Natalia Zubarevich - ‘the Four Russias’ – in selecting research 
sites. 7  This splits Russia into four zones: the Federal cities, regional 
capitals/smaller towns, the rural heartland (glubinka) and, finally, the 
underdeveloped periphery of the North Caucasus and South Siberia. Due to the 
limited resources of this research, I was unable to visit rural sites or those more 
industrial ‘Russia Two’ cities. While some of my respondents either grew up in 
‘Russia Two’ or still kept connections there, the vast majority belong to 
‘Russia One’.8 Zubarevich describes Russia One as having a post-industrial 
infrastructure, high internet access and a large well educated and middle-class 
component (30-40%) (ibid). Thus, much of the data in this thesis relates to this 
part of Russian society, one that is the most prosperous, educated and, 
arguably, the most influential in terms of Russian national identity formation 
and evolution. 
Preparing research questions prior to fieldwork – Literature review and 
textual analysis  
My research questions for the pilot project emerged from writing an extended 
literature review in the first year of the research, taking advantage of the 









to view national identity as founded on key thematic areas where nationalist 
claims are made. I arranged the interview format to explore possible 
commonality in the following areas of claim making:  
Exploring the common historical memory of Russians: How do Russians 
view the last century of their history and what are the points of contention 
and consensus? 
Common view of desired socio-economic and political order and the values 
behind this.  
The common understanding of ‘us’ in Russia: Meanings behind ambiguous 
terms such as ‘nationalist’, and ‘patriot’, how to define being/not being 
Russian.  
Common view of the territory making up Russia:  Do the borders of the 
Russian Federation adequately reflect the true extent of ‘Russia’?  
Common view of role in world: How to understand Russia’s relations with 
other powers and her sense of purpose or mission in a global sense 
After the pilot project I significantly revised these sections. Eventually four 
sections emerged in the interview guide. The first section sought out whether 
respondents could identity positive and negative phases of ‘national’ history. 
The second section evolved into an examination of civic and ethnic 
Russianness and the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. The third came to 
explore the legitimacy of the current leadership and how this compared to 
politics under Gorbachev/Yeltsin. The final section shifted away from territory 
to explain the salience of ‘geopolitical visions’. These ‘evolutions’ were driven 
by the way respondents reacted to pilot project questions and represent an 
attempt to get closer to the issues at the forefront of people’s minds. I also 
operated under the assumption that different people would want to talk about 
different topics and, in the course of the interviews, enough material would 
emerge of interest in each thematic area that could, in turn, be contrasted and 
compared to discourses in media output and state proclamations. My 
interviews with ordinary respondents could show how certain discourses are 





Identifying dominant discourses on the nation  
Over the course of the thesis (2013-2016), I sought to build a fuller picture of 
the kind of debates and discourses in existence on my topic. The process of 
tracing modern Russian national identity from 1917 to the current day entailed 
reading a large quantity of historical primary and secondary sources, 
journalistic material, academic articles and publications, state policy 
documents, memoirs or biographical material and a host of media output from 
the current period that includes interviews, talk shows, radio phone-in shows. 
These materials reveal discourses in Russian national identity debates that may 
or may not resonate with ordinary people. If nation-building is the ‘aspiration 
to justify and explain why the population of the state is a whole entity’ (Panov 
2010: 87), then this is at least partially achieved through the discursive 
activities of the state, media, political actors. In modern sociology, discourse as 
a term owes much to the work of Michael Foucault, who claimed a dominant 
‘hegemonic discourse’ helps ‘constitute the general conditions under which 
dominant members of society “know” their world’ (Cited in Berg 2009: 215). 
Discourse only exists within a given historical context, something that shapes 
our feelings or understanding and can be referred to ‘episteme’ or ‘zeitgeist’. 
Within this I sought to trace a dominant or hegemonic discourse on the nation, 
finding that social consciousness is strongly connected to an ‘us/them’, 
‘normal/abnormal’ dualism on certain nodal points (Berg 2009: 217).  
It is with this in mind that, throughout the first two years of the PhD, I built up 
a list of websites that regularly produce articles thematically linked to my four 
areas of nationalist claim-making. These were monitored using a RSS feed 
programme ‘NetNewsWire’, which allowed me to retain relevant material for 
later detailed analysis. Furthermore, I also ‘followed’ key figures on both their 
personal websites and in social networking sites ‘Facebook’ and ‘Vkontakte’, 
collecting their most pertinent posts for analysis. I identified them as ‘key’ 
based on their number of followers, the frequency with which they were 
mentioned by my respondents, other texts and from my own judgement of their 
profile while in the field. In Russia, it can be argued that the control of 
discourse is more obviously in the hands of a state ‘power vertical’, which 





mapping the activities of the state policy and responses to it, I was able to 
identify influential contributors to the building, reinforcing and contesting of 
these discourses. In doing all of the above, I worked on materials in Russian 
language. This brings us to an important question, how using a second 
language affects fieldwork and data analysis.  
Doing research in a second language  
 
Prior to beginning my PhD research, I had lived and worked in Russia for four 
years, passing language proficiency examinations there and in the UK. I had 
also carried out a qualitative research project in Almaty, Kazakhstan, which 
gave me experience of conducting ethnographic fieldwork using Russian. 
While I felt ‘proficient’ in the use of Russian, doing fieldwork in a foreign 
language throws up serious challenges. Looking back on how I prepared 
myself for the field, it is clear that, even though I was technically ‘proficient’ 
in Russian, I was still very anxious about presenting myself as a ‘master’ of my 
subject, in order to instil a sense of confidence among respondents and experts 
alike. It may be that this pressure to ‘perform like’ and ‘pass for’ a ‘native’ 
emerged from my own language learning habits and urge to reach ‘native-
level’ fluency. In the first year of the PhD this ‘striving for fluency’ returned, 
only now the focus was to demonstrate ‘proficiency’ when talking about 
history, sociology and politics in Russian, to ‘fluently’ communicate my 
research aims to a Russian audience. 
It has only been through retrospective reflection that I have come to a new 
understanding of language learning and identity, and the role cultural learning 
plays. Fluency in a language is accompanied by increasing capacities in 
intercultural communication, as Roberts et al. (2001: 6) note, ‘Language-and-
culture learning involves a repositioning of the self both intellectually and at 
the level of “felt reality”’. Conducting ethnographic fieldwork in another 
language means being an effective ‘intercultural speaker’, ‘border crosser’ and 
‘cultural mediator’ who is able to take ‘a critical perspective both on their own 
cultural practices and that of others’ (Roberts et al, 2001: 31). It is possible I 
spent too much energy on ‘passing for a native’. Consider the laborious work 





advance and checked by other native speakers but often not used. Rather than 
improving the quality of the interactions in interviews or making me a better 
listener/interpreter, these may have been more about making me feel 
‘authoritative’. I believe it is more helpful for the researcher to embrace the 
role of ‘intercultural speaker’, i.e. one faced with the on-going challenge of 
communicating between two cultural spaces. It is my experience that a heavy 
focus on demonstrating ‘proficiency’ and ‘mastery’ does not necessarily 
improve the quality of the data one collects.  
Another vital part of the ‘intercultural speaker’ is being open about the 
challenges of translation. Before setting off to begin fieldwork, the decision 
was taken early on to avoid translation to English until very late stages of the 
write-up. This protected the analysis from potential errors in translation and 
allowed me to examine Russian national identity with the idioms, metaphors 
and connotations emerging from Russian language, rather than rendering this 
invisible by early translation (Temple, Young 2004: 174). This allowed me to 
retain the Russian terms while developing ideas, rather than employing 
English-language ‘equivalents’, which can sanitise or strip away layers of 
meaning and inferences that exist in the original Russian phrase (Muller 2007: 
207). In the example given by Martin Muller (2007: 208): ‘uniform translations 
of vlast’, sila and derzhava as “power” normalize and neutralize the historical, 
cultural and social connotations that resonate with each of these terms.’ In 
order to counteract the losses of meaning involved in translation I have, where 
relevant, introduced and employed terms in Russian, which is otherwise known 
as a Holus-bolus translation. In employing a critical approach to translation and 
being transparent about the difficulties while retaining certain terms in Russian 
language, ‘grey areas’ between Russian and English are highlighted rather than 
obliterated. 
After the pilot project I became more fully aware of the constant challenge of 
acting as an intermediary between two cultural spaces. It became clear to me 
that a variety of ambiguous terminology was being used in interviews, both in 
my questions and respondents’ answers. This included words such as ‘patriot’, 
‘nationalist’, ‘The West’, and even ‘Russian’ – which has two versions in the 





in English and Russian ran far deeper than I had expected; it was only being in 
a Russian-language environment that made me realize that the meanings 
behind them were worth exploring, echoing the points made by Muller (2007) 
on the difficulties and near impossibility of translating key terms. The complex 
and changing meanings of certain terms in Russian also left me with the sense 
they were untranslatable; in this sense they are ‘moving targets’ whose 
meaning differs across time and place. This is, in turn, an advantage of the rich 
‘thick descriptions’ of my respondents: they offer space to understand these 
phrases and words in a genuine context. I took the approach of retaining certain 
key expressions in Russian when writing in English and presenting at 
conferences.  
The Actual experience of conducting the research 
Selection of Data sites 
Data collection began with a pilot project in Moscow from May to August 
2014. Moscow was chosen for practical reasons: I have personal professional 
contacts at the Higher School of Economics and had a close friend living there 
ready to share accommodation. It was also a convenient base to visit Nizhny 
Novgorod several times and make initial contacts with the Lobachevski 
University. These visits resulted in working out a plan of co-operation with the 
sociology department there. The aim of the pilot project was to collect elite 
interviews to discuss some of the thematic areas and carry out six interviews 
with ordinary respondents, three from each age cohort. After twelve interviews 
and the conclusion of the pilot project, I returned to Glasgow for one month to 
examine the data and consider how well the existing approach had worked. 
Elite interviews provided useful discussion on how to explore the thematic 
areas of the research and where to look in terms of other texts or authors.  
At the end of September 2014 I travelled to Nizhny Novgorod, where, over a 
period of three months, the period of main data collection began, with eighteen 
interviews conducted with both age groups, giving a total of thirty-eight. A 
partner organisation, the Lobachevski University of Nizhny Novgorod, was on 
hand to provide informal assistance in finding respondents. Snowball sampling 





representative mix in terms of gender, occupation, education levels and 
birthplace. It was hoped that younger respondents would also assist with 
referrals to older candidates, thus bridging the age gap in the researcher’s 
social network. For the second stage of main data collection, from January to 
April 2015, the researcher was based in Moscow. The aim of these interviews 
was to show explore how experts or specialists on the thematic areas of my 
interviews would approach some of these questions, potentially offering a 
contrasting picture to that of my ‘ordinary’ respondents. It also gave me a 
chance to expose some of my own early tentative conclusions on specific 
research questions (arising from fieldwork notes over the period in Nizhny 
Novgorod) to the scrutiny of my expert respondents, who could react or 
provide comments. From April to September 2015, the final stage of data 
collection, I was located in St. Petersburg, where I conducted thirty-three 
interviews. This city was selected primarily to provide a good comparison with 
respondents in Nizhny Novgorod. In addition, as I had lived there previously 
for four years, the process of recruitment and referrals would be easier. In total, 
this meant I interviewed ninety-nine people for this research.9  
Recruiting respondents 
For the younger age cohort, the process of finding respondents was fairly 
straightforward. In the first site, contacts were made at the Lobachevsky 
University, at local groups such as ‘Nizhny Novgorod English Club’ and the 
‘Russian Folk Singing Association’, which in turn led to referrals for 
respondents fitting my requirements. Other contacts were made during social 
activities in my time there. Within two months the target of fifteen interviews 
had been reached, with respondents from a wide range of professional and 
social groups. While the snowball method was rapidly successful in the 
younger age group, locating older respondents from the ages of 40 to 55 
proved to be somewhat harder. I had hoped that younger respondents would be 
happy to connect me to older respondents, however, especially relatives. As it 
turned out, however, only two of those I interviewed in Nizhny were willing to 
put me in touch with their friends or family. With hindsight this is 
																																																																				







understandable: these people had, after all, selflessly given up their time for an 
interview for no obvious personal or professional benefit only to face, at the 
end of the process, a request to help the research even further by providing a 
referral. It also reflects a sensible desire (in a Russian context) not to expose 
your most intimate circle of family to a person who has perhaps not yet 
‘earned’ this level of trust.  
One way I was able to circumvent this issue was by preparing an introductory 
message in Russian describing my research that could be sent by my contacts 
to potential respondents through social networking websites Vkontakte and 
Facebook (see appendix 5). This message explained the point of the research 
succinctly and was sent through an existing friend that I had become 
acquainted with. This ‘softer’ approach to recruitment let respondents more 
leeway in responding and reduced the tendency of ‘pressure’ recruitment, 
where one of my contacts may ‘harry’ a friend into meeting me without being 
given any real indication of the nature or purpose of the research. This 
approach was successful with both age groups but particularly with older 
respondents who, busy with work and family, would need some kind of 
explanation as to why they should sacrifice their time.  
My introductory message also made it clear the interviews would be 
anonymous. My primary ethical consideration was to safeguard the ‘rights, 
interests and sensibilities’ of my ordinary respondents (Spradley 1979: 35). 
This entailed ensuring their participation and views would remain confidential, 
as disclosure of ‘unacceptable’ or ‘unpatriotic’ views in today’s Russia can 
potentially have an unpleasant impact on professional and personal affairs. I 
explained how interviewees would appear as anonymous and they did not have 
to answer every question. Data was stored on password protected hard drives 
on both a laptop and an external hard drive and respondents were informed 
their participation would be anonymous. All respondents agreed to be 
recorded, in the cases when these files were sent for transcription, those doing 
the work were from a different town and had no way to identify the 
interviewee. The transcriber was also asked to delete the recordings after use.  





differently. In Moscow, after drawing up a list of potential elite respondents in 
the preceding months in Nizhny Novgorod and sending emails out in January, I 
received responses from elite respondents in a staged manner, with interview 
appointments gradually being arranged over the three months. In order to 
arrange interviews, it was essential to customise emails to each respondent 
very carefully but also concisely, highlighting what you wanted to discuss and 
demonstrating knowledge of their activities. Most emails resulted in being 
given a telephone number to call and finalise the place and time of interview.10 
Fourteen elite interviews were conducted in this period of the research, all of 
which took place in public places or private offices.  
Data collection in St. Petersburg was simplified by immediate use of the 
methods employed in Nizhny Novgorod and the additional benefit of my own 
rather extensive social network in the city. The latter part was involved 
reconnecting and ‘catching up’ with old acquaintances and friends to ask for 
help with interview referrals. Half of respondents (6-7) in each age group were 
from my social network, while the rest came from new people I met through 
my social life in St. Petersburg and my introductory message on social media. 
Four interviews actually involved people who knew me well from my time in 
the city and, reflecting on the quality of these interviews, this did not have any 
negative affect on the results.  
To help make it clear to respondents that I was grateful for their participation I 
made it clear I was at their disposal in terms of when and where interviews 
took place. This followed the principle that ‘the interviewer is the “taker” and 
the participant is the “giver”; hence the interviewer must be flexible and 
willing to adapt him or herself to the preferences of the participant’ (Herzog 
2005: 27). Interviews took place in a variety of locations, from the office 
provided by Lobachevski University, to cafes and bars, the homes and the 
workplaces of respondents. In terms of safety, I only went to people’s homes 
when accompanied by someone I knew well and all interviews at workplaces 









meant a good range of locations, there were different dynamics in each place. 
In public places I had to be aware of privacy, selecting a table that would not 
be too intrusive or be subject to loud noise. Overall, I did not find that the place 
the interview was conducted was central to building rapport in an interview; as 
will be discussed, this appeared to depend more on how respondents were 
prepared prior to interview. 
The importance of gatekeepers and the ethics of access 
One part of the recruitment process deserving of more examination is the role 
of gatekeepers in securing access and opening the chain of referrals. Within the 
context of this research then, I defined a gatekeeper as a person who provided 
direct referrals leading to an exceptional number of interviews. Two of these 
gatekeepers worked in the Sociology and Politics departments of Lobachevski 
University respectively and provided help due to their own interest in the 
project and, as they mentioned, to support a ‘fellow researcher’.  The other two 
main gatekeepers were a contrast in terms of their motivations; the first was a 
Russian-born researcher from Spain temporarily in Nizhny Novgorod with 
extensive contacts in the working-class district of Avtozavodsk. She was happy 
to assist a fellow PhD student and was vital in setting up the interviews with 
people from working class backgrounds of the older generation. As all of these 
interviews took place in the home of respondents, her presence in the 
interviews was the key to breaking the ice, gaining rapport and trust, resulting 
in rich and productive interviews. She was careful not to intervene in the 
course of the interviews and acted mainly to facilitate initial introductions.  
The other key gatekeeper, Nadia, whom I met at the ‘English Club’, had 
previously studied in the UK and was very keen to help.11 Her direct referrals 
led to five interviews and, direct referrals from these led to large number of 
interviews that would have been otherwise impossible. Her role did, however, 
highlight some of the issues of using gatekeepers and how I was perceived in 
Russia. In return for Nadia’s help, I assisted her with a job application, and 
helped her relatives with some tasks. In some ways this felt like a familiar 







understood as a culturally accepted way of beginning friendships or 
relationships. In this situation I soon found myself under pressure not to 
disappoint Nadia but at the same time maintain an ethical and professional 
position. While this was at times challenging, I believe both parties were 
ultimately happy in this exchange of favours. However, as a relatively young, 
Western researcher arriving in a provincial Russian town, some respondents 
may have viewed me as carrying a certain amount of social opportunity and 
believed that, by providing help with the research, they would be able to build 
a friendship or relationship with a ‘Westerner’. Thus, I soon was made aware 
of the need to manage expectations in a careful way to avoid disappointing or 
hurting those who generously provide researchers with assistance. One lesson 
from this is the need to encourage fair expectations and be careful about the 
amount of time we take from any single individual. I remain, however, 
indebted to Nadia and numerous other individuals who, asking very little in 
return, opened their social networks to me; without gatekeepers this research 
would not have been able to reach the people it did.  
Conducting the interviews 
The dynamic between interviewer and interviewee, which plays out differently 
in each interview, is of key importance to data quality. Interviewees react to 
what they see; not only in terms of what they see in ethnicity or gender, but to 
the emotional performance of the interviewer and how they present themselves 
(Silverman 2004: 127). Central to a successful interview is engaging the 
interviewee, which entails creating the right atmosphere prior to interviews. 
Most of my respondents had never participated in an interview and often did 
not see why anyone would take their ‘opinions’ as ‘data’. In other 
environments or cultures it could have been superfluous to launch into a 
preamble as to why their participation was needed in the research. I found that 
introductory remarks helped respondents feel more confident about the validity 
of their participation. This involved underlining that, in order to form a picture 
of Russian identity today, I wanted the subjective views and experience of 
different Russians of different age groups. I took care to always point out that 





problematic to skip any part. To reduce any feeling of discomfort, I indicated 
that they should feel free to take any breaks when needed.  
It is worth noting my handling of the elite interviews was quite different. They 
involved more time-consuming preparation than interviewing ordinary 
respondents. The key difference was the pressure to appear well informed and 
deserving of the faith shown in you by ‘experts’ who give you their time. 
Failure to do so entails negative consequences not only for oneself but also for 
others who attempt to follow in your footsteps. In several cases I was 
interrogated as to my credentials just before the interview to ensure they were 
comfortable with me recording the interview. In another situation, I faced a 
very uncomfortable interview with an academic who was convinced my 
research approach and aims were incorrect and full of flaws. This, naturally, 
made it hard to focus on the questions and resist emotions that would make the 
interview hard to conduct. The point here is that elite interviews can be more 
demanding and stressful in different ways to the other ‘ordinary’ respondents 
but offer rewards in terms of data and contacts that compensate for this 
investment.  
Elite interviews proceeded along two lines: Either they would take the standard 
interview of the ordinary respondent and give their own perspective on it from 
their own professional sphere in Moscow such as journalism, the media, 
political organisations or state bodies; or the interview would have specialised 
questions on the precise area they focus on, be it for example international 
relations, civic identity, historical memory or interethnic relations. For the 
former type of elite interviews, I prepared specific questions from my readings 
from each individual expert, in accordance with their status and their own 
output/work. For example, I questioned the historian Professor Alexei Miller 
on issues relating purely to historical memory and the history of Russian 
national identity formation. In the second type of elite interview, I interviewed 
someone with a ‘special’ background using more or less the same questions I 
put to my ‘ordinary’ respondents. This included the TV producer of the 
nostalgic cultural NTV programme ‘Namedni’, A former leader of Kremlin 
youth organisation nashi, and journalists from Kommersant and Open 





referred for an additional three elite interviews in St. Petersburg. 
My role as researcher: the emergence of a field identity  
Given the centrality of identity to this thesis, I feel it would be amiss not to 
consider how fieldwork interplayed with my own sense of self. This was a 
dynamic that I came to understand more clearly after post-fieldwork 
reflections. Entering Russia just months after the annexation of Crimea (in 
March 2014), in an atmosphere of heightened national feeling, I was often 
asked by a wide range of people why I wanted to do this kind of research. My 
own field identity emerged as an answer to a rather simple question: ‘Why 
have you come to study us?’ Answers to this revolved around my connections 
to Russia: where I learned Russian, why I chose Russia and why I was 
pursuing this research, along with attempts to elicit my own personal view of 
the country and her current situation. In answering such questions I had to 
come to grips with my own identity and convincingly explain why I had 
chosen to take on such a project. There was a sense of role-reversal: instead of 
the curious ethnographic researcher exploring the ‘alien world’, I was the 
‘intruder’ being submitted to interrogation. Given my own background living 
in Russia and connection to the country, this was about coming to terms with 
the ‘Scottish’ and ‘Russian’ parts of my identity. The conversations I had with 
Russians, which were and influenced by the events of the time and the trends 
of the larger media space, helped forge a field identity that combined Scottish 
and Russophile elements.  
Presenting myself as ‘Scottish’ in the context of the then recent independence 
referendum brought curiosity to the fore and, given my own (moderate) pro-
independence and anti-Westminster stance, could rather unexpectedly position 
me as being a ‘friendly’ European rather than part of the ‘anti-Russian’ 
American-British contingent. The ‘neutrality’ of this position, while 
challenging to maintain at certain moments, was something I took on as part of 
my responsibility as a professional researcher. The essence of this ‘neutrality’ 
was outlined to respondents who asked for my views in the following way: ‘I 
want to see things from your perspective. I am here to learn and provide a more 





representations both here and in the West. Russia is a country close to my heart 
and I want to learn more about it from Russians themselves’. This message, 
which is in line with my feelings on the matter, helped establish trust and 
credibility in a sensitive environment among people of a wide spectrum, from 
pro-Putin patriots and Slavophile Orthodox traditionalists, to anti-Kremlin 
nationalists, pro-Western liberals and Soviet nostalgists. Given my own 
background living in Russia, I would like to underline that the emotional part 
of this argument was by no means a fabrication: a key driver in doing this 
research was to improve understanding of the Russian perspective for a wider 
audience. I would argue the emergence of a field identity is a vital process in 
ethnographic research, both in making you appear as a credible researcher in 
the field and in sustaining energy and morale levels over extended periods ‘in 
the field’. The final section of this chapter will turn to how I analysed the large 
amounts of data produced during fieldwork.  
Data analysis 
Before data analysis could begin, a large volume of transcription had to be 
carried out. I personally carried out all the interviews and avoided the issue of 
‘third-hand data’ where somebody else carries out the interviews, while 
another transcribes (Temple et al 2006). I was, however, forced due to time and 
workload considerations to ‘outsource’ around half of the transcriptions to 
native speakers of Russian. There are issues to be considered in this ‘hiring out 
of the chore’ (Tilley 2003: 769) of transcriptions and I looked to take 
precautions. In selecting transcribers I looked for two things; diligence to 
accuracy and remoteness from the social networks of the interviewees. To 
explain what was meant by ‘accuracy,’ I asked the transcribers to reproduce the 
intended feelings of the respondent with minimal editing of word choice. To 
ensure this accuracy I had two safeguards; firstly extensive checking of the 
first transcript to ensure quality before sending more interviews; secondly, 
correcting and looking over the transcripts with audio in background when 
doing the coding of the interviews in data analysis phase.  
As mentioned above, this study looked to employ, as far as possible, an 





occurred side by side. Nonetheless, I still faced the classic situation of 
returning from the field with a large amount of data and notes that needed 
‘sorting, summarising, organising, translating’ in order to reach a ‘coherent 
argument’ (O’ Reilly 2012: 186). Data analysis began with a phase of ‘open-
coding’, where data were re-examined and re-organised and deconstructed into 
discrete parts by manually searching through the textual material and coding all 
interesting areas of the data with as few preconceived ideas about what will 
emerge as possible (Welsh 2002). Coding followed a three-stage process 
involving: ‘(a) noticing relevant phenomena, (b) collecting examples of those 
phenomena, and (c) analysing those phenomena in order to find 
commonalities, differences, patterns, and structures’ (Coffey 1996: 28). After 
developing a large number of open codes, I carried out ‘focused coding’ that, 
as opposed to the deconstructive nature of open coding, is a more constructive 
process and is achieved by a great deal of analysis. 
 I employed Nvivo software to assist in this process, taking the approach of 
‘learning by doing’ to become proficient in using the platform. It was hoped 
that it would compensate by saving time in organising and retrieving data and 
codes. Nvivo was used to divide up data into the questions I asked respondents, 
and then I manually coded and analysed these sections into smaller themes. I 
used Nvivo alongside manual coding, printing off NVivo ‘node coding’ 
reports, which collected all the text coded at one node in one document. These 
hard copies were then coded the ‘old-fashioned’ way with pens of different 
colour (Welsh 2002). I also made use of Nvivo’s memo function to track my 
own notes, thoughts and comments, which proved to be a useful tool in 
reflective thought and data analysis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the foundations of the original research design and 
revealed some of the practical constraints acting on data collection and 
analysis, as well as the personal challenges and ethical dilemmas involved. It is 
hoped that this transparent account on how this thesis evolved clarifies my own 
role and influence as researcher. The above methodological approach was 





discourse of ‘lived reality’ that is often lacking from studies of Russian 
national identity. This micro-discourse complements and, at times, confronts 
the macro-discourse of quantitative surveys. In doing this, my own self-
presentation as a researcher emerged as a response to encounters with Russians 
in a variety of settings, most of which were informal. The use of a ‘grounded 
theory’ approach allowed far more flexibility in the emergence of interview 
guides and made me respond to emerging themes in empirical data at an early 
stage, rather than me being tied to the mast of a rigid hypothesis. This, 
naturally, also made the process of data collection and analysis much longer 
and time-consuming, a point to be considered for those weighing up 
methodological approaches. However, the ethnographic approach can be 
fruitful in shedding light on national identity. Having an extended period to 
determine interview questions based on what people actually respond to and 
can talk about at length is important; far too many large scale surveys contain 
questions that people may, in reality, be unable to say more than a few words 
about. Before I present the empirical data that emerged from the above 
methodology, I will now return to the specific case of Tsarist and Soviet 
national identity formation and nationalism from 1900 to 1991. This is then 



















The Literature Review  
Part one. Two empires, two collapses: 1900-1991 
In the theoretical chapter of this thesis, national identity was defined as a fluid 
entity evolving and shifting across time. While this identity is not immutable, it 
is not a blank canvas. The national identity we study today is moulded and 
shaped by the historical, social and cultural conditions of previous generations. 
For nationalist entrepreneurs attempting to lead the imagined community, 
national identity is not mere silly putty that can be easily refashioned to suit the 
needs of elites. The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of the key 
historical factors that have shaped Russian national identity, which are 
important to the argumentation of this thesis. These can be divided into three 
areas: the pre-revolutionary or Romanov heritage, Soviet legacies and the lived 
experience of a tumultuous decade (1988-1998) that saw promises of a new 
age, state disintegration and socio-economic turmoil.  
The first part of the chapter examines the last decades of Tsarist Russia, 
highlighting the salience of the imperial in the official nationalism of the time, 
the importance of the Slavophile-Westerniser debate and the unbridgeable 
gulfs between state and intellectuals, on the one hand, and the Russian masses 
and elites on the other. Secondly, I will examine the effects of the Soviet 
period on Russian national identity, highlighting the special features of Soviet 
nation-building and the emergence of a ‘Soviet person’ (Homo Sovieticus). 
This includes the promotion of a Russocentric version of the civic nation that 
outwardly rejected ethnicity but encouraged Russians to think of themselves as 
the ‘vanguard’ within the Soviet ‘Friendship of Peoples’. It also involved 
strong commitment to the ideas of a mighty state, one capable of both retaining 
superpower status in global terms and essentially running almost every aspect 
of economic, social and cultural life. Soviet citizens responded to this unique 
‘statism’ of Soviet totalitarianism by withdrawing from any kind of activism 
not approved by the Party-State, adopting a paternalistic relationship with the 
all-powerful state while advocating a conservative and passive patriotism. The 





chapters of this thesis on today’s Russia. Thus, the historical pre-conditions 
described in this chapter should be kept in mind when considering the current 
equilibrium in mainstream Russian national identity and nationalism.  
Nation-building in the decades leading up to 1917  
Stretching from Poland in the West to Vladivostok in the East, the Romanov 
Empire was one of the world’s largest empires. It appears intuitively 
unsurprising that Tsarist nation-building faced serious challenges, especially in 
comparison to Germany or Great Britain, with whom it failed to maintain pace 
in terms of economic, military and political development. In an age of rising 
nation states, the Russian empire has been accused of failing to bring about the 
‘transformation of subjects into citizens’ (Beissinger 1995: 8). The challenges 
of achieving this in nineteenth century Russia still resonate in the present day. 
For one, the sheer size of the country made it far harder to achieve the kind of 
internal economic and regional integration seen in France or Germany in the 
same period (Suny 1997: 30-32). In other words ‘the vastness of the empire’s 
territory, the lack of (…) means of communication and transportation, the 
underdeveloped educational system and a low level of literacy’ made nation-
building harder (Suny 2102: 22). Secondly, Russia emerged as a great land 
empire that expanded well beyond its original ethno-cultural Russian (russkii) 
core. 12  As the Romanov dynasty progressed in its territorial expansion, 
imperial imperatives for stability included the extensive incorporation of non-
Russian elites into imperial administrative structures. The Russian ethno-
cultural core was not separated from its colonial conquests by water but 
sprawled across the Eurasian continent. The dividing lines between ‘home 
nation’ and ‘imperial domains’ were unclear and, furthermore, ethnic Russians 
made up less than half of the empire’s population. Thus, it is not an 
exaggeration to say ‘Russia did not have an empire; it was an empire’ (Sakwa 
2008: 208). Integrating the majority of the population into a Russian nation 
(russkaya natsiia) was made more difficult due to the diversity of the empire. 
Thirdly, autocratic and aristocratic political structures, which successive 








could link citizens and civil institutions. This resulted in great chasms between 
the illiterate, Russian peasant masses, the intelligentsia and the ruling elite 
(Hosking 1997: 478). 
Nonetheless, by the last decades of the Romanov Empire, small spaces of civil 
society had emerged where public opinion could be contested and certain 
topics in national identity discussed. In these decades the main discursive 
division in Russian national identity was between Westernisers and 
Slavophiles. This split revolved around whether Russia was fundamentally 
‘European’ and, thus, bound to follow the Western European development 
pathways or whether, in fact, she was civilizationally distinct and, thus, able to 
forge her own ‘unique’ path by embracing the traditions of the ‘real Russia’ 
found in the peasantry and Orthodoxy (Tolz 2001: 16). While Russia’s leaders 
successively flirted with both of these camps, the last two Tsars adopted 
Slavophile positions (ibid: 100). Part of the reason for this was the tendency to 
view nationalism as a threat to the empire’s stability by carrying the 
‘contagions’ of democracy and liberalism into Russia. This was manifested in 
the Decembrist revolt (1825) and Polish November Uprising (1830-31), both of 
which demanded a new constitution that would make ‘the People’ the source of 
sovereignty, thus challenging the Tsar’s authority and legitimacy (Pain 2016: 
49).  
Emil Pain (2016) has argued that the ‘official nationalism’ of the Minister of 
Education Sergei Uvarov (in office from 1833 to 1849) was designed to 
counter this challenge. The concept of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality’ 
acted as a direct counterpoint to ‘liberty, fraternity and equality’. As a 
conservative ideology, Tsarist official and statist nationalism rejected the word 
‘nation’ (natsiia) as foreign word, and replaced it with narodnost’ (Pain 2016: 
49). This conservatism was combined, however, with Russification policies, 
which Anderson has described as ‘stretching the short, tight skin of the nation 
over the gigantic body of empire’ (Anderson 1991: 86). Russification, 
however, only enflamed anti-Russian sentiment in the non-Russian regions 
and, thus, threatened the integrity of the empire. Therefore, Russification was 





(Finland and Poland) and pursued more fully where it was relatively successful 
(Ukraine and Belarus) (Tolz 2001: 174-77).   
 The historian Alexei Miller (2015: 309-368) has convincingly argued that, 
among Ukrainians, Belarusians and ethnic Russians at least, the authorities 
made impressive progress in building a ‘greater Russian nation’ (bol’shaya 
russkaya natsiia), encouraging many groups to identify as Russian (russkii). 
Miller characterised the Tsarist state as a ‘nationalising empire’ and argued it 
was only the outbreak of war that interrupted this promising attempt to bind 
empire together with a common sense of Russianness. While Miller argued 
increasing numbers of the empire’s commercial and intellectual elites were 
accepting this project, Vera Tolz (2001) underlined that Russian intellectuals 
were fatally divided over how to approach Tsarist official nationalism. Given 
the disproportionate number of Russian intellectuals that rejected collaboration 
and joined the political opposition, it appears Uvarov’s Slavophile-inspired 
‘official nationalism’ lacked important appeal (Lieven 2000). This deprived 
‘official statist nationalism’ of a genuine popular liberal and socialist 
component and suggests the limitations of managing nationalism ‘from above’.  
The failure of the Tsarist authorities to allow a genuinely civic form of 
nationhood to emerge through civic institutions and participation that could 
integrate Russia’s intelligentsia was an important background factor in the 
eventual demise of the empire in 1917. While the co-opting of the intelligentsia 
was limited, the process of transforming the peasants into ‘Russians’ was still 
‘barely underway in the Russian-speaking lands at the turn of the twentieth 
century’ (Brandenberger 2010: 724). If we take the modernist perspective of 
Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, this failure can be attributed to the lack of 
mass literacy and urbanisation, a deficiency the Soviets would eventually 
remedy. Ultimately, the state-promoted, conservative and Slavophile version of 
Russian national identity had limited mobilising potential as a hegemonic 





Soviet nation-building from the Revolution to Stalinism  
The October Revolution and Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War 
ushered in a seventy-four year phase during which the new Soviet state, which 
claimed to have started a new era in human history, attempted to transcend 
both nation and empire to create a new entity. Vehemently rejecting 
imperialism, Marxists held that nationalism and national consciousness was a 
mere transitional stage in a wider identity metamorphosis that would end with 
a socialist, internationalist ‘proletarian’ identity that did not depend on 
ethnicity or language. Soviet thinkers tended to see nationalism as a ‘pubertal 
disorder of the human race, a necessary phase, but something to be got through 
as swiftly as possible’ (Hosking 2006: 71).13 On the other hand, in the first 
decade of Soviet power the new authorities were embattled and in search of 
allies; one group they attempted to win over were the ‘oppressed’ non-Russian 
national groups. Terry Martin (2001) famously characterised the USSR of the 
1920’s as an ‘Affirmative Action Empire’. Martin argued Soviet Nationality 
Policy looked to disarm nationalism by giving certain aspects of nationhood to 
‘small nations’. In the words of party theorist Nikolai Bukharin, the Bolsheviks 
sought ‘to purchase for themselves the genuine trust of the previously 
oppressed peoples’ (Hosking 2006: 72). Yet, in promoting korenizatziya, the 
Soviets unintentionally constructed and promoted national identity in the non-
Russian republics, resulting in what Francine Hirsch called ‘an empire of 
nations’ (Hirsch 1997, 2000).  
The other major pillar of Soviet Nationality policy was to root out ‘Great 
Russian Chauvinism’. As V. Vujacic (2009: 54) has noted; ‘whereas the 
oppressed nationalities could overcome their backwardness and become Soviet 
through the medium of their particular national cultures, the Russian peasant 
could not’; their transformation to socialist consciousness had to occur much 
faster. As a result, Russian national, cultural and social institutions were 
subjected to comprehensive assault: the Cossacks were the first national group 











aristocracy liquidated, and the Orthodox Church devastated by the widespread 
arrests of priests and the closure of churches. In their treatment of Russian 
national symbols and institutions, the Bolsheviks were faithful to the battle cry 
of the Internationale: ‘We will destroy this world of violence, Down to the 
foundations, and then, We will build our new world’.  
Thus, the Soviet project meant ‘the domestic, social and economic institutions 
of Russia were uprooted and replaced by a paternalist police state’ (Hosking 
2006: 38). This was followed up by educational policies to encourage a 
socialist consciousness among citizens, which can be viewed as an attempt to 
impose a single dominant meta-narrative upon an entire population. This 
mission was led by M. N. Pokrovskii, deputy people’s commissar of education 
of the RSFSR, who devised a series of textbooks to teach the masses ‘historical 
materialism’: the historical journey of class struggle throughout the ages that 
ended with the birth of an international proletariat. According to this version, 
Russian Tsarist history was full of backwardness and oppression and ‘no 
positive value was attached to any ethnic group’s inclusion under Tsarist rule’ 
(Szporluk 1980: 43).  
With the rise to power of Joseph Stalin at the end of the 1920’s, a new urgency 
and violence entered politics, resulting in the rejection of Pokrovskii’s 
historical materialism and a return to the Russocentric ‘nationalising empire’ 
traditions of the late Tsarist period. The Soviet state was to be mobilized to 
meet the demands of collectivization, rapid industrialisation and military 
redevelopment. With this came a distinct turn toward promoting conventional 
patriotism for the Soviet motherland. ‘Socialism in One Country’ required a 
new patriotic narrative to legitimise the massive sacrifices required and bring 
stability and cohesion to Soviet society. Some have argued that the Soviet 
leadership came to view the historical materialism of the ‘Pokrovskii School’ 
as ineffective in consolidating a common Soviet identity (Brandenberger 2002; 
Vujacic 2009).  
Whatever the motivations, this 1930’s turn to patriotic language and a useable 
past was a crucial moment in the story of modern Russian national identity. 





means of communication, a national discourse could be spread across a 
putative ‘imagined community’ with more rapidity and breadth than was 
possible under the Romanovs. Stalin’s jingoistic and nationalistic propaganda 
condemned Trotskyism and Menshevism for lacking faith in the USSR’s 
ability to build socialism by itself, condemning the country to the role of mere 
‘appendage of the future revolution in the West’ (English 2000: 39). In 1931, 
Stalin underlined this in a speech to a major conference: ‘Now, since we have 
overthrown capitalism and power belongs to the working class, we have a 
fatherland and will defend its independence’ (Brandenberger 2002: 28).14  
David Brandenberger argued that the USSR under Stalin shifted to a 
‘Russocentric’ form of identity, pursuing this ‘form of etatism as the most 
effective way to promote state-building and popular loyalty to the regime’ 
(2002: 4). This approach was able to ‘foster a maximally accessible, populist 
sense of Soviet social identity’ (ibid: 9) that proved enduring beyond Stalin’s 
death. Brandenberger (ibid: 91) offers compelling material evidence for this: 
new state policies promoted a Sovietised-Russian identity through a sudden but 
selective embrace of Russian literature, including Pushkin, Turgenev, 
Nekrasov, Tolstoi and Chekov. In film, historical figures such as Peter the 
Great and Alexander Nevsky were lionized, providing the masses with 
examples of Russian heroism from the past. A new textbook, ‘A Short Course 
on the History of the USSR’ (1937), replaced the now discredited Pokrovskii 
curriculum, providing a simpler narrative history of the heroic figures and a far 
more positive treatment of Russia’s pre-1917 past.  
It should be noted, however, that many Bolsheviks in Lenin’s time viewed the 
Russians as the ‘elder brother’: the most ‘advanced’ nation, the glue holding 
the USSR together, the vanguard leading the rest of the world into the 
‘promised land’ of communism.15 While he lauded elements of pre-Soviet 














Nationality policy. A massive ‘Friendship of Nations’ propaganda campaign 
was launched across the country and was enshrined in the 1936 constitution’s 
commitment to multi-ethnic diversity. On the other hand, Stalin did violate 
some elements of Leninist nationalities policy. Commitment to Korenizatzia 
was diluted by ‘Russification’: a 1938 law made studying Russian language 
mandatory in schools, and millions of Russians were sent to the non-Russian 
periphery to take key jobs, with 1.7 million moving to Kazakhstan and Central 
Asia alone from 1926 to 1939 (O’Connor 2006: 37). This occurred alongside 
the mass arrest, execution or deportation of non-Russian intellectual and 
administrative elites in the Great Terror.  
Yuri Slezkine (1994) employed the metaphor of the Soviet Union as a 
communal apartment to shed light on the way the hierarchies between national 
groups functioned in this period. While the bedrooms of this kommunalka were 
allocated to each of the non-Russian republics, who could decorate them with 
their own flags, languages, maps and heroic histories, the central, communal 
part of the flat was occupied by the Russians. This area was ‘unmarked by 
paraphernalia, unclaimed by its “own” nation and inhabited by a very large 
number of austere but increasingly sensitive proletarians’ (Slezkine 1994: 433). 
The increasing recognition of the Russians’ leading ‘elder brother’ role under 
Stalin, meant, in Slezkine’s view, the start of a new phase where ‘the Russians 
began to bully their neighbours and decorate their part of the communal 
apartment’ (ibid: 444).  
The fact that this period involved a desperate and heroic struggle with fascist 
invaders made the process of consolidating the regime easier in some ways. 
Victory in the Second World War ‘solidified and sanctified the Soviet regime 
and Stalin’ (Suny 2012: 28); the famous battle cry ‘For Stalin, for the 
motherland’ reflected new ties to a Soviet homeland (rodina). The post-war 
environment was increasingly isolationist, militarist and xenophobic. 
Resentment at the way the West treated the USSR after 1945 and fear of 
subversive anti-Soviet elements, which were supposedly agents of Western 
imperialism, facilitated a shift in the USSR’s constituent other; from Nazi 
Germany to the perfidious West. Shelia Fitzpatrick characterised this Soviet 





traditional culture with celebration of the party’s leadership, the achievements 
of Soviet industrialisation, and the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism’ 
(Fitzpatrick 1980: 67). To this can be added a strong focus on the threat from 
without and within, be it Trotskyism, Fascism, the lackeys of capitalist 
imperialism or ‘rootless’ cosmopolitanism (Davies 1997). As will be seen, 
elements of this version of national identity, which puts a strong focus on 
national security and stability, demanding vigilance against external and 
internal enemies, still play out in Russia today.  
Stalinist mass identity was based not only on ‘love for the motherland’ but also 
coercion and fear. Mass terror ensured no serious challenges to this construct 
emerged, be it from the non-Russian national groups or the Russian heartland 
itself. Great injustices were done to non-Russian national groups in a series of 
brutal deportations and purges. The mass deportations from the Baltics, 
Western Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia and the North Caucasus would leave 
poisonous sores unhealed beneath the ‘Friendship of Nations’ propaganda (See 
Conquest 1991). Russians themselves from all backgrounds were swept up into 
what Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn famously termed the ‘Gulag Archipelago’ – a 
vast network of slave labour camps across the Union. This was a time when 
national identity could not be based on open discussions or become a genuine 
reflection of social memory; after the Great Terror and the post-war crackdown 
no such space existed. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1985: 452) put it in his 
famous Gulag Archipelago, ‘the prolonged absence of any free exchange of 
information within a country opens up a gulf of incomprehension between 
whole groups (…) we simply cease to be a people, for we speak, indeed, 
different languages’. After Stalin’s death in 1953, however, the USSR entered 
a new phase, where mass coercion was no longer acceptable. This led to a new 
and relative openness in identity politics, where nationality and Russianness 
could be discussed with more freedom.  
After the Death of Stalin 
The Khrushchev thaw period was one where the Stalinist coercion was scaled 
back and, in conditions of relative freedom, forms of Russian national feeling 





direction in Russian national identity (Cosgrove 2004: 9). The ‘Village prose’ 
literary movement, inspired by ‘nostalgia for a vanished rural, ethnically 
Russian golden age’ (ibid: 14), allowed new discussions about Russia’s path in 
the so-called ‘thick journals’. 16  Now intellectuals could elaborate on the 
problems of Soviet society in ways that would have risked a death sentence 
under Stalin. Roughly speaking, two camps emerged, ‘liberals’ in journals such 
as noviy mir, and ‘conservatives’ in nash sovremennik and molodaya gvardia 
(Brudny 1998: 152). The liberal wing became known for opposition to militant 
isolationism and Stalinist methods. They attacked foundational texts as the 
Short Course of the History of CPSU as primitive. They lamented the 
destruction of Soviet avant-garde after the Stalinist turn and looked for return 
to ‘fundamental values’ and ‘worldwide humanism’ (English 2000: 185). The 
‘conservative’ wing was a diverse collection of moderate and more radical 
elements, who shared concern for moral decline in the country but sought to 
preserve the USSR and avoid westernising reforms. Thus, in the thick journals 
the Westernizer-Slavophile debate returned once again, albeit buried deep in 
literary journals largely consumed by the Soviet intelligentsia.  
Yitzak Brudny (1998) argued that the Soviet regime, unwilling after 
Khrushchev’s demise to rely on the most utopian parts of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, looked to co-opt the Russophile writers of the thick journals by 
granting them a ‘golden straightjacket’. This offered the privileges and perks 
and inclusion into the intellectual elite, in return for conformity on the key 
points of official ideology and submission to requirements of the censor 
(Brudny 1998: 132). There was another side to this, however. After 1970, 
however, the KGB clamped down on those identified as more ‘threatening’, 
forcing an important part of the intelligentsia underground in samizdat 
publications, which Dina Zisserman-Brodsky (2003: 16) described as ‘enclaves 
of civil society in the totally censored world’. Geoffrey Hosking (2006: 358) 
argued this emerging civil society went further than samizdat; it included new 
‘Russian’ mass movements concerned with the environment and cultural 









whose membership grew from 7 million by 1972 to 15 million by 1985 
(Hosking 2006: 358).17  
Overall, however, the USSR did not have a vigorous civil society in this period 
and political controls, combined with the previous damage wrought to society 
by Stalinist repression, halted the development of horizontal bonds across the 
population. It is important not to overestimate the influence of intellectuals, 
thick journals or new civic forms; ultimately, the vast majority of the 
population was not exposed to or aware of these debates. The RSFSR of the 
late seventies did not resemble in any way the bubbling social activity of 
solidarity-era Poland, where horizontal bonds began to emerge between 
intellectuals, workers and churchmen (Lewis 1994: 234-35). Instead, the vast 
majority were exposed to a Soviet meta-narrative on the emergence of a Soviet 
people in conditions of ‘Developed Socialism’, which came about as a result of 
the merging (slianie) of the USSR’s various national groups into one (Bassin, 
Kelly 2014: 4).  
The Brezhnev regime was in its essence conservative, focused on the 
preservation of social order, stability and superpower status. J. R. Millar (1985) 
argued a conservative and paternalistic social contract (‘The Little Deal’) was 
in place between the Party and the people. The regime shelved radical utopian 
projects and offered citizens more space to pursue their own affairs, even if this 
meant tolerating petty corruption. In return, the ruled gave political passivity 
and loyalty to the party. The Brezhnev phase is of real importance to Russian 
national identity; memories of this ‘Little Deal’ are still strong in the 
population today. Large numbers recall these years as marked by stability and 
security, comfortable life conditions and faith in the future.  
On the other hand, by the end of the 1970’s, significant socio-economic change 
had occurred in Russia (the RSFSR): the population became largely urban 
(70%) and unprecedented numbers gained access to higher education (Lewin 
1988: 31). While there was social-economic change, the political system was 
frozen and the regime’s ideological constructs were insulated from any 







both within the leadership and between it and the intelligentsia ‘over the path 
that the Soviet Union should take to renew its ideological appeal and improve 
the effectiveness of its social and economic system’ (Hosking 2006: 368). This 
stalemate would prove damaging and demoralising for many in the 
intelligentsia; lacking an open forum to debate Russia’s problems, many 
conservative intellectuals were faced with a stark choice: either remain silent 
but loyal to the Soviet state or make common cause for reform with their hated 
liberal rivals. Those in the liberal wing were also constrained by the limits of 
censorship that, if violated, would spell an end to one’s job, apartment and life 
prospects. With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, however, this deadlock was 
finally broken.  
Perestroika and the collapse 
Gorbachev subsequently claimed that it was only upon taking office that he 
discovered the true extent of the rot in the USSR; it included not only 
economic stagnation but inferior healthcare, shockingly slack work practises, a 
falling birth rate and ever-present corruption across all levels. Nationalities 
policy, however, was an area he felt needed little attention. In his 1987 book 
Perestroika, he lauded Soviet progress: ‘Against the background of national 
strife, which has not spared even the world’s most advanced countries, the 
USSR represents a truly unique example in the history of human civilization in 
building a harmonious multi-ethnic state’ (Gorbachev 1987: 119). This was a 
continuation of Brezhnev-era rhetoric, which claimed the nationalities problem 
was ‘resolved completely’ (cited in Nahaylo, Swoboda, 1990). This optimism 
was shared by much of Soviet academia.18 Yet, glasnost and perestroika 
exposed elements previously hidden behind the totalitarian monolithic façade 
(Bassin, Kelly 2014: 5-6). One was the unexpected vigour of ethno-cultural 
movements that soon demanded sovereignty for the national republics. This 
contradicted the claims of the Soviet authorities, which insisted a Soviet people 
had emerged even though ethnic and national cultures were simultaneously 











Russians, started to agitate for the satisfaction of their own rights as a ‘people’. 
Nation-ness came to dominate political discourse with shocking rapidity, 
despite the assumptions of so many that, as a force of popular mobilization, it 
had gone the way of the dodo.  
Yet, in the first years, Gorbachev was blissfully unaware of nationalism’s 
potential. Instead, he was confident of mobilizing conservative and liberal 
wings of the intelligentsia behind his regeneration programme. Appointing 
Yegor Ligachev as his unofficial ‘second secretary’, Gorbachev looked to win 
over conservatives in the Russian Writers Union and VOOPIK. A new 
Andropov-style discipline campaign was combined with an anti-alcohol 
campaign. It seemed the leadership was finally heeding calls for a moral rebirth 
in Russia (Brudny 1998: 195), fighting the ‘conspiracy to keep Russians drunk 
and stupid’ (Duncan 2000: 116). The cancellation of a long-anticipated scheme 
to divert the Siberian rivers Ob and Irtysh in Northern Russia for the irrigation 
of Central Asia in 1986 can also be seen as a concession to Russophile 
conservatives.20 At the same time, Gorbachev courted liberal ‘westernisers’. 
Eventually disillusioned with the results of the above policies, Gorbachev 
turned decisively to the liberal camp during the second phase of perestroika, 
demoting Ligachev and appointing liberal reformers to the Ministry of Culture 
(O’Connor 2006: 87).  
What followed was an intense proxy war of culture between conservatives and 
reformers in the media, bringing the neo-Slavophile/neo-Westerniser war of 
words out into the open. The liberals launched their offensive with the release 
of previously banned works from authors such as Grossman, Akhmatova, 
Solzhenitsyn and Pasternak. Readers were shocked by candid descriptions of 
life in Stalinist Russia; conservatives found themselves on the defensive, 
forced to justify the USSR. The conservative counter-attack focused on anti-
Western themes: Pasternak and Nabokov were abhorrent and only loved in the 
perverted West; the increased presence of Western rock music was evidence of 
alien Western ‘mass culture’ that, in the words of Nash Sovremennik, would 









2006: 96). The March 1988 letter of Leningrad Chemistry lecturer Nina 
Andreevna, entitled ‘I Cannot Forsake my Principles’, rejected efforts to 
present ‘the slightest expressions of Great Russian national pride’ as examples 
the ‘chauvinism of a great power’ (Cited in O’Connor 2006: 119). The letter 
attacked the West and defended Stalinism, protecting Soviet-era myths about 
the war and upholding the merits of a Soviet civilization that was under assault. 
As Tolz (2001) noted, the rapid re-emergence of the Slavophile-Westerner 
debates during perestroika suggest the long-term importance of the West as a 
constituent ‘Other’ had not abated. Today it remains an important feature of 
Russian national identity; one of the contentions of this thesis is that the 
Slavophile-Westerniser debate will again re-emerge with new vigour after the 
current Putin consensus breaks down.  
By the end of the 1980’s, as the above cultural war of words drew to a close, it 
seemed public opinion and popular momentum was behind Yakovlev and the 
reformers. While the combined circulation of Molodaya Gvarida, Moskva and 
Nash Sovremennik was 1.6 million, the liberal journals Noviy Mir, Znamya and 
Yunost could boast a circulation of 6.6 million (Brudny 1998: 230). In the 
marketplace of ideas, it seemed the liberal reformers were beating 
conservatives and nationalists hands down. The latter appeared to lack a clear 
vision and were out of sync with the zeitgeist of the perestroika generation. 
From 1989 to 1991 the battleground shifted away from the war of words in 
journals into the newly opened arena of electoral politics and political factions. 
Here the conservatives suffered even more decisive defeats, both in the 1989 
legislative elections, and the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet (Brudny 
1998: 227).  
Yet, the liberals could not convert their victories into political power; due to 
the diluted nature of Gorbachev’ reforms, conservatives retained control of the 
Congress of People’s Deputies and blocked the election of popular liberals to 
the Supreme Soviet. It is at this point that political actors began to employ 
nationalistic ideas of Russian sovereignty in their appeals to the electorate. 
Desperately in search of a political power base, Boris Yeltsin turned to the 
institutions of the RFSFR. In demanding a new level of sovereignty for Russia, 





suffering from her position as ‘main donor republic’ in the USSR. This was 
inflamed and given temporary centrality after the sudden manifestations of 
nationalism in the non-Russian republics, which offended the sensibilities of 
many Russians.21 Yeltsin undoubtedly fed off this sentiment to improve the 
prospects for his own political trajectory. He moved the discussion to whether 
it was time for more power to be devolved away from all-Union ministries and 
into new RSFSR institutions.  
In the lead up to the 1990 elections Yeltsin added this ‘nationalist’ tint to his 
political message on Moscow radio: ‘the issue of primary importance is the 
spiritual, national and economic rebirth of Russia, which has been for long 
decades an appendage of the centre and which, in many respects, has lost its 
independence’ (Laba 1996: 8). The issue of Russian autonomy was used as a 
political weapon; a dramatic ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’ was passed in the 
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, ensuring that Yeltsin remained in the 
political limelight (Hosking 2006: 383). Much of Yeltsin’s rhetoric tied in with 
Solzhenitsyn’s political pamphlet, Rebuilding Russia, which emerged in 1990, 
minus the focus on Russian Orthodoxy or demands to redraw the RSFSR’s 
borders (Solzhenitsyn, Klimoff 1991).  
Yeltsin’s efforts culminated in the creation of the RSFSR Congress of Deputies 
and Supreme Soviet, an institutional power base from which Yeltsin and his 
followers could issue new laws. This brought about elections for a new RSFSR 
President, which Yeltsin duly won, becoming Russia’s first ever 
democratically elected leader on the 12th of June 1991. At his inauguration he 
surrounded himself with symbols of the Russian nation: the flag hanging 
behind him was the Tsarist tricolour of red, white and blue and the song ‘A Life 
for the Tsar’ by Mikhail Glinka played in the background.  In his speech he 
announced: ‘Great Russia is rising from her knees. We will, without fail, 
transform her into a prosperous, democratic, peaceful, law-abiding and 
sovereign state’ (O’Connor 2006: 257). After the August Coup, Yeltsin was 










losers were the various conservatives of the Soiuz anti-reform faction. Yeltsin 
moved to remove his last serious opponent, Gorbachev, and dissolved the 
USSR with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991.  
While the above section has attempted to shed light on a highly complex period 
of Russian history, it neglects a vital part of the picture; how ordinary Russians 
reacted to these rapid changes. In his ethnography of the late Soviet period, 
Alexei Yurchak highlighted how rapid changes to ‘discursive conditions’ 
caused ‘a dynamic and powerful social system to abruptly and unexpectedly 
unravel’ (Yurchak 2006: 296). The question of how Homo Sovieticus 
responded to the end of this system is challenging to answer. While there was 
turbulence and rapid change at the political apex, there were low levels of 
mobilisation in the RSFSR. Unlike some of the non-Russian republics, the 
newly legalised neformaly in the RSFSR did not merge into one united, 
popular front. Mark Bessinger highlighted three main lines of mass 
mobilisation among Russians during perestroika: ‘nationalist-conservative, 
liberal-intellectual and labour-based economic’ (Bessinger 2002: 394). The 
first group involved the largely ethnic Russian Interfront movements in the 
Baltics and Moldavia, who came together under a platform of ‘saving the 
USSR’. Liberal mobilisation, on the other hand, remained an urban 
phenomenon in Moscow and Leningrad. The final group was largely confined 
to coal-mining regions of Western Siberia, Northern Kazakhstan and Eastern 
Ukraine.  
Unlike Poland’s Solidarity movement, no force emerged to connect and co-
ordinate these three mass movements. Russians seemed to respond slowly to 
the waves of national unrest that spread across the USSR. Ordinary people 
faced economic dislocation and hardship as reforms disrupted the systems of 
blat (personal connections) to which they were accustomed. At the same time, 
they had to endure attacks on the Soviet past, which exposed previously hidden 
tales of brutal repression. A 1988 article by Yuri Afanasiev argued Russians 
were stuck in an ‘ideological vacuum’ that was causing an ‘identity crisis’ 
(cited in Szporluk 1989:16). On top of this, it appeared they were hated by 





While they were assaulted from all sides by bewildering change, it is also 
important to note some of the characteristics of Soviet Russians, which can be 
found in research done immediately after the collapse, which forwarded  
several important conclusions (Levada et al 1993). Firstly, Soviet Russians 
tended to lack feelings of belonging to an ethnic group and identified more 
with their malaya rodina22  and the Soviet Union as a whole. Secondly, 
paternalistic views of the state predominated alongside a preference for a 
hierarchal society. Surprisingly there was no overwhelming support of 
collectivism. A readiness for individual gains was consistent but moderate; the 
study underlined that simplicity in desires and needs was common, perhaps 
offering an explanation of the stoic response to falling living standards in the 
1990’s. Much of this can be explained by the habits the Soviet people adopted 
over generations of authoritarianism: loyalty to the authorities is largely 
symbolic, the private sphere of family is prioritised, while, on the whole, very 
few demands are made of the authorities. The key objective for the Soviet 
person, as will be seen in the empirical chapters, is to survive; the willingness 
to endure hardship as long as certain minimums are met partially explains why 
Soviet Russians did not react more explosively to the rapid changes of 1988-
1998.   
Soviet Russians were also poorly prepared for participation in mass politics. 
When it came to the critical year of 1991, it seemed Russians supported both a 
continuation of the USSR with a new Union Treaty and increasing the prestige 
and power of the RSFSR institutions.23 Many Russians seemed to view the 
USSR as the ‘nation-state’ of the Russians and did not desire its dissolution. 
The suggestion that the ‘nationalism’ of the periphery made the continuation of 
the USSR impossible was a shock. A chain of events, poorly understood by 
many, then and now, brought an end to the state they called their ‘motherland’. 
Rather than emerging as the product of a coherent popular movement, the 
Russian Federation must have looked to some as the freak result of political 












very valid point that ‘as a political entity, Russia came into being as a negative: 
“not-the-USSR”’ (Hosking 2006: 388). Emil Pain also highlighted the 
challenge for Russia’s post-Soviet leaders: ‘How can a single positive identity 
form among inhabitants of a state that is regarded both by the authorities and 
the public as an unexpected, illegitimate child, a cripple, the victim of a 
catastrophe or plot?’ (Pain 2009: 15). Given the complexities behind this 
collapse and way ordinary people became alienated from political 
developments, it would prove tempting for some people subsequently to 
explain the collapse in terms of an anti-Russian conspiracy; a ‘stab in the back’ 
myth that also emerges in the empirical chapters of the thesis.  
Conclusion 
The above review has covered two ‘empires’ that both, for contrasting reasons, 
collapsed. In both of these states the tension between ‘empire’ and ‘nation’ was 
important. In describing both as empires, I refer to a supranational state 
claiming a civilizational identity that seeks to ‘manage’ the ‘nationalism’ of 
‘subject’ peoples. In both cases, the size and diversity of these states made 
national integration a serious challenge, whether it was along the lines of a 
‘nationalising empire’ or a ‘Sovietisation’. In the periods of Uvarov and Stalin, 
the authorities increasingly relied on a Russian ethno-cultural core in their 
nation-building efforts and emphasised the ‘imperial’ traditions of the state. 
Both treated ‘nationalism’ as a threat to state-building in a large multiethnic 
space, leading to ambigious stances both towards local non-Russian ethnic and 
cultural identities and the role of the largest ethnic group, the Russians.  
The vital difference between the two is that, while Romanov nation-building 
was attempted in conditions of peaceful economic development and relatively 
open spaces for public discussions, Stalinist efforts were part of a social 
engineering project of unprecedented scale involving mass terror, the forced 
resettlement of millions, constant mobilization and, eventually, war on a scale 
unrivalled in modern history. While Tsarist nation-building foundered on the 
rocks of war exhaustion and revolution, Stalinist nation-building successfully 
defeated the worst invasion Russia has ever suffered. Importantly, it was in the 





their rodina (motherland), taking the whole of the Soviet Union to be their 
nation-state. Russian national identity was dominated by Stalinist Russocentric 
statism infused with components not unfamiliar to today’s Russia: consider the 
strength of anti-Western feeling, the pride in felt in being a self-sufficient and 
mighty world power, the identification with a strong leader and rejection of 
political opposition and factionalism. These ‘Fortress Russia’ statist tendencies 
re-emerge in the empirical chapters as an important discursive formation in 
Russian mainstream nationalism today. 
Yet, as Solzhenitsyn pointed out, Stalin’s Soviet nation lacked a vital 
component: people could not talk to one another. As a result nation-building 
lacked a genuine and organic discursive element. The ‘nation’ was fossilised 
into its a xenophobic Stalinist statist form held together by the fear of violence. 
Nonetheless, after Stalin’s death, Russians started talking to one another far 
more, the ‘nation’ as a discursive formation, whatever the limitations, became 
possible beyond the confines of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. When 
Stalinist controls were relaxed a generation became enthused with the 
challenge of building communism and Russians were at the vanguard of this. 
The regime looked to secure the support of the Russian intelligentsia in this 
effort, although co-option was often combined with coercion when certain 
figures crossed the line of acceptable discourse. Although the 
Slavophile/Western split of the pre-revolutionary years re-emerged in the thick 
journals, the same cannot be said of the population at large. Of all the national 
groups of the USSR, it can be argued it was the Russians who became the most 
‘Soviet’ and the least likely to view the ‘Friendship of Peoples’ in a critical 
light. The systematic terroristic violence of the Stalinist period, where Russians 
suffered no less than any other group, was important in shaping Homo 
Sovieticus. A whole generation was taught it was helpless in face of the mighty 
state. This deterred them not only from political activity but even independent 
thought.  
The post-Stalin years did not fundamentally change this; although state 
violence was scaled back, we cannot view the long ‘stagnation’ period (1964-
1982) as one where ordinary people were encouraged to voice opinions or the 





phase of political demobilization, where Russians were encouraged to turn 
their back on politics. Although the prerequisites for the modern ‘nation’ such 
as urbanisation, industrialisation, modern transport and mass literacy were in 
place, the regime ‘froze’ the political and cultural environment. This partially 
explains why when reform was initiated ‘from above’, the great mass of 
Russians were unwilling or perhaps unable to participate. Paternalism and 
passivity, two interlinked phenomena, are important features of the ‘Soviet 
man’ that still resonate in today’s Russia.  
In the first years of Russia’s new post-Soviet era, many assumed that Russia 
would be able to easily ‘overcome’ Soviet legacies and ‘join the West’. This 
was central to Yeltsin’s platform and, after his consolidation of power, he 
rather distanced himself from the nationalistic ethno-cultural language he had 
occasionally used during his political ascendency. In the next section, I will 
examine post-Soviet nation-building ‘from above’, bringing us from the 
collapse of the USSR to the current day, highlighting the challenges faced, first 
by Yeltsin, then by Vladimir Putin, in building a common national identity for 
post-Soviet Russians.  
Literature Review Part Two: Russian Nation-building in the Post-
Soviet Context.  
The first part of this section offers an interpretation of a vital period in Russian 
national identity today, the decade of Boris Yeltsin’s leadership. The second 
unpacks in more detail how, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, a clear 
directon has emerged in the promotion of a certain version of the Russian 
nation. The evolution of post-Soviet Russia is a great demonstration of how the 
‘imagined’ national community that crystallizes and solidifies in one period, 
can quickly reconstitute into new forms. The disintegration of Marxist-
Leninism, after a long phase of decline as an accepted worldview within 
communist societies, left a vacuum to be filled. In the immediate post-1991 
phase, many shared a ‘naive and romantic faith in the wonders of democracy, 
capitalism and nationalism’, and elites set about to use these ideas to build new 
loyalties (Suny 2012: 33). In Russia, subsequent disappointment and frustration 





on Russia’s decline as a great power, the loss of Soviet certainties and 
resentment at the way relations have worked out with the West and the former-
communist states.  
Building the Post-Soviet Russian nation: The Yeltsin years  
Upon becoming the first leader of Russia after the USSR, Boris Yeltsin 
inherited serious problems. On one hand, as the largest post-Soviet state, 
Russia inherited 76% of USSR territory, 61% of its GNP, 51% of population 
(Sakwa 2008: 36). On the other hand, the state of the Soviet economy in the 
final months of the USSR was critical; in November 1990 food shortages had 
compelled Gorbachev to send his foreign minister to beg $1 billion in 
commodity credits from Washington (Reddaway, Glinksi 2001: 278). It was 
from this less than promising starting point that the new government attempted 
to simultaneously jump through several transitions that had taken place in the 
West over many centuries; nation-building, democratisation, market reform, 
capitalist accumulation and building civil society. In this, the challenge was to 
overcome Soviet backwardness and become ‘Western’. The Yeltsin leadership 
centred their legitimacy claims on anti-communism, presenting the Russian 
people with a simple dichotomy: ‘either you are with us moving into the future 
or with the communists going back in time’.  
Yet, this narrative of entering Western civilization and enjoying the fruits of 
prosperity and modernity was soon contradicted by stark new realities. The 
Yeltsin period was one of appalling socio-economic decline. Russian GDP 
declined by 44% from 1992 to 1998, almost double the 24% drop in Soviet 
GDP that occurred during the Nazi invasion. Meanwhile, capital investment 
fell to 20% of 1990 levels (Reddaway, Glinksi 2001: 249).24 The demographic 
statistics were shocking; over 1992-2000 the Russian population fell by 2.8 
million, with male life expectancy reduced from 64 in the 1980’s to 57 in 
1994.25 It is not surprising that given these conditions ‘many Russians came to 
identify “democracy” with poverty and degradation’ (Hosking 2006: 392). The 










country defeated in war, although in this case much of the damage was done 
after ‘defeat’ in the Cold War. Rather than the sudden destruction of bombs 
and bullets, neoliberal reforms and a domestic kleptocracy dismantled the 
social protections of the Soviet system and oversaw apparent Russia’s slide 
into third world status.  
Thus, it is in this context that the limitations of Yeltsin-era nation-building 
must be assessed. Given the increasing unpopularity of Yeltsin and rising 
nostalgia for the certainties of Soviet times, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
new authorities found it difficult to rally people around the symbols and 
rhetoric of the new state. Russia’s pre-Soviet past was haphazardly mined for 
symbols of the new Russian Federation. The double-headed eagle returned, 
along with the imperial flag. Yeltsin participated in the ceremonial reburial of 
the last imperial family in St. Petersburg’s Peter and Paul Fortress, where he 
called the Bolshevik execution ‘one of the most shameful episodes’ in Russian 
history that demonstrated a valuable lesson: ‘Any attempt to change life 
through violence is condemned to failure’.26  
This ‘anti-Soviet’ narrative was combined with the rhetoric of civic 
inclusiveness, a process that aimed to convert ‘Soviet people’ into citizens of 
the Russian Federation. Yeltsin explicitly underlined the civic and non-ethnic 
basis of Russianness. The Russian Constitution of 1993 addressed a ‘multi-
national people’ (mnogonatsional’nyy narod) and the population was referred 
to as rossiyane (citizens of Russia) rather than russkie (ethnic Russians) 
(Duncan 2000: 131). Furthermore, Soviet ethno-federal structures were 
adopted with little alteration in the Russian Federation, with Yeltsin leaning 
toward what has been described as ‘ethnic laissez faire’ in the devolution of 
powers to regional elites (Rutland 2010: 120). Efforts to build a civic Russian 
identity, however, suffered greatly in the context of economic hardship and a 
discredited democratic polity. Struggling to build legitimacy on the 
foundations of anti-communism and civic Russianness, in 1996 Yeltsin even 
created a competition in order to find a new ‘national idea’ for the country 







substantial. All in all, the expected rapid transformation of Homo Sovieticus 
failed to occur. 
Arguably the Yeltsin years made more progress in state-building and elite 
consolidation of power than nation-building. Opposition to shock therapy 
reforms crystallised in parliament under the leadership of Ruslan Khasbulatov 
and his Civic Union coalition and, in March 1993, they voted to repeal 
Yeltsin’s special powers of decree. Yeltsin responded by declaring a state of 
emergency, gambling that ‘the level of public cynicism and apathy had become 
so great (…) that widespread active support for its opponents would not be 
forthcoming’ (McDaniel 1996: 182). The crisis ended with Yeltsin essentially 
carrying out a coup in October 1993, removing the legislatures at federal, 
regional and local level, all of which were pillars of an infant Russian 
democracy (Reddaway, Glinksi 2001: 372). The post-1993 regime bought 
stability at the price of legitimacy; the events of 1993 cemented popular 
alienation from politics; only 46% of the electorate voted in the December 
1993 elections, with 12.8% voting against all candidates and 4.8% destroying 
their ballots (ibid: 348). The post-1993 constitution affirmed the power of the 
executive and removed virtually all checks and balances against it; the promise 
of a post-Soviet democratic transition was thus in tatters from an early stage.27  
This top-heavy statist structure helped not only to reproduce many of the 
problematic elements of the Soviet state system; it also encouraged 
bureaucratic parasitism in the form of rent-seeking. 28  One good way to 
describe what emerged is ‘state-apparatchik-oligarchic capitalism’, within 
which a significant organised crime element was enmeshed (Brudny et al 2004: 
40). The new ruling class included a small club of new billionaires known as 
the ‘oligarchs’ who, in co-operation with Western fund managers, took part in 
the stripping of capital out of Russia at a rate of $2 billion a month. In 1991 
Russia had no billionaires. By 2003 that number had risen to seventeen (Klein 










Approaching the 1996 elections, economic hardship, the debacle of the First 
Chechen War and Yeltsin’s declining image, meant the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation (CPRF) were poised to make serious gains. With the 
backing of Russia’s richest men Yeltsin, and widespread electoral violations 
with campaign costs over $100 million, Yeltsin saw off the communist 
resurgence.29  The final result in the second round of voting brought no 
landslide; Yeltsin won 53.8% of the vote (40 million) versus Zyuganov’s 
40.5% (30 million) (Duncan 2000: 138). It can be argued that 1996 was the 
beginning of ‘managed democracy’; the sustained use of state and oligarch 
resources to subvert the democratic process. Those voting for the CPRF were 
clearly roused by the sense Russia had been corrupted by venal oligarchs and 
self-serving bureaucrats. The economic meltdown in 1998, leading to a 
devaluation of the Rouble and more deprivation for the bulk of Russia’s 
citizens, only served to stoke feelings of injustice in the population.  
Overall, it is easy to understand how people came to view the Yeltsin years in 
terms of multiple failures. This includes the failure to build a democratic 
system, to promote a new Russian identity, to enter the ‘civilized’ world, to 
bring prosperity to Russia, to rebuild Russian military or industrial strength. 
Russians lost the best aspects of Soviet life while gaining the worst excesses of 
Western ‘bandit’ capitalism. While the Soviet empire crumbled, transition into 
the ‘First World’ failed, leaving many alienated and frustrated. The ‘successes’ 
of this period were more dubious from the point of view of ordinary Russians: 
power and property were transferred to a reconstituted elite, an executive-
dominated political system was built, communist and nationalist forces were 
held in check and no popular disturbances arose to challenge the new system. 
The experience of 1988-1998 is vital to understanding how and why Vladimir 
Putin was able to emerge from obscurity to become a genuinely popular leader 









The Putin years  
It is revealing that the new president’s first decree upon entering office was a 
measure to protect the ex-President from prosecution. The establishment of 
Putin as president was carefully planned from above and controversy still 
surrounds events prior to his appointment.30 Yeltsin’s sudden resignation on 
31st December 1999 was timed to allow Putin to capitalize on his temporary 
popularity from the Second Chechen War and hold successful elections. From 
the outset, the mood of the country at the end of the nineties differed sharply 
from what prevailed at the start of the decade. Public opinion had shifted with 
regards the fateful year of 1991; rather than viewing it as ‘the birth of a free 
Russia’ it came to be seen as ‘the collapse of the USSR’. ‘Liberalism’, 
‘democracy’ and ‘reform’ became anathemas to the general public, connected 
as they were to the travails of the Yeltsin years.31  
Putin moved to distance himself from the anti-communist and pro-Western 
ideological language of the Yeltsin period, restoring the Soviet anthem and 
reclaiming some of the ‘Soviet’ parts of Russianness without making clear 
statements of a radical change of course. In 1996 Yeltsin claimed that ‘the 
communist project could not stand the test of time… the Soviet Union failed 
under the weight of universal crisis due to economic, political and social 
contradictions.’ By 2005 the zeitgeist of the country had changed to such an 
extent that Putin felt comfortable asserting: ‘we should acknowledge that the 
collapse of the USSR was the major geopolitical disaster of the twentieth 
century’ (Panov 2010: 93). In some ways, Putin’s pandering to Soviet nostalgia 
can be understood as posturing to the electorate; bringing an end to rhetorical 
de-Sovietization was popular in older voters. Yet, Putin’s version of the ‘post-
Soviet’ nation is more than Soviet nostalgia. In order to unpack it further, I 
examine four areas of nationalist claim-making: (a) forging a common 
historical memory; (b) fostering a common civic identity; (c) bolstering the 
legitimacy of those that lead the nation; (d) promoting a geopolitical vision of 













On one level, Putin-era memory policy is characterised by ambiguity towards 
the Soviet period. On the other hand, it involves clear efforts to build a 
patriotic ‘useable past’ by weaving together a bricolage of pre-revolutionary, 
Soviet and post-Soviet elements. Ambiguity to the Soviet past can be found in 
measures to commemorate the victims of Soviet repression, such as Putin’s 
2007 visit to the Butovo Memorial south of Moscow in October 2007, where 
he paid his respects albeit without directly referring to the crimes committed 
this site.32 Putin said the victims of this repression were ‘people with their own 
ideas (…) unafraid of speaking out (…) they were the cream of the nation’.33 In 
2015 Moscow’s Gulag Museum was reopened in an impressive and larger 
venue with the support of Moscow local government in October of that year to 
commemorate the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repression, 
an official public holiday instituted in 1991.34 This was followed by the passing 
of a long-prepared law ‘On the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Political 
Repression’ in March 2016, which resulted in an additional 3.5 million 
‘enemies of the Soviet state’ being rehabilitated.35 Thus, a consistent direction 
is visible in recognising the horrors of Stalinist repression and encouraging the 
story of the victims to be included in Russia’s historical memory. 
These measures, however, have been accompanied by other policies working 
in a rather different direction. The historian Alexei Miller (2014) argued 2014 
was a watershed year when ‘the established sites and forms of dialogue and co-
operation in the field of historical memory were destroyed’. It was in this year, 
for example, that plans for a Stalin museum were announced, whose exhibits 
will focus on Stalin’s contribution to victory and his role in the rebirth of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, neatly side-stepping Stalinist wartime errors and 
wide scale repression.36 In the same year of the Gulag Museum’s expansion in 















Perm-36, was shut down after pressure from the local authorities and vague 
accusations of ‘extremism’ among the museum’s organisers.37 On top of this, 
in April 2014 a new law was ratified against the ‘Rehabilitation of Nazism’ 
that, among other things, makes it an offence to ‘spread flagrant lies about the 
military activities of the anti-Hitler coalition during World War Two’.38 It 
remains to be seen how far the legislation will be used to curtail historical 
writings of an anti-Stalinist flavour. Overall, it appears there is increasing 
space for more positive portrayals of Stalin, perhaps reflecting the desire of 
many Russians to downplay the question of repression and focus more in 
taking pride in him as a wartime leader. 
The ambiguity about the Stalinist past may be connected to the desire to protect 
the memory of the Second World War, which can be viewed as the centre piece 
of state policy and aspirations to fostering unity and patriotism in the 
population via historical memory. Extensive polling has shown that all 
generations of Russians seem to regard it as the most important event in the 
country’s twentieth century history (Laruelle 2011: 233) and the biggest source 
of national pride about the past (Sperling 2009:239). Increasing amounts of 
state resources have been spent on commemorating the victory. A new pomp is 
visible in Victory Day ceremonies with the omnipresent presence of orange 
and black ribbons. In recent years, the Victory Day celebrations have become a 
truly mass phenomenon with the state’s co-opting of the grass-roots ‘immortal 
regiment’ movement (bessmertnyy polk), which emerged in Tomsk in 2012, 
where TV-2 station supported the march of over 6000 people carrying portraits 
of relatives who had participated in the war. In the following years it spread to 
other Russian towns with 30,000 turning out in St. Petersburg in 2014. In 2015, 
the event was led for the first time by the state as part of the seventieth 
anniversary celebrations. These administrative resources helped bring out over 
four million into the streets of Russia, including 500,000 in Moscow alone.39   
While there is significant ambiguity about the Soviet past, a concerted effort is 
visible in building a patriotic view of Russia’s history, one that could unite her 









this narrative is the view that Russia is the legal heir of a 1000-year tradition of 
statehood, with continuity in her historical path from Kievan Rus, through the 
Russian Empire and the USSR up to the current moment (Malinova 2014b). 
One of the central means of propagating this 1000-year narrative has been 
through the issuance of new history textbooks, where the authorities have 
pushed for the creation of one, standardised textbook. The Kremlin’s 
endorsement of Alexander Filippov’s ‘The Modern History of Russia: 1945-
2006: A Teacher’s Handbook’ has produced a great deal of controversy. While 
it did not subsequently become widely used in Russian schools, Filippov’s 
handbook can be seen as the precursor to the creation of ‘Unified Textbook on 
History’, a 2013 initiative that is still labouring to produce a definitive textbook 
that, according to Putin, should be written ‘within the framework of a single 
unified concept’.40 In their discourse analysis of Russia’s current textbooks, 
Levintova and Butterfield (2010) found increasing consensus on three areas of 
recent history that were connected to the ‘lessons’ of Russia’s 1000-year 
history:  (i) centralisation is positive and necessary to avoid a repeat of the 
1991 collapse that came as a result of the ‘legal nihilism of the regional elites’ 
(ibid: 145) (ii) ‘cowardly’ foreign policies (such as those of 1990’s) are 
condemned (ibid: 154) (iii) Putin’s impact is seen as positive, strengthening the 
state, ‘solving’ the Chechen question, providing positive economic growth and 
introducing a positive, assertive foreign policy’ (ibid: 156).  
Trends in education textbooks are reinforced by other measures, such as 
changing the name of the public holiday ‘the Day of Accord and Conciliation’ 
to ‘Unity Day’. This shifted the focus to the heroic figures of Minin and 
Pozharsky, who were central in expelling Polish invaders and ending the ‘Time 
of Troubles.’ This new focus encouraged citizens to look back to distant 
ancestors who had united against an external enemy to preserve Russian 
statehood as it faced its darkest hour. This encouraged identification with 
medieval Russian patriots, displaying their acts as a model for today’s 
Russians. In a recent polemical essay, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov 
(2016) outlined his own commitment to a longue durée view of Russian 







with the Golden Horde, victory over Napoleon and Soviet achievements into 
one coherent narrative that highlights the positive role Russia has played in 
global affairs while underlining how, in much of this, the ‘West’ has sought to 
undermine the country’s efforts. Above all, this useable past encourages 
Russians identify with a long period of Russian statehood that crosses 
seamlessly from feudal Muscovy, the Russian Empire and the socialist Soviet 
Union. In many ways, this reduces national identity to loyalty to the state and 
pride in its strength, buttressing a conservative worldview. This longue durée 
view of Russian history is one that will be returned to in the empirical chapter 
on popular historical memory ‘from below’.  
Building a common civic identity  
Following on from Yeltsin’s abortive efforts to forge a civic identity based on 
the pillars of anti-communism, Western-style civic inclusivist language and the 
promise of Russia’s post-Soviet transformation, Putin’s first decade was 
marked by ambiguity. Oxana Shevel (2011) described Russia’s nationality or 
ethnic policies as ‘purposefully ambiguous’. This muddled picture is made all 
the more challenging due to the difficulties and ambiguities in certain key 
terminology used in the Russian context. First of all, in Russian language two 
adjectives exist for the term ‘Russian’ – the first is rossiyskii and is more 
connected with civic, non-ethnic belonging to a state, while the second, russkii, 
is more about ethnic, linguistic and cultural Russianness. This duality tempts 
many observers to locate signs that the Kremlin is moving closer to one or the 
other definition of Russianness.  
However, Shevel (2011: 199) concluded that alterations to Russia’s 
‘Compatriots Policy’ were merely a ‘legalisation of vagueness’; in other words 
no decisive measures had been taken to revitalise Yeltsin’s sterile and muddled 
rossiyskii civic identity project. Peter Rutland (2010) referred to these policies 
in terms of the ‘presence of absence’; rather than seriously cultivating either 
the civic or ethnic aspects of Russian identity, Putin has made ‘state power’ the 
‘object of veneration’ (Rutland 2010: 124). Overall, both authors argue that the 
Kremlin’s conceptual murkiness allows the leadership to appeal to different 





commitments by which future performance may be measured (Shevel 2011, 
Rutland 2010). 
Events in 2010, however, pushed questions of patriotism, interethnic harmony 
and nationalism to the forefront in Russia, raising serious doubts over the 
state’s management of this area. In 2010, after the rioting of right-wing football 
fans on Manezhnaya Ploshad resulted in deaths, President Medvedev 
underlined that ‘interethnic conflicts are lethal for Russia, no matter where they 
occur’ and affirmed ‘All peoples should learn to live together. It is difficult, but 
our is no stranger to that. Our country is truly, really multinational.’41 In 
January 2012, Putin dedicated an entire article to the ‘National Question’. The 
article opened with a discussion of the ‘general failure of European 
multiculturalism’, to which the Russian experience compared favourably: 
‘Russia is neither an ethnic state, nor an American “melting pot” in which 
everyone is, one way or another, an immigrant. Russia emerged and has 
developed for centuries as a multi-ethnic (mnogonatzional’noe) state’ (Putin 
2012: 2). Putin claimed ethnic nationalism was a virus and rejected nationalist 
slogans, such as ‘Stop feeding the North Caucasus’, as irresponsible and only 
likely to bring calls to stop ‘feeding’ Siberia, the Urals and the Far East (ibid: 
3) and, thus, bring about the collapse of the country.  
Putin also outlined the unique features of Russia as a multinational state, where 
the Russians (russkie) play the role of the ‘state-forming people central to the 
very existence of Russia’ whose ‘great mission’ is to ‘unite and hold together a 
civilization’ in the Eurasian space. As with the Soviet ‘Friendship of Nations’, 
the Russians sit at the top of the ethno-cultural hierarchy, encouraging the 
peaceful integration of ‘smaller’ nations into a large and powerful state. Thus, 
Putin attaches a certain civilizational identity to Russianness ‘based on culture 
not ethnicity’. Thus, a new neo-imperial and statist flavour was outlined that 
also utilised elements of civic patriotism. Luke March (2012: 411) pointed out 
the continuity Russian ‘official nationalism’ has with Tsarist and Soviet 
traditions in that it is a ‘conservative nationalism that venerates, justifies and is 
subordinate to state interests’ while being ‘primarily focused on achieving 







Since the Ukraine crisis, however, the increased usage of russkii in state 
discourse has led some to conclude the Kremlin is ready to move from ‘statist’ 
and ‘civic’ rhetoric’ to ‘ethno-nationalism’ (Tepel 2015, Blakkisrud 2016). 
This can be seen in references in state speeches and media to the ‘russkie in 
Ukraine’, Crimea as ‘russkaya land’ and Sevastopol as a russkii town. 
Speaking in September 2015, Putin himself highlighted how ‘russkie’ had lived 
in one country as one family and were split up suddenly and unexpectedly in 
1991, leading to Russia becoming the ‘largest divided nation in the world 
today’.42 Thus, a well-worn piece of ethnic nationalist discourse was finally 
adopted by a leading state figure.  
Nonetheless, this should not be taken as clear cut evidence of ethnic 
nationalism; the adjective russkii has a powerful supra-ethnic meaning 
inherited from the Imperial and Soviet periods. As Marlene Laruelle (2016) 
recently argued, the term russkii is more often used by Putin in two clearly 
non-ethnic ways:  (i) a ‘way to underline the historical unity of the Eastern 
Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians)’ (ii) and ‘as an appellation to the 
messianic historical purpose of Russia’.43 Thus, the term russkii has long roots 
of ambiguity and Putin is able to use it without contradicting the principle of 
Russia as a multi-ethnic state.44 In this reading russkii and rossiyskii do not 
have a clear conflict, one affirms a civic, multi-ethnic state, the other refers to 
an imperial unified state and common cultural code.  
A. Verkhovsky and E. Pain (2012) have termed Putin’s solution to the 
construction of a common Russian identity as ‘civilizational nationalism’, one 
that uses neo-imperial language and claims to civilizational distinctiveness to 
consolidate Russian society in place of ethno-cultural nationalism (which 
would cause separatism and instability in multi-ethnic Russia) and civic 
national identity (which is difficult given the lack of independent civic 
institutions and active civil society).  This is supported by a neo-traditional 
discourse (Stepanova 2015) that has resulted in policies aimed at protecting 











language and culture. These include the banning of ‘homosexual propaganda’, 
restrictions on abortion, making divorce more expensive and criminalizing 
‘insults to religious feelings’. Elena Stepanova (2015: 122) has pointed out that 
much of the rhetoric in the two key official documents of Russia’s neo-
traditional turn (The Ministry of Culture’s ‘The Basics of State Cultural Policy’ 
and the Orthodox Church’s ‘The Basic Values – The Fundamentals of National 
Identity’) are both infused with the Soviet-era language of the Communist 
Party’s ‘Moral Code of the Builder of Communism’. In some ways this 
discourse is also an attempt to flesh out what makes Russia a distinct country 
from the West, returning us to the Slavophile-Westernizer debate. The above 
outlines a neo-Slavophile vision of Russianness that has yet to be converted 
into a coherent state ideology but contains elements of Russia’s Tsarist and 
Soviet heritage.  
Legitimising the state in leading the nation 
From the outset, the key difference in Putin’s presentation of the state’s role 
from that of Yeltsin was his focus on the importance of a strong state as the 
ultimate guarantor of order and stability. As Putin expressed it: ‘From the very 
beginning, Russia was created as a super-centralised state. That’s practically 
laid down in its genetic code, its traditions and the mentality of its people.’45 
As a corollary to this, internal unity was demanded; critics and fault-finders 
were seen to be treacherous; ‘Those who oppose us need a weak, sick state, a 
disorientated, divided society, so that behind its back they can get up to their 
dirty deeds and profit at your and my expense.’46 This drive to centralise was 
pursued through the expansion of a ‘power vertical’, which, among other 
things, involved reasserting central authority in Russia’s regions. This was 
linked to the claim that the post-1991 decentralisation had caused state 
disintegration. In his first presidential address in 2000 Putin announced that in 
Russia was still not a fully-fledged federal state’ due to excessive 
decentralisation, where a ‘power vacuum has led to state functions being seized 
by private corporations and clans’.47 In his second address of 2001, he asserted 









to the disintegration of the state that I spoke of in last year’s address’.48 This 
language of ‘statism’ prioritises the preservation and strengthening of the state 
in order for it to play a primary role in running the economy and providing 
social services. 
The second aspect of Putin’s presentation of the state came in the form of a 
new political brand termed ‘Managed Democracy’ or ‘Sovereign 
Democracy’.49 The central idea of this was that the Western experience of 
democracy was not applicable to Russia and that the West could not to be 
relied upon to be an effective tutor in this question. Well-known political 
scientist Sergei Karaganov has argued that ‘sovereign democracy’ was 
introduced as a new model for semi-authoritarian developmental states to 
follow as an alternative to developed liberal-democratic Western states (see 
Evans 2008: 909). This was informed by a somewhat Darwinian view of the 
world where only strong states can prevail, injecting a polarity between 
countries who were ‘great powers’ and those who were weak and dependent on 
the West, therefore not ‘sovereign’ (ibid).  
Thus, out of the ashes of the ‘three-worlds’ Cold War system, a new 
reconfiguration emerges, where the BRIC countries replace the communist 
bloc countries as the ‘second world’ challenging the West. The vital difference 
here is that this ‘second world’ is not offering an alternative to the liberal order 
of the West as such; instead it demands the end of ‘second class status’ of 
sovereign nations such as Brazil, India, China and Russia. In a 2005 address 
Putin declared: ‘Russia is a country that has chosen democracy through the will 
of its own people… As a sovereign nation, Russia can and will decide for itself 
the timeframe and conditions for its progress along this road.’50  
The announcement of the new ‘Sovereign Democracy’ doctrine went hand in 
hand with new measures to ‘manage’ post-Soviet democracy by limiting the 
role of political opposition while cementing the dominance of United Russia. 
New electoral regulations form 2006 made it much harder for opposition 









shot up from 35,000 in 2001 to 1.5 million in 2007 (ibid: 145). United Russia 
can be described as a ‘party of power’ in that it promotes presidential 
prerogatives in the legislature and is propped up by extensive use of state 
resources and presidential patronage (Smith 2012: 122).  
Tightening control of the political system, however, is only part of the picture. 
A key feature of Putin-era politics was the sense of quid pro quo where ‘in 
return for opting out of politics and leaving such matters in the hands of the 
current power-brokers, the Russian people will receive material well-being and 
be able to be full of pride in their country’ (Laruelle 2009: 25). A variety of 
Russian analysts have referred to this is as a ‘social contract’ between the 
electorate and the president. The director of the Levada Centre Lev Gudkov 
(2015a) argued the first version of Putin’s social contract, running from 2000-
2011, was based on the idea the people would stay out of politics and, in 
return, the state would provide economic prosperity and growth. This was 
particularly attractive to Russia’s emerging middle-class. In this context, the 
unexpected protests that occurred after the 2011-2012 elections of real 
diversity across a variety of regions (Ross 2015) caught both the authorities 
and the expert community by surprise, challenging the country’s existing status 
quo (Gel’man 2013).  
The ensuing clampdown that followed these protests included a variety of 
measures reducing freedom of speech and opportunities for public assembly 
(March, Cheskin 2015: 266-67). Gudkov argues this led to redrafting of the 
social contract so that the state’s main partner was no longer the ‘creative’ 
middle classes but the ‘poor and state-dependent conservative groups in the 
provinces’ (Gudkov 2015a: 864). This version of the contract is even more 
paternalistic, involving state promises to, on the one hand, prop up the existing 
dilapidated systems of free healthcare, education, state pensions and state-
dependent industries, and, on the other, to achieve Russia’s rebirth as great 
power by ‘standing up’ to the West.51 As the Moscow Carnegie Centre’s 










sustained any longer, a new version was offered: the people trade “loyalty and 
non-involvement in politics" in return for “Crimea, the glory of being great 
power and a one-thousand year history”’ (2017:1). This brings us to the final 
vector of nation-building in the Putin period: foreign policy initiatives and 
geopolitical visions.  
Foreign policy and geopolitics  
If Yeltsin publicly promoted the political values of ‘democratic statehood, civic 
consciousness and patriotism’, the Putin era witnessed a shift in focus towards 
the merit of ‘maintaining the state spread over a vast territory’ (Panov 2010: 
91). This involves restoring Russia as a ‘great power’, something expressed in 
Russian as derzhavnichestvo or (greatpowerness) (Urnov 2014). The main 
change in foreign policy under Putin has been to move away from the 
‘integrated European power’ goal of Yeltsin period to the ‘independent, 
Eurasian and rhetorically revisionist power it became by 2004-05’ (Newton 
2010: 88). This was partially a response to American actions under neo-con 
president George W. Bush, who neglected to treat Russia as a serious partner in 
the ‘War on Terror’, expanded NATO, installed missile launch facilities in 
Eastern Europe and, perhaps worst of all, supported colour revolutions in the 
post-Soviet space (Trenin 2015: 76-91). Whatever they were a response to, 
Russia’s new assertive foreign policy have brought positive shifts in the public 
approval rates of the President, whose spikes in 2008 and 2014 coincide with 
Russian involvements in Georgia and Ukraine respectively. Foreign policy is 
arguably the centrepiece of Putin’s identity project today and taps into the 
memory of Russia’s historical greatness in the Russian population. For Lilia 
Shevtsova (2015: 25) ‘foreign policy has become the Swiss Army knife of the 
personalised-power system’s drive to preserve itself’ that can be used to 
‘compensate for the Kremlin’s waning internal resources’ and ‘divert attention 
away from deep social and economic problems’.  
Vyacheslav Morozov (2013, 2015) has argued that Russia’s assertive foreign 
policy has a dual nature. One part of this is neo-imperial and looks to assure 
Russian dominance of the post-Soviet space. This revolves around the apparent 





zones designated as strategically vital; Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The other main component is Russia’s struggle with the ‘West’, an American-
led force that looks to obstruct Russia’s attempts to achieve her legitimate 
goals. In this struggle Russia presents herself in an ‘anti-imperial’ mode 
advocating a ‘multipolar world’ that would ‘democratize’ international affairs, 
bringing about a liberation from American dominance. (Morozov 2013: 16). 
For Gudkov (2015b) this activates certain previously dormant components of 
Soviet identity, when the ‘the feeling of belonging to an enormous country (…) 
provided the “little man” with compensation for daily humiliation’ in terms of 
‘chronic poverty’ and ‘lack of rights’. This anti-Western and negative 
mobilisation is ‘preoccupied with the search for internal and external enemies’ 
(Gudkov 2015b: 37-8).  
Yet, Russia’s stance to the West has more to it than this hard-nosed and 
confrontational style. Russia is also presented as a ‘normal’ modern and 
innovative country to visit for tourism and business. ‘Mega-projects’ such as 
Skolkovo, Sochi and the football World Cup are presented as evidence of this 
vector (Makarychev, Yatsk 2014). Both sides of this are projected in state 
media to shore up support for the country’s current course.  In examining 
media discourses on the ‘West’ in Russia, Joanna Szostek (2017) highlighted 
three main recurring themes: (i) the USA is hypocritical and wants to run the 
world (ii) Europe and Russia would get on better without US interference and 
that, after the current conflict is solved, they will return to ‘normal’ co-
operation (iii) Russia and the other BRIC countries deserve more say in world 
affairs. The mass transmission of these themes on state media are part of a 
communications strategy on the part of the Russian leadership. The Foreign 
Policy Concept of 2013 underlined Russia’s need to influence how the world 
perceives her and wage struggle to ‘counteract information threats to (Russia’s) 
sovereignty and security’.52 These efforts to wage an information war with the 
West are part of a drive to have Russia recognised as a great power, and, from 
the point of view of the authorities, it is hoped that ordinary Russians will 







According to sociological polling, these policies have succeeded in uniting 
Russian society in particular phases.53 Emil Pain (2016) has argued that an 
‘imperial syndrome’ continues to dominate in Russia. Central to this is the 
obsession with keeping the ‘imperial body’ in one piece, which Pain traces 
back to a 2003 Putin speech where he outlined the challenge of  ‘Maintaining a 
state spread over such a vast territory and preserving a unique community of 
peoples while keeping up a strong international presence’, which he saw as 
Russia’s thousand-year ‘historic fate’.54 Obsession with retaining the ‘imperial 
body’ is combined with ‘imperial consciousness’, which Pain views as 
composed of two elements: Russian essentialism (the idea of a special Russian 
civilization) and viewing the West as the key existential threat to this 
civilization (Pain 2016: 60). Overall, Russia’s imperial syndrome works toward 
a conservative worldview that has strong parallels with Count Uvarov and the 
Slavophiles: Russia needs ‘a strong ruler, an emperor, as a defence against 
external enemies’ (ibid). Thus, the state’s use of foreign policy involves a 
potent mix of rebooted Soviet imagery, pre-revolutionary Slavophile 
intellectual traditions and modern language of international law and self-
determination to offer a compelling geopolitical mission for Russia today. 
Conclusion  
This review has highlighted a number of trends in post-Soviet nation-building. 
Firstly, the Putin period has abandoned much of the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the 
Yeltsin years, ending the ‘westerniser’ turn of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, 
responding to shifts in public opinion about the nature of Russia’s post-Soviet 
course. Secondly, while the construction of a common identity ‘from above’ 
has taken some time to take shape, the current bricolage is an interesting blend 
of pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet elements. This includes imperial imagery 
(consider the pomp and fanfare of the Presidential Address), claims to 













values. Thus, in some ways, Putin-era conservatism bears comparison with the 
official nationalism of the late nineteenth century. Together with this, Soviet 
elements continue to play a role, with Russians continuing in their ‘elder 
brother’ role under the new brand of a ‘state-forming’ people forging the 
peoples of Eurasia into a ‘unique civilization’. The rhetoric of conservative 
Soviet social policy is also reproduced in the current turn to neo-traditionalism. 
Post-Soviet elements also play a role, as state discourse employs language of 
the civic nation partially imported from the West, as well as using the 
discourse of self-determination and equality among nations to justify a more 
robust stance in foreign affairs.  
Thirdly, it is important to note no clear state ideology has emerged to replace 
Soviet communism. As Lilia Shevtsova (2015: 25) concluded the current ‘array 
of legitimating concepts resembles a stew whose ingredients are simply 
whatever the chef could obtain: Sovietism, nationalism, imperialism, military 
patriotism, Russian Orthodox fundamentalism, and economic liberalism’. From 
this mixture, civilizational nationalism, social conservatism and neo-
traditionalism are used most clearly in state narratives to elaborate on Russia’s 
distinct path. Fourthly, the most recent period has also witnessed an incomplete 
reboot of the Soviet social contract, the first version of which exchanged non-
involvement in politics in return for material well-being and stability (Laruelle 
2009: 25). This has now evolved into updated version that has replaced the 
promise of prosperity with minimum social welfare provision and a much 
heavier accent on great power politics.  
Putin’s statist brand of national identity blends authoritarianism with 
democratic window dressing (managed democracy), Russian great-power 
imperial (rossiyskii) identity and a civic inclusive (rossiyanin) sense of 
Russianness. All of this is underpinned with commitment to maintaining a 
powerful and paternalistic state to hold the country together and provide social 
stability and solidarity (Brookfield 2012: 392). Finally, the centrality of foreign 
policy is clear, with the West playing a central role as the key constituent 
‘Other’. The way the West has come to play this role is partially explained in 
the alienating actions of the USA and NATO. On the other hand, this can be 





holding together the world’s largest state, the great importance attached to 
retaining great power status. The re-emergence of geopolitical tensions and 
new divisions, along with the persistence of imperial consciousness suggest 
Soviet and pre-Revolutionary legacies have been important in determining the 
shifting course of the post-Soviet story.  
The four themes highlighted in this concluding section re-emerge in various 
parts of the four empirical chapters of this thesis, which offers a picture of how 
ordinary people have absorbed, internalised, reproduced, rejected or ignored 
various elements of post-Soviet nation-building. The shift to a Slavophile style 
is visible in viewing the West an enemy across Russian history (chapter four), 
Russia as a distinct civilization that has her own path (chapter six and seven). 
The sense of bricolage in identity is highlighted most of all in discussions on 
nationality, citizenship, ethnicity and interethnic relations (chapter five). The 
lack of a coherent ideology stands out in discussions on the political system 
and foreign policy goals (chapters six and seven). Finally, the persistence of 
‘imperial consciousness’ and ‘greatpowerness’ are also salient in 
conceptualisations of the Russian ‘we’ (chapter five) and Russia’s role in the 















Popular Historical Memory ‘from below’: Themes of 
stability and conservatism, the salience of 1988-1998.  
Introduction and theoretical considerations 
This chapter considers the role of popular historical memory in Russian 
national identity, revealing commonly shared visions of the national past. 
Collective memory undoubtedly can act as a powerful cohesive force, binding 
the disparate members of a nation together. It is another force demarcating the 
boundary between Us and Them, delineating the national self from the foreign, 
alien ‘Other’. Such binding memories can be passed from generation to 
generation, transmigrating across multiple historical contexts. Collective 
memory then, is about how the historical ‘we’ is constructed and defined in 
communities by ‘agreeing upon what they hold to be important, to which story 
they accord, which anxieties and values they share’ (Assmann, 2008: 52). As 
we saw in the previous chapter, state-led efforts towards the construction of a 
‘useable past’ for the national community are not without contradictions and 
ambiguity. In uncovering some of the shared ideas, values and interpretations 
located in collectively remembered versions of the past, we see how state 
policies ‘from above’ are accepted, rejected, transformed and subverted.  
Below I examine the myths and historical longue durée view of history that 
form an important component in Russia’s hegemonic nationalist discourse. 
Furthermore, I consider the important role played by lived experience and 
transmitted memory of the period 1988-1998. The chapter also dispels the 
notion that historic memory in Russia is dominated by nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union across the board. In fact, the absorption of the ‘Soviet’ into a ‘useable 
past’ is complicated by an important split in normative standards across the 
population. Before we examine these points, I will preface these findings with 
some important theoretical considerations in the study of historical memory.  
The starting point in terms of theory can be found in the pioneering work of 
Maurice Halbwachs, who coined the term ‘collective memory’ and claimed ‘no 





determine and retrieve their recollections.’ (Halbwachs 1992: 43). Memory is a 
cultural inheritance very much influenced by social networks; it is up to the 
social group to decide what is remembered and forgotten from history and this 
is achieved, in part at least, through discussions in families and communities. 
Thus, Halbwachs makes a key contribution in linking collective memory to 
social groups. A central concept in this chapter is that interactions between 
families, peer groups and generational cohorts affect the (re)production and 
transmission of historical memory.  Representations of the past can only be 
deemed credible if they are congruent with the dominant thoughts, values and 
feelings of the group in question.  
 
Beyond social frames, another important theoretical consideration is the 
question of generation. The sampling of respondents covered two age groups, 
the last Soviet youth generation (40-55) and current post-Soviet youth (18-30). 
Generational positions can be examined along the lines of a common ‘age 
cohort’ (people of a similar age) and generational ‘lineage’ (the transmission of 
memory from older to younger) (DeMartini 1985). It is important not to treat 
generations as natural units that always exist. It is more useful to think of them 
as ‘produced through common experience and through discourse.’ (Yurchak 
2006: 30). This chapter also draws out some of the key moments where age 
cohort differences are significant and instances of lineage transmission in 
collective memory. What is of key interest here is to identify those ‘myths’ 
that, although significant, are confined within certain generational, social and 
cultural pockets, and those with the ability to transcend these barriers and 
become more acceptable to the wider population. 
In connecting a ‘suitable past’ with a ‘believable future’ (Misztal 2003:17), the 
remembering of a desirable past often involves locating a ‘golden age’ or 
‘heroic past’; those periods when the country was in more desirable 
circumstances. At the same time, there are certain ‘disastrous’ periods that 
stand out as ‘how not to life’. As Mark Jubulis (2007: 173) pointed out, this 
focus on the golden age or the trauma is not about a return to the past; it is 
about supporting agendas in the present, be it economic modernization or more 





future destiny by locating and remembering its desirable past – the ‘golden 
age’ and the ‘heroic past.’ As Barry Schwartz (2000: 251) put it, memory is ‘a 
cultural programme that orientates our intentions, sets our moods, and enables 
us to act.’ He argued that we ‘key’ the past, bringing memory into line with 
contemporary cultural values and standards, allowing models of the past to 
share one meaning space with the experience of the present (Schwartz 2000: 
226). In this sense of ‘memory as cultural programme’, ‘normality’ plays a 
vital role. This chapter argues much of what is deemed ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ is strongly connected to the lived experience of the period 1988-
1998. 
In approaching the study of historical memory, the term ‘collective memory’ is 
not without its problems. Duncan Bell (2003) argued there is a danger we rely 
too much on the term ‘memory’; he warned against the totalizing connotations 
of ‘collective memory’; ‘the alleged unified, coherent memory shared amongst 
all of the people concerning their national past’ (Bell 2003: 74). Nets-Zehngut 
(2012: 254-255) proposed the division of ‘collective memory’ into five 
constituent components.55 It is the fifth and final of these, the ‘popular’ 
collective memory, or, in other words, representations of the past that dominate 
in larger social groups, that is the focus of the chapter. Few would doubt the 
importance of the ‘popular,’ given that it acts as a restraint on the activities of 
‘memory entrepreneurs,’ who in attempting to reshape visions of the past to 
their own goals are limited by ‘the constraints of historically developed, 
socially transmitted, and culturally framed credibility’ in popular historical 
memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014: 9).  
This brings us to the question of how to access popular collective memory. For 
a variety of reasons, many appear more than happy to rely on public opinion 
polling data, where a set of positions are mapped out in advance by researchers 
and respondents are expected to tick the boxes and provide a picture of how 
history is perceived. Without becoming embroiled in methodological debates 
too deeply here, the use of semi-structured interviews reveals how people 









‘forgotten’ in longer descriptive sections or ‘thick descriptions’. It is important 
to underline that the scholar of popular collective memory approaches research 
in a rather different way to the professional historian: while the latter looks 
from the outside in with apparent objectivity and scrutiny in the service of 
‘historical truth’, the former looks for access to the myths and representations 
that a group knows within itself. This is one reason why ethnographic 
fieldwork can produce important data on popular collective memory.  
While examining the ‘thick descriptions’ of respondents, what became clear is 
saliency of myths in collective memory. In order to trace the most salient 
aspects of popular collective memory I take up Duncan Bell’s argument that 
‘collective memory’ is at least partially made up of constructed, internalised 
and commonly reproduced ‘nationalist myths’, which he defines as a story that 
‘simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and 
its place in the world … through (re)constructing its past’ (Bell 2003: 74). Here 
‘myth’ does not take on the meaning of ‘lie’ or ‘falsehood’; instead it can be 
viewed as a narrative that possesses an ‘emotional underpinning’ and is able to 
‘add significance to the world’ (Bottici and Challand 2015: 90-92). In 
attempting to locate these myths on certain historical junctures we are looking 
for ‘an idea, an event, a person, a narrative that has acquired a symbolic value 
and is engraved and transmitted in memory’ (Assmann 2008: 67-68). This 
emphasises the point that, in order for the past to become ‘memory’ it must be 
articulated in social groups and passed on through creative interpretation. The 
myths examined here must be coherent and exciting enough to be deemed 
worthy of transmission in social settings.  
Thus, in this chapter I examine certain ‘myths’ that are successfully reproduced 
in the ‘mythscape’ (Bell 2003) or the ‘mnemonic field’ (Bernhard, Kubik 
2014: 17). This is an area where various myths on history battle it out for 
primacy. This leads us to also to view memory as a discursive practice – its 
‘discursive materiality’ means we can uncover memory existing in different 
and competing ‘discursive formations’ (Foucault 1978: 15). Here we recognise 
the fluidity of collective memory and argue it is subject to change; shifts from 
established memory to counter-memory are expected in response to the 





overcome the established hegemony of political elites, thus we can also view 
the ‘mythscape’ as a ‘contested territory in which groups engaging in a 
political conflict promote competitive views of the past in order to gain control 
over the political centre.’ (Zerubavel 1997: 11).  
One example of how myth can set agendas in the present can be found in the 
work of Jelena Subotić on Croatian and Serbian hegemonic narratives that both 
focus on ‘broadly shared feelings of victimhood, even martyrdom, and 
injustice at the hands of more powerful states, and a desire for the vindication 
of past wrongs’ (Subotić 2013: 325). In examining myths in circulation in post-
Soviet Russia, Alex Oushakine linked these narratives to the pain experienced 
in economic transformation of country and showed how ‘the inability to 
convincingly explain individual or collective losses’ led to the ‘intensive 
production of popular conspiracy narratives aimed to bring light to hidden 
forces and concealed plans of “evil outsiders”’ (Oushakine 2009: 74). Here 
myths with conspiracy themes reveal the ‘real’ origins of unfair situations 
today and offer way to overcome unpleasant things in the present. Thus, ‘the 
mutual recollection of the country’s negative past was often used to shape new 
forms of solidarity and belonging’ (Oushakine 2009: 109). In this chapter, we 
also examine how myths can often be conspiratorial in style and operate as a 
‘populist theory of power’ (Fenster 2008: 84–90). Having examined some 
important theoretical considerations, I now turn to the empirical findings of 
this chapter.  
Findings on historical memory 
The findings of this chapter are divided into three main sections. The first will 
explore how the dominant ‘golden ages’ reflect deep-seated longings for 
stability and order, while negative periods generally involved violent 
revolution and/or state disintegration. Interestingly, despite high-profile state-
led efforts, very few respondents referred to the Great Patriotic War. Instead, 
an idealised version of pre-revolutionary period (1900-1917) took centre stage, 
alongside positive views of the ‘Putin era’. In examining the most common 
images of a ‘desirable past’, I will also refer to normality and abnormality in 





experience of both the very recent past and present. Furthermore, a popular 
longue durée view of Russian history among certain respondents will be 
unpacked and examined, revealing a vision of Russia experiencing positive 
phases of stability followed by disastrous downward spirals, with the West 
often playing the role of the dangerous external force seeking to gain from this.  
In the second section, attention will be paid to how lived experience and 
transmitted memory of Russia’s recent past (1988-1998) influence the above 
myths and longue durée view of Russian history. This will involve an 
exploration of how older respondents related their own lived experience of 
1988-1998 and where younger respondents reproduced this. I will outline the 
way memory of this period shapes political values in the present, especially in 
the rejection of previous ‘liberal’ myths on the end of the USSR as a ‘triumph 
of democracy’, encouraging a general conservatism in the population.  
The final section will examine the role of Soviet periods in popular memory, 
revealing how strongly contested positive and negative myths about certain 
Soviet period appeal to different sections of the population. This section will 
reveal the importance of social frames in reproducing the Soviet past is the role 
of social frames. I will explore how pro-Soviet positions tend to be within a 
certain age and background. On the other hand, while anti-Soviet myths are 
more likely to cross such social lines. In examining myths that defend Stalinist 
and Brezhnev era development policies, what becomes clear is that praise for 
the ‘Soviet’ is veiled or open criticism of the deficiencies of the economic and 
social policies of the current period. The section will also examine powerful 
anti-Soviet myths that act as a break on the incorporation of these elements of 
the Soviet past into Russia’s ‘useable past’. 
Part one: The myths of stability and myths of national tragedy 
The pre-revolutionary decades as a ‘golden age’ 
It is surprising that period leading up to the First World War (1900-1914), and 
the Putin era (2000-2014), both of which fall outside of the Soviet Union’s 
seventy year history, were most often selected as the ‘best periods’ in Russia’s 





more effort on commemorating the Great Patriotic War period and we have yet 
to witness any significant shift in how to commemorate the end of the Tsarist 
monarchy or the October Revolution of 1917.56 Given that respondents of 
various ages, location, gender and social background reproduced myths on 
1900-1914 and 1917, the period has strong potential for incorporation into 
Russia’s ‘useable past’. The way positive representations of the 1900-1914 
period were framed was striking; respondents were consistent in describing 
Russia as being ‘on the up’, enjoying a positive and healthy trajectory. The 
myth of 1900-1914 tells us much about what Russia’s ‘normal’ condition 
should be: a country well on the road to entering fully-fledged modernity, as 
one of the Great Powers of Europe. This fits with the picture of quantitative 
surveys, which have also shown positive identification with this period.57 
There were a number of features in presenting this period as a desirable past 
for Russia. Firstly, Russia is remembered as a strong country that is respected 
and admired by other European countries, one that possessed a dynamic and 
attractive economy with a powerful Rouble. Russia was then a magnet for 
talented people rather than, as is the case today, a country suffering from ‘brain 
drain’: 
Pre-revolutionary Russia was a very strong country. We had a Rouble that 
was then a convertible currency. We lived better than Europe. I mean 
Europe came to us: doctor, tutors to work in Russian families. (…) but now 
we see the opposite picture, when people are looking for ways to leave here.  
Natalya (50) Accountant. NN 
Part of the idea of a developing and dynamic Russia revolved around 
understandings of Stolypin’s agricultural reforms that made ‘agricultural 
production more flexible, making the peasants modernize and produce more’. 
Alongside this ‘the Rouble was placed on the gold standard, making it one of 
the most important and dependable currencies in the world’ (Viktor (22) International 
Relations Student, NN).  According to this myth, the Russia of 1900-1914 was ‘not a 











successfully’ (Elisa (58) Director of Sports Centre, SPB). Furthermore, Russia’s place in 
the world was promising: she ‘exported grain to the whole world, industry was 
developing (…) Prospects were pretty good’. (Vyacheslav (53) Head of corporate security, 
SPB). This is a picture of gradual, steady economic growth bringing growing 
prosperity; the country was ‘on the ascendancy (vzlet)’, ‘with everything on the 
up (vse shlo vverkh) (Mikhail (29) Actor, Moscow) and on the road to becoming a 
‘normal’ or ‘strong’ European power.  
 What is interesting about these descriptions of 1900-1914 is how they resonate 
with the other period chosen by a large number of respondents as a successful 
phase in Russia’s development: 2000-2014. This is a tendency also recorded in 
very recent Levada Centre surveys.58 While this can hardly be considered a 
‘historical period’, respondents were given the freedom to pick any era 
between today and 1900, and, as this was their preference, the results should 
not be disregarded. In this context, we find the qualities of the Stolypin and the 
Putin eras being presented in similar terms, independently. 59  What both 
representations have in common is a focus on steady economic improvement 
and gradual evolution towards the level of ‘normal’ countries. Overall, the 
2000-2014 period is described as one where the course has been set in an 
understandable manner in general terms, producing visible dividends across 
several key indicators. Many respondents highlighted this period as one of 
upward trajectory, particularly in the first decade of Putin’s tenure, a period 
‘when the people of Russia had never lived better, I mean for the our whole of 
history, (…) whatever they say about it elsewhere (…) it was a new level of 
consumerism (….) Russia has never eaten so well. (Konstantin (27) state municipal 
management specialist, Moscow). 
Thus, central to choosing this period is the feeling of increased prosperity, 
stability and security and economic growth, which brought visibly improved 
living standards. One respondent highlighted some key commonalities between 













history were that in both cases ‘Russia in one way or another took a jump 
forward and started to rise to the same level of other European countries (…) 
(this was about) a leap forward (skachok), progress, a strong ruler’ (Anastasia (21) 
Economics Student, NN). Putin era stability is contrasted to the era of ruin that 
preceded it (the wild nineties), while the 1900-1914 period is compared to 
what followed it; the October revolution and civil war: 
Firstly, before the First World War we had a good period, the country was 
on the rise (na pod"yeme) and if it hadn’t been for that disaster (beda) 
(October 1917 M.B) (…) It’s possible that everything could have turned out 
differently for us. The second, is the current period. Even if there are still 
some things lacking, some of our places are still in ruins, at least we have a 
direction and we are starting to develop again.   
Ludmilla (50) Head of University Dormitory, NN 
 
Thus, memories of a peaceful and stable phases - 1900-1914 and 2000-2014 – 
both tell us much about how many view Russia’s desirable future: one of 
continued economic development, improved living standards, stability and 
predictability. Here, a clear dynamic emerges linking the past (1900-1914), the 
present (2000-2014); the desirable past is connected to the perceived social 
reality of ordinary people and reflect agendas for the future.  
The Myth of 1917 as rupture and catastrophe  
If we move away from ‘golden era’ and consider Russia’s ‘worst period’, we 
find the period of the October revolution and the foundation of the USSR 
(1917-1923) was chosen by an outright majority of respondents. This is largely 
in line with quantitative survey results in Russia, which show a large majority 
viewing the period in negative terms.60 Seen as a dark period that shattered 
Russia’s progress in social, political, cultural and economic development; the 













October Revolution was ‘the biggest evil because it if wasn’t for this we would 
have just had our normal February revolution and we would have developed 
like all normal European countries. We would have taken that path because we 
were on it already. (Julia (47) Assistant in film set production, SPB). This ‘dark’ and 
‘abnormal’ age for Russia was described in rich and diverse ways, suggesting 
the powerful potential it has accumulated in popular collective memory.  
Representations of the ‘disaster’ focused on three interlinking lines, (i) as a 
human tragedy (ii) as a catastrophe for the Russian nation (iii) as a geopolitical 
disaster for the Russian state (and a relief to our rivals). In the first case, 
respondents paid attention to the human cost of the revolution, the sense of 
horrendous bloodletting in an orgy of destruction and violence. One event that 
was commonly referred to was the brutal execution of the royal family, an act 
that typified the blind, ruthless violence of the era and the sense of wilful, cruel 
and inhumane destruction being inherent to the revolution’s progression: 
As a humanist, just how they (the Bolsheviks) behaved with the family of the 
Tsar, I think that was unjust and simply inhuman. It was awful and it 
summed up the nature of the new authorities. Also for the people it was 
supposed to give them an idea of what these new rulers were really made of.  
Marina (25) Language teacher, NN 
In the second case, we find the tragic human losses are considered more on the 
level of the nation as a whole. This includes, for example, not only individual 
tragedies but collective loss, such as cultural destruction wrought by the 
Bolsheviks on ‘lifestyles, a feel for language, and the ability to sing our 
Russian songs (…) Every people has the experience of previous generations, 
the ‘collective subconscious’. And, sadly, what we had built up, we lost here’ 
(Mikhail (29) Actor, Moscow). This imagines October 1917 as an assault on Russia as a 
‘nation’: her culture, intelligentsia, religion, and traditions. One common idea 
was that the October Revolution started a process that wiped out some of the 
best minds in Russia at the time. This line of thinking emphasises the tragedy 
in terms of the ‘Russian nation’ rather than the torments of individual victims. 
The focus is on the long term consequences for the Russian people as ‘a large 





specialists, either left or were exterminated after the revolution (…) they could 
have made a contribution in the development of the country. Instead they were 
removed’ (Ruslan (57) Programmer, SPB). The sense that Bolshevism acted as a motor 
of ‘unnatural selection’ that ‘led to moral and mental degeneration’, was a 
favourite theme of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1995: 81) in his later political 
writings.61 It appears some of this message has found a home in popular 
collective memory today.  
An interesting term that cropped up in several respondents, especially in the 
SPB respondents was the idea that ‘the cream of the nation’ (ves’ tsvet natsii) 
was exterminated during this era of catastrophe.62 What is emerging here is 
some idea of what the Russian nation is, an imagined entity of different people 
united along national lines that is torn apart in 1917. This sense of national 
disaster focuses on the senseless destruction of civil war as: 
The most terrible thing that can happen to a country, when your brother 
becomes your enemy. An enormous number of people died. Those who 
didn’t die, left and this was an awful loss for Russia. The best of the nation 
(ves’ tsvet natsii) was either killed or, having survived, left the country (…) 
All that was left behind were the drunken sailors that had carried out the 
revolution (laughs). 
 Alexei (25) Assistant to deputy of Local Assembly, SPB 
 
The ‘disaster of 1917’ was often described in the most the most emotive terms, 
and is an excellent example of how myth operates in popular collective 
memory. Firstly, the period in question (the Revolution and Civil War) is 
simplified and painted in terms of ‘trauma’ – a tragedy in terms of what it did 
to the Russian people. Secondly, meaning is injected into the narrative through 
emotion. Here the emotion is great lament, the feeling of victimhood. In using 
the term ‘we’, the trauma is imagined to have hurt the Russian nation that, in 
the case below, is comprised of the royal family, the Church, classes of people. 











damage done to the fabric of this ‘nation’:  
The worst was October 1917. We Russian people, desecrated everything 
sacred that we had (…) we shot our royal family, a house that had served 
the state for centuries with faith and truth (veroi i pravdoi) (…) we started 
totally destroying our own religion, wrecking our churches and killing our 
priests. We killed entire classes of people! The whole best of our nation 
(ves’ tsvet natsii) was killed or left the country. It was like a knockout blow 
that nobody can get up from.  
Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB 
Facing up to this disaster means coming to terms with collective failure. This 
myth suggests that Russia’s twentieth century was built on ‘abnormal’ 
foundations and, as we will see below, dovetails with the tendency to view the 
Stalinist period as another ‘tragedy for the Russian people’. Much of this ties in 
with what was once a ‘counter-memory’ position at the end of the 1980’s: the 
idea that, had Russia avoided this Bolshevik ‘disaster’, would have continued 
on a path of modernization and remained one of the ‘civilized nations’.63 Thus, 
it can be argued a shift has occurred in the mythscape of Russia that has 
involved absorption and reproduction of more anti-Bolshevik interpretations of 
Russian history ‘from below’.  
In this research, however, few respondents articulated an anti-Bolshevik long 
view of Russian history. Instead, a different longue durée was found to be in 
circulation, which I return to in more detail below, that focuses on Russian 
history as a series of upward and downward shifts. This also is connected to the 
third trend in viewing 1917 as a ‘disaster’: the view that the revolution was a 
geopolitical catastrophe for the Russian state, wiping out years of successful 
Romanov statecraft. Sociological polling suggests this line of thinking has 
retained a stable share of popular thinking on 1917, with around a quarter of 
respondents viewing the collapse of the monarchy as ‘leading to a loss of 
national and state greatness’.64 This line of thinking views Russia’s trials and 









interprets October 1917 as a ‘great betrayal’ linked to ‘Western intrigues’. 
Here the revolutionaries are seen as traitors to Russia; by forcing her out of the 
war the country lost her rightful place at the table of victors: 
I consider the collapse of the Russian Empire to be an act of treason. I mean 
(pause) imagine it, while the war is raging a person arrives, Lenin from 
Germany, who passed in train through the country, he arrives and brings 
down. I mean the socialists brought down our army and, in the end, Russia 
leaves a war she could have won.  
                            Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN. 
 
This brings us to one possible ‘lessons’ of 1917: that Russia ‘didn’t have 
enough smart people in the state, those who could have done something and 
taken control of these processes, applying some political will and a certain 
amount of harshness (zhestskost’) in order to bring the situation under control’ 
(Igor, (41) Lecturer in International Relations, NN). Thus, the weakness caused by this 
indecisive leadership, combined with the arrival of various treacherous and 
terroristic revolutionaries, allowed internal upheaval and disorder to cause 
treachery and the defeat of Russia’s interests. Sociological polling comparing 
mass views to the revolution between 1990 and 2017 shows an increased 
number view the loss of the Autocracy as a ‘great loss’ and explain the 
revolution as a result of ‘weak central government’ (from 36% to 45%) and ‘a 
conspiracy against the Russian people’ (from 6% to 20%).65 This links into a 
longue durée view of Russian history that reveals anxieties about the present: 
lingering fears that the precarious progress being made by Russia under Putin 
could be undone by internal upheavals. 
The popular longue durée view of history 
It would appear that life experience and transmission of memories of the very 
recent past (1988-1998) are vital in crafting a longue durée narrative that views 
Russian history as led by cycles of stability and collapse over the centuries. 
This portrays Russian history as a struggle between two extreme states: stable, 
ordered periods characterized by strong central rule and phases of disorder, 







offered the pre-war era (1900-1914) and the Brezhnev era (zastoi) (1964- 
1982) as classic stable phases, while contrasting them with the October 
Revolution and Civil War (1917-1923) and the perestroika/market reforms of 
the nineties (1989- 1999). This cycle is graphically illustrated in the following 
way: History goes in like a spiral in Russia, people never learn. We always 
have to end up with the shit hitting the fan (v polnoy zhope) and then, only 
then, do things pick up. Our country doesn’t know how to develop in a gradual 
way (Zakhar (29) Manager in export company, SPB). The acceptance of this cyclical long-
view interpretation of Russian history is linked to three very important ‘lessons 
from history’ that help support current values and ideas. The first of these 
equates ‘revolution’ with any rash and overly hasty policies or sudden social 
and political change. According to his view, ‘the path of revolution is totally 
unacceptable’, political change ‘shouldn’t be done through the great leaps and 
killing (skakaniya i gibeli) of people’. Furthermore, revolutions are seen to be 
led by ‘a handful of people’ who ‘stupefy’ the masses. Finally, the masses 
themselves ‘just stupidly follow’ these leaders even though they ‘don’t really 
get the point’ and are ultimately all this ‘talking’ ends with ‘few results’ except 
that the people ‘suffer’ in the end (Ludmilla (50) Head of University Dormitory, NN).  
It is likely that lived experience of the changes that followed 1988-1998 are 
influential here; the various reform promises of ‘democracy’ and 
‘liberalization’ were felt to end with chaos, collapse and despair. The lived 
experience of the nineties may well be crucial in building a narrative according 
to which Russians have ‘been through enough’. Below, Russia’s twentieth 
century traumas explain the desire for ‘peace’ and ‘quiet’. This viewpoint 
presents Russia as a country lurching from one radical set of events to the next 
with barely any respite between. This represents a kind of yearning for the kind 
of ‘normality’ respondents described with regards 1900-1914 and 2000-2014 – 
that of stability, order and peace: 
They accuse us Russians of some kind of passivity. Like we aren’t capable of 
decisive action. But we Russians are tired of war, revolution. For the last 
one hundred years, through the civil war, revolution, then the Stalinist 
repressions, the war with fascism, where many millions of people lost their 





classmates fighting there. And remember the zinc-lined coffins that came 
back from there. We are tired of all this, just let us have a peaceful life. I 
don’t want lots of impulsive actions (aktivnykh deystviy). Let the politicians 
agree among themselves somehow, we just don’t want any demonstrations, 
we’ve had enough. We don’t want any wars. 
 Natalya (50) Accountant. NN 
This kind of sentiment above shows how life experience (Afghanistan and 
political demonstrations) ties in with understanding of history to create values 
in the present.66 This idea was condensed down into a more transmittable form 
and was a common position for respondents young and old. The essence of this 
mass common-sense position is that ‘you shouldn’t try to change life through 
revolution’ as this will ‘destabilise life completely’. Thus, reform ‘needs to be 
done gradually, not to destroy and then build from nothing’ (Katya (22) Student 
Politics, NN).   
A logical extension of this is the second key lesson: Russia only prospers when 
she has a ‘strong leader’ at the helm. This connects ‘strong leaders’ with 
‘stability’ and ‘weak leaders’ with ‘chaos’. Thus, one consequence of this 
longue durée view of Russian history, is support for political leaderships that 
are ‘powerful’, ‘decisive’ and ‘tough’: a point that chimes well with the image 
projected by the current President: 
Russia only starts to get back on her feet (podnimat’sya) and start living 
more or less well when she has a powerful leader (moshchnyy lider). Take 
Gorbachev, he was neither here nor there and the country fell apart. (…) 
But take Stalin, Putin, Lenin… well, let’s just say the Russian people on a 
genetic level behave themselves well only when they are under the 
leadership of a tough Tsar (zhostkogo tsarya). If the Tsar is not tough a 
collapse will happen. 









This brings us to the third important element of this longue durée: the idea that 
the West was and is central to explaining Russia’s troubles, then and now. This 
ties in with research showing the ‘West’ has played a vital role as a constituent 
‘Other’ in the historical development of Russian identity (Greenfeld 1992; Tolz 
2001). In explaining the 1917 disaster with reference to the role of the ‘West’, 
a more conspiratorial, anti-Western myth emerges. A selection of respondents, 
mostly male and aged over forty, viewed the 1917 revolution as a conspiracy 
fostered abroad in Western Europe and unleashed on Russia when she was at 
her most vulnerable. These respondents view revolution as a weapon employed 
to weaken states in time of conflict and connect 1917, something external 
powers were seen to deploy in 1991 and the Time of the Troubles. Thus, 
themes of conspiracy abounded in this demographic group, who had 
experienced the 1991 collapse, which was also ‘arranged from without’ while 
‘certain forces inside the country that facilitated this’. Afterwards, however, 
ordinary people ‘did not benefit from the collapse of the USSR’ (Vitaly (42) 
Businessman, semi-retired. NN).  
Living through this experience (1988-1998) was increasingly disempowering 
as time passed; empirical research has supported the idea that conspiratorial 
themes were adopted in Russian society to help make sense of this increasingly 
challenging environment (Oushakine 2009). There were numerous examples of 
how it was only retrospectively that these respondents came to use conspiracy 
themes to explain the changes they experienced. While one could be ‘pretty 
relaxed’ about the collapse at the time, now ‘but now some time has passed, 
many things have come to light. We now know that Gorbachev betrayed the 
country, they are right to be talking about criminal charges for him.67 (…) this 
was all done deliberately, he got a lot of money for this (Nikolay (52), ex-policeman, 
retired, SPB).  
What is interesting is how some of the ideas of the ‘male over-forty’ segment 












particular version of the longue durée view of Russian history. Russia’s 
upward and downward trajectories over the centuries are tied to the 
interventions and subversive acts of the Western powers who, concerned by 
Russia’s potential might, conspire to place obstacles in her path and, when 
possible, bring about her downfall: 
They say the USSR was brought down on purpose in order to destroy 
stability in Russia. They say Russia is a potentially very strong power (…). 
We have great potential. The fact is that revolutions and crises have 
destroyed Russia periodically at precisely the times she was about to get on 
her own two feet… only to then force her back into obscene positions... all 
so that she won’t get too powerful(…) We all know the world is run by 
people from the West.  
Daria (28) Events Manager for Local Goverment, SPB 
This idea of the perfidious West that still seeks to bring down Russia and 
reduce her into humiliating subordination cannot be presented as a fringe 
phenomenon; in chapter seven’s discussions about Russia’s role in the world 
we find plentiful examples of the USA being presented as an acquisitive 
superpower using revolutions to control the world, subvert states and break up 
countries with desirable resources into controllable chunks. The West’s blame 
is not limited to 1917 revolution; the recent past is also referred to: ‘the 
Gorbachev money, payments to the Ukrainians (during Maidan MB), all of this 
is from our beloved America, she is the one who needs the destabilization of 
Russia’ (Elisa (58) Director of Sports Centre, SPB). According to this view, Russia has 
been subject to constant probing by external powers searching for opportunity 
in Russia’s internal upheaval. This goes all the way back to the Time of the 
Troubles and links various foreign powers with a common aim: to break up 
their large and powerful geopolitical opponent, Russia. 
If we look at history, we can see that Russia can only be destroyed from 
within. The external enemy, whether it is Napoleon, Hitler, the Poles 
(pause) they all tried to destroy the country but it didn’t happen for them. 
But when the civil war started, we know things moved in another direction. 





know the answer. But on its own, the external enemy cannot take our 
country on.  
Zakhar (29) Manager in export company, SPB 
It is worth pointing out here that this conspiratorial way of understanding 
history and world affairs is contested. Some younger respondents commented 
on the popularity of conspiracy in certain older age groups.  One respondent 
highlighted how the during changes of 1991 ‘Russian society was blowing hot 
and cold, lots of different ideas hung in the air (…) with new freedoms people 
started to freak out (ofigivat’), now you could think and talk about so much, it 
was a shock for them.’ Given the extent of the change and the lack of 
understanding, many came to feel they ‘had let everything slip out of our 
hands, that a gang of conspirators had destroyed everything without asking 
anyone’ (Mikhail (24), IT support, SPB).  Another younger respondent used the 
example of his own father, who ‘had lived in such a comfortable world and 
now, suddenly, was faced with all these things happening. It was from all this 
that the feeling emerged that there are enemies in our midst. And it is these 
enemies that want to hurt us and destroy the country’ (Arkady (27) Computer 
Programmer, NN). This suggests this conspiratorial way of seeing the world is, in 
some ways, viewed as the ‘baggage’ of an older generation. Although further 
research is needed, it is possible that this longue durée is rooted in the last 
Soviet generation (or the ‘Children of Reform’) and, with time, will become 
less salient.  
On the other hand, the longue durée view of Russian history appears to be 
transmitted across generational lines, although more work is needed to reveal 
how far this is connected to social background, occupation, gender or 
education. It combines fear of rapid social and political change, support for 
‘strong leaders’ and antipathy to the West to form a significant part of Russian 
identity today. As we will see in more detail in chapter six, these ‘lessons of 
history’ support a certain conservatism that has an important role in supporting 
the status quo in Russia today. It also ties in well with chapter seven’s 
discussion of how Russia’s role in the world is imagined. In a recent televised 
debate with opposition politician Alexey Navalny, Igor Strelkov, an ex-





the West is has been responsible for Russia’s problems since 1991, including 
ruining the Soviet economy, installing an oligarchic system and turning the 
country into a resource colony.68 In doing this he clearly taps into pre-existing 
anti-Western sentiment ‘from below’ that is reinforced by the myths of popular 
historical memory. I would argue that part of this pre-existing sentiment is 
shaped by Russia’s recent past, which has witnessed great reform promises of 
democratization and liberalization, unexpected state disintegration and 
widespread social and economic dislocation. It is the lived memory of this, 
which is convincingly transmitted to younger respondents, that helps explain 
popular receptivity to myths around 1900-1914 and 1917, as well as the above 
longue durée view. Below, we will examine how interpretations of the recent 
past form part of are a ‘historically developed, socially transmitted, and 
culturally framed credibility’ (Bernhard, Kubik 2014: 9). This ‘credibility’ 
functions as a constraint on those seeking to offer new versions of the past. It 
can be argued that the most credible and consensual myths in Russia owe their 
success to their congruence with existing cultural repertoires influenced by the 
recent past (1988-1998).  
Part two: The influence of recent and lived history: 1988-1998 
Perestroika, the Collapse of 1991 and the Wild Nineties  
While there was much division on how to interpret 1991 and the question of 
how desirable the late Soviet system was, there was far more consensus among 
respondents on how to understand the complex and interlinked phases of 
perestroika (1985-1991), the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of a new 
country (1991-1998). Here a workable myth is on display that merges these 
two periods into one; the rapidly deteriorating conditions of 1985-1991 join the 
1991-1998 market reforms to make one massive downward spiral. One 
possible reason for this is actual lived experience of reform resulting in things 
nobody had asked for or expected. As Timothy McDaniel (1996:155) aptly 
remarked:  
All of the promises made by the reformers to the public were turning into 








irresolvable conflict; instead of a revitalization of the economy, declining 
growth, growing deficits and increased corruption; instead of moral 
renewal, a sense of apathy, powerlessness, and hopelessness among the 
masses.  
As reform proceeded and freedom increased, living standards started to drop, 
hardly a good association. In the narratives of personal experience of these 
periods from older respondents there is a powerful sense of families being 
disconnected from the reform process. As will be seen in chapter six, the 
experience of this period is influential in explaining aspects of political 
behaviour today.  
This merging of the two reform periods into one allows people to mark it off as 
a phase in which Russia experienced a clear downward trajectory. This entails 
‘forgetting’ other aspects of the reform era, such as the neformaly, business co-
operatives or democratization, and ‘remembering’ the period of 1985 to 1991 
and 1991-1999 with reference to words such as ‘collapse’ (razval), ‘stupidity’ 
and ‘rashness’. This is combined with the idea that the USSR could have 
limited itself to gradual economic reform, while postponing democratization 
indefinitely. Levada Centre polling shows that, over the last twenty years, the 
majority view the collapse as regrettable and avoidable.69 Older respondents 
(who had lived through it as young adults) often described the reforms in 
general in negative terms: ‘it led to nothing good’, ‘it wasn’t anything to do 
with us’, ‘we didn’t support it or oppose it’ and ‘we went on trying to live, 
work, plan futures’. For many respondents, one way to make sense of the 
period is to argue that Russia should have followed the Chinese experience of 
reform, which as more conservative and economically successful, is more 
desirable. The essence of this myth is that had Russia ‘followed the Chinese 
path’ collapse could have been avoided (Roman (28) Journalist Kommersant, Moscow). 
Instead of ‘giving permission for everything all at once’, the leadership should 
have ‘introduced things gradually’ (Denis (41) Journalist, NN).  









was done too soon: ‘you can’t just give people permission for everything in one 
instant. Things should have been unrolled carefully and bit-by-bit. If it had 
been done that way then everything would have gone more smoothly and 
peacefully’ (Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB). The idea of ‘too much too 
soon’ was also told in metaphors of home repair: ‘Perestroika should have 
been like repairing a house not a demolition job. Gorbachev took perestroika 
so far to the point that he was ready to burn the house down just to get rid of a 
few cockroaches’ (Leonid (45) Religious history lecturer, NN). In other words, the 
reformers are compared to workers set to do home repair work who, instead of 
this, proceeded to ‘start ripping things apart (…) destroying everything that is 
old’ (Anatoly (55) History lecturer, NN). The central idea of this ‘botched repair ending 
in collapse’ metaphor was also present in younger respondents. Whatever the 
views on the new state that took the USSR’s place, there is a fairly strong 
consensus among respondents of varying ages that the USSR could have been 
reformed in a different way, that the collapse was avoidable. While ‘some 
things were right to happen, like for example democratization, legalization of 
other non-communist parties’, on the other hand ‘the rest of it was very hurried 
and rash’. (Vladislav (28) Postdoctoral researcher Middle Eastern Studies, NN).  
This kind of thinking is part of a more general conservatism toward political 
and social change, a common antipathy rooted in feat that policies promising 
radical change will lead to ruin: 
I would say that a critical view of radical reform has formed in me, 
especially to those that were carried out (perestroika MB) because they 
didn’t lead to anything good. This all should have been done, I don’t know, 
more methodically or something. I mean not to break things up in the 
harshest way but to evolve the system and try and move it in a new 
direction. Instead they destroyed it all and let things just fall where they 
would lay.   
Nadia, (26) Lecturer in Asian Studies, NN  
Thus, a strong myth is in circulation about the wrongheadedness of perestroika 
and it causing a downward trajectory. It should be noted here that attitudes 





fundamentally negative terms and a substantial minority viewing it in a more 
positive or neutral terms. What is interesting here is how ‘collapse’ is not 
remembered as a set of distinct and clear events, such as the August Coup, the 
signing of the Belazheva Accords in 1991 or the 1993 shelling of the White 
House. Instead, collapse is more of a process, something experienced and lived 
from 1988-1998. The consequences of the various hardships to befall ordinary 
Russians from 1988 (the start of Gorbachev’s more radical phase of 
perestroika) to 1998 (Russia’s financial default) has clearly left a mark on 
popular collective memory in young and old alike. Here a younger respondent 
refers to a similar sense, that the Russia he grew up in was like the morning-
after scene of a massive party, leaving the country in a ‘condition of 
drunkenness or hangover’. While he approves of the collapse in terms of the 
‘human freedom’ it brought, some of this ‘freedom’ produced undesirable 
results:  
… this also materialised into a gigantic mess, criminality, economic 
problems, poverty. Therefore we can hardly see 1991 as the start of 
something good (…) it just brought a new freedom of action, one could 
choose to study or not, to work or not, to kill or not, but as a normal person 
I cannot view this kind of freedom positively. Apart from freedom there are 
other things.  
Alexei (25) Assistant to deputy of Local Assembly, SPB 
This ties into a wider sense that lived experience of 1991-1998 discredited 
liberal values and makes it very difficult to view the end of the USSR as a 
‘triumph’ for the Russian people. The cleavage between political idealism and 
rhetoric versus the grim reality of everyday life makes the idealization of the 
end of the USSR, which is still attempted, for example, by liberal 
commentators on Radio Svoboda and Echo Moskvi, lack credibility to many 
people. Again this is because actual lived experience contradicted the lofty 
promises; ‘1991 was only a triumph for the first few days’ until expectations of 
‘a big improvement (pod"yem)’ ended with worsening economic conditions as 
‘people with money and pensions or savings lost everything’. In summary, 
‘people were ready for democracy in 1991 but all we got was a moral decline 





(Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB). As one self-professed ‘liberal’ 
respondent lamented, only ‘a very small percentage would agree with the 
things I have said about the importance of human freedom’ as ‘the experience 
of perestroika and then the 90’s really have made people very cynical about 
liberal ideas’. As a result of this lived experience, ‘it is very hard to find a 
person who would agree with the premise that human life and freedom should 
hold a priority of place’. (Igor (26) English language teacher, SPB).  
In tracing the rejection of ‘liberal values’, the long decade of 1988-1998 is 
central as it was one that combined a steady worsening of living standards with 
broken promises and false hopes:  
1998 (Russia’s default MB) was the key decisive year when people totally 
and finally gave up hope for liberal values. (…) Our people are really 
patient/enduring (terpelivyy) and for a long time they accepted the 
argument that ‘yes this is perestroika and this is a project that will take a lot 
of time.’ (…) after 98 people said ‘why the hell do we need this so-called 
freedom when we have nothing to eat?’ It was a turning point. 
Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB 
It appears recent lived experience influences attitudes to the other historical 
periods reviewed in this chapter. It is likely that the retrospective ordering of 
how to understand Russia’s most recent past (1988-1998) has also influenced 
the development of more positive views toward the Stolypin period and the 
Brezhnev era, while supporting a more negative views of the October 
Revolution. The prioritization of stability, order and state cohesion reflect 
much upon how the fear of disorder, chaos and lawlessness play a vital role in 
social memory for many respondents, thus forming a vital link in the chain 
between Russian popular collective memory and actual lived experience of the 
recent past and present social world. 
Part three: The Stalinist and Brezhnev periods 
When we turn to how the Soviet phase of Russian history (1917-1991) was 
treated, we find there to be far less consensus on ‘golden ages’ and ‘disasters’. 





periods discussed with most frequency, the Stalinist period and the Brezhnev 
era. One observable tendency about the selection of critical historical junctures 
from the Soviet era was the way that social frames dominated the selection of a 
positive era. Those selecting Stalin’s industrialization (1928-1938) and the 
Brezhnev zastoi era (1964-1982) were limited to a particular age and social 
group; the myths of a Soviet golden age were very rarely reproduced by 
respondents outside these social frames. In fact, it appears that positive 
versions of Russia under Stalin and Brezhnev are a source of real contention, 
as I found rich material from respondents presenting these two eras in far more 
negative ways. Quantitative polling has also revealed a split in the population 
on this question, although this is not broken down into age and social 
backgrounds.70 Below, what is found is that contradicting myths have emerged 
about both periods that act as a barrier to Soviet periods becoming more 
accepted in Russia’s ‘useable past.’  
When selected as Russia’s most positive period, the Stalinist period of 
industrialization was generally presented as a ‘big step forward for the country’ 
(Artem (49) computer programmer, NN) when the ‘country was under construction and 
developing (Olga (55) Factory worker Avtozavodsk, NN). Interestingly, these positive 
representations of Stalinist development policies resonated in older 
respondents with clear family biographies of working class backgrounds, 
families whose trajectories were largely positive under Stalin-era social 
mobility. Some Respondents (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB; Nikolay (52), ex-policeman, retired, 
SPB) praised this era’s scientific achievements and infrastructure projects, 
progress that for them compares favourably with the current rent-dominated 
resource economy of Russia. In admiring Stalin-era development in contrast to 
the shortcomings of today (no running water or sanitation, for example, in 
one’s suburban ‘dacha’ neighbourhood), the concrete results are seen to justify 












When I was working in Salekhard not long ago I ended up on a railway 
built by Stalin as early as 1935. It’s 600 km long. Yes, I know prisoners built 
it, but what’s the difference?  Obviously there was no money to hire people 
to do it, the country was isolated. But who cares? … that is just the way 
things were developed back then.   
Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB 
The above quote reflects a commonly found pragmatic sentiment on display 
throughout these respondents; the harsh methods are accepted as ‘the way 
things had to be back then’ and justified by the clear results on show.  
One quote, often incorrectly attributed to Churchill, emerged on numerous 
occasions among those defending or justifying Stalin: ‘Stalin found Russia 
with wooden ploughs but left her with Atomic bombs.’ In fact this quote is 
from the historian Deutscher writing in his 1953 work ‘Russia After Stalin.’71 
Its entry into Russian discourse can be dated back to Nina Andreeva’s famous 
anti-perestroika letter of 1988 ‘I Cannot Forgo My Principles’ that, among 
other things, sought to defend Stalin from his various liberal critics.72 Here it 
functions as a shorthand way of saying Stalin’s ultimate achievements 
outweighed the various ‘collateral damage’ caused by his policies: ‘Even if 
there were some kind of crimes, well they weren’t just done by us, they are in 
many other countries too. If we look at the end result, then we can’t forget that 
Stalin found the country with ploughs and left her with nuclear rockets’      
Artem (49) computer programmer, NN 
Respondents in this group praised Stalin as a strong and effective manager of 
people. This harsh and demanding leader managed to force the Russian people 
into shape and come together. It was his achievement in unifying and 
mobilizing the Russian people that ensured the nation’s survival after the 
German invasion in 1941. This idea is often condensed into the myth that ‘the 













policies resulted in ‘the successful resolution of our problems precisely in the 
conditions we found ourselves in’. Even though Stalinism was ‘a catastrophe, 
bringing the death of thousands of people, another serious blow for our 
country’, all the same this was ‘the best of all the evils we had to choose from 
then’ (Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN). This essentially presents Stalinism as 
a series of ‘forced measures’; it also justifies it as the best of the available 
development scenarios on offer in those difficult times. Some older 
respondents with victims of Stalinist repression in their own family tree still 
viewed his policies as vital to the survival of the country: 
those who carried out these policies understood it would not lead to any 
golden age of prosperity for our people. It was just done so we would not be 
destroyed. Collectivization was an awful thing but it was necessary. 
Industrialization was harsh but it was necessary (…) Therefore the view of 
Stalin in my family, probably like the majority of Soviet people, is that Stalin 
was some kind of mighty state power (nekaya moshchnaya 
gosudarstvennaya sila) that allowed us to achieve success. We faced a 
hostile encirclement, things were uncomfortable and hard and this was seen 
as by-product of our development path. Nobody held a grudge towards 
Stalin for what he did and when he died my mother even cried for him.  
Leonid (45) Religious history lecturer, NN  
Although these more sympathetic views towards Stalin were largely confined 
to a certain social and generational group, aspects of it appear to filter down to 
younger respondents and reinforce an identifiable trend in respondents 
claiming ‘Russia needs a strong hand’. Such a viewpoint (as will be seen in 
chapter six) has implications for one’s own political stance today. Here Stalin 
is harsh and unforgiving, but also patriotic and committed to the interests of 
Russia. This image of Stalin sees him as unrelenting in his drive to improve the 
country, smashing corruption and crime along the way. At the same time, 
Stalin’s policies are supported as they led to a strong industrialised economy 
independent from the world economy. It is no great leap to see the idealization 
of such qualities as dovetailing well with Putin’s image as the uncompromising 
and tough leader of an embattled Russia today. These values say much about 





 It is, however, important to note that these pro-Stalin positions are contested 
by extremely negative representations of the Stalin period. Indeed, 
collectivization and industrialization came in a close second place behind the 
October Revolution as the worst period for Russia’s modern history. The 
segment choosing this as Russia’s worst period crossed geographical, age, 
gender and social background/professions lines, suggesting this anti-Stalin 
myth has the power to be transmitted across the population more generally. 
The first main line in anti-Stalin positions, was to emphasise that his polices 
were ‘extremely unfair’ in how they ‘dealt with people’ by ‘removing their 
property against their will’ (Svetlana (25) Postgraduate researcher sociology, NN). Anecdotes 
from the period underline the inhuman conditions people faced under an ‘awful 
and frightening dictator’, and that ‘being five minutes late for work’ or ‘taking 
little bits of grain left over after the state harvesters’ could land one with a 
lengthy prison sentence (Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB).  
In terms of emotions, among these respondents this period provokes feelings of 
anguish, shock and shame; the idea that such things could be perpetrated on 
ordinary citizens is shocking:  
So many innocent people (…) It was like a tank rolling over a whole family 
(…) Everyone would suffer if the father was declared an enemy of the 
people. They also sent the wives to jail, the kids weren’t allowed to study 
(…) It was awful, I am actually ashamed of this chapter in our history. 
Natalya (50) Accountant. NN 
Discussions on the awful human cost of Stalinist policies act as a counter-
narrative that rejects the arguments of his apologists. The wider employment of 
the Stalin era as a ‘useable past’ appears blocked by the sense the period was 
one of upheaval, arbitrary violence and brutality. An interesting development 
in those who reproduced negative memories of the Stalinist era was to do so 
through the prism of one’s own family history. For some, ‘the moment of 
collectivization opened a great chasm opened up in our family histories’ 
meaning that the fate of these relatives remains unknown (Lubov (43) Private tutor, 
SPB). In other cases, memories of relatives falling victim to state repression are 





Our great-grandfather had a good peasant farm, some cows, some horses 
and they called him a ‘Kulak’. Then there were those who were drunks, who 
didn’t want to work but drink. They were the envious ones, they had nothing 
and they passed power to them. Can you imagine the human factor here? To 
wipe out the well-off person, to take what they have and grind them into 
nothing. It was utter lawlessness. (…)When the authorities give the 
opportunity for such people to rise to the top, this is the most awful thing.  
Sergei (29) Business Development, NN 
This narrative also ties in with discussions of how the Bolshevik revolution 
‘destroyed the best of the Russian nation’ and suggests there is strong potential 
for an anti-Bolshevik version of Russian history in the twentieth century. One 
respondent said she would ‘draw a line to link 1917 right up to 1956 for 
example, as an awful period because of Stalin, the repressions, murders (…)It 
was like an extermination of people (…)the authorities exterminated people 
with ability and land, those who could look after themselves, that was a total 
disaster! (Marta (54) retired, SPB).  
The current role of Cossacks in Russian society and the role of the Orthodox 
Church would seem to make these positions worthy of sympathy from 
conservative Russia, thus not limiting the anti-Stalin narrative to liberal circles. 
On the other hand, other respondents, like Leonid above, still retain pro-Stalin 
views despite his own family’s narrative of suffering state repression. 
Nonetheless, narratives based on the authentic grounds of family history and 
emotional representations of the period have clear emotional potency. 
Understood in the longer view, these violent policies de-legitimize the Soviet 
state under Stalin and provide ample cause to resist any idealization of him as a 
leader. After all, it is hard to argue for the ‘normality’ of the Stalinist state: 
‘almost one million were shot and that is not normal, it can’t be justified. Have 
you ever seen a successful state that kills hundreds of thousands of its own 
citizens? That is totally unnatural’ (Arkady (27) Computer Programmer, NN). Given that 
such a substantial chunk of respondents were reproducing powerful negative 
myths about the Stalin era, it appears unlikely a myth will emerge to unite the 
two camps. The battle for how to view the Stalinist past can be expected to 





The Late Soviet Period 
The other Soviet period to receive significant attention as a positive period was 
the Brezhnev era. Here as with the Stalin era, we find again a collection of 
respondents linked by age (all over forty). This time, however, they rooted 
positive portrayals of the period with their own memories of growing up here. 
They are complemented by those respondents who selected the market reform 
period (1991-1999) as the worst period for Russia, which came in at third place 
overall in terms of negative periods. This group included a few younger 
respondents who also related this to the story of their own families in the post-
Soviet environment. This provides evidence of the importance of lived 
experience alongside social frames and generational linkages in transmitting 
memory. However, as with the Stalin era, these positions are very much 
disputed; another section of respondents painted the late Soviet period as a 
‘dead-end’ and viewed perestroika or the nineties as a period of new freedoms 
and possibilities.  
For those with positive views of the zastoi era, the ‘normality’ of the Brezhnev 
era is agreed upon. This ‘normality’ revolved around features such as universal 
social welfare, education, certainty in the future and numerous opportunities. 
The key theme in these images was that of cohesion and security, the idea that 
this late Soviet society was a paradigm of stability. These respondents seemed 
to view the USSR as ‘heaven for ordinary people’, a place where one could be 
sure about what the future would hold: I didn’t feel any particular stagnation 
(zastoi), conditions were very good and stable. It was clear how life would 
develop then, how the country was developing. There was confidence in the 
future (uverennost' v budushchem) (Artem (49) computer programmer, NN). Condensed 
versions of this myth emerged in younger respondents as well, who appeared to 
accept this transmitted version of the Brezhnev era as a desirable past and 
suggests a shared preoccupation with stability in the present.  
As we will see in more detail in chapter six on representations of Russia’s state 
and political system, the Brezhnev era state is also presented as ‘normal’ in its 
ability to deliver acceptable services in healthcare and education. The 





part of this: ‘I firmly knew that after I finished school I could go to college and 
that won’t cost anything. I had guaranteed work; everybody worked. The 
minimum wage of 80 Roubles in those days would let a person life in peace, it 
was more than enough. There were no problems’ (Anton (52) ex-officer, small business 
owner, SPB). The stagnation era is clearly socially framed; respondents rooted 
their understandings on how their own families experienced ‘zastoi’. 
Remembering their childhood and their parents’ stable lives, these older 
respondents do not remember ‘stagnation’; instead it is a time when ‘we never 
lived better’. These respondents ‘forget’ the social and economic problems 
facing the country at the time. Furthermore, many of these older respondents 
came from families who benefited from the Soviet modernization project and, 
conversely, gained little from its demise.  
In one good example, we find a short family history of peasants moving from a 
small village to live in the dynamic and growing Soviet city of Gorky. Here the 
lifestyle in the late Soviet period is explicitly contrasted with that of the 
capitalist West and, the pressures people face in contemporary ‘capitalist’ post-
Soviet Russia are outlined: 
We know why people are on anti-depressants in USA and Western Europe. 
They are always under pressure to figure out how to live tomorrow, the 
battle to survive. My parents, the parents of our generation, they worked, 
they enjoyed life, they built socialism. (…) Waking up each morning I knew 
perfectly well I was defended by the best army in the world. When they 
raised the red flag at school I was proud of my country, it was a feeling of 
genuine patriotism. I saw things being built all around me. I remember as a 
little boy, them telling my parents to go and pick whatever flat they wanted 
in the new builds. We came from a village of 1500 people where we had 
nothing but wooden buildings and here were new flats, comfortable houses 
with central heating.  
Igor, (41) Lecturer in International Relations, NN 
Thus, it was common for older respondents to see the Brezhnev era as 
comparing positively with the current era. One could argue this nostalgia 





reality; liberation from the burdens of economic pressure, the pressure of 
competition, the sense of relative deprivation in comparison to more successful 
people, and general daily hardship to make ends meet. This sentiment can also 
be seen in words of a former Soviet engineer, who describes how most were 
‘comfortable’ puttering along with a ‘minimum but stable and guaranteed life’ 
that was ‘timetabled out for you practically up to your pension’ (Pavel, (58) IT 
specialist. NN).  
Quantitative polling on this period of Russian history suggests the outright 
majority view the period positively, while a consistent minority reject this.73 
Perhaps what stops nostalgic images of this secure and happy time from 
enjoying a more dominant space in the mythscape of Russian popular 
collective memory are the plentiful counter images that present it as a musty 
and dank period of ‘dead end’ development. This counter-myth is based on the 
‘abnormal’ elements in late Soviet life such as the lack of economic efficiency 
and shortages of goods, the sense of a mighty superpower suffering from a 
primitive internal consumer market. One aspect of this was the sense that 
‘there was lots of money about but you couldn’t buy anything with it’ and 
important items, like automobiles, could only be bought ‘through personal 
connections. (po blatu). For example, one respondent recalled how his 
grandfather, who had a good job and the needed contacts, had to wait three 
years to get his hands a Zaporozhetz, which he described as an ‘ugly Soviet 
mini’  (Arseny (41) Business development, NN). This memory of stable incomes being 
negated by the lack of available consumer goods contrasts sharply with the 
current era in a negative way, when many segments of Russian society can 
save or borrow to buy something, be it an iPhone, a car or a pair of new shoes.  
In the memories of late Soviet life outside of Moscow and Leningrad, the 
picture of poverty and shortages was stark, hardly something that would endear 
younger people to romanticizing the period. This was particularly the case in 
respondents whose families grew up outside of Moscow and Leningrad, where 
‘the people lived in absolute squalor (v polnoy nishchete) (Sergei (29) Business 









offering ‘400 grams of sausage a month, 200 grams of butter a month’ and the 
so-called ‘sausage trains’ of provincials going on ’22 hour journeys’ to 
Leningrad or Moscow to bring additional food back home (Oleg (49) Construction site 
foreman, SPB). These examples of Soviet era food distribution and consumer 
goods access relate a picture of backwardness, especially in relation to the 
more advanced West. Critical views of disengaged workers, inefficient 
economics, corruption and shortages, come together to produce a coherent 
view of the period as a ‘dead end’ in Russia’s development. The sentiment here 
is that the USSR was ‘rotting’ and things were falling apart from the inside’ 
and, thus, a ‘new path’ was needed (Vera (43) IT Project Manager, NN). This presents 
the late Soviet period as a ‘dead end’, with grey, incapable men at the top of 
the system unable to adapt and unfit to govern. Here the central idea was that 
‘bad management, especially from the mid-70’s onwards’ restricted and 
suppressed young people, all of which ‘made people desire fundamental 
change in the existing system’ (Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB). Another 
way of saying this was ‘old people were the only ones in power, people who 
didn’t give a toss, didn’t need anything as they had reached the top and 
thought they could tell the young folk how to do things… (Pavel (27) export-import 
business, SPB).  
Many younger respondents in this research reject nostalgic views of the late 
Soviet period. This is partly because so many older people have anecdotes of 
poverty, corruption and greyness that do not resemble a normal or desirable 
past. Overall, when comparing younger and older respondents’ views to the 
late Soviet period, we find younger respondents well informed of the economic 
woes of this system and its failure to create consumer abundance. The clear 
resistance shown to nostalgic and pro-Soviet images of this period show the 
limited utility of the Soviet past in the wider collective memory and useable 
past. The positive nostalgic view of a kinder society and better living 
conditions is contested by a critical view that underlines the ‘backwardness’, 
‘corruption’, ‘greyness’ and ‘unnatural social relations’ of the period. The 
former position appears to long for a return of aspects of the ‘Soviet’, the latter 
does not look at it as a model of ‘normality’ or something worthy of emulation. 





myth for the nation. Overall, positive representations of Soviet times, in 
focusing on the Stalin and Brezhnev periods, reveal something about certain 
values held by older respondents. Rather than actually demanding a return to 
these older systems, the respondents use these myths to criticize the present 
and suggest an agenda for the future. This includes demands for a state that 
cares about social justice and welfare, a stronger and more industrialised 
economy and improved infrastructure, real investment in education, healthcare 
and science, and, as we will see in chapter seven, a restoration of influence and 
power on the world stage. These Soviet-inspired versions of normality are 
clearly in circulation and, as we will see in the subsequent chapters, play an 
important role in Russian national identity today.  
Conclusion  
This examination of Russian collective memory ‘from below’ has highlighted a 
number of key points. Firstly, a preoccupation with stability and order are vital 
to understanding the selection of 1900-1914 and 2000-2014 as positive periods 
for the country. In both cases the country is seen to be on the rise, showing 
good economic growth and on the path to being a ‘normal’ ‘strong’ ‘respected’ 
European power. The consensus on 1917-1922 as the worst period in Russia’s 
history is a logical counterpoint to this; here Russia was torn off the path of 
positive development and plunged her regicide and fratricide, chaos and 
destruction. This finding is supported by quantitative polling evidence but, 
employing qualitative analysis, additional light can be shed on why 1900-1914 
and 2000-2014 win sufficient consensus to be ‘useable’. Namely, that these 
periods harmonise well with a certain social and political conservatism that 
combines a preference for a strong, orderly state with phobia of collapse and 
disintegration.  
I would argue that interpretations of the recent past (1988-1998) and its 
relationship to the present heavily influence why the above myths appeal. The 
aftershocks of the nineties are still relatively fresh in the minds of both young 
and old respondents and this appears to represent one source of the fixation on 
‘stability’ in constructing the ‘desirable past’. Thus, the above myths are 





social reality and lived experience of many respondents. The merging of 1985-
1991 with the ‘wild nineties’ as one downward trajectory is common across 
generations and has important implications for attitudes to political change in 
Russia today. Many respondents seem to interpret Russia’s history through the 
prism of 1988-1998; this is also the ‘abnormal’ and ‘undesirable’ past and acts 
as a vital discursive frame for those describing a ‘desirable future’. The themes 
that have arisen here in Russian collective memory return in later chapters; the 
imprint of 1988-1998 clearly plays an important role in modern Russian 
national identity.  
This chapter has also highlighted that, while nostalgia for the USSR is present 
in Russian society, what is not made apparent in quantitative polling is how 
opinion is polarised along social and age lines. This leaves the Soviet past as an 
unpromising resource in building a common historical memory. While more 
work would be needed to confirm this, it appears to be a normative split across 
social and generational lines. There is also a fault line that follows divergent 
family biographies. Those with stories of their family benefiting from the 
Soviet modernization project often had experiences of hardship and loss post 
1991. Conversely, those with relatives repressed in the Soviet period were 
more likely to adopt be negative to the Soviet phase of Russia’s past. It may be 
that personal and family trajectories post-1991 also play an important role in 
this split.  
This chapter has also underlined what Soviet nostalgia means for a number of 
older people. Rather than a reflection of any desire to reinstate the USSR, their 
portrayals of the Stalin and/or Brezhnev eras as ‘great times’ was more both an 
indictment of current conditions (lack of industrial development or poor social 
services) and a signal of support for some of Putin’s policies (increased 
pensions and protection of state industries). Above all, these older respondents 
still took these periods as times of ‘normality’ and use the past to highlight the 
‘abnormality’ of the present (lack of good free healthcare, expensive housing, 
corruption, collapsing infrastructure). In stark contrast, respondents with a 
dimmer view of these periods saw them as ‘abnormal’ in comparison to the 
present: the murderous ruthlessness of Stalinist policies, the lack of freedom, 





past. What this split in normality positions means is that appealing to the 
Soviet for a desirable past, present and future will remain a limited one; only 
certain social and age groups will find this credible. This perhaps explains why 
state historical memory takes such an ambiguous stance to the Soviet past.  
If we exclude the Great Patriotic War, it appears non-Soviet periods are easier 
to employ as a ‘useable past’. Themes around the pre-revolutionary past and 
the ‘disaster of October’ can generate consensus and state actors are more than 
ready to refer to certain ‘lessons of October 1917’. This is reproduced in a 
longue durée view of Russian history that characterises it as cyclical: stable, 
ordered phases are followed chaotic and destructive phases. The main 
explanation for how the country was sucked into phases of smuta (chaos and 
disorder) is the convergence of weak central leadership, hostile external forces 
and internal upheaval. Three themes are central to this longue durée and are 
vital components of the dominant nationalist discourse in Russia today. These 
are: (a) Russia must avoid internal upheaval at all cost (b) Russia must be ruled 
by a strong hand (c) external forces seek Russia’s dissolution and must be 
resisted. As will be seen later in this thesis, these three positions interact and 
reinforce one another and are important pillars in support for Putin’s domestic 
and foreign policy. Before turning to the world of politics, it is important to 
account for another central component in national identity: how the lines of 
















Chapter Five.  
Inclusion and exclusion in the Russian ‘we’: Searching 
for a common sense of Russianness 
This chapter sheds light on how ethnicity, race and nationhood are discussed in 
a Russian context, showing when and how people identify themselves and 
perceive of others in terms of nation and ethnicity. At the heart of this question, 
from the point of view of the state, is to promote an inclusive identity in 
Russia’s multi-ethnic society. This involves consolidating people around the 
‘nation’, a civic community with shared political values. In part, the challenge 
is to successfully articulate a sense of ‘Russianness’ that is compatible with 
what is written in the 1993 Constitution: ‘we are a multinational people’. 
President Putin (2004) recognised this challenge in his first term, when he 
claimed there were already solid grounds for seeing ‘people of Russia as a 
united nation’ (rossiyskii kak narod edinaya natsiia). In a more recent speech 
at the Valdai Conference of 2013, he expanded on what was needed for this 
‘united nation’: ‘In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop 
a civic identity on the basis of shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic 
responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, and a sense of responsibility 
for their homeland’s fate, without losing touch with their ethnic or religious 
roots’ (Putin 2013).  
Below, I will unpick some of the various elements of post-Soviet Russian in-
group and out-group dynamics, revealing some important Soviet legacies still 
active today in Russia’s distinctive form of ‘multiculturalism’. This includes 
the rejection of ‘nationalism’ and ‘ethnicity’ in principle and the adoption of a 
conservative Soviet-style patriotism. I will also explore how a certain Soviet-
style Russocentric version of the civic nation is being reproduced, as well as 
examining the salience of ‘imperial consciousness’: something that owes much 
to the pre-revolutionary and Soviet heritage. The above is an important part of 
the dominant nationalist discourse of Russia today. I will argue that this is 
because it is in harmony with some key elements of Russian national identity. 
As we will see, the key challenge to this vision of the Russian nation and 





parochial ‘put Russia first’ nationalism that is hostile to certain non-Russian 
elements such as labour migrants or the North Caucasus region. These 
nationalistic sentiments may explain why large numbers show receptivity for 
the slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’ (Rossiya dlya russkikh) in quantitative 
polling.74 Before moving to the empirical findings, however, it is necessary to 
outline some key theoretical considerations in studying national and ethnic 
feeling in ordinary people. 
Theoretical approaches to the nation-ness in everyday life 
At the heart of research into how the nation is imagined as a community are 
‘shared values’ behind a common ‘civic identity’, as well as ‘patriotic 
consciousness’ and attitudes to ethnicity. National identity is as much 
connected to everyday social relations as it is with understandings of history or 
politics. A central part of this is the us-them dynamic that is built on 
‘empathetic attachments to those included within the group, and distance and 
difference from those without’ (Suny 2012: 20). Thus, the aim is to account for 
how ethnic and national boundaries are made, as the ‘strategic nature of 
practices of categorization and association’ (Wimmer 2013: 4-6) can reveal 
how boundaries of group-making are determined in inclusivist and exclusivist 
ways. One should not expect, however, mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion 
to be mutually exclusive; research in social psychology suggests both are 
required to build firm identities. In other words, inclusive sentiment, such as 
shared in-group values, may often be accompanied by exclusivist language, 
such as hostility to an out-group (Taifel 1982: 15). Thus, we need not be 
surprised if, in the worldview of ordinary people, we find harmonic, inclusivist 
visions of in-group cohesion co-existing with exclusivist language that refuses 
membership of the nation to certain out-groups.  
In attempting to locate inclusivist and exclusivist sentiment, it is useful to 
examine the meanings and understandings emerging from everyday social 
interaction. This is of importance as ‘it is ultimately in and through everyday 









ethnicity and nationhood are invested with meaning and produced and 
reproduced as basic categories of social and political life’ (Brubaker et al 2006: 
363-4). Thus, we attempt to trace whether a common identity emerges from 
everyday and common-sense divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘enemy’ and 
‘friend’. Here we are dealing with a social construct, one that is referred to in 
this chapter as the Russian ‘we’. It is important to underline that this construct 
does not owe its existence purely to the efforts of actors ‘from above’, such as 
state or media discourse; it is also shaped by social practices and everyday 
experience. Thus, defining who belongs to the ‘nation’ is an on-going and fluid 
process, one that can be challenged and is subject to change.  
In examining the picture ‘from below’ we look to understand ‘folk sociologies’ 
by revealing the ‘common-sense ways of carving up the social world’ 
employed across the population (Hirschfeld 1996: 9) According to Brubaker, 
this ‘carving up’ of the social world is achieved by ‘everyday encounters, 
practical categories, common sense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive 
schemas, interactional cues, discursive frames75, organisational routines, social 
networks and institutional forms’ (Brubaker 2004: 2). Antonio Gramsci (1971) 
also showed an interest in the role of everyday common-sense positions, both 
in supporting the hegemonic ideas of the present and acting as a barrier to the 
political projects of elites. In this chapter, we find that common-sense 
understandings of nation and ethnicity do not correspond neatly with the 
theoretical elaborations of the elite. The ‘ethnic’, ‘civic’ and ‘imperial’ shades 
of nationalism blur; instead of clarity we find complex combinations and 
interplays, as well as contradictory rational and emotional positions.  
Everyday common-sense understandings of nation and ethnicity are important 
in defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the body of the 
nation. Andreas Wimmer (2013: 50) highlighted three forms of integration: (i) 
‘incorporation mode’: when an ethnic group is identified as the category into 
which all should merge; (ii) ‘amalgamation mode’: the drive to create new 
nation out of different ethnic groups; (iii) ‘emphasis shifting mode’: the move 









the Russian case, we find most resonance with types (i) and (iii). Furthermore, 
Wimmer (2013: 11-12) suggested there are four main ways of reproducing 
basic categories and establishing boundaries:  
... those that seek to redraw a boundary by either expanding or limiting the 
range of people included in one’s own ethnic category; those that modify 
existing boundaries either by challenging the hierarchical ordering of 
ethnic categories, or by changing one’s own position within a boundary 
system, or by emphasizing other, non-ethnic forms of belonging 
 In this chapter we will pay most attention to the first of these strategies, the 
question of how boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are (re)drawn. Here we 
discover how people internalize concepts promoted in state and media circles, 
and, very often, construct their own meanings of these ‘from below’. Here, by 
studying ‘the “micropolitics” of categories’, we can reveal ‘the ways in which 
the categorized appropriate, internalize, subvert, evade or transform the 
categories that are imposed on them’ (Brubaker 2004: 13).  
As mentioned above, this chapter traces both in-group and out-group 
mechanisms and treats both as essential to the maintenance of group identity. 
In tracing the ‘in-group’ dynamic we seek commonality – this concerns the 
existence of common attributes to a group or a feeling of belonging together (in 
Max Weber’s term Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl). In examining ‘categorical 
communality’ and a ‘feeling of belonging together’ we should expect to find 
part of the imagined nation – that people who do not know each other and are 
not really connected ‘buy into’ idea of large collective ‘nation’ – ‘a powerfully 
imagined and strongly felt commonality’ (Brubaker 2004: 47) Following 
analysis of Brubaker, we can identify certain ‘stereotypes, schemas and social 
categorizations’ employed to support this feeling of belonging and counting as 
an ‘in-group.’ At the same time, the other side of this coin is to trace the 
mechanisms of exclusion; how certain ‘groups’ are transformed into an 
‘Other’. Here more negative ‘stereotypes, schemas and social categorizations’ 
are employed to shore up ‘groupist interpretations of the social world’ 





While xenophobia is common across the world in the twenty-first century, the 
cultural context and specifics differ from country to country. Relations between 
‘host’ communities and ‘outsiders’ can be tense and the challenge of 
integrating different groups will not disappear. Of particular utility in 
understanding these processes of ‘othering’ is social identity theory, a 
theoretical framework that explains ethnically-driven feelings, xenophobia and 
discrimination at the level of individuals and groups. In trying to explain what 
makes certain individuals more prone to this kind of thinking, the ‘social 
contact hypothesis’ (Hayes and Dowds 2006: 456) is backed by significant 
empirical evidence (Amir 1976; Savelkoul et al 2011). This hypothesis posits 
that the less actual social contact people have with ‘Others’ is connected to 
higher levels of hostility to ‘outsiders’, a connection that has been established 
in a Russian context (Kosmarskaya, Savin (2016: 149). Limited contact, on the 
other hand, deprives people of knowledge of what the ‘Others’ really do and 
leads to a preoccupation with perceived ethno-cultural differences. This, in 
turn, allows the survival and activation of a range of negative categories, 
schemas and stereotypes. 
Another important question in social identity theory is what factors make 
certain groups more/less important as ‘out-groups’. Here group conflict theory 
claims these tensions reflect a real conflict of socio-economic interests in the 
battle for resources between different groups (Bobo 1983). In some cases, 
however, xenophobia occurs without obvious competition for jobs or welfare 
services. Here it is the sudden visible increase in the presence of the ‘Other’ 
that threatens a feeling of dominance among the majority. As Lauren McLaren 
(2003: 916) pointed out, ‘it is not so much self-interest or competition for 
resources that drive individual attitudes, but concern for protecting certain 
cultural symbols of the dominant group’. Here the sense of ‘invasion’ or 
‘threat’ is connected to on the idea that these groups do not ‘fit’ with the 
culture, values and behaviour of the ‘normal’ majority. This connects to the 
‘defended neighbourhood theory’ (Bevelander and Otterbeck 2010: 407); the 
idea that sudden influxes of culturally dissimilar groups into neighbourhoods 
causes a backlash as it violates existing ‘norms’. This brings us back to 





Again, the ‘frames’ employed when discussing what is ‘normal’ are important. 
In this chapter we find the importance of Soviet frames in discussing a 
‘normal’ multi-ethnic environment, a ‘normal’ migration policy, ‘normal’ 
migrant behaviour and a ‘normal’ calibration of interethnic relations. In some 
ways, these visions of normality are not being met causing powerful feelings of 
frustration and dissatisfaction that put strain on more harmonious visions of 
Russia as a multinational space. Below, we will consider how certain ideas 
promoted by the state and media about ‘who belongs to the nation’ are actually 
understood and applied by ordinary people. Here we find certain discourses 
that secure the place of the in-group values, while highlighting the deviance of 
out-groups. When we examine popular attitudes ‘from below’, we find that 
popular discourse can deviate from the desired meanings of policy makers and 
cultural elites. 
The empirical findings 
A central feature that emerged in common-sense perceptions of the Russian 
‘we’ is the co-existence of open, inclusivist sentiment with regards in-group 
membership, alongside harder more demanding visions of the nation that 
exclude certain groups as ‘Other’ or ‘alien’. The first part of the chapter covers 
more inclusivist sentiments of membership to the Russian national community, 
ideas that are more about harmony and union, and show how ordinary people 
respond to group-making as a project – the drive of the state, media and other 
actors to promote a coherent ‘Russian national identity’, which involves the 
use of terminology such as russkii, rossiyskii, mnogonatsional’naya Rossiya, 
patriot and natsionalist, as well as definitions of Russianness (russkost’). 
Popular understandings of these terms show how ordinary people make sense 
of often-ambiguous state discourse.  
Consensus on a number of points unites respondents across age and social 
lines.  This includes advocacy of open and rather inclusive definitions of 
Russianness, rejection of ethnicity as important to being Russian (russkii), 
rejection of ‘nationalism’ in principle and receptivity to an inclusive and 
simple, ‘loving’ patriotism. All of these points show continuity with the Soviet 





down solid roots. Furthermore, positive myths about Russia’s multi-ethnic 
traditions, which are presented as differing greatly from those of the West, do 
much to reinforce these popular understandings. There is little evidence of any 
serious challenges to narratives portraying the Imperial and Soviet periods in a 
positive light. As we will see, the sense that Russia has no ‘colonial’ or 
‘imperialist’ past to confront encourages the feeling that non-Russian national 
groups (or the malie narodi) are comfortable and content within the current 
Eurasian multi-ethnic family. Below, I will consider how harmonic elements of 
the Russian ‘we’ not only fit well with the non-ethnic, civic conception of the 
Russian nation state that is promoted by current state nationality policy; they 
also are line with aspects of Russia’s imperial and Soviet traditions.  
In the second half of the chapter we turn to what might be called ‘fractures’ in 
the above picture of a cohesive, inclusive civic identity, where consensus starts 
to break down. Here we will examine why many who supported Russia’s 
multi-ethnic character and rejected nationalism in theory, still took up rather 
‘nationalist’ opinions and stances, such as hostility to people from the North 
Caucasus and labour migrants. This is excellent evidence of how inclusivist in-
group sentiment is often combined with exclusivist out-group sentiment, as 
boundaries are drawn ‘from below’ to highlight those groups barred from 
membership of the Russian ‘we’. 
 In the case of the North Caucasus, I examine the commonly reproduced 
stereotypes and schema highlighting the perceived hostility and disrespect 
these people show, as well as shared assumptions about the cultural 
‘backwardness’ of ‘these mountain people’. The idea that this region is a drain 
on ‘our resources’ suggests a redrawing of the lines of inclusion has occurred, 
leaving the North Caucasus outside the parameters of the Russian nation. This 
is part of a ‘put Russia first’ discourse of some importance to this thesis. An 
important feature in these discussions is the salience of ‘imperial’ or ‘statist’ 
consciousness in justifying the retention of the North Caucasus in the Russian 
Federation. Rather than any reference to fraternal friendships of malie narodi 
or retaining the unity of the Russian civic national community, the focus is on 
Russia’s great power requirements and the burden of responsibility for keeping 





Finally, attitudes to migrants reveal division along generation lines, 
highlighting a split between some of the older, Soviet-educated respondents, 
still showing attachment to ‘internationalism’, and younger respondents, who 
used ‘civic’ and ‘inclusivist’ rhetoric to make assimilationist demands’. One 
important element in examining attitudes to migration is the common sense 
view that the situation is ‘abnormal’. Digging deeper, I explore how Soviet-
inspired frames of reference largely constitute ‘normality’ and how the absence 
of normality is linked to how ‘othering’ occurs in a Russian context. At the 
heart of the problem, from the point of view of respondents, is the failure or 
refusal of these new comers to learn and embrace Russian language, culture, 
history and traditions, something that was not the case in the Soviet period. It 
would appear that the conclusion of Fran Markowitz (2000: 165) still holds 
true today: ‘Russia’s multinationalism demands an agreement from non-
Russian people to accept Russia’s cultural superiority (…) especially in regards 
to language and daily behaviour’.  
Part one. Inclusivist sentiment: harmonic ideas of in-group 
membership 
Russkii and rossiyanin: The two words for ‘Russian’ 
As mentioned previously, in the Russian language, two adjectives exist for the 
word ‘Russian’, rossiyskii and russkii. 76  Exploring the common-sense 
understandings of the meanings of these two words reveal how they are used to 
express common attributes and sense of common belonging. For around a third 
of respondents, the meanings of russkii and rossiyanin were straightforward. 
These respondents tended not to delve deeper and reproduced a rather textbook 
answer: ‘Rossiyanin is one’s citizenship and Russian is a nationality 
(natsional’nost’)’ (…) Russia has many nationalities (…) Millions of people 
with different nationalities. But at the same time they are rossiyane, because 
they have a Russian (rossiyskii) passport.’ (Nadezhda (30) nanny, SPB). This approach 
accepts the Yeltsin-era concept of rossiyanin and Soviet-style understandings 
of nationality as a fixed category from birth passed on or determined by 










existence and inter-relationship of the two adjectives. This is an example of 
how ordinary people subvert and transform categories offered ‘from above’, 
invest them with new meanings and reproduce them ‘from below’.  
In deeper discussion of the two terms, respondents often viewed Rossiyanin as 
a dry, formal and official label lacking real meaning: ‘The status of the term 
“rossiyanin” is rather artificial. I don’t understand what a “Rossiyanin” is. 
For me the words “russkii” and “Rus’” are closer to me.’ (Alexander (25) Business 
development manager, SPB). For these respondents, rossiyanin is a political construct 
with little meaning to them directly that they would not self-apply in any 
context other than in official documents. It appears that many would find little 
resonance with the statement ‘I am proud to be a rossiyanin’. For members of 
the older generation, rossiyanin was a still a ‘new word’ tied to ‘the appearance 
of democracy’ and Boris Yeltsin that was unclear in meaning (Denis (41) Journalist, 
NN).   
Russkii, on the other hand, had a far deeper significance: ‘the adjective: 
“russkii” says much more about you then the word “rossiyanin” as is about 
some kind of very rich history and culture that goes back to our roots and can 
tell more about you’ (Svetlana (25) Postgraduate researcher sociology, NN). Many pointed out 
that calling oneself a ‘rossiyanin’ would be ‘strange’ pointing out, for 
example, ‘rossiyanka for me is more about belonging to a state while russkaya 
is more about the merging/unification of people (ob’yedineniye lyudey) (Eva (26) 
Unemployed, university graduate, NN). It is important to note that this sense of 
‘unification’ makes no reference to blood or kinship. Instead, being russkii was 
often described as a ‘thing of the soul’, something one ‘feels within’.77 Here, 
the ‘feeling of belonging’ is literal; being Russian means sharing a common 
feeling with other Russians. While being a rossiyanin merely refers to those 
simply ‘living on the territory of the Russian Federation’, being russkii is 
about the ‘soul’ (dukh) (Julia (47) Assistant in film set production, SPB). The above offers 
strong evidence that the term rossiyanin has struggled to put down roots in 
Russian society and, despite the contemporary efforts of Putin era nationality 








resonate as powerful category of in-group belonging. In contrast, russkii is felt 
to reverberate back across the centuries and is of far more utility in describing 
commonality.  
Meanings of being russkii: rejection of ethnic grounds, the Soviet legacy 
and the demands of assimilation  
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the deeper connections 
respondents felt towards being russkii is part of a wider ‘ethnicization’ of 
Russian identity at the expense of more civic and state-orientated versions. In 
fact, when respondents defined Russianness (russkost’) there was a consistent 
rejection of ethnic criteria. According to popular thinking, ‘Russia was never 
only a “russkaya” country. Here everything is intermingled (…), so many 
national groups (natsiy) have intermixed that it is impossible to talk of “pure” 
russkie or “pure” Tatars (Olga (55) Factory worker Avtozavodsk, NN). As a result of this 
intermixing and gradual expansion,  ‘it is impossible to distinguish the russkie 
from the rest, (…). Russia has always been a common home. It is an empire 
and, like any empire, she absorbs people into her, these people then live 
together for centuries’ (Julia (47) Assistant in film set production, SPB). This presents 
Russia as a vast mixing space and the Russian state as an ‘empire’. Thus, part 
of being russkie is rejecting the narrow confines of ethnicity and embracing a 
supraethnic imperial identity.  
An important element of this is the rejection of ‘nationalists’ and ‘nationalism’. 
For the last Soviet generation ‘nationalism’ is a tainted word carrying 
overtones of divisive ethnic-based rhetoric.78 This view of nationalism appears 
to still hold firm today. Both older and younger respondents presented 
nationalists as being outside the boundaries of the acceptable behaviour and 
often equated them with ‘Nazis’ or ‘racists’. This was in stark contrast to 
patriotism, which was defined as a far more positive trend by respondents 
across the board. The most succinct version of the difference between the two 
terms in one sentence was ‘a nationalist is a person who is against everyone 
that is not russkii while a patriot is a person that is for Russia’ (Sergei (40) 








up needless trouble, a patriot has different values such as ‘ honour, dignity and 
love toward the mother land (dostoinstvo, lyubov' k Rodine) (Ilia (46) Import-Export 
Business owner, NN). Patriots are ‘good’ and ‘normal’ people that ‘love the country’ 
and ‘all the inhabitants’ rather than ‘just one concrete national group (narod). 
On the other hand, the ‘nationalist’ ‘thinks all the good things should be 
reserved for their national group (natsiia) and the others should serve them 
(Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB).  
The respondent below reproduces a similar dichotomy below by claiming 
nationalists want to debase or humiliate members of other ‘nations’ (natsiia), 
while trumpeting the merits of their own:  
The patriot cares/looks after (zabotitsya) about the interests of the country 
while the nationalist is one who would probably try and humiliate/degrade 
(unizit’) the dignity of other countries and peoples. The concept of 
nationalism is more aggressive, while the idea of patriotism is more 
constructive, moderate and positive. 
Galina (40) Sociology department, NN 
As we will see in the next chapter, views of patriots as ‘normal’ and 
nationalists as ‘abnormal’ ties in with how ordinary Russians have disengaged 
from politics and adopted a kind of conservative patriotism. This ‘moderate’ 
patriotism employs category constructions of Soviet origin. Patriotism is 
defined in terms of loyal and peaceful citizens using language that would not 
have contradicted late Soviet pamphlets on ‘Soviet patriotism and 
internationalism’ (Collias 2012; Bezrogov 2012).  
Perhaps the most important link to make here is the focus shown in both Soviet 
and contemporary Russian patriotic education to the concept of homeland 
(rodina) (Bezrogov 2012: 113).79 Respondents’ view of patriotism often boiled 
down to the simple precept that ‘the patriot loves his rodina’. The image of the 
good patriot seems to tie in with imagery of the ‘traditional’ family unit, one 










children. This ‘love of rodina’ patriotism suggests an ‘automatic relationship 
between motherland, kin and love (Markowitz 2000: 147). The continued 
dominance of Soviet-style definitions of patriotism helps explain some of the 
success of sate-driven rhetoric on the need for all Russians to be good patriots. 
In 2016 President Putin went as far as to claim that patriotism is the only 
unifying idea that can exist in Russia today.80  
In this research, the image of the calm and loyal patriot, who is conservative in 
outlook, stands in stark contrast to the radical, aggressive nationalist with 
messianic plans to reshape the nation. Thus, these patriotic values strongly 
support a non-ethnic vision of Russianness and helps promote the idea of a 
multinational, civic Russian nation. Here we find a link between being a 
patriot and being russkii, as a ‘patriot is a person that loves their country, her 
language’ and loves ‘all our writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoyevskii, Chekov and 
Bunin (…) our enormous incredible history (…) our nature’ (Nadezhda (30) nanny, 
SPB). This ties in with the common tendency to connect Russianness to 
belonging to a linguistic and cultural space, and consciously deciding that you 
‘feel Russian’: ‘For me the meaning of russkii, is not belonging to some family 
name such as Ivanov or Petrov, but about what you feel yourself to be from the 
inside’ (Zakhar (29) Manager in export company, SPB). This rejects the idea that one cannot 
become russkii, or that it is a fixed category.  
Two styles of treating Russianness as an ‘open category’ were identified, one 
with very Soviet-influenced ideas, the other with a more ‘modern’ 
assimilationist and civic style. In the former, we find interesting reproductions 
of the category russkii as it was understood in the Soviet period. Rather than 
seeing russkii as an ethnic category, as Soviet nationality policy often treated 
it, many older respondents described how, as a category of practice, russkii was 
something anybody could be. Thus, being russkii is equated with loyalty and 
service to the state. An excellent demonstration of this sentiment can be seen 
below in an anecdote about Tsar Alexander III: 
The emperor held a large parade with lots of foreign dignitaries, it was all 







ambassadors came over and asked the Tsar – ‘where are the russkie here?’ 
Alexander replied – ‘This detachment is made up of Bashkirs, here we have 
Byelorussians in the cavalry. But all of them together, all these 
nationalities, together in one place, these are the russkie’.   
Andrei (51) Computer Programmer, SPB 
The setting is pre-Soviet, but, according to the respondent, the story was 
popularly retold in the late Soviet period. Another commonly presented idea 
was that, while the term ‘Soviet’ was officially used to describe those with 
Soviet passports, in practice, when meeting other foreigners, the tendency for 
all Soviet citizens, regardless of ethnicity, was to self-define as russkii. The 
prominent film director and public figure Stanislav Govorukhin retold this in 
an article on the meanings of Russianness: ‘In the USSR there was a term 
“Soviet people”. But inside the country nobody called themselves this and 
when they went abroad the following dialogue would occur: “Where are you 
from guys?” “from the USSR” “Ahh! Russians! Welcome!”’81  
The point here is that, while when we zoom in for detail we find different 
ethnic groups across Russia, upon zooming out we find the all the peoples of 
Russia essentially treated as part of the russkii category. As the respondent 
below indicates, when there is a common purpose, ‘we all become russkie’: 
Before there was the Soviet person, but then, after that, everyone was 
artificially divided into nationalities. It seems to me that rossiyanin and 
russkii are artificial divisions. If it’s Russia then the term to use is russkii. If 
we take things in isolation, the small peoples (malie narodi), then an 
inhabitant of Mari El will call himself a Buryat. Well fine, if you are a 
Buryat then fine, you are a Buryat. But when we all get together, then we 
are all russkie, like in the train or when we have a drink.                            
Elisa (58) Director of Sports Centre, SPB 
The sense that ‘we all become russkie’ when there is a common cause is likely 
to be both a Soviet legacy and a typical mechanism of majority-group national 
identity. It essentially views Russianness as connected to working for the good 







russkii involved two Americans, both of whom received publicity at the time 
(2014) for their desire to live in Russia and contribute to the country. The first 
was a cheese farmer working for twenty years on the outskirts of Moscow, who 
‘even after all the sanctions started (…) kept his business, decided to stay, what 
a guy! … so I think you are russkii if you work for the benefit of Russia and 
love Russia. (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB). The other example was the blogger turned 
Russia Today journalist Tim Kerby who ‘came here, speaks Russian poorly, 
but took Russian (russkoe) citizenship and wants to live here. For me he is 
russkii because he loves Russia and works for her. (Leonid (45) Religious history lecturer, 
NN).  
The above demonstrates how russkii is understood as a category of practice: it 
is when people living alongside one another interact in Russian language and 
follow commonly-accepted behaviours that people ‘feel Russian’. In this we 
find a link between older respondents presentation of a non-ethnic Russianness 
and the civic and modern version articulated by younger respondents. In 
defining Russianness, what is important for these respondents is integration 
into the Russian linguistic and cultural world, as well as holding citizenship. In 
the first instance you are russkii if ‘you speak Russian and somehow identify 
yourself with Russian culture and history’ regardless of ‘who your parents are 
or what kind of blood you have’ (Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN). Here we 
also find citizenship equated with nationality; having a Russian passport you 
are free to consider yourself ‘russkii’ as ‘whoever considers themselves to be 
russkii, is a russkii. When a person makes the decision, and decides to be 
Russian then this happens and he immediately becomes Russian (Sergei (40) 
Marketing Department, SPB).  
While a large range of respondents embraced the latter concept of self-defining 
as Russian, many added additional clauses demanding deeper familiarity with 
Russia’s language and culture. It is at this point that definitions of Russianness 
become more prescriptive and narrow, in the sense that, to become russkii, one 
must absorb Russian culture and language and gain native familiarity with 
cultural symbols and products. In the example below the symbolic matryeshka 





The main thing is to be brought up in the traditions of Russian (russkaya) 
culture, even if you weren’t born here. If Russian (russkaya) culture is not 
alien to you, if it is in your blood, then you understand what a matryeshka 
is, not just because you saw in it in a souvenir shop, but because for you it is 
a native thing for you, a russkie (russkie) thing. Russian (russkaya) nature, 
the Russian (russkie) wide-open spaces… 
Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
The above is a good example how even non-ethnic civic integrationist 
sentiment draws hard boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. The demand to 
have ‘Russian culture in your blood’ and feel a ‘native’ connection to ‘Russian 
things’ links in, as we will see below, to how migrant workers are excluded. 
This version of commonality was popular and viewed Russian culture, 
language, history and traditions as forming a ‘cultural background that 
influences all people’. Thus, ‘studying the same course books (…) going to the 
same kind of schools, being in the same space with the same kind of towns’ 
produces a certain unity of common belonging (Nadia, (26) Lecturer in Asian Studies, NN).  
For some, this cultural linguistic version of Russianness is not something that 
can be learned in a few years: ‘to be russkii you need to be brought up in 
Russian cultural traditions as it is only then you will know the culture, its 
uniqueness, the identity of the Russian people (russkii narod) (Katya (22) Student 
Politics, NN). This assimilationist sentiment makes serious demands on non-
Russians (nerusskie) to work very hard to attain membership through cultural 
and linguistic adaptation. At times the requirements are so high it appears only 
the children of non-Russians have a realistic chance of integrating in such a 
manner: ‘no person can understand Russia if they have not lived here long 
enough, and not absorbed some of the values that exist in all rossiyskii people, 
all russkie people’. (Svetlana (25) Postgraduate researcher sociology, NN).  
The way the respondent above conflates rossiyanin and russkii is an important 
point. In most versions we find a civic, non-ethnic and cultural linguistic 
understanding of being russkii in the vast majority of respondents of both age 
groups. The question raised by some respondents then, was why are both 





artificially divide a larger group up, despite their common traits: ‘the word 
“rossiyanin” suggests that some people are “russkie” and others not very 
“russkie” but when you just call everyone “russkie” without any scrutiny, that 
is more humane.’ (Pyotr (29) Architect, NN). Again we return to the idea russkii 
should not be used as a marker of ethnicity but to describe citizens of Russia 
and members of the Russian linguistic and cultural space. Here we find a desire 
to change the meaning of a category in order to redraw boundaries in a more 
inclusive manner: 
I don’t think the difference in meanings between rossiyanin and russkii is 
very healthy. Because the word ‘russkii’ should mean a citizen of Russia but 
in reality it is not so. Actually, for many russkii is used to describe ethnic 
Russians. But it would be better if we all, regardless of ethnicity, just called 
ourselves ‘russkie’.  
Semyon (54) psychologist, SPB  
In essence, many respondents view rossiyanin and russkii as having similar 
meaning and, the former may be jettisoned, and russkii left to describe peoples 
of various ethnicity united into a ‘nation’ with a common language, culture, 
shared history and territory: 
We need to slightly change the meaning of the word ‘russkii’. We should 
equate it with the word “rossiyanin”. Being russkii is not because you have 
Russian blood, because we don’t have many of these “pure-blood” russkie 
around here. Everyone is half-something. So one just needs to decide for 
themselves what “russkii” means. 
Yaroslav (23), IT Student and small businessman, NN 
Thus, there is an interesting continuity in defining Russianness that may be 
transmitted from the older Soviet-born respondents to the younger cohort. 
While abstract terminology exists to differentiate between ‘ethnic’ Russianness 
and Citizenship in both eras (sovetskii and russkii in the USSR, rossiyskii and 
russkii today), the strong tendency to merge a variety of ethnic groups into the 
russkie category appears to hold true for many living in the Russian Federation 





ethnic cultural and linguistic category into which all other ethnic groups can 
(or should) merge. There is more than a Soviet tinge to this; at the core of 
Soviet nationality policy was the concept of various ethnic groups converging 
(sblizehnie) into one Soviet people (sovietskii narod).  The respondent below 
suggests the shared history, culture and language of the peoples of Russia 
makes them all russkie and, as long as they integrate and assimilate around 
these poles, ‘we are all russkie.’  
I don’t know, in university there were people from Buryatia and we got on 
fine. It isn’t a problem. They are still inhabitants of Russia, they are russkie. 
They live with us (u nas) and this is a multi-ethnic (mnogonatsional'naya) 
country, this is fine, and we can exist this way. For me these are people not 
from without but within my culture. Yes it is diverse and multifaceted, but it 
is all the same our culture.   
Marina (29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
The desire to merge these two terms, then, is not based on ideas of ethno-
nationalism but does connect with the goals of creating a unified civic nation 
based on common citizenship, language, culture and shared values. Here the 
term russkii offers more potential in ‘unifying people’, as long as its ethno-
national flavour is clearly rejected.  
On the other hand, we can find some divergence between older and younger 
respondents in what criteria must be met to become russkii. Younger 
respondents made more tough demands in terms of assimilation than older 
respondents, who were far looser and associating Russianness more as self-
defining and working for the good of the country. This is a split that will be 
returned below when considering attitudes to migrant workers. This division 
should not be overplayed; above we have seen how many respondents across 
the board share similar positions on certain points: indifference to being 
rossiyanin, rejecting nationalism in favour of a conservative patriotism, deeper 
connection to being russkii but on non-ethnic grounds, and receptivity to 
redefining russkii/rossiyanin. Beyond this, we find an important set of myths in 
circulation that encourage enthusiasm and optimism for Russia as a 





Support for multinationalism and visions of interethnic harmony 
Another key finding was that, despite literature on increasing xenophobia in 
Russia in the 2000’s (Gudkov 2002; Pain 2004, 2007), the vast majority of 
respondents in this research supported the idea that Russia is and should be a 
multinational country (mnogonatsional’naya strana) and a common home for 
different national groups (narodov). This appears to be a default position 
among respondents young and old, and is based on the common-sense view 
that ‘nationalism is simply not acceptable as a matter of principle’ given that 
‘Russia is a very multicultural country (mul'tikul'turnaya strana)’ in which 
‘thousands of peoples (tysyacha narodov) have lived and closely interacted 
(vzaimodeystvuyut) for many centuries’ (Boris (25) TV/radio presenter, SPB). A number 
of positive references were made across a range of respondents to the malie 
narodi (particularly Tatarstan, Bashkiria and Yakutia) as ‘native’ (korenie) to 
Russia. These peoples were presented as organic and home-grown (korenie), 
having lived compactly alongside the russkie for centuries. Rather than being a 
threat, ‘the various peoples of Russia have been pretty complementary to the 
russkie, I mean they have really got on well with us for hundreds of years (…) 
there is harmony (Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN). Respondents could report 
on their own observations of how, for example, Russians and Tatars interact in 
the present day: we have a village in our region that is half Russian, half Tatar. 
There is a significant difference between the two groups. You can see it, but all 
the same they live together. There is no enmity between them (Ilia (46) Import-Export 
Business owner, NN). In the above examples, we find interethnic groups imagined as 
peacefully interacting and the interaction is positive for the russkie.  
When we turn to how the russkie were imagined in this interethnic family, 
some traces of hierarchy emerged. The Russians are at the top, leading the 
family, while the smaller nationalities are content playing their part. This is a 
harmonious family unit that is imagined through history to the present day: 
Russia was formed from many peoples (narodami).  Of course the Russian 
people (russkii narod) has been prevalent (prevaliroval) and has led the 
others with her, it is more intellectual and industrious, that is how things 





won the war together, all fifteen republics took part, Jews, Azeri, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Georgians! We have always been multi-
national (mnogonatsional'nymi) 
Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB 
 
The view above is founded on a set of narratives on the peaceful absorption of 
malie narodi into a common space, a process that is led by the Russians. Here 
we find powerful myths suggesting these peoples were not oppressed by the 
central authorities but happily incorporated into Russia’s rich multi-ethnic 
tapestry. These discursive frames are important in explaining today’s world 
and shoring up the ‘normality’ of Russia as a multinational state. A common 
myth in circulation presents Russia’s multi-ethnic traditions as more peaceful 
and kind-hearted than the other imperial expansions of the age. Russia’s 
‘peaceful’ empire building on the Eurasian space was contrasted to the brutal 
colonisation methods of the Western powers, with frequent references to the 
Spanish, English or, later, American treatment of native tribes. 
I think we brought writing, the alphabet to many people. After all, peoples 
of the North didn’t have anything up to the Soviet period, we founded this 
for them, and we established their language, in contrast to the Americans 
who exterminated the native Indian population. Why are they not held to 
account in this world?  
Igor, (41) Lecturer in International Relations, NN 
The idea of ‘respect’ is highlighted below, in what represents a denial of 
Russia’s colonialism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Instead of 
‘colonization’, ‘occupation’ or ‘exploitation’ we find ‘absorption’ on terms of 
‘respect’, with the newly absorbed peoples becoming ‘equal’ to the russkie: 
‘the question of respect is important. We have never founded colonies for 
ourselves, we absorbed peoples (natsiy) and these peoples (natsiy) became 
equal to us’ (Vladislav (28) Postdoctoral researcher Middle Eastern Studies, NN). 
Another aspect of this narrative is that the Russians went out and harnessed 
wild tundra wastelands, won over primitive tribes with soft policies of 





industrialisation and modernity. Again below we find hierarchies on display, 
the Russians who lead, build, organize and the ‘natives’ who either ‘learn’ how 
to follow or remain ‘backward’: 
We came and gave education to them, built towns and, if it wasn’t for us, 
they would still be tending to flocks of deer. I don’t think we were in any 
way ‘occupiers’. Everything was different. Men set off across the kilometres, 
passing tundra, with the wind at their faces, and the cold. They marched on 
without seeing anyone for thousands of kilometres, stuck a flag in the 
ground and that is how it was declared Russian territory. As for the locals, 
well some of them wanted to study, the others to stay with the deer.  
Mikhail (29) Actor, Moscow 
In these narratives of Russia’s ‘natural’ and ‘peaceful’ expansion’ we find little 
reference to colonialism or imperialism to characterise the way Russians and 
non-Russians interacted. The imperial and Soviet past is presented as ‘normal’ 
and, therefore, not something in need of critique. By focusing on the positive 
aspects of the imperial and Soviet experience, these narratives support the 
image of Russia as a benevolent force in the Eurasian space.  
The above is reinforced by popular views of the USSR as a ‘kind’ 
internationalist society. Positive representations of the Soviet policy of druzhba 
narodov abounded in young and old. Here, the consensus was that druzhba 
narodov was a reality in the USSR, not just a propaganda construct. Older 
respondents consistently claimed they felt no difference among national groups 
and that ethnicity was of no importance. This sheds light on how Russians 
understood the ‘Friendship of Nations’ as a space where ethnicity was 
irrelevant: 
In the period we lived there was a real friendship of nations… In school we 
studied alongside all kinds of nationalities, we didn’t see any difference 
between nationalities.  I didn’t care about it at all. (Pause) Everyone was 
friendly with one another. In our courtyard, I don’t know, it was like we 
were all the same.  





There is little evidence respondents thought ‘non-Russians’ may have 
experienced things differently. Speaking for the majority, older respondents 
offer positive recollections: ‘people around me did not worry about nationality 
(…) we didn’t pay attention to this issue (…) and we all lived peacefully 
together as a multi-ethnic country’ (Yegor (44) Newspaper editor, NN).  This resonates 
with the discussions on the non-ethnic character of Russianness earlier in the 
chapter and suggests the relevance of Soviet traditions to such sentiment. Older 
respondents argued that this was definitely one part of Soviet ideology that 
people believed in and, as a result, functioned well.  
Indeed, respondents offer very few negative representations of how interethnic 
relations were handled either by the Russian Empire or the USSR. 
Furthermore, there was little open discussion of the role of the ‘russkie’ in 
either period. Overall, the russkie play a leading role as ‘elder brother’ in 
popular understandings of Russia’s multi-ethnic past, but, in keeping with 
Soviet tradition, this is not something that is carefully articulated and justified, 
but understood as the ‘way things have always been.’ At the same time, we 
find little appreciation of how things were for non-Russians in these 
arrangements, beyond the sentiment that they are generally happy with their 
status in Russia. Above all, the image of how the russkie and the malie narodi 
interact was one of harmony and agreement. As we shall see below, in contrast 
to the rosy picture of the past, there is criticism of certain current tendencies in 
the Russian Federation today. In the next part of this chapter, I examine how 
this picture of interethnic harmony between Russians and non-Russians breaks 
down.  
Part two: Exclusivist sentiment: out-group mechanisms  
One interesting point emerging from discussions on the multi-ethnic character 
of the Russian Federation, was to find support for multinationalism existing 
alongside anti-migrant or anti-Caucasus feeling. This suggests support for 
Russia as a mnogonatsional’naya strana may be disconnected from tolerance 
or openness toward non-Russian migration, which may exist in a different 
mental compartment. In examining this ‘othering’ sentiment, we turn first to 





‘groupist’ interpretations among respondents, who marked them out as an 
ethno-cultural ‘Other’. 
The North Caucasus issue  
Made up of eight regions, including the Republic of Dagestan and Chechnya, 
the North Caucasus stands out as a region exposing certain fault lines in 
support for mnogonatsional’naya Rossiya. Those from the North Caucasus, 
unlike the other korennie narodi of Russia such as the Tartars, Bashkirs or 
Yakuts, face a certain anti-Caucasus sentiment that has deep Russian imperial 
and Soviet legacies. This is especially true in attitudes to the Chechens, who 
suffer from a negative image as a tough mountain people who, among their 
neighbours, are ‘the most aggressive and uncompromisingly hostile to Russian 
rule’ (Russell 2005: 103). During the nineties, the explosion of separatist 
conflict in Chechnya and the arrival of new Caucasian migrants to Russian 
cities caused anti-Caucasus sentiment to ripple across Russian society (Trenin 
and Malashenko, 2004: 61). It appears such sentiment has not dissipated. In 
recent sociological polling with the open question ‘which groups of people 
provoke negative feelings’, kavkaztsy (Caucasians) were in third place (8.4%) 
behind the homeless (BOMZH) (9.5%) and skinheads (11.4%), with alcoholics 
following behind them (7.4%) (Tishkov 2013: 361).  
In this section we explore how attitudes to the North Caucasus reveal much 
about how Russian ‘we’ is constructed; kavkaztsy do not fit with the template 
of other ‘good’ or ‘normal’ peoples in the Russian Federation. This is due to 
their unacceptable behaviour, their alien and wild culture and the fact that the 
region is an undesirable drain on Russia’s resources. Firstly, it is worth noting 
that respondents treated kavkaztsy in a very different manner from the other 
malie narodi above, even though, like Tatars and Bashkirs, they are fully-
fledged citizens of Russia and hold Russian passports. In doing this, one 
common line was to highlight their ‘rudeness’ and ‘disrespect’ (naglost’); their 
behaviour was seen to be ‘cheeky’ or ‘aggressive’ and demonstrated an 
unwillingness to ‘play by our rules’. The peoples of the North Caucasus, the 
Chechens in particular, were seen to have ‘a totally different way of thinking 





(Nikolay (52), ex-policeman, retired, SPB).  
As we will see later, this theme of cultural aliens not ‘fitting in’ to local norms 
emerges again in the section on migrants, where there is a sense many 
respondents do not differentiate the kavkaztsy from migrant workers. The 
behaviour of ‘these people’ does not fit with how a ‘normal’ migrant or 
foreigner should act: the hostility and wilful independence of the kavkaztsy is 
taken as a threat and subverts existing ethnic hierarchies within the 
contemporary ‘friendship of nations’. As a group, the kavkaztsy are imagined 
to violate or resist the accepted order and respondents, in turn, demand an end 
to this. Here the threat is not put in tangible terms of crime or socio-economic 
competition, but in terms of their negative behaviour.  
This brings us to a second main theme, that the kavkaztsy are culturally 
backward or incompatible with Russian culture. This is reinforced by 
stereotypical images of cultural differences that echo long-standing images in 
Russian literature. In rendering kavkaztsy as a culturally alien and warlike 
people who ‘have a different way of seeing the world’ we find common use of 
certain stereotypes and social categorizations. One common image was to 
present them as ‘people from the mountains (…) who have different ways from 
us. (…) they are not overburdened by education (…) they shoot guns into the 
air and that is considered normal there (Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB). 
There are also common schemas employed to summarise this ‘lower cultural 
level’, for example, ‘they fire guns into the air and don’t care that its not 
allowed’ (which shows them to be wild, hot-blooded and disrespectful) or ‘they 
still kidnap women for wedding traditions and this is barbaric’ (which shows 
their culture to be backward) (Pyotr (29) Architect, NN). These kinds of 
representations were reproduced across respondents, even those with ‘liberal’ 
inclinations. The respondent below argues the region stands out from the rest 
of the Russian Federation due to its ‘barbaric culture’ that means ‘no matter 
what they do there, it ends up with death and violence’, something connected 
to the fact that ‘several generations have grown up there who are very 
military-style people, who have known nothing but war in their lives’ (Julia (25) 
Human rights activist, Moscow). A diverse range of respondents of reproduced these 





visions of the kavkaztsy. 
A third factor in ‘othering’ the North Caucasus was to imagine it as a region 
sucking up money: ‘The worst thing is that it is a subject of the Russian 
Federation with the same rights as the rest but with a much smaller population 
that is receiving very large subsidies’ (Pyotr (29) Architect, NN). Here the Russian 
verb kormit’ (literal translation ‘feed’) was used extensively to describe the 
subsidies and maintenance payments paid by the Federal Centre to the North 
Caucasus. Here the ‘insolence’ of the kavkaztsy is due to their demands for 
money from ‘our pockets’. The respondent below appears to merge migrants 
and kavkaztsy into one category: 
Now migrants really bother us and have ruined what is called ‘friendship of 
nations’ today. (…) in the USSR the Caucasus was never so brazen. Now 
everyone understands that enormous funding is sent there. This is money 
from our pockets. And they are so cheeky, they demand more and more. So 
that is definitely a negative.  
Julia (47) Assistant in film set production, SPB 
Thus, the kavkaztsy deviate from ‘normal’ behaviour within the ‘friendship of 
nations’ due to their ‘insolence’ – which is partly about their independent and 
demanding stances. A significant minority of respondents cutting across age 
and social lines took up this critical position, demanding that ‘our tax money 
should not be sent to them’ as ‘we owe them nothing’. Here we find more 
evidence of how boundaries are redrawn: Russia, or in other words, ‘we’, send 
money to ‘them’ - the North Caucasus. There is a clear sense the region is thus 
excluded from the imagined Russian nation and boundaries are reconfigured to 
exclude the kavkaztsy. For some of these respondents, the answer to the 
problem was to cut off the flow of Federal money flowing south and let the 
North Caucasus break away from the Russian Federation. This raises the 
question as to why so much money should be given to a region that is not seen 
to be part of the Russian ‘we’.  
This brings us to the final theme in representations of the Caucasus. Somewhat 





support the current status quo and keep things as they are. What is interesting 
is how arguments in favour of the North Caucasus rarely referred to any 
‘Friendship of Nations’ or adherence to the principle of Russia as a multi-
ethnic state. Instead, the common-sense understanding of the current state of 
affairs between the Federal Centre and the region is ‘the money sent out there 
is a pay-off (podkup) to the local fighters there, to stop them from turning the 
place into a slaughterhouse.’ Marina (29) Manager in Software Company, SPB.  A message 
that cut across all respondents was the need to contain ‘a dangerous region 
with a dangerous people (opasnii narod)’(Zakhar (29) Manager in export company, SPB).  
Even among respondents who lamented the loss of ‘our resources’ that should 
be spent on ‘our population’, we could still find support for keeping the North 
Caucasus: ‘the subsidies are in a political sense probably an inevitable 
measure, if we want peace on the borders, we will have to give something for 
this’ (Galina (40) Sociology department, NN). In this sense, differentiation of regions into 
‘ours’ and ‘not-ours’ has occurred but support for retaining the territory 
remains, which is justified on the lines of state security. Thus, the North 
Caucasus is presented as a space that must be quarantined in order to contain 
violent, terroristic, separatist and even criminal elements. Sending money to 
this zone helps neutralise it and keep things ‘spokoino’ as ‘If we don’t keep 
things in order in the Caucasus those blacks won’t let us live (nam zhizni eti 
chernyye ne dadut)’.82 However, as long as ‘There is money for everyone there 
(Tam vsem nikakikh deneg ne zhalko) (…) there is peace, calm among people, 
development…. And all this is worth it (Ludmilla (50) Head of University Dormitory, NN).  
This desire to quarantine the region for security reasons, tended to imagine the 
region as a ‘peripheral zone’ on Russia’s southern frontier where peace, 
security and stability must be achieved. The important point here is that, if this 
peace is disturbed or order collapses on the frontier, the consequences for 
Russia itself could be disastrous. This sentiment connects the retention of 
territory with securing peace and stability. Below the process of gathering 









territory is regressive (reducing security). Thus, even if these lands are filled 
with people that are not ‘ours’, it is ‘our’ territory and vital to creating a buffer 
zone around the core Russian lands. According to this version, loss of these 
territorial frontier zones could cause Russia itself to break up: 
If we gave Siberia to the Chinese or Karelia to the Finns, this would be like 
a reversal of history, all the country would be divided into regions, into 
little kingdoms, who would then fight among themselves (….) the buffer 
space we have today holds Russia in a condition of peace (uderzhivayet 
Rossiyu v sostoyanii mira) 
Daria (28) Events Manager for Local Goverment, SPB 
Thus, respondents reproduced a popular domino theory that applies to post-
Soviet Russia. This way of thinking treats claims to national self-determination 
and separatism as a genie that, once released, cannot be restrained, and could 
even lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation. Here the respondent clearly 
underlines that, even though his gut feeling is to let the North Caucasus secede, 
his head tells us this is not in the ‘interests of the state’: 
I can say in the nineties one position was strong: just put a fence up there 
(in the Caucasus MB) and remove them, let them live as they please. On the 
other hand, you have to understand if you let one (national group MB) do 
this, then the others will start making noises (shurshaniye). It’s like the 
domino principle. So you need to operate here not according to emotions, 
you can’t just follow the feeling ‘let them all go to hell.’  
Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB 
In part, this suggests a continuation with previous polling that suggested up to 
half of Russians believed the Second Chechen War was fought to prevent the 
collapse of Russia as a country, while three quarters believed it was mainly to 
combat banditry (Trenin and Malashenko, 2004: 51). Indeed, there was the 
sense among respondents that, in spite of much talk of Russia’s size, strength 
and power in modern discourse, many respondents keenly feel the country’s 
internal weakness: ‘if you take one part away then the whole thing will fall 
apart’ (Sasha (28), University Lecturer in History, SPB). The fear of a 1991-style unravelling 





essential fragility of the current arrangements and doubts the Russian state’s 
capacity to survive the ‘stress test’ of losing certain territories. 
Some older respondents explicitly framed their conservatism towards territorial 
change in reference to what happened in the 1991 breakup. Once again we find 
the salience of life experience guiding the older generation and influencing the 
general mood. Here they remembered how slogans of separatism and secession 
promised a better life but, in reality, ‘after separation we did not go on to live 
any better. (…) That was a trick (obmanka), a kind of formula that allowed the 
disintegration of the country. (Leonid (45) Religious history lecturer, NN). One clear 
connection was to link secession to chaos and violence, given the past and 
present examples, the respondent suggests it is better to leave things be and let 
the Federal Centre decide redistribution questions as they see fit: ‘Ukraine is a 
very clear example. Look what happened in the Donbass, things fell apart and 
it is all dog eat dog there (kak pauki v banke). The same thing would happen 
here if we started to separate some regions (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB).  
The above offers evidence that memory of recent lived history acts as an 
important driver in the adoption of statist and security discursive frames. It is 
this point, rather than any narrative of the kavkaztsy as ‘one of us’, a ‘brother 
people’ or another malie narodi, that ultimately unites respondents behind 
keeping the North Caucasus in the Russian Federation. Memories of recent 
history (1991 collapse, the Chechen Wars) help explain the focus on 
geopolitics, state security and national interest, as well as imagining Russia as 
a giant but fragile state with many national groups that must be held together in 
a stable unit. All the same, for many the North Caucasus and kavkaztsy are a 
threatening and undesirable ‘other’ of the Russian ‘we’, a source of anger, 
resentment and shame. It is worth noting, however, that this popular 
‘Caucasophobia’ is not connected to a wider islamophobia that we might 
observe in Western Europe. Instead, a large part is based on negative 
stereotypes, schemas and categories available in everyday life, both on the 






The increased presence of migrant workers from surrounding CIS countries has 
been an important aspect of social change in much of Russia’s urban spaces 
since 1991. In the 1990’s almost five million migrants entered Russia, although 
when we consider the total number of migrants as a percentage of the 
population, this was only 8.7% in 2010.83 At the time of interviews, according 
to the Federal Migration Service, 11.5 million foreign citizens were present in 
Russia by 2014, of which, only 1.5 million were working on a legal basis.84 
Thus, Russia’s post-1991 demographic decline appears only to have been 
arrested by the migrant influx. As much as 98% of the population growth 
registered in Russia for 2016 came from migrants.85 Nonetheless, there is 
significant ambiguity to the integration of migrant workers in Russia, with state 
policies ranging from inclusivist integration policies to mass expulsions of 
migrants. Hutchings and Tolz (2016: 328) also discovered ambiguity in media 
coverage of the issue, as state media is ‘caught between (a) attempting to 
preserve ethnic cohesion by under-reporting inflammatory topics and (b) 
acceding to popular sentiments by echoing the prejudicial fears to which those 
topics gave rise’. This ambiguity is also visible in popular sentiment, with 
similar proportions of the population (53.3%) agreeing migrant workers are a 
‘necessity’ in Russia, and 42.5% supporting the idea that migrants should be 
sent back to their countries of origin.86  
Commenting on this ‘absence of a stable public consensus’, Kosmarskaya and 
Savin (2016: 156-9) noted how, among their own respondents, ‘pragmatism’ 
on the demographic need for migrants coexisted with the ‘emotionally 
coloured’ desire ‘not to let them in’. A similar split in attitudes was found 
among respondents in this research. While some clearly wanted to exclude 
migrant workers from the Russian ‘we’, another large segment was more 
sympathetic to migrants and receptive to their integration into Russian society. 
It is worth noting that there is some correlation between this split on migrants 












research there was a rough three-way split on migration between: (i) those 
adhering to Soviet-style inclusivist visions of Russianness who tended to be 
more open to migrants; (ii) those holding civic assimilationist views on 
Russianness who had more demanding stances toward migrants; (iii) those 
taking more hostile stances to migrant workers, using groupist language that 
focused on ethno-cultural difference.  
The first group of respondents had markedly more positive stances toward 
migrants and generally tended be made up of older respondents. On the one 
hand, this is a logical extension of the Soviet influenced view that, to become 
russkii, what is needed is to be ‘patriotic’ and work for the good of the country. 
Here the focus is not on ethno-cultural difference, which is downplayed, but on 
the social status of the migrant. What is emphasised is that migrants have come 
to ‘work and not live on hand-outs’. They do the ‘dirtiest jobs, those that local 
people won’t do’ and, therefore, we need to view them with understanding, give 
them permission to work, temporary right to live here. (…) without them we 
won’t make it, no way. (Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB). According to this 
view, migrants come to Russia to improve their lot and work really hard; this 
kind of behaviour and attitude is something with which these respondents can 
positively identify. Older respondents also revealed idealistic sentiments that 
seem to emerge from Soviet-inspired imagery. One supervisor at a construction 
site was certain interethnic harmony was still a real thing declaring: ‘I think the 
Friendship of Nations has still remained from the Soviet period. It is in the 
blood of the russkii person to get along well with all the rest’ (Oleg (49) Construction 
site foreman, SPB). There is still a sense among many in the last Soviet generation 
that the peoples of the former USSR are of common origin and have a shared 
history and, therefore, there simply cannot be hostile feelings between them: 
Two weeks ago a women in Uzbekistan died who, as it turned out, adopted 
150 children from here during the Leningrad Blockade. She brought up 150 
evacuated children in Uzbekistan. How can I tell her that her own sons who 
have come to work should just get the hell out of here? That would be 
impossible. You need to remember when things were bad for us they helped 
and now, things are bad for them so let them work.  





While Soviet internationalist sentiment is important, we must also recognise 
the importance of everyday encounters in attitudes to migrants. One important 
theme in this group of respondents was references to positive interactions with 
migrants. This offers evidence supporting the ‘social contact hypothesis’, as 
respondents in this group did not see migrants or nerusskie as a problem in 
their everyday life and tended to have some positive experience of them on a 
one-to-one basis: 
I think that now we need to take it case by case. If a person has come to 
work and live here, it brings a benefit. Like for example here in the 
dormitory we have Tajiks who came here as a couple, started working, then 
their kids came and they have received citizenship, they work. Their kid has 
gone to serve in our army even. These kinds of people have the right to stay.  
Ludmilla (50) Head of University Dormitory, NN 
Here we find another example, a retired miner who has employed Tajik 
labourers to work on his dacha. With closer interaction and real experience 
comes a different image of the migrants, whom he sees as people who have 
come to work and get on in life, people with whom he can identify, those who 
behave themselves ‘well’ and ‘normally’.   
Here the Tajiks can do things they can’t do back home like walk around 
safely, go to good shops, smoke, drink. But we haven’t had any trouble here. 
There are lots of them here, practically whole village was built by citizens of 
Tajikistan. But they have never started any fights or stolen anything. They 
just come and work and what is most surprising is they study Russian and 
know it well, even the young lads.  
Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB 
This sentiment of the ‘well-behaved’ migrant who speaks Russian is also 
important for the next group of respondents, most of whom were younger and 
subscribed to more ‘civic’ versions of Russianness. Here we find a practical 
consequence of defining Russianness in terms of culture and language: the 
demand for assimilation and the stigmatization of those non-Russians unable or 
unwilling to accomplish this. Here attitudes to migrants were conditional on 





was the responsibility of migrants to learn ‘some rules’, to ‘learn Russian and 
become familiar with the cultural specifics’, rather than ‘behaving incorrectly 
and insultingly (Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, NN) and not the other way around. 
This assimilationist position on migrants takes the line that, in order to achieve 
integration, the migrant must accept local values, absorb Russian culture. One 
common point of reference here was to the Russian proverb ‘Do not go into 
someone else’s monastery with your own rules’, which functions as a kind of 
cultural idiom that is internalised and passed around: ‘You are entering 
another’s home, you are a guest, you must get acclimatised, understand, not 
destroy, but they come here with their own rules and don’t want to respect 
ours. (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB) These migrants, in failing to learn and follow ‘the 
rules’ do not become russkii. This ties in with the popular understanding of 
Russianness as being about the acceptance of culture, language and values: 
If you come with your own set of rules and try and enforce them here, then 
you are not russkii, you have come to Russia but have remained, say, a 
Tajik. It is the effort to absorb and pass on this Russian culture that makes 
you russkii. 
Marina (29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
Turning to the final group of respondents, who were the most hostile to 
migrants, we find three main lines of objection, some of which is similar to 
representations of people from the North Caucasus. Firstly, we find the idea of 
migrants having a ‘lower culture’ that form a ‘wild’ or ‘dangerous’ element in 
Russian cities and seek to ‘force their ways upon us’. Such a position, as we 
see below, need not entail abandonment of the principle that Russia is a 
multinational state. In the extract below the respondent speaks in a way that 
merges the people of the North Caucasus (people from the mountains) with 
other migrants (priyezzhiye): 
Of course, Russia is a common home for many nationalities, I have always 
thought that and probably always will. But I don’t like it when they come 
down from the mountains (s gor spuskayutsya) and start imposing their own 
ways. I mean like trying to spread their traditions into Russian culture. Yes, 





when migrants (priyezzhiye) here unite into their own enclaves and start 
‘terrorizing’ the native population («terrorizirovat'» korennoye 
naseleniye)… well that is what causes confrontations.  
Denis (41) Journalist, NN 
Here we find the idea of a culturally alien ‘Other’ that ‘descends’ upon 
‘civilized’ urban spaces and threaten the locals. This is an emotional anti-
migrant discourse that points to cultural backwardness and inappropriate 
behaviour among new arrivals to cities when drawing lines of exclusion on 
cultural lines. This is a narrative common to other parts of the post-Soviet 
space, such as Bishkek, where researchers found new lines of exclusion and 
inclusion being drawn along lines of newly arrived rural migrants and more 
established Russian-speaking urban dwellers (Flynn, Kosmarskaya 2012, 
2014). Part of this hostility is based on the idea that these ‘Eastern’ ethno-
cultural groups are harbingers of a lower culture who have arrived uninvited 
en-masse to ‘European’ Russian cities. Below, the respondent suggests that St. 
Petersburg, which she sees as a city of high culture, is being swamped by the 
people of the Central Asian ‘auls’. The respondent connects this to general 
trends occurring across Europe and firmly associates Russia in this context 
with ‘other European countries’: 
I think a visa regime would help because soon we will end up with auls 
here. And, as a person of culture, this really worries me. (…). Our 
incredible Petersburg culture is starting to deteriorate (portit’sya). But this 
is happening all over Europe. People come with their culture and they don’t 
integrate into your European one, they do not accept your culture. They live 
on their own. Here the same thing is happening unfortunately.  
Julia (47) Assistant in film set production, SPB 
The sense of an ‘Eastern invasion’ presents migrants as a threat to urban spaces 
in as far as their ‘alien’ external attributes intrude on ‘our’ space and impose 
themselves on ‘our’ cities. This was less a reference to race as such; rather the 
focus was on cultural objects (scarves, clothes) and practices (praying, 
gathering in street):  





religions. In Petersburg and Moscow they have already started to overflow 
the metro stations and streets when they have their own special kinds of 
holidays. But I think this shouldn’t happen in our towns. In Tatarstan or 
Dagestan, where the principal religion is Islam, that is fine, but not here.  
Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, NN 
The negative images produced above of migrants as ethno-cultural aliens are 
reinforced by negative everyday experiences related by these respondents. 
Thus, rather than understanding this xenophobic sentiment as a shift to 
nationalism or rejection of multinationalism, we can find evidence it is more a 
response to what they perceive of as significant visible changes in the habitat 
and lifestyle to which they are accustomed. This brings us back to the ‘social 
contact hypothesis’, as respondents in this group usually had limited 
experience of any deeper interaction with migrants and, as a result, tended to 
experience displeasure at the point of contact. This everyday contact served 
only to activate certain negative schemas and stereotypes that described the 
perceived differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in terms of culture, manners, 
traditions and language. The first example shows how unpleasant feelings 
emerge after witnessing migrants enjoying common urban spaces in public 
holidays or weekends: 
If you go out on the 31st of December, I mean God forbid you do end up on 
the street at New Year, especially Palace Square, it is all migrants there, 
some of whom have been let off work and you see them all and realise how 
many there are in our town. Because up until then they work in their 
bunkhouses at the construction sites and we don’t see them in the centre. 
Sasha (28), University Lecturer in History, SPB 
Again, it is appears to be limited contact that breeds antipathy to migrants. A 
second example concerns a male respondent who resents the presence of a 
migration registration centre near his home. He accuses the migrants of not 
‘playing by our rules’, of behaving in outrageous ways they would never get 
away with in their home countries. Again the theme of ‘behaving rudely’ (vesti 
sebya po-khamski) returns as it did with regards the North Caucasus, and 





My parents live close to the Unified Centre of Documents near Smolny 
where there are millions of migrants (gastarbayterov)! My 16-year old 
sister is afraid to walk past it. I have to accompany her or, otherwise, if she 
walks alone they all start catcalling her, whistling and behaving in an 
utterly vile way (vesti sebya absolyutno po-khamski). That is acceptable for 
them. But of course they don’t behave that way with their own women but 
here they permit themselves this kind of behaviour because it seems they 
don’t have to take responsibility for it.  
Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB 
The sense of ‘abnormality’ in this picture is clear. Here, migrants are an 
‘Other’ that behaves in an utterly deviant fashion. This brings us to the 
important dynamic of ‘normality’ operating across all three groups of 
respondents. The image of the ideal migrant and desirable interethnic relations 
is commonly taken from Soviet frames of reference. In some ways this 
explains the tendency to combine ‘multinationalism’ with the idea ‘all peoples 
should stay in their homelands’. This duality was present in Soviet 
Nationalities policy and seems to still leave strong traces today. Below, we find 
a good example of this tendency of combining support for a multi-ethnic 
country with a preference for restricting ‘ethnic mixing’ among the peoples: 
Russia is a pretty unique country (…) during the internal colonisation of 
Eurasia (...) a very large amount of nationalities were accumulated (…) On 
the one hand, we are all inhabitants of one country and have one 
citizenship, but on the other hand, we have great diversity. But I also think 
everyone should live on their own land. (…) together we are inhabitants of 
one huge country, on the other hand, I don’t think we should mix everything 
up.  
Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB 
The above combines Russian multinationalism (a continuation of Soviet 
internationalism) with indigenization (Soviet korenizatzia encouraging separate 
homelands for each national group). Perhaps this explains how respondents 
could comfortably combine xenophobia toward newcomers to urban spaces - 





support for the idea of Russia as a harmonic multinational country. One 
respondent, who was otherwise an enthusiastic proponent of multinationalism, 
viewed the large concentration of migrants in Russian cities as evidence of ‘a 
special policy to mix the Slavic population with other ethnic groups’, a trend 
opposed by the respondent on the grounds ‘nothing good will come of making 
Russia into a kind of composite solyanka87 with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.’ 
(Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB). Another respondent made a distinct 
division between ‘native Russian peoples’ (korenie rossiiskie narodi) and 
‘migrants’ to explain her own understanding of the situation: 
The definition of Russia as a multi-ethnic country in our constitution alludes 
to the fact that many peoples (natsiy) live here. I think Russia should be a 
state only for those peoples (narodov) that are native (korenie) rossiyskie 
peoples like the Tatars or those living in the far north. But Russia should 
not be a home for peoples such as the Tajiks and all those immigrants that 
we have.   
Ksenia (22) Law student, NN 
Thus, desires for a diverse multi-ethnic country where most people stay in their 
own land may be about a return to Soviet ‘normality’. One position held by a 
wide range of respondents was that the current situation with regards migration 
and interethnic relations is far worse than that of the late Soviet period. The 
claim that things were ‘better in the USSR’ reflects the idea that mass 
migration is a new kind of phenomenon that did not exist in the USSR as ‘back 
then we didn’t have all this mixing. Every people lived in their own republic, it 
wasn’t like now (Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB). Very few respondents 
argued druzhba narodov continued fully intact today and many claimed they 
now lived in an atmosphere of increased intolerance and xenophobia. For 
some, the ‘abnormality’ of today’s situation centres less on ethno-cultural 
difference and more migration as a social and political problem linked to poor 
wages, corruption, unfairness, and criminality: 
I think more and more there is bad feeling among people towards foreigners 








mass media and the atmosphere that reigns all around us. It is also caused 
by the authorities, who cannot control these migration flows or their 
presence here in Russia. This situation is getting worse and, of course, it 
would be really good if things were like back in the USSR, where there was 
a Friendship of Peoples.  
Marina (25) Language teacher, NN  
In respondent assessments of why druzhba narodov was successful in the 
USSR as compared to today, the role of state policy was often seen as central 
to interethnic harmony. A commonly expressed idea in both age groups was 
that migration in the USSR was far more carefully managed and confined to 
certain places rather than being a mass phenomenon. Many respondents 
revealed their understanding of how Soviet druzhba narodov actually worked: 
each narod was almost expected to stay in their home republic, rather than, for 
example, uproot and come to Russia to find work. Only a selected few were 
offered the chance to move. In addition, a Union-wide planned economy 
helped to balance out economic development across the country leaving ‘more 
money was in the republics’ and making it unnecessary to ‘come to Moscow or 
Nizhny Novgorod’ for work (Julia (29) Chemist in State company, NN).  In essence, during 
Soviet Friendship of Nations ‘in general everybody was happy’ because ‘it is 
not hard to love such people when they live on the territory of their own 
national republic’ (Konstantin (27) state municipal management specialist, Moscow).  Below is a 
good example of how the Soviet-era system is remembered as more settled and 
orderly. New arrivals were carefully selected and allocated places in 
universities and factories, and, as a result, things were more peaceful. Today, 
however, migrants arrive en masse via a conveyer belt fed by corruption that , 
in turn, spreads criminality: 
Before it wasn’t like this, it wasn’t on this scale. People came to us to work 
at the factory, or went to study at higher education facilities in Tashkent. 
Here they would be settled in dormitories. Young folk, around twenty years 
old. They would find jobs for all of them in the factory. In the evenings we 
would meet, well you know young blood, there would be the odd fight but all 
that was done in a harmless way (по-доброму) unlike what is going on 





and three will have a clear criminal inclination. (...) They will have no 
choice but to work through illegal channels.  
Ilia (46) Import-Export Business owner, NN 
One younger respondent offered a concise description of how the ‘normal’ 
Soviet-era migrant, who is a good fit with the urban cultural surroundings, 
contrasts to contemporary ‘gastarbeiter’ that cannot be absorbed into the 
national body:  
The migrant of the early nineties was a person who, let’s say, was around 
30 years old when arrived here. He had been born in the USSR and had 
studied Russian. He would have been acquainted with Russian culture, I 
mean he would be at a pretty high level. The kind of person who comes here 
today, the young folk, now I think 30% of them don’t know Russian or 
Russian culture. (…)  If we take all this together with the problems of 
radical Islam in Central Asia, what we end up with is some kind of monster 
that arrives here and there is already nothing we can do with him but he is 
needed because we have low-paid jobs that nobody wants.  
Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN. 
 
Thus, this new type of migrant is a ‘monster’ that cannot be reformed, 
integrated or made ‘one of us’. While this example is rather extreme, other 
respondents of varying suggested similar ideas about how today’s migrant 
differs sharply from what their parents faced in the Soviet period and how the 
older Soviet system was desirable for today. Overall, the issue of migrants is a 
complex one with numerous threads to consider. A solid proportion of 
respondents view nerusskie migranti as an undesirable ‘Other’ inside the body 
of the nation. The desire to either remove these migrants or force them to 
‘follow our rules’ represents a form of nationalism common to other European 
countries. Here an inclusivist civic definition of Russianness makes certain 
rather uncompromising demands for migrant integration, while the apparent 
focus on ethno-cultural differences is often tied up with very emotional 
language connected to ‘disrespect’ and ‘insolence’. While the Soviet legacy of 
bratski narodi is stronger in some older respondents, for others this 





towns’ being ‘invaded’ by ‘newcomers’.  
The Soviet legacy here works in a complex manner. On the one hand, a strong 
echo of Soviet internationalism is still present, especially in older respondents, 
who view the whole post-Soviet space and its peoples as ‘ours’ and tend to 
sympathise with migrants as working people. On the other hand, there is a 
continuation of Soviet Nationalities Policy’s strange dualism: the country is a 
family of different nations but each national group is encouraged to stay in its 
own homeland. This partly explains how ordinary Russians can combine 
support for a multinational Russia alongside a demand for a certain ‘normality’ 
to be restored in migration that takes its inspiration from Soviet frames.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted some of the distinctive features behind the 
common, imagined sense of the Russian ‘we’. Central to Russia’s distinctive 
form of ‘multiculturalism’ is the salience of Soviet legacies. On the one hand, 
the deeper appeal of russkii in contrast to rossiyanin, suggests Yeltsin-era 
rhetoric has not put down deep roots among respondents of either age group. 
Secondly, rather inclusive non-ethnic definitions of Russianness dominate 
across the board. For older respondents this emerges from how russkii was in 
practice a supraethnic category in the Soviet period. For younger respondents, 
russkii is conflated with the civic nation that any person, regardless of 
ethnicity, can join. Membership, however, is subject to assimilation around 
Russian culture and language. Thirdly, ‘nationalism’ is firmly rejected, as is 
the principle of dividing on ethnic lines (such as ‘Russia for the Russians’ 
slogans). Instead, many respondents see a ‘peaceful’ and ‘calm’ patriotism as 
more appropriate. Much of the above sentiment is harnessed by state actors and 
dovetails well with state-directed efforts at nation-building ‘from above’ (see 
Putin 2012).  
Another distinctive feature to the Russian ‘we’ is the strength of an 
unchallenged ‘imperial consciousness’. This views the incorporation of various 
national groups into a common state as peaceful. In other words, the non-





nor the USSR was ‘bad’. Here there is little evidence that Russian 
‘colonialism’ or ‘imperialism’ has been deconstructed or problematized among 
respondents. No respondents offered any suggestion that this past, when looked 
at through the eyes of non-Russians, could be seen differently. This will be 
returned to in chapter seven, where we find very limited articulations on 
Russia’s leading role in the Eurasian space, perhaps because Russia’s 
dominance in the region is ‘common sense’: something taken to be so ‘natural’ 
and ‘given’ it does not require unpacking. This imperial consciousness 
perpetuates Soviet-era hierarchies and involves common-sense knowledge on 
an imagined harmony of Russians and non-Russians: ‘we peacefully integrated 
the “smaller nations” into a great state’ ‘we have always had interethnic 
harmony’ ‘druzhba narodov was a real thing’. Just as in the Soviet period, the 
role of ethnic Russians as the leading group is not specifically articulated but 
commonly understood; while the malie narodi may have their own native 
languages and customs, in actual fact, when people in the Russian Federation 
come together to do important things they all essentially become ‘russkie’. 
This imperial consciousness is reinforced by statist narratives, revealed in 
attitudes to the North Caucasus, where support for the Kremlin’s current policy 
subsidising and holding on to the region is not explained in terms of 
‘integration’ or ‘multiculturalism’ but the statist priorities of geopolitical 
balance, national security and deterring separatism. Overall, Russia’s 
‘imperial’ thinking does not contradict the non-ethnic, civic conception of the 
Russian nation state promoted by state policy; if anything it reinforces it.  
Thus, what has emerged in this chapter is how a Soviet-style Russocentric 
version of the civic nation predominates. This is largely made up of a certain 
‘imperial consciousness’, statist narratives and Soviet-era understandings of 
Russianness, nation, nationalism, patriotism and multiculturalism, which 
appear to be passed on to a younger generation. The above form another 
important component of hegemonic nationalist discourse in Russia today. Its 
fundamental function is to present the ‘Russians’ as a generous, welcoming 
and open people, the kind of group to which any person would want to belong. 
Yet, as we have seen, there are cracks in this picture of harmonic unity and 





has shown that many assess ‘Russia as a multinational state’ today very much 
in reference to the ‘normal’ way it was organised in the Soviet era. This 
‘normality’ consists of most national groups remaining on ‘their own lands’ 
while together, these national groups work in one ‘multinational state’. 
Migration, when it does occur, is carefully controlled and involves only those 
candidates able and willing to learn Russian and respect the culture and 
traditions of the majority. While non-Russians are free to retain their own 
languages and cultures, they are expected to happily assimilate into the wider 
Russian cultural and linguistic space.  
Perhaps one reason that migrants and the people of the North Caucasus are 
subject to ‘othering’ is the ‘abnormality’ of their position; they deviate from 
Soviet-framed norms. On the one hand, they are seen to resist integration and 
assimilation: they do not think, talk or behave like a kul’turnii or russkii 
chelovek. These people are seen to gang together to resist the peaceful, 
harmonic druzhba narodov narrative and adopt an independent and hostile 
stance: they ‘do not play by our rules’ and have ‘a totally alien culture.’ This is 
an emotional narrative that focuses on status; migrants and kavkaztsy seek to 
‘humiliate’, gain an ‘unfair position’ and show ‘disrespect’. As we have seen, 
the question of whether these negative stereotypes become activated can 
depend on how much contact people have with these ‘Others’. The more actual 
positive social interactions people of different backgrounds have, the less likely 
such thinking will prevail. Furthermore, it is clear that a large number of older 
respondents still often treat all the people of the former USSR as ‘one people’ 
bound together with a common fate. Younger respondents, however, are more 
likely to apply an assimilationist and integrationist model that treats ‘russkii’ as 
a non-ethnic cultural and linguistic category into which all other ethnic groups 
can (or should) merge.  
In this chapter, the key challenge to above vision of the Russian nation and 
Russianness is not framed in terms of democracy or liberalism; instead a 
certain populist ‘put Russia first’ nationalism was identified. This rejects the 
inclusion of labour migrants or the North Caucasus region into the Russian 
‘we’; there is clear hostility to subsidising ‘these people’ (stop sending ‘them’ 





sentiments were espoused not by people who called themselves ‘nationalists’ 
or showed any interest in the slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’. Instead, the 
leitmotif was that ‘our citizens’ need to be put first, a theme that we will return 
to in chapter Seven in attitudes to the ‘Russians of the Near Abroad’. In many 
ways, attitudes to the North Caucasus are a microcosm of the current 
equilibrium in Russian national discourse: statist and geopolitical priorities 
encourage people to swallow their dissatisfaction over inequality, unfairness 
and corruption and accept the priority should be peace, stability and securing 
Russia as a great power. The theme of great power goals and statist rhetoric 
combining with the conservative worldview of the many is important to the 
final two chapters of this thesis, which examine how people understand the 




















Who rules the nation and how? Viewing legitimacy and 
trust ‘from below’ 
The essence of this chapter is to explore how ordinary Russians perceive, 
negotiate, challenge and reaffirm the political configuration of the country and 
leadership of the nation. One key question here is one of legitimacy; how far, 
on one hand, the activities of the political class and the state are congruent with 
the aspirations of the ‘nation’, and, on the other, how far the leader of the 
country, Vladimir Putin, embodies the ‘nation’ in terms of his character, style 
of rule and actions. Even in Russia’s increasingly authoritarian context, 
politicians and parties (re)define aspects of national identity to fit in with their 
policies and, in the process, strive to make themselves and their policies appear 
congruent with the concerns of the ‘people’ and the ‘nation’. What will be 
examined is how political legitimacy and trust in the leader is internalized, 
transmitted and, at times, subverted or challenged. This chapter offers further 
evidence of how Soviet legacies, as well as lived and transmitted memory of 
1988-1998, shape political stances today, leading to a conservative worldview 
that is central to the current hegemonic nationalist discourse in Russia today.  
This can be described as the ‘Putin consensus’, which I will unpack as an 
essentially conservative social contract that is strongly influenced by Soviet 
legacies. The chapter also introduces an important dynamic that has been 
partially touched on in the previous two chapters: the split in normative 
standards between those who do and do not take the late Soviet period as a 
benchmark for normality. This split is visible in the more positive and negative 
versions of the Russian ‘self-image’: either as stoic endurance and resilience, 
or servility, passivity and paternalistic urges. Thus, a diverse group of 
respondents contest the ‘Putin consensus’, criticising a whole range of 
deficiencies in Russia in comparison to ‘normal modern states’, providing 
ample material for the creation of an anti-hegemonic discourse to arise. The 
content of this contestation is often unclear in quantitative polling; this chapter 
remedies this by shedding light on why people are critical of the status quo in 





polarisation along political lines is proceeding in a Russia that, according to 
opinion polls, is strongly behind the political leadership.88  Before turning to 
the empirical findings, however, I would like to focus on some important 
theoretical considerations. 
Theorising political legitimacy  
As Putin approaches twenty years in power, the challenge is to gauge the 
effects of these past two decades on the imagined relationship between leader, 
state and people. Research into Russian domestic politics often revolves around 
two central questions: the nature of the system and the character of mass 
political behaviour. On the first point, there is a rough consensus that a ‘hybrid 
regime’ has emerged under Putin: a ‘mild to medium form of authoritarianism’ 
combined with democratic façade: ‘elements of electoral democracy, 
pluralism, civil society, and respect for human rights’. (Reddaway 2012: 102-
103). This is also seen as a ‘Managed Democracy’, a system of ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’ with ‘uneven playing fields’ (Gel’man 2012: 504). In the 
categorisation of Thomas Carothers (2002), Russia belongs to a group of 
countries in the ‘grey zone’ between democratic and authoritarian states. This 
preoccupation with placing Russia on the spectrum between ‘democracy’ and 
‘authoritarianism’ often reflects the desire of political scientists to apply 
abstract political theory to a ‘case study’. This can also be influenced by the 
writer’s own political convictions.  
From the point of view of this research, this ‘transition paradigm’ is limited 
utility when it comes to explaining how the people living within such a system 
conceptualise it. As Stephen Holmes (2015: 32) pointed out, by using terms 
such as ‘semi-authoritarian’ or ‘hybrid regime’, these authors imply that 
‘democracy’ is the only way forward and that this is ‘the appropriate 
framework for locating the point at which Russia got “stuck” in its otherwise 













What emerges in this chapter is how, when making sense of Russia’s political 
system and state configuration, few respondents refer to ‘democracy’ and 
‘authoritarianism’ as the main alternatives between which Russia’s leaders 
must choose. I would argue what is more central to their descriptions is the 
concept of what is ‘normal’ – and understanding what is ‘normal’ is largely 
determined by certain frames of reference points and the adoption or rejection 
of certain political myths, all of which can differ among social and age groups.  
While the ‘transition paradigm’ is of limited use in explaining how the Russian 
political system is understood ‘from below’, one model of interest is 
Delegative Democracy (DD), which was theorised by the Argentinian scholar 
Guillermo A. O'Donell. Similar to some Latin American countries, post-Soviet 
Russia also shares historical inexperience of democracy and recent memories 
of deep socio-economic crisis. The main characteristics of DD that apply to the 
Russian case include the emergence of a popular, charismatic leader who wins 
a sweeping majority at a time when confidence in public institutions (such as 
political parties, the courts, the press, the police) is low. Presenting itself as 
‘the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its 
interests’ (O’Donell 1994: 60), ‘a government of saviors’ promises to take the 
bold measures required to ‘save the country’ (ibid: 65). The applicability of 
O’Donell’s model to the Russian context can be explained through the contexts 
of ‘normality’ and ‘political myths’. It is seen as ‘normal’ for a strong leader to 
bypass institutions and ensure order and stability, as it is ‘normal’ for Russians 
to want a strong leader. Political myths about the ‘abnormal’ and traumatic 
recent past (the wild nineties) offer a foundational myth for why ‘a government 
of saviors’ is needed. These myths encourage the rise of the ‘plebiscitary’ 
presidency, as every four to six years the president is given another mandate to 
broaden his powers and take on more challenges (Rogov 2015: 1321). Thus, 
ideas of what is ‘normal’ are buttressed by myths on how it is ‘natural’ for 
Russians, given their characteristics/habits, to be ruled/led in such a fashion.  
The second question, the relationship between people and the state, is often 
answered with reference to Russians as ‘apolitical’, ‘submissive’, or ‘easy to 
manipulate’. To take one example, Shevtsova (2015: 25) presents Russians as 





who believe that ‘if an action is deemed necessary, ideas will be found to 
justify it’. Another aspect highlighted by authors is the gap that exists between 
the people and the state in Russia. In an article in Novaya Gazeta, Vladimir 
Pastukhov (2012) highlighted the deep historical roots of this yawning chasm 
between state and people in Russian statecraft across the Romanov and Soviet 
eras, continuing into the post-Soviet period. In the words of Holmes (2015: 41) 
this is still a factor today, although the dynamic has shifted somewhat as now 
‘Russia’s rich and powerful’ are driven by ‘single-minded self enrichment’ and 
have ‘little commitment to national development’. This chapter also examines 
how ordinary people imagine the relationship between leader, state organs and 
people, and argues that ideas of what is ‘normal’ is reinforced by the existence 
of a certain imagined social contract between the nation (the people) and the 
leadership (the President).  
The central importance of normality to national identity is that it reinforces the 
sense that a given national status quo can be acceptable. The ‘normality’ of a 
political order inspires trust between rulers and ruled (Misztal 2001: 322). 
Here, we can expect more than one version of normality to exist in the 
population; generational, social and cultural differences between certain groups 
in society make it likely they will have differing ideas about what is ‘normal’ 
and ‘natural’. Thus, frames of reference are vital in understanding these 
differences. In this chapter, the division of ‘frames of normality’ is an 
important feature in exposing fault lines in the political nation. In this it is 
important to highlight how what is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ is contested, and 
when we look at how individuals differ in their positions in this question, it is 
often the ‘frame’ that is important. 
One of the ways visions of ‘normality’ are reproduced is through the 
transmission and reproduction of political myths. Here it is important to 
understand political ‘myth’ not as a synonym for ‘narrative’ or other forms of 
‘false belief’ (Bottici and Challand 2015: 2). Work must be done on a narrative 
to transform it into myth; it must possess an ‘emotional underpinning’ and ‘add 
significance to the world’ (ibid: 90-92). The importance of these political 
myths, is that they act as a ‘vehicle of legitimization’ (Hutcheson, Petersson 





right to do so and why we should obey’ and ‘create links between governing 
and its subjects’ (de Salla 2010: 5). This chapter examines a number of 
important political myths operating in the Russian context and attempts to 
explain their appeal. In examining how political myths operate, the social 
identity approach to understanding successful leadership in groups is useful 
(Fielding, Hogg 1997). This views leadership as something that emerges from: 
‘the creation, co-ordination and control of a shared sense of “us.” Within this 
relationship neither the individual nor the group is static. What “us” means is 
negotiable, and so too is the contribution that leaders and followers make to 
any particular definition of “us-ness”’ (Haslam 2001: 85). 
 In summarising the qualities of Putin as they are presented in the mass media, 
a variety of authors have examined the more outward and staged performative 
aspects of Putin’s masculinity as the action hero and macho sex object (Goscilo 
2012; Riabov and Riabova 2014; Sperling 2016).89 The image of Putin as a 
vigorous and dynamic leader with clearly desirable masculine qualities is 
reinforced by myths on the President’s role as a ‘saviour’, a point that links 
well with O’Donell’s framework of Delegative Democracy (O’Donell 
1994:65). Bo Petersson (2013, 2016) also argues that Putin owes much of his 
popularity due to his place within a certain popularly accepted mythical 
framework that views Russia as an eternal world power (derzhava)90 that only 
returns to her rightful place after overcoming periods of upheaval and 
dislocation (smuta). Today, Putin is seen to be the central actor in pulling 
Russia out of smuta while restoring her derzhava status. This foundational 
myth, which takes the ‘abnormality’ of the nineties as its starting point, clearly 
legitimises the political leadership and helps bond people to its goals. 
The second set of myths on display in this chapter focus on the ‘qualities’ of 
the Russians as a people. Here we find ‘self-categories that define the 
individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with members of certain 
social categories’ (Turner et al 1994: 454). The social identity approach to 










dominance of certain views of the national character. Rather than linking the 
positive characteristics of the ‘people’ to the similar attributes of the ‘leader’, 
we find cultural idioms describing ‘what we are like as a people’ linked to 
conclusions about what this means for how ‘we should be governed’. This 
brings us to Michael Herzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’: ‘the recognition 
of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of external 
embarrassment but that nonetheless provide insiders with their assurance of 
common sociality’ (Herzfeld 1997: 3). In other words it is ‘part of cultural 
identity that insiders do not want outsiders to get to know’ but still provide 
feelings of national comfort, group solidarity and categorical unity (Herzfeld 
2013: 491). Sardonic and humorous representations of the national character 
should not be dismissed; they represent one important way people ‘negotiate 
the terrain of social identity and daily life in the (…) modern nation-state’ 
(Herzfeld 1997: 91). 
It is also important to note the contestable nature of normality and myth, which 
are subject to changing contexts, and events, as well as shifting social 
environments and generations. The emergence of counter-myths and new 
frames of normality can undermine and break down hegemonic stances among 
people to the political leadership of the country. One interesting area to trace 
this in a Russian context is the so-called ‘Information War’. As Richard Sakwa 
has pointed out, in the current climate Russians are faced by ‘the constant 
structuring of binaries’ (Sakwa 2015: 199); we have the ‘good’ patriots and the 
‘bad’ fascists or nationalists; the ‘normal’, ‘loyal’ people and the ‘treacherous’ 
fifth column turncoats; the ‘honest defenders’ of Russia and those trying to sell 
her out. Attitudes shown by respondents to the Information War in this chapter 
contest the notion that Russians are passive victims of state propaganda; 
instead conflicting frames of normality exist among different social and 
generational groups that have important ramifications for whether certain 
myths about Putin or the Russian people are absorbed and internalised, or, 
conversely, contested and rejected. 
The empirical findings 





may be called the ‘Pro-Putin Consensus’. I explore how the figure of Putin 
successfully bridges the gap between state and people, ensuring the President 
appears to be one who ‘stands for the nation’. In this section we find interesting 
empirical evidence for how the social identity approach to leadership can be 
applied to a Russian context and how the image of the leader contrasts to the 
image of the people (narod). What emerges is the central role of commonly-
held negative views of the Russian mentality/character as ‘lazy’ or ‘passive’, 
traits that justify the rule of a ‘strong leader’. This is a narrative with rich roots 
in pre-revolutionary and Soviet political discourse and acts as an important 
feature of Russian national identity today. In addition, certain myths about 
Putin’s personality and performance as leader are examined, which serve as 
justification for his manual rule (ruchnoe upravlenie) of the country. These 
myths are found to be largely appropriate to the model of ‘Delegative 
Democracy’ or ‘plebiscitary presidency’ described by Guillermo A. O'Donell. 
In the second part of the chapter I explore how lived experience of 1988-1998 
is important to national identity in the way it shapes political attitudes and 
stances today. Memories of politics in the late Soviet era provide a ‘frame’ 
from which to understand ‘normal’ political behaviour and a ‘normally’ 
functioning political system. What emerges is how many see political inactivity 
as ‘normal’ within the context of recent lived experience. This ties in with the 
commonly reproduced stereotype of Russians as ‘peaceful’, ‘patient’ and 
willing to endure all kinds of hardship without expressing anger. Thus, Soviet-
inspired frames of normality help justify non-involvement in politics and 
encourage a preference for devolving almost unlimited power into the hands of 
the capable President, a picture that again resonates with the model of 
Delegative Democracy. Thus, Homo Sovieticus lives on in today’s Russia in 
the behaviour of people who are still in favour of the status quo. This is 
challenged by the presence of a diverse number of respondents who do not 
want a return to the late Soviet-era social contract and are critical of Russian 
‘paternalism’, viewing dependence on the state as a backward tendency.  
This division in frames of normality is also visible in part three, where I 
examine widespread negative attitudes to the contemporary Russian state, 





leader and the people. I consider how the ‘abnormality’ of this state is 
explained in divergent ways: older respondents viewed it as deviating from 
Soviet norms while younger respondents focused on the failure to meet the 
standards of a developed modern state in the context of the twenty-first 
century. This division in normality frames is important; it re-emerges in 
attitudes to the Russian national character, how people explain Putin’s 
popularity and the Information War.  
In the final section of this chapter, the attention shifts to those areas where the 
Putin image and its associated myths are far more contested. This shatters the 
monolithic picture of the pro-Putin consensus, highlighting the significant 
potential for an anti-hegemonic discourse to emerge. A significant number of 
respondents discussed Putin’s popularity with some analytical distance or 
irony. In other words, this is not something they believe in personally but view 
as packaged up and delivered for the ‘masses of Russia’. This is a tendency 
with rich roots in pre-revolutionary Russia, where the urban intelligentsia 
struggled to find common ground with the peasantry. Here, as in section one, 
political passivity and state paternalism are criticized as part of Russian 
backwardness, rather than some admirable ‘special path’. Frames of normality 
also appear to play an important role in determining stances toward Putin’s 
domestic policies. Those who ‘framed’ the question in reference to the ‘chaos’ 
of the nineties are far less critical than those who ‘frame’ it in terms of a 
comparison to the ‘modern and developed’ states of the twenty-first century.  
The chapter concludes with an exploration of how the Information War, and 
the unity suggested in Putin’s sky-high approval polls, conceals deeper social 
and cultural polarisation in the country. While the explosion of state media 
propaganda noticeable since Maidan (2013-2014) has rallied some behind the 
leader, it has also provoked confusion and dismay among many who see the 
new media coverage style as ‘abnormal’. Here generational lines are important 
in responding to the Information War as this is connected to media 
consumption patterns. Thus, the final section offers evidence that Putin-era 
‘normality’ and its associated ‘mythology’ is being challenged and that many 





Part one: Putin’s image and the Russian ‘character’  
A wide range of respondents reproduced the well-worn traits of Putin as a 
dynamic and vigorous leader; for many respondents Putin is clearly accepted as 
‘one of us’ rather than ‘one of them’ (i.e. another corrupt deputy or venal 
official). It appears an idealised version of Putin’s character and image links up 
with rather negative stereotypes on the Russian national character. This brings 
us back to the Social Identity approach to explaining successful leadership: the 
idea that the leader and the ‘nation’ achieve a kind of fusion of purpose when 
qualities of the ‘leader’ are those needed by the population. In the Russian case 
it appears many respondents view Putin’s qualities as precisely what ordinary 
Russians should have (and by implication lack): strength, stamina and vigour 
and a very clear and rational mind carefully tuned to achieving key objectives.  
Putin ‘speaks sharply’ (rezko) and in ‘concrete terms’, it is admirable that he 
‘does that which he promises’ (Yegor (44) Newspaper editor, NN). Furthermore, he is 
able to ‘formulate goals in a clear (chetkii) manner’ and ‘his goals match with 
our desires’ (Artem (49) computer programmer, NN). Putin’s intelligence and sharpness 
means he is able to ‘hold an enormous amount of information in his head’ and 
be an effective and competent ‘boss (khozyain)’ (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB). Putin was 
also commonly described by male respondents as a ‘strong person’, the ideal 
of a ‘real man’ (nastoyashchiy muzhik); a person with ‘inner determination’ 
(vnutrenniy sterzhen'). Putin’s resolute and steadfast manner contrasts from the 
hysterics of European leaders who ‘twitter like magpies’ while Putin ‘is silent 
and does what he does’ (Igor, (41) Lecturer in International Relations, NN). Female 
respondents praised Putin as someone to be proud of even if ‘a bit abrupt and 
uncompromising (...) at least he is ready to answer for his words. (Julia (47) 
Assistant in film set production, SPB).  
Respondents of all ages were familiar with this image, which has been 
reproduced on a mass scale in the media for the best part of fifteen years.91 
What is interesting is how this contrasts with popular views of the Russian 









comparison to Westerners, are disorganised, sloppy and less than 
conscientious: ‘I think one of the key characteristics of the Russian 
(rossiyanina) is for things to be a total fucking shambles. (raspizdyaystvo). It 
has always been this way. It is like, “who cares”, like stealing a crate of vodka 
to sell but then drinking half of it (…) Stupidity’ (Denis (41) Journalist, NN). This kind 
of chaotic behaviour, the classic image of Russian-style drunken chaos, is 
something that is the antithesis of the sober, sharp and wily Putin. Russian 
‘slackness’ was also discussed in terms of a lack of professionalism in the 
workplace, such as the idea that European workers and managers ‘approach 
things very rigorously, they try to do everything with quality’ while their 
Russian counterparts follow ‘the principle of the “Russian Ivan”, which is 
basically saying “yeah right, that’ll do, fine” (Anastasia (21) Economics Student, NN). 
Thus, while the ‘Russian will forget about his own affairs’ and suffer from 
‘fecklessness (bezalabernost')’, the ‘Western person, will keep working until it 
is completely finished, according to what is written on the contract’. (Galina (40) 
Sociology department, NN).  
Given the prominent place of these self-images it is unsurprising to find many 
respondents support the idea that Russians need to be ruled by a strong hand, 
and that a person with Putin’s personal qualities is a good fit: ‘Our people are 
very lazy and until you actually kick them, they won’t do a thing’ (Matvei (43) 
Double-glazing installer, NN). This could also be explained in terms of Russia as a 
semi-Asiatic country that has to be ‘kicked into shape’: ‘We are more-or-less 
an Asian country, I think we can’t do things ourselves, we need to be kicked. 
We can’t make it without a Tsar (…) we are an Eastern country and cannot be 
fully Western in mentality (…) and we can’t be so for a long time’ (Julia (47) 
Assistant in film set production, SPB). 
The above sentiment also ties in with the general idea that the ‘Russian 
mentality’ and ‘democracy’ do not go well together: ‘the number one person is 
the owner/boss (khozyain)’ and ‘democracy has brought nothing good with it: 
Multipolarity of opinions only leads to tittle-tattle (peresudam) until someone 
says “right, enough!” and then everyone goes where they are told’ (Grigori (49) 
Computer programmer. NN). This links into a strong historical myth discussed in 





at the helm. The connection between this interpretation of the Russian 
mentality and Putin’s personal qualities is one part of the popularity of Putin. 
The idealized image of Putin that respondents reproduced may represent a 
desirable version of the Russian ‘we’; following Putin expresses hope that he 
will ‘kick us into shape’ and remedy the negative elements of the Russian self-
image. Interestingly, the ‘cultural intimacy’ revealed in portrayals of ‘what we 
are like as a people’ are not connected to despair. Instead, they often reveal 
acceptance of a common social identity and, at the same time, a certain 
confidence that the strong leader can overcome these problems ‘from above’. 
This is, in turn, buttressed by certain myths about Putin’s performance as 
leader. 
Two key narratives on Putin intertwine to create a foundational myth of 
Putinism. The first is that Putin pulled Russia up from her knees and out of a 
period of disorder (smuta). The second is that he has restored her as a great 
power (derzhava). The backdrop for this foundational myth was always set in 
the last years of the 1990’s, a time remembered by young and old as a dark 
period, with a variety of important threads emerging. The first is memories of 
uncertainty and the fear things would fall apart. Russians ‘had endured so 
much in the 90’s and accepted for a long time that “yes, this is perestroika, 
and it will take a long time” but then, after all they went through, it all fell 
apart again in the 1998 default (…) after this people were thoroughly 
disillusioned by liberal values’. It was in this atmosphere of fear and 
uncertainty that Putin appeared alongside a wave of terrorist attacks (1999-
2000) and looked like ‘a tough person who will put things in order. The phrase 
“snuff them out in the latrines” was one the population, naturally, really liked. 
(Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB).  
The phrase ‘snuff them out in the latrines’ came from a Putin press conference 
that defined his early militant stance towards terrorists and was mentioned by 
several respondents looking back on the period when Putin emerged on the 
political arena. It seems these words are remembered as the moment bringing 
an end to the ‘anything goes’ atmosphere prevalent in the nineties. This 
contrasts the nineties and the Putin period as two distinct phases: the first is ‘an 





(the security organs): 
In 1991 when Yeltsin came to power, everything was allowed. There were 
no big restrictions. You weren’t allowed to kill people of course, but the rest 
was allowed. Back then very large amounts of money were divided up, there 
was a really massive orgy of criminality  (ochen' sil'nyy razgul kriminala), 
people were shot on the streets, bandits ran the show. Then, as time passed, 
they started passing laws restricting all this. Now power has passed to the 
cops and the security structures (mentam i silovym strukturam).  
Denis (41) Journalist, NN 
It is worth underlining that Putin is not seen to take the power from the 
‘criminals’ and restore democracy or liberate institutions to function 
independently; instead this is a transfer of power to his silovik entourage. This 
centralisation of power is understood to ignore democratic norms.92  
Thus, the arrival of Putin is remembered as ending a period of fear, 
uncertainty, immorality and chaos, bringing to a close many of the ‘abnormal’ 
aspects of life in the nineties. Central to the Putin’s mythology is the idea that 
he ‘pulled the country out of the total mess it was stuck in during the Yeltsin 
years’ and ‘brought her into a more decent/acceptable condition (…) he led a 
huge country into a more normal condition, in comparison to what it was in up 
to that point’ (Eva (26) Unemployed, university graduate, NN). Here the restoration of 
normality is a key theme. Putin is praised not so much for ‘making Russia 
great’ but for returning ‘normality’ and ‘decency’ to everyday life. This idea of 
returning ‘normality’ has a very powerful emotional component. This involves 
remembering/imagining the period immediately prior to Putin’s presidency as 
one of depression and degradation when, according to popular memory, 
Russian people lost face, status and dignity. This was a period when ‘we were 
deep down at the bottom. We were poor, a destitute population, without 
subsistence’ and it was only by the second half of the 2000s that ‘things started 
to smoothen out (vyravnivat'sya)’ and ‘people started to live better’ (Marta (54) 









nineties crossed the generational divide; younger respondents could rely on 
their childhood memories to confirm this picture:  
The period of Putin’s leadership is the best one for the country because the 
90’s were the absolutely most terrible (zhutkie) years for Russia. It was a 
nightmare, it was all corruption, bribes, illegal business (chernyy biznes), 
rackets, kidnappings, murders on every corner (…) A person living in the 
90’s felt like an insect, humiliated and embarrassed of living in Russia. The 
view of other countries was like looking up, servile. But now, the generation 
that has grown up in the 2000’s to now, they are proud of their country.   
Nadezhda (30) nanny, SPB 
This idea of the Putin era ending an era of humiliation is central to the other 
component of the Putin foundational myth, that the President restored Russia’s 
power vis-à-vis the outside world, reflecting strong desires to return to the 
‘normal’ way the Soviet state behaved on the world stage, something I will 
examine in more detail in the next chapter. Putin’s foreign policy impresses in 
terms of its independent stance: ‘He doesn’t cave in to anyone. Russians, in the 
main, think that the country has its own path of development, as we are neither 
Asia nor Europe. That is why Putin has won such respect from Russian people’ 
(Eva (26) Unemployed, university graduate, NN). Putin is thought to have successfully 
reduced Russia’s dependency on the outside world, something that, especially 
among older respondents, was seen as a serious weakness. Putin ‘got rid of all 
the ringleaders of that market bacchanalia’ and ‘then he paid off the debts and 
then implemented his own vision. The main thing is that the country started to 
develop according to its own path, not simply doing how we are told’. (Ivan (55) 
Retired miner, SPB).  
Younger respondents also showed faith in Putin as an actor on the world stage, 
mainly focusing on his seemingly ‘independent position’ vis-à-vis the West 
who does ‘what is best for Russia and not what the West wants’, ensuring the 
‘opinion of Russia is reckoned with by foreign powers’ (Dina, (22) IR Student, NN). 
Putin is imagined to have ‘lifted Russia from her knees’ by ‘taking a hard 





success in foreign policy can be enough to convince those, who might 
otherwise be unimpressed by internal economic development, to support him: 
I really like Vladimir Putin even if, basically, he has done nothing for me, 
neither good nor bad (…) I think I am positive toward him because of the 
figure he presents, his image, because he presents himself as being so 
powerful (takim mogushchestvennym) and that he represents the whole of 
Russia and it is like he tells the other countries that they need to reckon with 
us (s nami nado schitat'sya).  
Katya (22) Student Politics, NN 
The emotional component in this narrative of Putin restoring derzhava status is 
vital; the idea that he has made Russia ‘a country to be reckoned with’ was 
commonly reproduced and suggests imagining Russia as a country that, once 
downtrodden and degraded, is now respected and treated with respect. For 
many respondents, this foundational myth offered solid justification for the 
increasing concentration of power in Putin’s hands. This myth provides a vital 
context-rich explanation for why Russia needs a ‘government of saviours’ to 
rescue her. Thus, the imagined fit between the positive qualities of the leader 
and the negative attributes of the Russian national character is combined with 
the popular internalisation and transmission of foundational myths to justify 
and legitimise popular withdrawal from politics in favour of ‘delegating power’ 
to a ‘strong leader’. As we will see in the next section, this sentiment is also 
informed by memories of 1988-1998 in an everyday and family context.  
Part two: Memories of the late Soviet period  
One highly observable trend among respondents recalling personal and 
family/friend political positions from Perestroika to Putin was the stance of 
general disengagement. For older respondents this was reported as remembered 
lived historical memory, for younger respondents this was a transmitted history 
of family behaviour in the period. Employing the idea of ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’, many respondents defined a ‘normal’ family as not interested in 
politics and retaining a certain ‘calmness’ or ‘peacefulness’ (spokoistvo). In 
contrast, politically active behaviour such as waving flags, actively joining 





were not revolutionaries, they did burst forward with a flag in their hands (oni 
ne rvalis' vperod s flagom). It was more like they felt some light dissatisfaction, 
but as a whole they stayed calm. (Lev (46) Programmer Developer Oracle, SPB).  
Interestingly, younger respondents also described political inactivity and 
passivity when asked about their parents in perestroika, without adding any 
particular criticism or judgement of this behaviour. As above, the lack of 
political activity is portrayed as ‘normal’ behaviour for a ‘typical peaceful 
family.’ There was a sense that being politically ‘inactive’ and disinterested in 
ideology, parties and protests is the ‘normal’ and ‘default’ position in families, 
while it is only the ‘strange’ that become fascinated with politics: My parents 
didn’t take an active political position. (…)They weren’t active party members 
or participants in any demonstrations or protests. They never went to anything 
like that. Just a normal, peaceful family.  (Obychnaya spokoynaya sem'ya) (Julia 
(29) Chemist in State company, NN). This ties in well with quantitative polling that 
suggests the vast majority of Russians today still do not want to be active in 
politics.93 
Throughout these narratives of family behaviour in the late Soviet period, very 
few respondents described perestroika and the end of the USSR in positive 
terms, such as the story of how people actively came together to win their 
freedom and overthrow the tyranny of the Communist Party in a relatively 
bloodless fashion. Instead, respondents presented the process of political 
reform as alien and imposed from above by party agitators and experienced 
passively. As the respondent below points out, these reforms were not 
demanded ‘from below’ as people lived in relative comfort: ‘My parents, just 
like the rest of the population, did not understand perestroika, except that it 
was a kind of visible (political MB) agitation (…) on the TV and news (…) But 
in general people did not want any kind of changes because everyone lived 
well, there was enough for everyone’ (Ilia (46) Import-Export Business owner, NN).  
Older respondents claimed the reforms of 1985-1999 were driven by those 









particularly take part in all this, they behaved purely as observers’ (Natalya (50) 
Accountant. NN). Older respondents rarely described the reform era as one where 
people had a real chance of influencing events. Instead, respondents admitted 
to their own de-politicized existence and often portrayed the world of politics 
as a place where only certain influential and powerful people could operate. 
This view suggests many people in the late Soviet did not take sides in the 
reform debates. Employing the metaphor of an ocean, the tranquillity of those 
working and living at ‘the lower depths’ (kak na dne) is contrasted to the 
dramatic and energetic events bubbling over at the surface: 
Actually down at the bottom, where we run around, there was no sense of 
being advocates of one thing or another. People lived and worked, I don’t 
know how to say it, like we were at the lower depths. Up on top, passions 
boil over, there are storms in the sea. At the bottom there was a dead 
calm… 
Olga (55) Factory worker Avtozavodsk, NN 
This brings us to another important aspect of Soviet-era political behaviour that 
is still important today: the preference for turning one’s back on politics and 
focusing on one’s personal world of work, family and friends. It was striking 
how many older respondents described the normality of their disinterest in 
politics, which they saw as distant from their everyday lives. Physics student 
Viktor (51) claimed ‘Politics was not in our field of vision’ and ‘our circle was 
highly educated, we could read what we wanted to’. For Viktor, late Soviet life 
offered him all he needed as a member of the technical intelligentsia and there 
was no need to get involved in politics: ‘personally I couldn’t have cared less 
about what was going on at the top because I could study mathematics, I could 
go out with my friends (…) all of that (politics) was somehow remote; it had no 
relation to my life’ (Andrei (51) Computer Programmer, SPB).  
Thus, ignoring politics in the perestroika period is ‘normal’ as everything ‘is 
decided at the level of the elite (verkhushki) (Natalya (50) Accountant. NN).  
Retrospectively looking back at lived experience of this period, some older 
respondents did remember the exciting atmosphere of the late eighties when 





change in the country’. This, however, faded away, and was replaced by a 
great sense of disempowerment, disappointment and alienation: 
Over twenty years normal people (normal’nyye lyudi) came to realise that 
we simple folk (prostyye) can’t change a thing, everything stays in its place. 
After that people started to distance themselves – you are there, we are here. 
In Russia it has always been the case that the elite (verkhushka) does its 
own thing, it is like a separate state. Ordinary people say ‘you don’t bother 
us and we won’t bother you’. 
Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB 
Thus, the division between the elite and the ordinary people was commonly 
reproduced. Such memories of political alienation and passivity are 
complemented by the way respondents of all ages commonly claimed 
‘passivity’, ‘inertia’ or ‘patience’ was a typical feature of Russian national 
character, especially in terms of political behaviour. The sense of Russian 
‘endurance’ was often rendered with the word ‘terpenie’, which combines 
ideas of holding one’s patience, endurance, fortitude and forbearance. This idea 
here is that the Russians are, by their nature, very calm and ‘will endure to the 
very last (terpit do poslednego), right to the very final extreme, and only then 
will they raise a revolt (bunt) (Galina (40) Sociology department, NN). Thus, this 
‘passivity’ was not always explained in a negative sense but felt to be a result 
of Russia’s tumultuous twentieth century, which was full of exhausting 
upheavals, leaving Russians today quite justified in seeking a ‘peaceful life’ 
without ‘upheavals’ (Natalya (50) Accountant. NN).  
This brings us back to the idea of ‘cultural intimacy’, that an attribute that 
could cause some embarrassment and defensiveness if raised by an ‘outsider’ 
to the group, can function within the group to produce feelings of commonality. 
One common way this was done was by comparing the Russian disinterest in 
being politically active or making boisterous demands to political authorities 
with other Europeans and Westerners. Unlike the Europeans ‘who go on 
marches, protests or strikes with enviable frequency (…) we don’t know how to 
make revolutions, we just don’t have it in the blood’. Looking at political 





given that, looking back at the recent past, mass protests are seen to have 
achieved little: We are accustomed to enduring, it like we say “that is how 
things are, and let’s keep it that way”. (…) It might actually be a good thing 
we are that way. (Katya (22) Student Politics, NN). A further way to ‘normalise’ this 
difference is to put it within the context of the Russian environment: they 
(Europeans MB) haven’t experienced the wide-ranging upheavals we have 
over many years, they believe in the law and the defence of the courts. Russian 
people are like… they don’t believe in anything and don’t expect anything from 
our state and government (Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, NN).  
For some respondents the tendency of Russians to ‘endure’, or ‘to take things 
as they are and get on with things’ is taken more openly as a source of pride. It 
appears this tough enduring manner is part of a deeper Soviet mentality, a 
stance taken by generations of Soviet Russian families to survive the enormous 
challenges of collectivization, industrialisation, terror, war and, later, the 
economy of shortages and blat. To negotiate this people did not resort to 
complaints or protests, which would be ruinous to oneself and family and 
achieve ‘nothing’. Instead they did what their parents had done in previous 
crisis situations: they got on with ‘surviving’: 
When Gorbachev came to power, that was all just a total scam (...) but what 
could you do? All that was left was to accept things as they were. 
(Ostavalos' vse vosprinimat', kak yest'). You aren’t going to gather people 
and start a rebellion. We were used to living according to the situation, 
according to the circumstances (my privykli zhit' po obstoyatel'stvam, po 
usloviyam) (…) If there was no water, we’d find it…. no food, we would find 
some. (…) when conditions changed for all of us and that meant we had to 
change our approach to life… 
Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB 
This idea of ‘living according to circumstances’ reflects a view of how the 
Russian people have adapted to the challenging external conditions they have 
found themselves in throughout the twentieth century. There is an element of 
stoic pride in how ordinary Russians are imagined to have ‘endured’ these 





clearly transmitted across to younger respondents in their assessment of the 
national character. One claimed that ‘the Russian is unique in that he can adapt 
to any environment, to any system. Putting it crudely, he is like a cockroach 
that can survive any situation, I chose ‘cockroach’ because they could even 
make it through a nuclear war, right?’ (Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, 
SPB). This sardonic humour is perhaps another part of the cultural intimacy 
involved in representations of national identity: ‘Survival is a very telling point 
for Russia. We have endured everything here and take it all with humour. 
Because if you try and live here without a sense of humour you will just end up 
six fucking feet under! (laughs)’ (Zakhar (29) Manager in export company, SPB).  
Younger respondents also expressed admiration for their parents who, in spite 
of the enormous difficulties, battled on stoically without complaining in the 
late Soviet period and 1990’s. Rather than criticizing any of this as ‘passivity’, 
this emphasises the grit and toughness of people who silently accepted the 
challenges of the reform era, and ‘made it through’: 
My dad worked two jobs at the same time and on top of that managed to 
graduate and look after two children. I don’t know if there was some Soviet 
romanticism then but I never heard them complaining about any particular 
people or saying that someone had caused the country’s collapse. They 
accepted the all reforms in silence; I don’t even know how to explain it! 
Marina (25) Language teacher, NN 
It appears this positive spin on ‘apolitical’ behaviour is somewhat mythical in 
style. According to this version, Russians lived through the unpredictable and 
traumatic years of reform, collapse and disorder with stoicism and strength. 
Instead of worrying, whining or protesting about politics, they simply ‘rolled 
up their sleeves’ and ‘got on with it’.   
Thus, people had a simple choice: Either you go and work in government and 
make reforms yourself or you adjust to the current situation (…) Sitting by the 
kitchen stove and whining (…) this is not a way out (…) What difference does it 
make (…) if you want to work and earn money? (Pavel (27) export-import business, SPB). 





explaining why many prefer to turn their backs on politics and ‘get on with 
life’. The idea that participating in politics is a ‘waste of time’ unless you enter 
the ‘elite’ fits well with longer narratives of family behaviour in perestroika 
and the nineties. As we will see below, such sentiment is also on display in 
attitudes to the political opposition and the Bolotnaya protests of 2011-12.  
While this positive view of endurance and stoicism is clearly endorsed by 
many, it is important to note that a large number of respondents robustly 
contested the causes of Russian ‘terpenie’, rejecting the sense that it is ‘good’, 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’ for Russians to be this way. Instead, this trait was 
couched in terms of passivity and paternalism, something holding Russia back, 
a historically rooted ailment that must be remedied. This often entailed playing 
up the mindless and hopeless aspect of this passivity, in ways that represented 
the Russian people in ways not dissimilar to cattle:  
The Russian people are very patient (terpelivyy). You can leech off them, 
you can beat them, torment them (iztyazat’), they will put up with it all (…) 
They just sigh and say: “Everything will work out” or “we will survive” 
(Vse samo ili my perezhivem). My parents endured and sighed in precisely 
this way.   
Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
Portraying Russians as ‘inert’ or ‘passive’ was also done with reference to the 
negative legacy Soviet rule had on the Russian mentality. As people were 
forced to ‘endure all these experiments on them’ and ‘this endurance (terpenie) 
is already something on the genetic level’ making the Russians a ‘very inert 
people’ (Pavel, (58) IT specialist. NN). The Soviet system created people determined to 
be ‘layabouts’ as more ‘entrepreneurial people were gotten rid of by the 
machine of socialism’ and those ready to ‘work as a functionary in some office’ 
were encouraged to the top positions (Sergei (40) Marketing Department, SPB).  
This brings us to a second feature of this Russian passivity: paternalism. For 
some, Russian passivity is part of a ‘slave-like mentality’ and the need to ‘look 
up to the ruler’ as ‘when you are told one hundred thousand times repeatedly 





(Olga (26) Costume designer, SPB). For some, this paternalism is rooted in pre-
revolutionary and Soviet political culture leading to a dependent and 
paternalistic relationship between people and state. Here this historical legacy 
is summed up by the point ‘the majority want some kind of father. The Tsar 
was a father, then Stalin was a father – they were all fathers upon which you 
could rely’ and that people, even today, are still not ‘ready to take 
responsibility for the country’ and participate in politics; they prefer to rely on 
a ‘father’ (Timur (26) Postgraduate researcher, Moscow). This reluctance to take more 
responsibility and the preference for delegating difficult choices to an 
‘authoritative figure’ (avtoritet) leaves Russians submerged in a massive 
collective ‘we’ rather than developing a sense of ‘self’ and personal 
responsibility: 
I think that people on the inside are not morally ready to lead an 
independent life (...) instead the majority are drawn to some kind of 
authoritative figure (avtoritet) that can decide everything and, what’s more, 
give things. And if he doesn’t give now, we will be patient (my poterpim). 
On the other hand we remain within a huge ‘We’ where, unfortunately, 
there is no place for ‘I’  
Nikita (42) Ventilation system salesman, NN  
Thus, we find a split: a section of respondents criticize paternalism’s 
pernicious effects on the national character while, in contrast, a significant 
number defend the concentration of power into the hands of the President as a 
‘natural’ and ‘normal’ evolution for Russia. Lying between these two positions 
were those respondents who were essentially pragmatic, uncommitted to either 
democratic principles or shifting to authoritarianism, merely interested in a 
system that ‘works’.  
This three way division in stances was visible in attitudes to the Bolotnaya 
protests of 2011-12, an event still relatively fresh in the memory at the time of 
fieldwork. The first group, which was largely made up of younger respondents, 
took a positive view of the protesters and generally shared the critical views of 
paternalism shown above. They argued the Russian political system was no 





meant ‘Russia is basically a monarchy now (…) as there is only one ruler’ 
(Alexei (23) Computer programmer, NN).  Others referred to the idea of a ‘sham 
democracy’, as ‘in Russia there are democratic institutions but not democracy’ 
and in important matters ‘democratic principles are not respected’ (Timur (26) 
Postgraduate researcher, Moscow). The key point is that democratic procedures are 
subverted and manipulated to fit the prerogatives of the government. 
According to this version Russians live in a ‘presidential republic’ with ‘one-
party rule’ where ‘parliament only exists as a nominal thing (…)  all the 
parties follow the same line with very few significant differences, we don’t have 
an opposition as such. (...) and all decisions are made by the president (Olga (26) 
Costume designer, SPB).  Respondents with such views took a more positive view of 
the protests as an indicator people were ready to ‘take responsibility (… ) stand 
up for their point of view and go out on the street’ (Timur (26) Postgraduate researcher, 
Moscow).  
In stark contrast to this were those respondents who rejected concerns about 
the demise of Russian democracy by offering well-known arguments such as 
Russia is not ready for ‘full’ democracy, there is, in any case, no ‘ideal 
democracy’ for Russia to adopt or Russia has a ‘special path’ and need not 
measure up to other countries: 
As for those who criticise the current system because it has no democracy at 
all, I want to say the following: Russia is moving according to her own path.  
(Rossiya idet po svoyemu puti). She is not similar to anyone else, everything 
is a bit different here, we have our own type of democracy that is not like 
the West. (…) I cannot say this is good or bad. We live and survive as we 
can… 
Marta (54) retired, SPB 
Thus, here we find a strong Slavophile flavour, although, as we will see in the 
next chapter, this is often lacks a deeper ideological basis. Nonetheless, many 
believe Putin has developed ‘democracy with a Russian flavour’, one where 
power is delegated to a strong leader and strong state. Much of this resonates 
with the kind of democracy described in the concept of ‘Delegative 





vlasti). I mean a special kind of democracy with strengthened powers, one that 
develops under the influence of this state power (Lubov (43) Private tutor, SPB). Thus, 
this democratic-authoritarian hybrid is not popularly viewed as a dictatorship 
as such. Instead, it is viewed as ‘the democratic choice of society as a whole 
(…) the majority, especially those who feel happy living here, feel a degree of 
reassurance in passing their internal rights/powers (vnutrennikh polnomochiy) 
to the highest leadership (Vladislav (28) Postdoctoral researcher Middle Eastern Studies, NN).  
These respondents were not embarrassed about Russia’s increasing lack of 
resemblance to a democratic state. In fact, they openly praised the shift toward 
a more paternalistic and caring style of rule. Again the important idea is 
delegating ‘supreme power’ to Putin and leaving things for him to solve:  
The population needs protection and the state must somehow take care of it. 
Russian people have always been pro-state (gosudarstvennikami). We have 
always had relatively strong authorities and a monarch. Really at heart the 
Russian person is a monarchist. We can’t have democracy in the Western 
understanding of the word in Russia. That is not our path. Putin is the 
president but Russians view him as a Tsar. I am sure that more than half of 
Russians would give Putin supreme power (verkhovnuyu vlast') – let him be 
the monarch.  
Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB 
Thus, two groups of respondents are in direct conflict over the question of 
whether paternalism is ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ for Russia. It can be argued that 
in conditions of more open and unrestricted political debating and 
electioneering, this division would come to the fore quite quickly.  
On the other hand, the final (and largest in size) group of respondents tended to 
take the middle road in attitudes to the political system and the Bolotnaya 
protests. They tended to view the Bolotnaya protests as irrelevant to their 
everyday lives, something happening ‘far away’ from them and downplayed 
the importance of election rigging as ‘United Russia and Putin would have won 
without this anyway. He is the most worthy ruler and there is nothing better on 
offer. As long as everything is peaceful in the country and I have a normal and 





Programmer, NN). This pragmatic sentiment means putting a premium on 
effectiveness over adherence to democratic norms or any ideological 
commitments to the ‘purity’ of a political system. One respondent, who 
described himself as ‘an advocate of democracy, rather than any totalitarian 
system’, still defended the slide toward authoritarianism as ‘what is in Russia’s 
interests is a good standard of living, social protection and improvement in life 
quality. If these things are getting better, that means it (the system MB) is fine’ 
(Valery (40) Business Development, NN).  
On the one hand, this can be understood as pragmatism. For some respondents, 
however, this was also a case of ‘paternalist longings’ (Gudkov 2015: 138). 
This was often connected to memories of living in the Brezhnev period, where 
the state offered certain guarantees for citizens provided they disengaged from 
politics.94 An excellent example of such sentiment can be found in Ivan, who 
was a miner in the late Soviet period.  Below he underlines that, in terms of 
everyday life, the Soviet social contract was simple: ‘You studied, graduated, 
worked. (…) you made money, you bought things. You had to work: that was 
the main principle, the ideology of the USSR, every Soviet citizen had to work, 
that was the only red line, everything else, including political aspects, didn’t 
enter the mind of a Soviet person’ (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB).  
Indifference to politics is part of a ‘deal’: the people are allowed to disengage 
from politics and delegate this to a political class. In return, a stable and secure 
living environment is created. This boils down to a basic stance that many 
respondents seemed to take toward political behaviour even today: For us it 
does not matter, what kind of regime it is. (…) Just let us peacefully work and 
live well! (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB). This is a longing for the days when the 
individual could be indifferent to ‘what kind of regime we have’ and get on 
with a ‘normal life’. In essence, ‘Democracy’ is more of a background or 
secondary matter and not equated with ‘freedom’, which, for these respondents, 
is more tied up with being able to live a ‘normal’ life in terms of education, 
economic growth and career opportunities, the chance to accumulate and spend 









‘freedoms’ are in place, politics can be safely ignored and left to the politicians. 
This means judging the system by its effectiveness rather than other categories: 
S: It’s just that we judge the system in terms of its effectiveness. (…) We 
have lived through the decades and know how bad it was and how it has 
gotten better.  
V: The living standards here are pretty high. I mean we feel like free people, 
we can do things, take decisions, go abroad, start some kind of business, I 
mean, the point is we live in a normal way (normal'no zhivem). 
S: You don’t feel like they say there is a police state, I don’t feel any 
pressure.  
V: We are not under surveillance.  
Vlad (26) Marketing, NN, Sergei (29) Business Development, NN 
Such sentiment reveals much about how many Russians view this current 
system; it is not an almighty leviathan asserting its authority in all walks of 
everyday life, but system that puts things in decent order so that people can get 
on with life. Respondents in this group tended to suggest that ‘now people have 
the chance to do what they want, think how they want’ and that, comparatively 
speaking, there is sufficient freedom and it is only ‘some extreme-minded 
people (ul'tra-nastroyennyye lyudi) who think that freedom of speech in Russia 
is suppressed, that we are under the jackboot (…) that there is no democracy’ 
(Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB).  
Overall then, there is a significant divide on how to view ‘passive’ Russian 
political behaviour, some viewing it as ‘normal’, others ‘abnormal’. For some, 
Passivity is a ‘normal’ way to behave in a Russian context, while, for others, it 
reflects the refusal of ordinary Russians to ‘take responsibility’ in politics and 
prefer an ‘abnormal’ paternalistic style. This split on versions of ‘normality’ is 
a recurring theme throughout this chapter. It is visible again in the different 
ways respondents displayed their common widespread antipathy to state 
institutions and structures, which are seen as parasitic and corrupt. It is to this 





Part three: Portrayals of the current Russian state system 
(gosudarstvennii stroi) and ruling class (pravyashii sloi)  
An interesting feature of discussions on everyday life of respondents was 
critical comments about the ‘abnormal’ performance of the state and the ruling 
elite in Russia today. This is also observed in quantitative polling that show 
that, with the exclusions of the Presidency, the army and the Orthodox Church, 
institutions and the state bureaucracy in general are not held in high regard in 
Russia.95 While this basic sentiment cut across class, age and profession, what 
differentiated respondents was how they framed this ‘abnormality’. While 
older respondents did this with reference to the Soviet state, younger 
respondents focused how these deficiencies deviated from the idea of a 
‘normal’ modern state in the twenty-first century. With regards older 
respondents, the Soviet state apparatus and party elite were often portrayed as 
having good intentions, a positive force working to the benefit of the people. 
The Soviet system offered ‘more socially orientated laws (sotsial'nykh 
zakonov)’; it ‘let people live (lyudyam davali zhit’) and ‘gave lots of good 
things to the many’ rather than just ‘to the few’, whereas today the ‘state makes 
more money out of the people than it gives back’ (Denis (41) Journalist, NN). The 
contemporary Russian state is often presented as predatory in its very nature; 
its ultimate aim is not to support or nurture but to ‘trick’, ‘rob’ and ‘cheat’. The 
basic equation here is that state officials plot and scheme to discover new ways 
of harvesting the people’s resources for personal gain. As one respondent put it 
‘over the last fifteen years, and always the strategy is the same. It is for the 
state to win at the expense of the population. So, for us, in any case, it never 
works out well.’ (Galina (40) Sociology department, NN). 
Another common way to highlight the malfunctioning performance of the 
current Russian state was to talk about everyday instances when state officials 
deviate from expected norms in their search for sources of self-enrichment. 
One area causing common rancour were multifarious attempts to extort bribes, 













place for one’s child or traffic police to speed up their meddlesome 
‘inspections’. Thus, the corrupt representatives of the state act as a constant 
break on people’s attempts to get by in life. As the respondent below suggests, 
it is venal and predatory officialdom that stops him from having a ‘normal’ 
family life: 
if I want to start my own business, then the tax inspectors, fire safety control 
people and public health officials will suddenly appear out of nowhere. You 
need all these stamps, papers, you need to give bribes. Bureaucrats in 
Russia – this is our great misfortune (…) We need only one reform here. Let 
the Russian people earn money in peace, don’t limit us, don’t rob us! I 
would be able to feed myself and my family if they did this…. 
Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB 
These images of a corrupt state sucking money out of ordinary working people 
is reinforced by common-sense understandings of Russia’s contemporary elite 
as alien, unpatriotic and interested only in money. The state bodies are seen as 
money-making opportunities, as ‘state power is a business’ and ‘talented 
people, who otherwise could prove a success in the business world, instead go 
to work for the state because that is the simplest and shortest pathway to make 
money (Sergei (40) Marketing Department, SPB).  
Below a respondent expresses alienation from Russia’s ruling class (pravyashii 
sloi) who are seen to benefit from the current economic model as it allows 
them fulfil their key goal: to enjoy a prosperous Western standard of living. 
Given that this, rather than any patriotic loyalty to Russia, is their aim, it is 
only to be expected they will pack up and leave if things get tough: 
…most of all the ruling elite (pravyashii sloi) is made up of people who have 
done well out of this economic model and (…) are orientated towards the 
West. (…) they have certain reserves and, when the time comes, they are 
ready to go off and live there. They don’t see any need to build or develop 
here, or to think of the overall good of the country (…) this is like a 
comprador elite (…) I don’t think many of them really care about the 





Gennady (41) Researcher in International Relations, NN 
Thus, older respondents revealed alienation from the state and elite viewing the 
‘abnormality’ of current life (a predatory state, corruption and a venal elite) 
through the Soviet frame of ‘normality’ whereby the ‘normal’ situation is a 
powerful paternalistic state that provides people with the basics they need. The 
respondent below reproduces the powerful sense of abandonment echoed by 
many older respondents from the last Soviet youth generation: 
I can’t say anything bad about the Soviet Union. I had a happy, peaceful 
childhood, a whole load of possibilities in life. Everything [was done] for a 
person (…) Now a person is left one on one against the elements (s etoy 
stikhiyey), left to the mercies of these officials, to this corruption, to face just 
about any kind of thing. But before we had a fine-tuned system, everything 
was there for a person but not anymore…  
Galina (40) Sociology department, NN 
In contrast to how older respondents criticised the current political system, 
younger respondents focused on how this corruption and venality did not fit in 
with the principles of a ‘normal’ functioning modern state. Younger 
respondents picked out a variety of ways in which those working in the state 
apparatus were seen to violate the principles of the modern state. One was a 
central standard concept of the modern state – those working in the state 
apparatus are paid by taxpayers to do a job and they are expected to be 
competent: ‘The state is the management and the country is the company – thus 
the management should not only work for its benefit, but to the benefit of its 
workers, to benefit ordinary people’ (Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB). 
One respondent, an architect working on a government contract for the 
Governor of Penza, claimed most of his entourage was ‘not competent, openly 
rude, openly greedy’ and interested only ‘the goal of personal enrichment’: 
even if ‘for appearances sake they will say a few clever words, nonetheless 
they take bribes all the same (Pyotr (29) Architect, NN).  
Another example of how the current elite and state system violate the principle 





respondents below explain, there is one law for ‘them’, another for ‘us.’ This 
allows the state to rob the people as they wish, with no real punishment and the 
law playing a merely decorative role in people’s lives. Thus, ‘those at the top, 
those oligarchs and deputies, they sit about stealing loads of money, they can, 
but we are not allowed’. Instead the ordinary person is at the mercy of the 
powerful and ‘can be put in jail for any old thing’ (Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, 
NN; Inna (28) factory worker, Dzershinsk, NN). Both generational groups, albeit with 
differing reference frames, portray the Russian state system and corresponding 
political elite/establishment in seriously negative terms, revealing a lack of 
trust in state officials, whose vulture-like behaviour is aimed at self-
enrichment. This ties in well with quantitative sociological data on the lack of 
trust Russians have for a variety of state institutions, with low figures for key 
bodies such as the courts and the state procurator’s office, the State Duma and 
local government.96  
One respondent offered an interesting improvised characterization of life in 
Russia today that rather neatly summarises the way the state system 
(gosudarstvennii stroi) was perceived by many respondents. Describing 
Russia’s egregiously unfair and dangerous system, he employed the metaphor 
of an anthill with a large sugar cube at its peak:  
I would say our system (stroi) is like... (pause)… an anthill, on the top of 
which lies a little pack of sugar. There is a small hole in the little pack of 
sugar and sometimes grains of sugar start falling out, and then the ants run 
over and take bits for themselves and use them. But the at the same time 
there is a boy with a magnifying glass and those who take too long or go too 
far in taking these bits, these ants are burned alive by the sun’s rays (via the 
magnifying glass MB). I, for example, sit at the bottom of the anthill. To be 
honest, I don’t really feel like climbing up there for the sugar.  
Stepan (22) Physics student, SPB 
The respondent places himself in the above picture as at the bottom, 







sugar’. If we turn to the ‘boy with the magnifying glass’, it is likely the 
respondent is referring to the very highest branches of the state.  
This brings us to how President Vladimir Putin is imagined as the leader of the 
country, a figure who appears to enjoy high levels of legitimacy and trust 
levels in public opinion. Some respondents spoke of an ‘ambiguous view of the 
authorities’; combining ‘respect’ for the president with the knowledge that ‘no 
matter how he tries there is no freedom, you always come up against an 
apparatus of officials and ministers, that you cannot bypass’ (Eva (26) Unemployed, 
university graduate, NN). This imagery of a trustworthy Putin at the top, the hopeful 
masses at the bottom, separated by a venal bog of unreliable officials in the 
middle, was often reproduced in interviews. This idea has a long history in 
Russian history found in the saying ‘The Tsar is good but the Boyars are 
wicked’.97 In one sense, supporting Putin as leader is due to a feeling of intense 
alienation from the rest of the state structures and the hope that he will 
somehow ‘drain the swamp’ and lead the nation to better times. 
Thus, an important part of what may be termed the ‘pro-Putin’ consensus is the 
way idealised positive views of Putin’s personal qualities promote him to a 
special place in political terms: a person who is ‘one of us’, the embodiment of 
desirable qualities. This is reinforced by representations of the Russian national 
character as in need of a leader with such qualities and the mass internalization, 
reproduction and transmission of Putinist foundational myths. It also seems the 
pro-Putin consensus is strongly influenced by memories of Russia from 1985 
to 1999, which remembers the country and its population as helpless and 
abandoned, and in need of rescue. The sense that Putin embodies the nation 
and leads a ‘government of saviours’ is strong. On the other hand, it is 
important, however, not to take this as suggestive of monolithic unity in 
Russian society; many respondents saw political inactivity and passivity as 
negative trends holding Russia back and, thus, do not ‘buck’ the Putin 
consensus. They tend to describe the popularity of Putin in terms of ‘Other’ 
Russians, those of different or lower social background. We will now turn in 







Part four: Contesting the ‘Putin consensus’ 
A diverse range of respondents offered ample evidence they had deconstructed 
or demythologised many of the factors explaining Putin’s popularity. One area 
of active deconstruction was Putin’s marketing of himself as a tough-talking 
leader who will ‘snuff them out in the latrines’ and restore Russia on the world 
stage. Here Putin’s claim to be ‘a fighter for Russia’s status in the modern 
world’ could be viewed a kind of hollow ‘populist’ performance, as, in this 
view, Russia has no ‘real’ military or economic power. The Putin effect, then, 
is akin to a kind of narcotic ‘doping’: something the people can take to feel 
good or strong about themselves: 
this is often done in a populist style, such as the thing with Crimea now, it is 
like, in order to maintain his own image as a kind of champion of Russia’s 
position in the modern world. Even if, actually, we all understand that we 
have no real position. Not in a military sense, not in an economic one 
either. But the people all the same want to feel strong because for seventy 
years they were accustomed to feeling like a power (derzhavoi) with which 
the surrounding world had to reckon.  
 Ilia (46) Import-Export Business owner, NN 
This idea of a ‘feeling strong’ and ‘narcotic effect’ can be found in critiques of 
Putin’s domestic policies. While within the family it is ‘basically understood 
that nothing concrete, no changes at all, have happened in our lives: wages are 
still pretty much low, he isn’t raising them, he doesn’t really pay attention to 
this’, on the other hand, Putin is respected for once again making Russia ‘a 
strong power (derzhava) on the international stage’ (Katya (22) Student Politics, NN). 
Thus, foreign policy initiatives have a compensatory effect allowing people to 
accept the lack of visible improvement in their everyday lives.  
Another means of contesting the Putin consensus was to refer to the actual 
current state of the country that the President has ‘risen from her knees’: As the 
respondent below indicates, a wide number of deficiencies are clear in 
everyday life, ranging from corruption and uneven development to plummeting 





Russian state, such views are far from rare. Here the respondent clearly does 
not look back to the nineties anymore in framing normality. Instead, Putin’s 
domestic policies are seen as a failure in the context of a ‘normal country in the 
twenty-first century’: 
Putin’s foreign policy is one thing, his domestic policies are something else. 
I don’t like the domestic policies (...) the thieving, the patronage networks, 
that brotherhood (vorovstvo, pokrovitel'stvo, pobratimstvo) (…) Power is 
centralised, all the money is in Moscow. This is a bad thing. The regions are 
not developed. The villages were in a bad state and have remained so. The 
healthcare system is falling apart (Meditsina razvalivayetsya). Teachers 
used to make 10,000 a month, and they still do today. Education has hit 
rock bottom… (Obrazovaniye na nule) (…) Our rockets and satellites are 
falling from the sky. Our Lada factories still can’t produce normal cars. (…) 
In terms of technology, the country is a good fifty years behind. (…) we are 
not developing (…) we can’t go on like this, just being addicted to the drug 
of oil. 
Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
Focusing on the idea that Putin’s domestic policies have failed in terms of the 
standards of the modern world, this clearly contradicts the foundational myth 
of ‘Putin as saviour’ by claiming his attempts to ‘rescue’ Russia have not 
produced the desired results. For those taking the developed world as reference 
point, Russia can still be viewed as a ‘shambles’.  
When we look at those respondents who still employ the frame of the 
‘abnormal’ nineties, however, Putin’s achievements are put in a different light. 
Here Putin’s domestic policies are seen to have returned normality and 
‘minimal’ standards in areas such as pension provisions, the basic functioning 
of the state or the orderly payment of wages. Thus, from the point of view of 
someone living in the lower-income end of Russian society, Putin has returned 
a certain minimum in terms of living standards that corresponds to the Soviet 
norm that preceded it. In doing this he has delivered, where previous reform 





Why? The people love stability and don’t want sharp changes (Narod lyubit 
stabil'nost' i ne khochet rezkikh izmeneniy). There have already been so 
many changes over the last century and they have always told us ‘just hold 
on a bit longer and things will get better’  (poterpite yeshche nemnogo i vse 
budet khorosho). Now our people, who remember well the Soviet past, they 
see something good today. They can afford more things. Some kind of social 
fairness has appeared (sotsial'naya spravedlivost'), they don’t withhold 
wage payments like in the Yeltsin years. He has established order, it is 
shaky and unsteady, but it is order. And the people value this. (…) there is 
pretty much still a minimal welfare state (minimal'noye sotsial'noye 
gosudarstvo). 
Leonid (45) Religious history lecturer, NN 
Thus, we find that the use of differing frames of normality can lead to differing 
evaluations of Putin’s domestic policy. Those still appraising Putin in terms of 
how he has regained something resembling late Soviet stability draw different 
conclusions from those looking out onto neighbouring European states, where 
different standards of political and economic development are on display. This 
split re-emerges in the chapter on Geopolitics and how respondents have 
differing ideas of what it means to be a ‘great power’. It can argued that this 
split in normative frames will be important as the years pass and generational 
shifts continue. As more Russians travel and communicate with the outside 
world, it may be the generational dynamic will work against the Putin 
consensus as the lived memory of the nineties as a frame of reference becomes 
less salient. 
Another visible division in respondents concerns those who actively subscribe 
to the pro-Putin myths, and those who distance themselves from this, preferring 
to explain Putin’s popularity in terms of a bonding that has occurred between 
Putin and ‘the lower orders’. In St. Petersburg, a variety of respondents 
claimed it was provincial Russia that supports the President most. In 
comparison to the big cities who take a more critical view, it is the ‘hinterland 
(glubinka) that really loves Putin’ as people there ‘don’t really appreciate the 
delights of democracy’ and ‘pretty much still live as they did in the USSR’ (Julia 





According to this view of Putinism, the rough language and macho posturing 
employed by the President is largely an appeal to the ‘lower classes’. In other 
words, Putin’s ‘not accidental use of criminal jargon (blatnuyu leksiku)’ such 
as ‘snuff them out in the latrines’ (‘mochit’ v sortire’) or ‘hang them by the 
balls’ (‘povesit’ za yaytsa’) caters to the ‘most base emotions that exist in the 
people’. These resemble the common language of ‘criminal underworld jokes’ 
that a ‘certain part of the population loves’ (Semyon (54) psychologist, SPB). It is clear 
that cultural, educational, regional and generational difference plays a serious 
role in the reception of the Putin myth and image. A large number of younger 
and older respondents reproduced the myths of Putin’s popularity with some 
heavy irony. These respondents underline that such myths are only accepted by 
‘stupid’ or ‘backward’ Russian masses, who have reverted to the role played by 
the Russian peasantry of the nineteenth century: they revere the Tsar as the 
protector of the people and look to him to solve all the country’s problems.  
The idea of the ‘Tsar-father who will take care of us’ (tsar'-batyushka, kotoryy 
zabotitsya obo vsekh nas) is a return to a long-running political tradition: the 
‘tough’, ‘demanding’ and ‘severe’ Tsar, who ‘who frowns and speaks in a 
confident tone’ ensures that ‘the well-being of the people will continue to grow. 
(laughs) (Mikhail (24), IT support, SPB). In abstracting the Russian people in this way, 
these respondents replay pre-revolutionary discourses; they take the role of the 
Europeanised urban intellectual, the Russian people are the Russian peasant, an 
object of contempt and, at times, fear. Thus, the various ways that respondents 
unpacked and criticized myths about the Russian mentality, Putin’s image and 
performance as leader, reveal a significant degree of polarisation that is not 
represented in sociological polling claiming 85% support levels for Putin. This 
polarisation can also be traced in attitudes to the Russian trait of ‘endurance’ 
(terpenie), which some saw as a pernicious paternalist streak. Attitudes to 
Russia’s ‘information war’ offer further evidence of cross-generational and 
cultural divisions emerging that may prove problematic for the future 





Understanding the ‘Information War’ 
One topic that provided much evidence of generational tension is the 
‘Information War’, a term that describes the intensification of state media 
propaganda in both Russia and Ukraine today. The first point to make about 
the ‘information war’ is that a very small number of respondents saw this as a 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’ thing. In cases where respondents held this viewpoint, the 
most typical approach was to present the topic as a non-issue. A common 
argument was to claim information wars are a natural ‘instrument for any 
conflict’ (Valery (40) Business Development, NN) and that ‘all governments in all 
countries distort facts (Boris (22) Computer Programmer, NN). Russia in this case is no 
exception.  
Most respondents, however, saw the changes in the media environment as 
‘abnormal’ in one way or another. One way was the sense of confusion this 
caused, leading many to doubt all information to be lies on both sides and 
conclude that holding a clear political position is untenable or pointless. The 
lack of ‘objectivity’ or a ‘middle road in media’ makes it ‘hard to say where 
the truth is’ and leaves one ‘at a loss’ (Eva (26) Unemployed, university graduate, NN). Here 
we find evidence of how the information war creates conditions that neutralize 
critical thought. After all, if one can’t believe any sources’ as they are 
understood to be ‘blatant propaganda’ then all that one is left with is a ‘total 
muddle (polneyshaya nerazberikha) in the mass media’ (Anastasia (21) Economics 
Student, NN).   
Another disorientating aspect here was that, for many, the Information War has 
led them to avoid political conversations with friends in such a heightened 
atmosphere of polarised and aggressive political discourse. Many respondents 
was offered their own anecdotal evidence as to how the media influenced 
discord, usually by introducing aggressive polemics into discussions:  
We try not to discuss politics with friends. Because conflicts can start from 
this. Politics is one thing, friendship another. A conflict even started with 





Everyone watches various television programmes and there are lots of 
radical opinions on them. That is the source of the conflict.  
Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB 
Here a key factor was the divide in media consumption between those 
following state media in TV and radio, and those preferring the Internet. This 
ties in with sociological data suggesting Russian society is divided into media 
consumption groups, each with rather distinct views. On the one hand we have 
the ‘party of the television’ (partita televisora) – those who watch Channel 
One (Perviy Kanal) and other state media, on the other we have the ‘party of 
the internet’ (partiya interneta).98  
This split may render the increased frequency of state media propaganda in the 
‘information war’ counter-productive; instead of uniting diverse groups of 
Russians it seems to win over the older age groups at the expense of alienating 
younger audiences. A large proportion of younger respondents claimed they 
did not consume state media as a matter of principle and preferred internet-
based sources. One younger respondent describing the television as a very 
different information space that has undergone a ‘return to a Soviet style’ 
where ‘they “make enemies” for us’ and announce ‘There he is guys, attack!’ 
In this context the respondent claims ‘you feel like closing your ears when you 
see the news; at least then the pictures won’t tell a lie’ (Yaroslav (23), IT Student and 
small businessman, NN).  
This view of the Information War as a return to Soviet-style propaganda is 
expanded on by the respondent below who has observed a common theme: the 
morally upright home country is contrasted with the degenerate West delivered 
in reports delivered with a tone of ‘malicious joy’. What is important here is 
that this kind of media lacks credibility for both him and his mother: 
Every time I see the news (…) they show only good things happening here, 










the blacks and whites (the Ferguson unrest of August 2014 MB) it was 
presented here as if America was about to fall apart. My mother was 
watching it and said ‘Hmm, this is like the 70’s and 80’s’ (…) like when the 
TV show ‘vremya’ talked about party congresses, and the successes of 
Soviet production and, meanwhile in the West, everything in that degrading 
bourgeois society was bad.  
Evgeny (30) sales manager construction materials, SPB 
A variety of respondents viewed this kind of media reporting as something ‘not 
for them’. Older respondents also viewed television media as something 
designed for the older generation, such as their over-60 parents. This kind of 
thinking suggests the information war has created a new category in Russian 
society: those who, are happy (as they were in the Soviet period) to believe 
what they are told.  Here the simple binaries of ‘we are good and they are bad’ 
are viewed as soothing for the older generation: 
Lots of people live like this. Take, for example, my mother. She is old now, 
72. She is a Soviet person. She is used to believe what they say on the 
television and what is printed in certain newspapers. The television 
propaganda pushes one line – ‘we are Russians (rossiyanine) and we are all 
correct, but the Ukrainians are shits (kozly) They’ve done this and that to 
us, but we are good people.’ And they believe that.  
Denis (41) Journalist, NN 
Interestingly, those belonging to the ‘party of the internet’ could discuss their 
identity in very positive terms, as people who have been liberated from the grip 
of state media and, rather than being forced into one-sided positions. They live 
outside of the Information War, receiving information on current affairs from 
bloggers, independent writers and other non-systemic media. This naturally 
leads to conflict in discussions between those who rely on state media: 
One key feature of my circle and my generation is that we are the people of 
the internet, we sit at our computers, we don’t watch state-run information 
channels (…) I often speak with my mother and she only watches federal TV 





things, to help her understand more (…) but in the end we have just started 
to talk less, (…) It is one of my pet hates, when a person has one-sided 
views, I try not to think and speak that way.  
Alexei (23) Computer programmer, NN 
Many respondents offered anecdotes of intergenerational conflict in the 
immediate family, reporting the frustration and discord bred by state media, 
which creates a rift between parents and children. Almost all of this reporting 
was one-way: respondents lamented the one-sided positions of their older 
relatives. One respondent described how, on coming home to visit her parents 
in the midst of escalating media rhetoric in the Maidan crisis, she ‘hit a brick 
wall’ when trying to communicate with her father:  
I saw my father watching television non-stop. And my arguments (…) just 
hit some kind of brick wall. He totally believed what was being said on TV 
and wouldn’t believe anything I said about there being other information 
available from other sources. He said ‘they are all lying to you on that 
internet of yours, look at the horrible things happening on TV!’  
Sasha (28), University Lecturer in History, SPB 
The emotions generated by this ‘brick wall’ could vary; below we find an 
example of sad sympathy and acceptance of their parents falling under the spell 
of one-sided aggressive propaganda. As with other respondents, she is grateful 
not to have ‘fallen victim’ to the information war. The implication here is that 
this is a misfortune that can happen to those not lucky (or educated/cultured) 
enough to have a healthier perspective: 
I have been observing this information war for the last six months as I lived 
in Crimea with my parents during this time. They watch the TV 24 hours a 
day (…) my parents are on the side of Russia and say ‘look how Ukraine 
lies! Aren’t they ashamed of themselves?’ I don’t look any worse on my 
parents for this (…) but thank God I am not a victim of the information war 
because I do not believe that two kindred  (blizkikh po dukhu) peoples can 
just start hating one another like that. I have loads of friends in Kiev. They 
still invite me to visit them and my relations with them have not changed.  





For other respondents, the sense of ‘losing’ one’s parents to the state media 
propaganda machine is vexing and hurtful. In one way, the Information War 
creates a feeling of separation between ‘thinking people’ and ‘Channel One 
zombies’ who rely on the TV. According to this view, ‘people who watch TV, 
get dumb, and that is hard to take because it means they lose their critical 
faculties, lose any inclination to analytical thought. (…) People find it easier to 
go by the path of least resistance’. State media like Channel One target such 
people and ‘lie in brazen, cynical and disgustingly stupid ways’; the hatred of 
state media could at times be expressed in extreme ways: ‘Channel one is full 
of bastards and bitches, I would spit on all their faces (…) they are causing 
this polarisation’ (Pyotr (29) Architect, NN).  
Generalized negative representations of such ‘Channel One zombies’, whether 
the respondent called them this or not, were commonly reproduced. One 
common thread was to classify them as people of lower culture or education. 
There is a sense that it is only ‘very uneducated people who fall under the 
influence of the TV, when they are told things by Channel One, that one 
country is good and another bad, they believe this and with all their passion in 
their hearts insists on this in any conversation…’ (Stepan (22) Physics student, SPB). 
This ties in with a phrase that has seen increased recent usage in spoken Russia 
– vatnik – that translates literally as a ‘quilted coat’ but is slang for the masses 
of people who are easily pleased, as long as the fridge is stocked with pickles, 
vodka and bread.  
The idea here is ‘the Russian person needs little other than something to eat, 
some beer and a colour TV’ and ‘As long as they have these things they won’t 
care who is in power and will do as they are told’ (Arseny (41) Business development, 
NN). Elaborating on the idea from his own life experience, the respondent 
describes a friend from a working class district (avtozavodskii raion) who is 
easily offended and, as a result, has stopped talking about politics with her. The 
absorption of state media propaganda has rendered her rigid and dogmatic in 
her views: 
I have a friend, she lives in the avtozavodsk region. She is smart but she has 





when I do she gets annoyed. Because everything is so black and white to her. 
(…) it is a formula forced upon her everyday by the television.  
Arseny (41) Business development, NN 
This image of a passive and zombie-like Russian mass that cannot be reasoned 
with also ties in with the sections above on views of paternalism and what kind 
of people the Russians are and why the current system suits them. What we 
have seen is how people react to and negotiate the political nation ‘from 
below’. They do this in ways that do not show them to be ‘brainwashed’ or 
‘controlled’ by the state propaganda of the Information War.  
In fact we find a variety of ways that in everyday life Russians negotiate this 
relatively new factor and observe how it is causing polarisation and poisoning 
of political debate, as well as consolidating some behind the leadership. It may 
well be that the Information War is resulting in consequences unwanted by 
those in the political establishment. Rather than achieving unity it causes 
polarisation and bitter dispute; rather than convincing people they belong to 
one political nation they divide this into an ‘us’ and ‘them’ community: the 
enlightened ‘party of the internet’ stands in contrast to the backward, zombie-
like state media consumers. On the other hand, as we will see in the next 
chapter, certain external mega-events such as Maidan and the Crimean 
annexation, whose presentation is stage-managed by state media, can often 
largely overcome divisions and consolidate Russian society at least on a 
temporary basis. 
Conclusion 
In exploring how respondents (mis)trust and support/contest the legitimacy of 
the current political order, a complex equilibrium is in place. On the one hand, 
we have explored the key elements of the pro-Putin consensus in Russia today. 
Putin’s carefully crafted image as a ‘real man’ can be juxtaposed next to 
widely held views of Russians being ‘lazy’, ‘unrealisable’ or ‘inactive’ to 
explain why the President is suitable for the nation. The Putin foundational 
myth provides additional contextual support for this feeling and is rich in 





a ‘government of saviors’ restored to its normal state. Whatever the realities of 
living in Putin’s Russia today, this myth, with its references to the end of smuta 
and restoration of derzhava, offer powerful promises of stability, order and 
security, appealing directly to anxieties people have in relation to what 
happened to Russia from 1988 to 1998. This period leaves people with little 
experience of a functioning democracy and little faith in its prospects. In 
‘delegating’ more power into the President, there is a clear hope he will 
discipline the state and mould these to fit the needs of the people, ensuring that 
it becomes more responsive to the nation’s goals. The President is popularly 
seen as the embodiment of the nation to whom there is no real alternative. He 
alone can be trusted to take on the nation’s ‘foes’, be they internal or external.  
In considering attitudes to political activity in the late Soviet period and we 
find much continuity with today’s Russia; the sense of distance between people 
and the state that claims to rule in their name, people’s lack of confidence that 
anything they do can affect change, a feeling that political inactivity and 
disengagement is ‘normal’. This is supported by common memory of the 
reform processes as started from above and alien to ordinary people; many 
were satisfied by the arrangements of Brezhnev’s little deal and wanted to stay 
out of politics. It is clear that many respondents still take the basic position of 
non-involvement in politics and prefer to ‘take things as they come’.  
This preference for the status quo and reluctance to risk personal participation 
suggest the habits and phobias of Homo Sovieticus live on in Russia to a 
significant extent. Whether one prefers to interpret this as ‘stoic endurance’ or 
‘servile passivity’, there are clearly a large number who are happy to accept 
Putin’s social contract where people ask the state to maintain the status quo, 
ensure stability and ‘leave us to get on with our affairs’, while providing the 
state, in turn, with loyalty and non-participation in politics. This arrangement 
bears a strong resemblance with the Brezhnev-era ‘Little Deal’ social contract 
of the late Soviet period, an equilibrium many older respondents clearly 
remember with fondness. Yet, it is important to note that respondents with pro-
Putin stances did not paint a rosy picture of live in Russia. They highlighted 
stagnating living standards, poor public services and the venality, corruption 





of the Soviet state, which did so much to guarantee a safe and stable life. It 
appears these ‘paternalistic longings’ play an important role in holding the pro-
Putin consensus together.  
Thus, the pro-Putin consensus is not the caprice of one man and his team of 
spin doctors; it something that elicits a real response among the masses and 
resonates with their values. Yet, the cohesion and solidarity of this majority 
should not be exaggerated. History has shown time and time again how the 
hegemonic positions of a majority within a nation can be overturned. As 
Yurchak (2006) noted in his ethnography of the late Soviet period, 
generational, social and cultural change can transform discursive conditions, 
causing what was once a cast-iron certainty to vanish. Putin, sixty-five at the 
time of writing, runs a very different Russia to the one in which he achieved 
his political ascendancy in 1999.  
This chapter has offered some important pointers as to how the Putin 
consensus is contested. Firstly, we find frames of normality are very important 
in determining political stances. It seems more pro-Putin respondents took their 
‘frame of normality’ to be what was ‘normal’ in the course of Russian history 
(strong leaders and order) versus what was ‘abnormal’ (the nineties). Those 
with more critical views tended to frame normality with reference to what is 
‘normal’ for a country in the twenty-first century. This entails viewing the 
historical legacies leading to political passivity and paternalism in negative 
terms. Reliance on a ‘Tsar’ to solve Russia’s problems and having a citizenry 
with a ‘slave-like mentality’ are seen to hold Russia back from achieving 
‘normality’. For this section of respondents, Soviet legacies in political 
behaviour are not seen as good or something to be replicated; they crave a new, 
‘normal’, relationship between the state and people. These respondents not 
only actively deconstruct the foundational myth of Putin; they criticize the 
‘gullible’ masses that swallow state propaganda. Many expressed deep 
scepticism over Putin’s domestic policies, suggesting foreign policy initiatives 
only ‘paper over the cracks’.  
This chapter has also revealed how the Information War has caused serious 





respondents lamented losing their (over sixty) relatives and ‘less educated’ 
friends to state media channels, while younger respondents often claimed to 
have totally turned their backs on state media and stopped communicating with 
the ‘victims of state propaganda’. It may be that the intensification of state 
propaganda has only consolidated the very oldest of Putin’s supporters and 
alienated those who are younger, educated in a post-Soviet environment and 
able to access alternative media sources. Polarisation on frames of normality 
are part of deeper divisions in Russian society, divisions that could prove 
challenging to the further maintenance of Putin’s popularity. This results in a 
society of dangerous labelling. ‘Vatniki’ are lampooned as content with vodka, 
pickles and salami, representatives of a glubinka that is willing to live with the 
bare minimums. ‘Liberals’ are accused of being ‘traitors’ in the pay of the 
West. ‘Nationalists’ are equated with violent racism and hatred.  
In this environment the only safe label is that of ‘patriot’. Yet, it may be that 
the hyperactive and excessive vitriol of state propaganda will devalue the status 
of ‘being a patriot’ in Russia today. It can be argued that such polarisation is 
damaging to the creation of horizontal ties across the national community. As 
we will see in the next chapter, one central method for overcoming these 
fractures is the focus on external geopolitical projects. Support for the current 
political configuration rests on a particular conception of the wider world. 
External events such as Maidan (2014) and common-sense understandings of 
Russia’s geopolitical role, especially the troubled relationship with the West, 
provide compelling reasons to suspend one’s doubts and accept that, for all its 
faults, the current leadership represents the best available means of securing 










Chapter Seven.  
Russia in the world: geopolitics visions as a 
consolidating factor in Russian identity 
In this chapter we examine the power of geopolitical representations in Russian 
national identity that, when invoked, encourage strong feelings of a common 
‘nation-ness’. In the view of Martin Muller (2009: 9), geopolitical identities are 
worthy of study because of the success they have had in ‘filling identificatory 
voids in times of crisis and uncertainty (…) Taking over a stabilising function, 
(…) becoming unifying social forces which counteract processes of 
fragmentation and social uprooting’. This appears to apply very clearly to 
Russia today, as polling shows support for the government has surged in both 
of Russia’s crisis moments in the post-Soviet space (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 
2014). 99  Geopolitics and foreign affairs form a vital part of the current 
hegemonic nationalist discourse. Here we are examining how a ‘geopolitical 
vision’ about one’s country’s place invokes concerns about national status and 
honour, as well as the sense of collective mission or national strategy (Dijink 
1996). The emotional narrative of Russia’s ill-treatment at the hands of the 
‘West’ clearly resonates with a wide range of respondents, regardless of age, 
social background or occupation. This builds upon the picture examined in the 
previous chapter, where the point was made that foreign affairs ‘paper over the 
cracks’ by offering ‘compensation’ for those who might otherwise be 
disgruntled with the political status quo.  
One element of this explored in this chapter is the centrality of a Soviet-
inspired template of what a ‘normal’ great power should be: self-reliant, active 
in world affairs and able to act as a counterweight to American unilateralism. 
Thus, again we find Soviet legacies playing a key role in Russian national 
identity and, as a result, shaping the content of the hegemonic nationalist 
discourse. Furthermore, this chapter also sheds further light on the ‘neo-
Slavophile’ turn in discourse about Russia in the world. Interestingly, one 









even Slavophile sentiment is articulated in very pragmatic terms. As a result, I 
argue that the current appeal of geopolitics rests on the emotional impact of 
certain key events, the adoption of Soviet normative standards and the 
transmission of a particular narrative on relations between Russia and the 
West. The glaring absence in this is any ‘ism’ to justify the huge sacrifices this 
foreign policy direction may entail. The chapter will also show that the clearest 
anti-hegemonic discourse regarding this question is isolationist and employs 
the populist ‘Put Russians first’ nationalism discussed in chapter five. Before 
discussing the empirical findings, however, I will unpack some important 
theories on the role of geopolitics in national identity.  
The theories behind geopolitical identities and the nation 
Geopolitics is commonly studied from the top down with a focus on state 
policy, the speeches of prominent figures and media coverage. This chapter 
examines a different part of the picture, ‘popular geopolitics’: common-sense 
understandings and representations of world politics at the mass level. It is 
worth accounting for sentiments ‘from below’ as this acts as a constraint on the 
geopolitical projects of elites (Hopf 2002; Tsygankov 2012; Clunan 2014). In 
other words, state propaganda is far more likely to be successful when it taps in 
to existing sentiments, fears, and feelings already present in the population. An 
excellent example of these connections can be found in Linda Colley’s 1992 
study of British national identity from 1707. She demonstrated the salience of 
empire and geopolitical relationships, highlighting the importance of Britain’s 
‘civilizing mission’ to the wider world in empire, as well as her conflict with 
Catholic France, an ‘Other’ that was portrayed as ‘superstitious, militarist, 
decadent and unfree’ (Colley 1992: 5).  
Returning to the Russian context, it is clear that Soviet identity also owed 
much to the USSR’s superpower confrontation with America and her 
‘internationalist’ mission in the socialist camp and the third world. Clearly, 
when state policy and rhetoric are in step with popular geopolitics ‘from 
below’, social cohesion and a degree of unity can, at least temporarily, emerge. 
In today’s Russia, a large part of this geopolitical identity is based on an 





‘parity’ with the Western powers.  
As with previous chapters, much of this is supported by commonly reproduced 
myths and visions of normality. Referring to what is ‘normal’ helps people 
make sense of global politics and gives a road map for a country’s aspirations. 
In studying the role of ‘normality’ in Russia’s promotion of ‘mega-events’ 
such as the Winter Olympics in Sochi and the upcoming World Cup, Andrey 
Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsk (2014) identified two key thematic drivers. 
Firstly, normality was connected to ensuring Russia is seen as a ‘normal’ 
country in twenty-first century terms. Here, the aim is to achieve Russia’s 
‘inclusion in the global normative standards’ and, thus, to demonstrate that 
Russia ‘has finished its post-1991 transition to effective statehood’ 
(Makarychev and Yatsk 2014: 71). This version of a ‘normal’ Russia is capable 
of hosting major events and can successfully compete for foreign investment.  
Secondly, ‘normalisation’ is also Russia returning to a ‘normal’ great power 
status, rising up from the deprived status she suffered in the nineties. As 
Vyacheslav Morozov (2013, 2015) noted, some part of this ‘normal great 
power’ narrative is derived from demands for ‘parity’, ‘respect’ and ‘fairness’ 
within the Western-dominated world system. Here Russia’s political leadership 
claims to work toward a more ‘democratic’ world order based on ‘guarantees 
of the sovereign equality of nations’ (Morozov 2013: 20). This version of the 
‘normal great power’ does not reject the principles of ‘democracy’ or ‘market’ 
as such; the normative terms of the West are not overturned, instead the focus 
is on Russia (and the other BRIC countries) improving their status within this.  
In addition to visions of normality, another important framework in this 
chapter is the role of emotions in geopolitical identity. This involves endowing 
countries with human attributes; nations insult one another, they are proud or 
cruel, they have wicked intentions. This is also a ‘normative’ element to this; 
the behaviour of states can be viewed ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ according to the 
expected norms of conduct. At the centre of these emotional narratives is the 
tortured relationship between Russian and the ‘West’. The role of the West as a 
constituent ‘Other’ for Russian identity has rich traditions that can be traced 





Russia’s perceived ‘backwardness’ (Tolz 2001, Greenfeld 1992). In the current 
period, the first decade of post-Soviet Russia revolved around attempts to 
achieve a ‘triple transition’ and move closer to the Western model of 
modernity. Since Putin’s 2007 Munich Speech, however, Russia’s flirtation 
with ‘joining the West’ was replaced by new normative standards.  
In studying official Russian state discourses from 2008 to 2012, Andrei 
Tsygankov (2014) found that the underlying emotions on show were fear, 
frustration and hope, each of which enjoyed distinct phases in response to new 
changes in Russia’s relations with the West. Other authors have also argued 
that emotions such as satisfaction, aspiration, and frustration should be 
included in the toolkit for explaining how new identities are produced and 
promoted (Malinova 2014a; Clunnan 2009). This entails studying the national 
‘collective self-esteem’. In the words of Anne Clunan (2009: 28), this is 
formed on ‘notions of the group’s internal purpose and its status vis-à-vis 
others’. If we consider Russia’s relations with the West from the perspective of 
group identity, the key emotional driver is to achieve a new status, one more 
fitting with the group’s internal purpose.  
Much of this chapter resonates with writings on ‘ressentiment’: which Olga 
Malinova (2014a: 292) defined as ‘a psychological state resulting from feelings 
of repressed envy and hate (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying 
these feelings’. This dynamic can be seen in Russia’s search for equality with 
the West, alongside changing conditions that seem to make achieving this 
harder. In a Nietzschean sense, ressentiment is about the transfer of negative 
feelings around one’s own failures or inadequacies toward an external 
scapegoat (Nietzsche 1994). Thus, feelings of inferiority, for example over 
Russia’s continued ‘backwardness’ or ‘failure’ to join the West, can be 
vanquished and blame can be assigned to an external ‘evil’: the pernicious 
‘West’. 
While visions of ‘normality’ and emotional narratives about the West play an 
important role, we cannot capture the energy of geopolitical identities if we 
ignore the role of events. As we noted in chapter one, nationalism is discursive 





al 2006; Billig 1995; Bessinger 2002; Calhoun 1995). Michael Billig argued 
that nationalism goes through ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ phases. In the ‘hot’ phase, 
nationalism is dynamic and game-changing; large numbers of people turn to 
the idea of the nation in order to ‘make sense of problems or predicaments, to 
articulate affinities and affiliations, to identify commonalities and connections, 
to frame stories and self-understandings’ (Brubaker et al. 2006: 12).  The 
‘banal’ phase concerns those periods when the passionate nationalistic wave 
subsides and ‘normality’ returns, leaving a steady, almost unnoticed, low-level 
everyday reinforcement of nationalism.  
Geopolitics is an area where ‘event-based’ nationalism can be observed, 
activating the previously dormant ‘banal nationalism’ into a ‘hotter’ form. 
According to this version, the nation is not a ‘daily plebiscite’ but a far more 
irregular event; ‘The timing of these punctuated plebiscites is largely 
determined by the perceived opening and closing of opportunities to contest an 
existing order’ (Bessinger 2002: 25). As Mark Bessinger pointed out, 
Nationalism is about a ‘struggle for control over the imagination about 
community’. In this struggle, the event  ‘constitutes a critical moment at which 
the loyalties underlying competing claims to nationhood are put to open test’ 
(Bessinger 2002: 18). In this chapter we examine two external events that have 
occupied a prime place in Russian political life in 2013-2014, the Maidan 
‘revolution’ in Kiev, the other the ‘absorption’ of Crimea. 
The empirical findings 
In the first section I unpack the dominant ‘geopolitical vision’ of the majority 
in Russia today. This includes an examination of how Soviet imagery frames 
what it means to be a ‘normal great power’. This is refers to pride in the 
derzhava, one that demands the respect of world powers but is also 
increasingly self-reliant and able to play the role of ‘counterweight’ to US 
dominance in world affairs. I will also examine how this is reinforced by a 
powerful emotional myth about how Russia and the West have ‘got on’ in the 
past and present, narratives that are heavy with frustration/envy (ressentiment) 
and status-driven demands for equality. A key finding of this chapter is how 





since 1991 are not abstract issues; they seem to have seeped into personal lives 
in highly emotional ways. Thus, in part one we find at the core of popular 
geopolitics an emotional Russian great power nationalism that, at the moment 
at least, seems to lack any ideological foundations beyond restoring ‘normality’ 
and fighting the next battle in a struggle with the West.  
The second section turns to what one would expect to be an important part of 
Russia’s foreign affairs; understandings of her role in the post-Soviet space. 
Here we have an interesting negative finding: the appeal of both Eurasianism 
and protecting/uniting a Russian ethno-cultural space (russkii mir) is limited 
among respondents.100 The ideologies behind these projects are not well-
understood or internalised across respondents. Yet, even though many 
respondents were not aware of these ideological justifications for Russia’s 
primacy in this space, many still approved of the country’s leading role in the 
region without elaboration, suggesting this is still a hegemonic position for 
many. On the other hand, a coherent set of ideas opposing supranational 
projects like the Eurasian Union and russkii mir was observed. This appears to 
be grounded in a certain populist ‘put Russia first’ mind-set that demands 
priority for citizens living inside the Russian Federation’s borders. This point 
of view may have strong potential to offer challenge the statist rhetoric of 
hegemonic nationalist discourse.  
Thirdly, I consider the role of external events in rallying and convincing 
ordinary people of the need for unity. This ties in with the previous chapters in 
several ways. These events activate an inherent conservatism within popular 
historical memory that fears collapse and rapid social and political change. 
This triggers for the painful memories of relatively recent lived experience 
such as the collapse of the USSR and the ‘wild nineties’. Furthermore, I will 
argue that external events assist the political leadership in temporarily 
overcoming deeper fractures within the political nation and convincing the 
wavering middle that the nation’s course is sound. In both cases, popular 










emotions released in these events are vital to the way the nation is ‘lived’. 
While Maidan produced powerful feelings of fear and relief, the addition of 
Crimea brought jubilance, both on the peninsula and in Russia itself. Overall, 
Crimea and Maidan also function as graphic and visceral evidence of the need 
to struggle against the West’s pernicious designs and follow the experienced 
and strong leadership provided by President Putin. Thus, in this chapter we 
examine how geopolitics are central to the current, rather stable equilibrium 
achieved in the Russian political system. This is one where radical socio-
economic inequality, corruption and falling or stagnating living standards at 
home are balanced out and compensated for through an appeal to a geopolitical 
vision in which Russia strives toward her ‘normal’ and ‘desirable future’ 
despite the constant struggle with evil external forces. 
Part one: The essence of the geopolitical vision ‘from below’  
Soviet frames of normality  
In recollections about the USSR’s role in the world, a common tendency, for 
both young and old alike, was to demonstrate pride in a strong, powerful, large 
state that played a vital role in the world. This was about ‘pride in the 
derzhava’, the feeling that ‘we lived in the biggest country, where we had so 
many prospects, you could be whatever you wanted, there were astronauts, 
industry, the best education and healthcare, there was pride for the country.’ 
(Galina (40) Sociology department, NN). A large part of this thinking in older respondents 
is that ‘until perestroika we were considered to be a strong state. We were kind 
of unique (ocobennymi) (…) our economy performed well. We were the first to 
get to space. I mean we had achievements in which we were strong. I think that 
we had a far better position than we do now’ (Natalya (50) Accountant. NN). This focus 
on ‘remembering’ the strengths of the USSR was common in the older 
respondents, suggesting positive images on Soviet strength still predominate 
and are not seriously confronted, contradicted or counteracted by any counter-
narrative about a ‘colossus with clay feet’ or ‘a superpower with rotting 
vegetable warehouses and salami shortages’ (Arseny (41) Business development, NN).  
What is being reproduced here is a nostalgia for Soviet greatness and a pride in 





critical narratives on the existence of a Soviet empire. Instead, we find the 
USSR presented in idealistic terms: ‘we did not attack anyone, but we always 
helped who ever asked for help. And, by and large, I still believe we will never 
attack anyone (…) or dictate terms to any country.’ (Ludmilla (50) Head of University 
Dormitory, NN). This presents the USSR as a force for ‘good’ in the world, a 
fundamentally peaceful country that sent out aid to ‘brother nations’. Thus, the 
USSR was a ‘normal’ great power that also behaved ‘normally’. There is the 
strong sense many respondents feel the Russian Federation has inherited these 
‘normal’ attributes today. Nostalgia for Soviet greatpowerness involves a 
certain whitewashing of the USSR’s record in foreign policy. For example, the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was generally viewed as a genuine attempt 
to help a ‘brother country’ rather than any indication of a malicious creeping 
Soviet ‘imperialism’.  
This nostalgia also included the idea that a state must be powerful and 
respected by other powers: ‘the feeling that we were a strong country and that 
were taken into account (s nami schitayutsya), we were respected, we had that’ 
(Zhanna (43) Journal editor, Moscow). Even today, quantitative polling suggests most 
Russians believe their country is most respected for her military might and 
nuclear arsenal.101 In other words, even if ‘nobody understood our country’ it 
was clear ‘everyone was afraid of us’ (Natalya (50) Accountant. NN). The emotional 
component of this revolves around respect: ‘Being a great power means being 
respected, they kind of feared us, viewed us as equal and did not treat us with 
any contempt. Because Russians are like bears, and when the mouse hits a 
bear in the nose, the bear gets mad!’ (Elisa (58) Director of Sports Centre, SPB). The sense 
that the USSR was too powerful to be treated disrespectfully re-emerges as an 
important theme later when we consider emotional narratives about Russia’s 
relationship with the West. Overall, however, defining greatpowerness in 
Soviet terms is popular. It appears many feel Russia looks more and more to 













On the other hand, this nostalgia is challenged by an important group of 
younger respondents who offered a very different definition for being a great 
power that had little to do with Soviet frames. Instead of defining a great power 
as a formidable, respected military superpower, these respondents took a 
different model to be worthy of aspiration. This was the model of modern, 
economically successful and culturally attractive countries with political 
systems that protect the rights of their citizens. This definition rejects the idea 
that ‘ a nuclear weapons stockpile and threatening the whole world’ equals 
great power status. Instead, a great power is one in which ‘citizens feel good, 
where there are possibilities for self-realization, for prosperity’ (Dmitri (28) Actor, 
SPB). Rather than military might, greatpowerness is based on ‘having 
technology, brains, writers, scientists, those who give something back to 
society. Those who don’t consume but generate values. A great power is one 
that has strong legal institutions, where everything works, where it is safe to 
walk the streets at night.’ (Marina (29) Manager in Software Company, SPB).  
This split in normative standards between younger and older respondents was 
also on display in the previous chapter in appraisal of Putin’s domestic 
policies, Russian political passivity and paternalism, as well as media 
consumption. It may be that this growing rejection of Soviet-inspired frames of 
normality among younger people will be increasingly important in sociological 
and political terms. Indeed, one feature of recent anti-corruption protests across 
Russia is the prevalence of younger protestors.103 Although more research 
would be required to confirm this, it does appear significant proportions of 
Russians under thirty tend to reject the normality of the Soviet past and ignore 
the abnormality of the nineties as their key frame of reference.  
On the other hand, in the representative sample of this research, there was more 
evidence that Soviet-style qualities are still dominant for many respondents 
explaining what a normal great power does on the world stage. This can be 
found in two key values about Russia as a great power.  Firstly, Russia should 
be self-reliant and self-sufficient. Secondly, Russia should act as a balance or 









wide range of respondents and are, not incidentally, things the late Soviet state 
enjoyed. From this point of view they are features of state ‘normality’ that 
should be restored and suggest that Russia’s role as a ‘second-class’ actor in 
world affairs is well understood by ordinary people. Central to this idea is 
viewing the 1990’s as an ‘abnormal’ period of collapse and declining state 
power, ending with Russia excluded from the core of developed nations and 
assigned the role of resource colony locked into a subservient relationship with 
the West.  
The first key point in restoring Soviet ‘normality’ was the popular view that 
Russia should be a ‘self-sufficient power’ (samostoyatel'noy derzhavoy), rather 
than the ‘resource power’ (syr'yevoy derzhavoy) of the 90’s whose leaders 
‘were paid by the Europeans and Americans’ and have large sums saved 
abroad as reward for their ‘treachery to the country’ (Lev (46) Programmer Developer 
Oracle, SPB).  Part of being self-reliant in the current period is the ability to say 
‘no’ to the West, in contrast to the way pro-Western leaders like Gorbachev 
said ‘yes’: ‘His “yes” was the worst word for us, and led to all that mess. I like 
it when a leader says “No, we won’t do it this way, it doesn’t suit us (…) we 
can live without the benefits(…) without apples, without meat, we can get by 
ourselves somehow’ (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB). Reference to ‘living without 
apples and meat’ is a nod to post-2014 Western sanctions and the need for 
Russia to be able to ‘stand on its own two feet’ by ‘becoming economically 
independent’ (Daria (28) Events Manager for Local Goverment, SPB). This interprets Russia’s 
imposed economic isolation and sanctions as a positive stimulus to Russian 
economic development ‘because, without this isolation business in the internal 
market simply cannot work, it just isn’t competitive’ (Sergei (40) Marketing Department, 
SPB).  
A common sentiment was that, after the sanctions are lifted, Russian 
companies would be in a better state to compete on the world market. 104 Thus, 
despite the immediate hardship and disruption entailed by sanctions, a new 








I think for development you need to do something by yourself, maybe again 
an Iron Curtain should be raised, we can soak in our own juices for some 
time, and only after that go out into the world market (…) it is normal to be 
a self-sufficient state (samodostatochnym gosudarstvom). I mean so fine 
there are sanctions, no meat, no fish, but we can get by without it, lets talk 
now and establish some kind of parity.  
Ilia (46) Import-Export Business owner, NN 
A key supporting pillar of this sentiment for a ‘self-sufficient state’ was that 
Russia has ‘enough of her own resources’ and, therefore, ‘we can provide for 
ourselves, develop our own sectors and we don’t need anyone, no partners.’ 
(Tanya (29), Nursery nurse, NN). Calls for Russia to be industrialised again were 
popular in older respondents, based on the common-sense position that ‘all 
revenues from the energy resources need to directed to the country’s interior 
(…) to develop infrastructure, roads, energy sources, industry (…) we can 
build all this ourselves’. (Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB). Thus, we find a wide range of 
respondents support the idea that Russia must be financially, industrially and 
economically self-reliant vis-à-vis the West. This means ending Russia’s 
subordinate status and essentially redrafting the way world politics functions.  
This brings us to the second main thrust in elaborating on Russia’s role in the 
world was that she should act as a ‘counterweight’ or ‘balance’ to American 
dominance of global affairs. There was common consensus among respondents 
that American global supremacy, arising from the collapse of the USSR, is a 
negative thing. America is ‘overdoing it’ and ‘kind of losing their minds due to 
absolute power’; the harmful effects of post-1991 US interventions from 
Kosovo to Iraq are cited to prove this (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB). Playing the role of the 
‘counterweight to the USA’ is, thus, a response to the aggressive destructive 
wars America has unleashed on various countries. One respondent, referring to 
Russia’s first 2013 intervention in Syria exclaimed: ‘I could not truly believe 
that our crumbling state (nashe razvalivsheyesya gosudarstvo) could hold 
America back (sderzhivat’)’. Yet, given the way the USA ‘has unleashed wars 
across the world’, it is clear ‘a counterweight is needed.’ (Timur (26) Postgraduate 
researcher, Moscow). Thus, in some ways, what we have here is a reboot of the 





imperial ambitions in the Third World. Another respondent developed this 
further, claiming Russia is the only country capable or willing to be a 
‘counterweight’ (protivoves) to American hegemony. While today’s Russia 
‘cannot do the same things as America’, it remains the case that ‘Russia is the 
last country to stand in the way of the Americans achieving world domination. 
Not North Korea, not the Middle East, only our country.’ (Mikhail (29) Actor, 
Moscow).  
In restraining the American push for global hegemony, many respondents 
underlined the defensive and anti-imperial nature of the Russian 
counterweight: ‘we don’t stick our noses in anywhere, we only defend 
ourselves, (….) but the Americans intervene everywhere and kill loads of 
people.’ This line of thinking views the recent clash over Ukraine as a decisive 
moment in US-Russian relations, as ‘when they started coming up to our 
borders, we were forced to react, after all that mess in the Ukraine (…) but we 
were just defending our borders and nothing else’ (Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, 
NN). The conviction that Russia is a defensive power facing up to American 
greed and imperialism is a well-worn sentiment that links well to Soviet 
traditions (and propaganda) in interpreting world affairs.  
On the other hand, Russia’s ‘counterweight’ alliance of the Eurasian Union 
states and/or the BRIC countries could be presented as distinct from the Soviet 
style: ‘we do not want to return to a bipolar world (…) and the numerous 
nuclear warheads, factories and closed cities’. Instead the hope is in aligning 
with ‘the rising centres of strength in China, India and Brazil and even Iran’, a 
new, fairer, world order will be built. (Vladislav (28) Postdoctoral researcher Middle Eastern 
Studies, NN). In contrast to the Soviet period, the BRIC countries are not united 
around an internationalist socialist ideology but merely co-operate on a 
pragmatic basis to reduce American hegemony and gain a voice in deciding 
global problems. In such a way, national interests are still taken into account, 
many centres of power co-operate and negotiate and the principles of 
democracy and the market are not contested by any alternative vision of 





essentially defensive is also backed up by quantitative polling.105 
Thus, a distinct geopolitical vision emerges of Russia ‘going according to her 
own path’ by ‘creating the Eurasian Union, linking with the BRIC countries 
and connecting closer to China’ thus ‘creating a counterweight’ and 
‘infuriating America’. The ultimate result of these efforts will be that ‘Russia’s 
voice in the world’ will be heard more clearly (Vlad (26) Marketing, NN, Sergei (29) 
Business Development, NN). Russia’s new assertiveness in Syria and Ukraine were 
offered as evidence that this vision is being realised. It would appear that high-
profile foreign policy actions, such as the Russian intervention in Syria, 
reactivate certain schemata of what makes a ‘normal’ great power. Yet, 
perhaps one important strand of this, which runs deeper than Soviet legacies, is 
the idea that Russia can offer something distinct to the world. A significant 
number of respondents suggested Russia’s counterweight bloc could eventually 
emerge to win a deep long-term strategic partnership with Europe: ‘the EU and 
Eurasian Union could act as a counterweight to the New World (USA). What 
excites me most is that Russia and Europe could be closer on these terms’ 
(Sergei (40) Marketing Department, SPB). This, in essence, means ‘Europe won’t be 
worse off if Russia becomes a strong state. Then Europe will have an 
alternative (…) to the USA, the superpower that controls everything’ (Alexander 
(25) Business development manager, SPB).  
This brings us to the third key aspect of Russia as a counterweight – this 
imagines Russia as a force that acts as a balancer between East and West. This 
idea was presented in diverse ways, such as in a more general terms, that world 
politics are ‘like a biological system, from which you cannot just discard one 
element. It is like if you remove one element then total chaos will ensue’ (Marina 
(25) Language teacher, NN). More specifically, respondents viewed Russia’s global 
role in terms of ‘establishing a balance of power between European and Asian 
countries, smoothening out the rough edges on both sides, bringing harmony to 
the world’ (Anastasia (21) Economics Student, NN). The above is closely bounded to a 
question with rich intellectual and cultural roots, is Russia closer to Europe or 









supported the idea of Russia’s unique path, justifying this along the lines that 
Russia is a large and diverse country and that ‘geographically we have 
connected East and West. Culturally, it has worked out that we are not quite 
Europeans and not quite Asians (…) therefore the recipes that suit some 
countries don’t always work here (…) One way or another we need our own 
thing (nado chto-to svoye) (Mikhail (29) Actor, Moscow). Most did not elaborate on 
deeper value clashes between a ‘degenerate West’ and a ‘traditional Russia’ as 
a bastion of conservative values; instead there was more of the idea that Russia 
could be a ‘happy medium’ (zolotaya seredina) between Asian and European 
values/cultures (Anastasia (21) Economics Student, NN).  A common theme was to present 
‘Western’ values as more centred on materialism and individualism, while 
‘Eastern’ values referred to more a spiritual collectivism, a cosmic acceptance 
of one’s fate. Respondents argued that both value systems could exist side by 
side in Russia and, given her position between these two value systems, Russia 
can act as ‘a connecting platform between East and West’ (Lubov (43) Private tutor, 
SPB).  
Thus, even in advocating the idea that Russia had a unique role in the world, 
most respondents did not internalize a coherent sense of Russia’s distinct 
civilizational purpose or offer any ideological basis for this difference. This is 
also the picture in quantitative polling, where large numbers (40%) are unable 
to articulate what Russia’s special path is and those who do tend to link it to 
economic development (29%).106 Practical and simple arguments were often 
encountered in this research. One of the most common of these was that Russia 
must tread ‘a third path’ as she is ‘too large to enter the EU (…) and Russia 
still needs to go through a long period of development to reach this stage’ 
(Roman (28) Journalist Kommersant, Moscow).  As an ‘enormous country’, Russia ‘must 
have her own mind and go her own way, and not copy the experience of other 
countries’. She needs ‘a Tsar’ at the head and ‘effective local rulers’ in the 
regions to hold together ‘a complex multi-ethnic country with so many regional 
specifics’ (Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB). It can be argued that the above 
is not about Soviet frames of normality as we lack any reference to the kind of 







this is a return to pre-1917 discourses about Russian exceptionalism and her 
‘unique path’, all of which makes it impossible to follow the example of the 
West. What can be said with some certainty, however, is that discussions on 
Russia’s distinctiveness are less important to geopolitical identity than certain 
popular emotionally charged myths about how Russia’s relationship with the 
West has developed in modern times. 
Emotional narratives on the struggle with the West 
Interestingly, emotional narratives on the relationship with the ‘West’ chime 
well with the previous section on Soviet frames as the message is similar: 
Russia must regain past strength and stand on her own two feet. What is 
different is the shift in focus, as in these emotional narratives an external 
protagonist (the West) is moved to centre stage. The way the politics of 
emotion operate here very much tie in with theories on collective self-esteem, 
whereby group self-worth emerges from discussions on the internal purposes 
and goals of the group and status comparisons with out-groups. According to 
these emotional narratives, the main goal for the Russians is to end 
subservience and restore normality, while the main status comparison is with 
the ‘West’, which is seen to be the main force standing in Russia’s way.107 This 
emotional narrative is of vital importance to how the nation is ‘lived’ by 
ordinary people; by internalising the emotions emerging from the nation’s 
triumphs and travails, one may ‘experience’ the nation is a very powerful 
manner.  
The first part of this emotional narrative is that the 1990’s were a disaster in 
geopolitical terms, a point made by Putin in an oft-quoted speech.108 One key 
emotional component of this ‘disaster’ was the common idea that, after the 
collapse of the USSR, Russia was ready to join the West but, despite her 
earnest willingness, she was turned away. The respondent below jokingly 









Thrones,109 a royal house that are constantly cheated, attacked and humiliated 
in wicked and devious ways by their enemies: 
The West missed a really big chance to behave themselves here like people, 
back when they were loved here. But given that they behaved like pigs, my 
attitude to them got much worse. I constantly saw treachery. Remember 
‘Game of Thrones’? The Russians are the Starks. All of our life has been a 
struggle with some tough force, all of our lives we have been faced with 
betrayal, deception and destruction through various means.   
Yuri (45) Sales Manager, Moscow  
The sense that Russia as a country has been victim to all kind of lying and 
cheating is reproduced in a number of interlinked ways. It could be reflected in 
the ‘broken promises’ over NATO’s Eastern expansion after 1991 (Viktor (22) 
International Relations Student, NN) or in frustration at how economic reform saw 
Western-backed policies and money being used to encourage Russia’s 
deindustrialization and her transformation into a ‘resource colony’ (Ivan (55) 
Retired miner, SPB).  The key emotion in this narrative is that Russia was not treated 
fairly, the West was devious in her treatment of a hopeful if naive Russia. The 
apparent ‘invitation’ for Russia to join ‘the community of Western nations’ was 
not done on the basis of enjoying equal rights; instead it was like a restaurant 
where ‘Russia was brought in not as a dinner companion but as a course to be 
eaten’ (Grigori (49) Computer programmer. NN).  
Thus, in the Russian ‘collective self-esteem’ we find a powerful emotional 
consensus exists on what happened to the nation after 1991. Morozov (2013) 
has described Russia’s relationship with the West as ‘paradoxical’ as, on the 
one hand, Russia was ‘dependent on the West in both economic and normative 
terms’ seeking further integration into the Western-led global system but, on 
the other, she remained an independent great power and sought 
acknowledgement of her own regional power base (Morozov 2013: 25). What 
is interesting is how respondents portrayed this ‘dependency’ in terms of 
humiliation and approved the end of this phase of unequal relations. It is here 








frustration and anger over the failure of the post-1991 transition is outsourced 
to an external scapegoat. This transference allows one to avoid experiencing 
this failure in terms of one’s own failures or inadequacies. 
The second important component to this emotional narrative was the idea that 
the West maintains a consistent desire to weaken Russia, something seen as 
part of a ‘Great power struggle’ that has bubbled on through the centuries. In 
this example, the longue durée version of history propagated by an important 
segment of respondents in chapter four is embedded in popular geopolitics. 
Respondents of all ages and social backgrounds reproduced this image of a 
plotting and scheming West. It is worth noting that some did use non-emotive 
terms to describe this contest. This used realist interpretations of international 
relations that view the West and Russia as locked in a zero-sum contest for 
relative gains, such as winning access to ‘markets and resources’ and gaining 
‘economic growth’ (Artem (49) computer programmer, NN; Stanislav (22) Electrical Engineer, NN). 
In other words, Russia and the West have incompatible aims on the world 
stage, and neither can be too pleased about the successes of the other: ‘Russia 
only becomes friends with the West when she is weak. When we hear Russia is 
an enemy to the world, that can only mean we have become strong. (…) That is 
normal. When Russia is strong she acts in her own interests.’ (Evgeny (30) sales 
manager construction materials, SPB).  
On the other hand, the sense that the West is the main obstacle in Russia’s path 
could be expressed very emotionally, revealing how this emotional narrative is 
deeply internalised and personalised. In this way the collective self-esteem is 
powerfully felt on the individual level: 
They have always tried to screw Russia (…) they always want to take things 
from us. But I like it when we answer them in kind (…) like when we took 
Crimea back on the sly, I was glad. Any misfortune for the West that is 
accompanied by our success always makes me feel proud. This is my 
country. I was born here and I must love her even if there are things I don’t 
like about the leadership.  





Thus anti-Western emotional sentiment works in a compensatory fashion and 
helps reduce feelings of inferiority, inadequacy or failure. This emotional 
narrative of Western hostility claimed that the West has never really shown any 
genuine goodwill to Russia. While Russia has ‘been drawn to the West over the 
centuries’, the West has viewed Russia with ‘contempt.’ Here Russia is 
imagined as a person who is ‘frozen out’, forced to ‘sit it out’, shunned as a 
‘lesser people’ (vtorosortnie rebyata) (Sergei (29) Business Development, NN). Thus, the 
West emerges as a constituent ‘Other’ in popular geopolitics; many 
respondents expressed the conviction that Russia could never expect to be 
treated well by the West. This is because the West wants to ‘limit Russia’s 
potential and reduce her allies’ (Svetlana (25) Postgraduate researcher sociology, NN) or 
‘demonstrate to the world that Russia is a weak country’ (Boris (22) Computer 
Programmer, NN).  
Respondents commonly claimed the goal of the West is to ‘subordinate’, 
‘weaken’ and ‘control’ Russia as part of a geopolitical game centred on access 
to resources (Marina(29) Manager in Software Company, SPB). Here the West is ready to 
treat Russia much like the Middle East; a region with resources that must be 
broken up and controlled:  
Now the whole of the Middle East is going up in flames, Yemen and Syria 
and all that. They managed to do that there and they also want to do it here 
to stop us escaping them. All these wars have a common aim, to get a 
certain part of the world to enter the world market for energy resources. I 
think that is why they want to smash/fragment (razdrobit’) Russia and 
divide up the energy resources.  
Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB 
Given the salience of such views and the strong feelings they provoke, Russia’s 
goal in world affairs is obvious: resist the perfidious West, break free of 
dependency and subservience and gain equality. A large part of this emotional 
language presents Russia as a ‘player’ in world affairs that is in a ‘contest’ with 
the West and other powers. In this imagining of Russia she is seen as 
previously crippled and side-lined but now in full recovery, ‘standing up’, 





second-class status, she is on her own again, ‘on an equal basis with some 
other countries that are able to live their own way (po-svoyemu) (…) and not 
under the dictates of others’ (Andrei (51) Computer Programmer, SPB).  
Thus, Russia’s new and independent manoeuvring on the world stage is a 
return to ‘normality’: ‘I don’t want Russia to be like some errand boy, some 
servant sent to do this and that. I think there should be enough strength to take 
good, normal, sensible decisions without submitting to anyone’ (Vera (43) IT Project 
Manager, NN). Respondents repeatedly made the point that Russia’s goal in all this 
was ‘to be respected and listened to (…) as a fully-fledged equal participant 
(polnopravnyy uchastnik) in world affairs (Marta (54) retired and unemployed, SPB), in 
other words, ‘to occupy a place equal to the other countries (…) to be an equal 
among equals.’ (Yegor (44) Newspaper editor, NN). The above offers compelling 
evidence of the important role played by feelings of frustration and anger that 
are displaced outward onto an external scapegoat (ressentiment). A common 
tendency in these portrayals is the way emotional language is consistently 
internalised and reproduced by diverse respondents. This suggests that 
emotional narratives are a powerful locomotive force driving Russia’s 
geopolitical identity, partly because they invoke othering language against an 
external force (the West) and also, as we will see in the final section, fit in with 
on-going events in world affairs.  
Part two: Russia’s backyard: The Post-Soviet Space  
Territorial conservatism  
The above section demonstrates how a mixture of Soviet frames of a ‘normal 
great power’ and emotionally-driven myths about Russia’s relationship with 
the West form a vital part of how people conceive of Russia’s role in global 
politics. A large part, however, of the worsening relationship between Russia 
and the West is connected to the sense that Russia demands a ‘leading role’ in 
the post-Soviet space, something that Western initiatives in Ukraine and 
Georgia appear to challenge. There is clearly a sense that Russia has a special 
role in a region that shares a common history of deep interactions in economic, 
cultural, social and political terms. With increasing frequency since Putin’s 





space in special terms; in her actions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), 
Russia announced a ‘hands off’ warning to any power considering involvement 
in the post-Soviet space. It appears, however, that Russia’s role in the ‘Near 
Abroad’ is either poorly understood and/or not something respondents can 
articulate easily.  
This data set, however, suggests there is very limited support for any 
‘revisionist’ or ‘irredentist’ project but, on the contrary, wide scale acceptance 
of the 1991 borders. This ties in well with quantitative polling that consistently 
shows the majority does not desire changes in borders or even agree Russia 
should expend effort to influence the post-Soviet space.110 Respondents in this 
study were also lukewarm in their views of the Eurasian Union project and 
took divided and murky stances towards any ethno-cultural ‘Russian World’ 
ideas or measures to support the ‘Russians of the Near Abroad’. Furthermore, 
while some respondents show tacit acceptance of Russia’s role, many also 
contest and oppose the expenditure of national resources away from citizens 
residing in the country.  
As was discussed in chapter five, the majority of respondents manifested a kind 
of territorial conservatism linked to fears of state disintegration triggered by 
separatism or internal upheaval. Rather than harbouring ambitions of 
expansion by rearranging the 1991 borders, the common trend was common 
acceptance of the RSFSR borders as a sound basis for the post-1991 status quo. 
Although the entry of Crimea into the Russian Federation heralded the first 
significant changes to this territorial status quo and was supported by a large 
part of the population, this should not be interpreted as a mass shift toward 
support for a ‘revisionist’ foreign policy akin to the post-Versailles Germany. 
While attitudes to the consequences of the 1991 collapse among respondents 
are divided, most of the negativity around it was not focused on any ‘unfair’ 










Instead, in remembering 1991, the principles of national self-determination 
often trumped any statist or imperial sentiment on keeping the USSR together. 
Older respondents spoke of a ‘relaxed attitude to the succession of republics’ 
as ‘you have to divide things up fairly and let them go in peace’ (Lev (46) 
Programmer Developer Oracle, SPB). The logic of separation was mentioned by a variety 
of respondents. In common-sense representations, the collapse was ‘part of the 
natural course of events’ as trying to hold the USSR together is like ‘keeping a 
husband with a wife he does not love or want to live with (…) well, there is no 
point trying to chain him to the radiator’ (Marta (54) retired, SPB). The principle of 
national self-determination was understood on the human level: ‘It was no 
shock to me. Every person can determine their own future and I thought then 
“let them sort things out by themselves”’ (Pavel, (58) IT specialist, NN).  
The idea of history ‘following its natural course’ also emerged, that the 
USSR’s demise was normal as ‘clearly at that moment it had to happen that 
way. In every state, a strong leader appeared that said, “It is time to go our 
separate ways. We have our own sources of income. We will form our own 
state”’ (Sergei (40) Marketing Department, SPB). The sense of an unnaturally large state 
that came to an expected or natural end is reflected as part of the trajectory that 
all large states go through: 
 I think that any empire lives according to a sine wave graph; it reaches a 
certain peak and then inevitably falls downward. This is a kind of law of 
nature. I mean 1991 was like the fall of an empire that could no longer go 
on in that form. Well, this is not just about empires, I mean any kind of 
powerful entity.  
Nadezhda (30) nanny, SPB 
While respondents listed a number of negative consequences emerging from 
the 1991 collapse, an unfair territorial deal was not one of them. We are still far 
from any mass irredentist view that the might present the Russian Federation as 
the leftover stump of something more authentic that was lost due to a 
‘disaster’. On the contrary, many respondents supported that the principles of 
national determination were respected in 1991 and, therefore, the peaceful 





was conducted in 2014, a year that saw the first changes to the Russian 
Federation’s borders since 1991, the redrawing of boundaries did not appear to 
be a hot topic. Instead, there was a clear preference among respondents for 
maintaining the current status quo. Thus, a very large proportion of 
respondents accepted the current borders of the Russian Federation as 
legitimate and an authentic reflection of the ‘real’ Russia.  
The lukewarm response to Eurasianism  
Thus, while revisionism and irredentism do not appear to be key drivers in 
respondents’ geopolitical thinking, it is also difficult to establish a clear interest 
in two key projects that offer ideological sustenance and practical ideas for 
Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space: Eurasian Integration and russkii mir. 
The first, Eurasian integration, concerns the creation of a voluntary union 
involving the co-operation of the different independent states in Eurasia; 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. It is a geopolitical 
project to bring these countries closer in ways similar to the European Union as 
it involves economic integration, the opening of borders, unifying the legal and 
administrative space and creating a single labour market. Among respondents, 
Eurasian integration was mainly viewed as a ‘logical’, ‘obvious’ state-led 
project of little concern to them or their everyday lives. Positive positions 
among most respondents typically reflected lukewarm approval and laconic 
acceptance without any serious engagement in any of the ideas behind 
Eurasianism.  
The key reasons for accepting the project as ‘natural’ were that it involves 
reintegrating countries that are close anyway, uniting old allies into a defensive 
cordon against Western geopolitical intrigues, as well as offering pragmatic 
economic benefits for Russia as the largest and most advanced economy. Only 
a smaller number of older respondents engaged more with the more ideological 
part of Eurasian integration and enthused over the prospect of reintegrating 
‘our people’ into another ‘large union’. The sense that the people of the post-
Soviet space are still one was common among older respondents in particular: 





here of mixed nationality (…) we are used to moving around freely (…) we 
don’t feel borders (Lubov (43) Private tutor, SPB). 
However the above sentiment was not regularly encountered in younger 
respondents. Instead, it was more common to find a focus on three key 
pragmatic benefits. Firstly, the point was often made that such a project was 
obvious as ‘neighbouring states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are 
pretty much on the same level’ Russia ‘can be a leader among them’ (Nadia, (26) 
Lecturer in Asian Studies, NN). Thus, it is seen as natural for Russia to lead these states, 
as ‘the majority of Russians still see the succeeded republics as part of Russian 
space, you can still travel there with no visa (…) these countries are not seen 
as foreign (…) for me these countries are very close’ (Olga (26) Costume designer, SPB). 
The idea that ‘we are better together than going it alone’ was often suggested, 
the sense being that the larger an economic, military and political entity is, the 
better off it will be: ‘I am totally in favour of this, it is like the creation of a 
new CIS (…) while the rest of the world falls into separate pieces, new 
independent states like Scotland and Catalonia, we, in contrast to the rest, 
should unite other states together’ (Alexander (25) Business development manager, SPB). The 
above views Eurasian integration as an ‘obvious’ and ‘natural’ development. It 
can be viewed as ‘hegemonic’ in the classic Gramscian sense; positions that 
are so obvious as to not require much elaboration or discussion.  
The second key line of pragmatic reasoning was the Eurasian Union is part of 
building anti-Western alliance bloc, a point that we have already encountered 
in this chapter. For example, one pair of brothers saw it primarily in terms of 
‘creating a counterweight (…) another bipolar opposition’ (Sergei (29) Business 
Development, NN), or in other words, it is a ‘political game, a kind of standoff, 
everyone knows about NATO and this is an attempt to create an equilibrium of 
strength, to hold back certain forces in the West’ (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB). This view 
of Eurasian integration clearly ties it to a wider attempt to resist Western 
hegemony along with the BRIC countries. The third pragmatic point of support 
was economic: Russia would gain with integration with her Eurasian 
neighbours. These gains were described in a manner not a far cry from empire: 
the attraction of profits, cheap labour and the penetration of Russian capital 





accompanied by descriptions of the chaotic and backward condition of the 
periphery countries; one that resonates with post-imperial perceptions of ex-
colonial spaces. The key benefit of the Eurasian Union is that large economic 
blocs follow ‘the logic of development’ by creating a ‘developed internal 
market of around 350 million people’ that will allow ‘stable and successful 
prospects for self-development’ (Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN). Thus, the 
Eurasian project is often viewed as a ‘plus’ in pragmatic terms without deeper 
sense about why the different countries of Eurasia should draw closer together.  
Interestingly, these ‘hegemonic’ positions must be balanced with the large 
amount of scepticism displayed by respondents from both age groups. On the 
one hand, there is the concern that Eurasian integration is the repetition of an 
old mistake: ‘there is a phrase, “do not enter the same river twice” – I mean if 
there is a possibility of unifying it should be on a different level, not like before 
in the USSR’ (Olga (55) Factory worker Avtozavodsk, NN). Opposition to this project was 
also offered on the grounds that it was another example of ‘gigantomania’, a 
mania or obsession with grand-scale projects: ‘why do we need it if we already 
can cross any borders, travel to any place, trade and work where we want’ 
(Julia (25) Human rights activist, Moscow). In comparison to the EU, some saw the 
Eurasian Union in different terms. Rather than a regionalist project emerging 
from soft power mechanism, Russia suffers from a negative image in the post-
Soviet space in the light of the Ukraine crisis:  
The Eurasian Union is like a large common territory upon which one 
shabby/mean man (Russia MB) has arrived and told the rest: “Now this is 
called this, everyone lives like this and I will tell you all what to do now”. 
But these are different states with their own national identities. (….) Russia 
won’t succeed as she has now ruined all her prospects of a voluntary union. 
Julia (25) Human rights activist, Moscow. 
Others expressed a lack of interest in this project due to the limited potential, in 
economic terms, of closer economic integration with ‘poor’ states such as 
Kyrgyzstan. Eurasian integration could be branded as a ‘union of poor bodies’ 
(souz bednyakov) that has little utility or genuine purpose beyond ‘naked 





to doubt how Russia would be able to integrate such vast lands into a coherent, 
functioning union. The vastness and diversity was highlighted as ‘difficult to 
manage’, a challenge of fantastic proportions as ‘it is really hard to control 
such an enormous system, such an enormous space that is so multi-ethnic. 
Maybe even impossible (…) utopian (Marina (25) Language teacher, NN). While some 
respondents were sceptical about Eurasian integration, attitudes towards 
another project for Russia on the Eurasian space, russkii mir, were even more 
poorly articulated. 
The lack of coherence on russkii mir projects and division on the 
‘Russians of the Near Abroad’ 
While the above suggests ideas around Eurasian integration do not bring a 
strong positive consensus among respondents, russkii mir, we find, despite the 
spike in its use across state media, is less commonly understood. 111 
Respondents very rarely actually mentioned the term ‘russkii mir’ or the 
principles of protecting an ethno-cultural unity in explaining the Russian role 
in the post-Soviet space. Most, when asked what the term meant for them, 
could not reply with any clear answer. Only a small number of respondents 
used the term in mapping of the post-Soviet space. Below, this is done when 
discussing Russia’s ‘natural’ borders, claiming that a large chunk of Ukraine is 
part of the russkii mir: 
As far as the other borders go it is hard to say… (pause) a large part of 
Ukraine should be part of Russia, although formally this will be impossible, 
but this is a part of the russkii mir and here some decision must be taken. 
On the other hand, it is clear the Baltic States aren’t ours and never have 
been.  
Artem (49) computer programmer, NN 
 
While some positive engagement with russkii mir was observable, a similar 
number of respondents actually rejected it as a concept, either due to its 










nationalism. It isn’t about culture or modern life, but nationalism, although, I 
don’t know, that is just how it makes me feel’ (Mikhail (29) Actor, Moscow). The 
overall majority of respondents, however, could not offer any elaboration on 
what russkii mir means to them and did not link it to how they understood 
foreign policy initiatives.  As we will see in the next section, russkii mir 
themes are not prevalent in the way people responded to events in Crimea.  
The term russkii mir clearly means a number of different things to different 
people. This ranges from a space where people speak Russian, to territory 
where ethnic Russians predominate, or places Russia has a special affinity 
with, or even some mystical or metaphysical form of Russia reflecting her 
thought, culture and literature. For many respondents in this research, the term 
appears to means nothing at all. At the moment the diversity of definitions on 
offer reduce the significance of russkii mir in popular geopolitics. Ambivalence 
on the Russian World topic is reflected in attitudes to the Russians living in the 
Near Abroad, a group that, by varying assessments, includes up to twenty-five 
million people in the fourteen former republics. Here we find respondents split 
over Russia’s responsibility for these people.  
The first group expressed a strong sense that these were ‘our people’ (nashi 
lyudi). Central to this were emotional narratives on the ‘plight of Russians in 
the near abroad.’ For older respondents this was founded on knowledge of the 
tragic experiences of family, friends or acquaintances who had ended up in 
these republics due to Soviet development patterns that ‘assigned there from 
the big cities to develop things’ Through no fault of their own, they were 
forced to flee when local leaders ‘started to turn the screw’ (Ludmilla (50) Head of 
University Dormitory, NN). Stories of hurried evacuation under the pressure of anti-
Russian violence buttress the strong sense that the Russians of the Near Abroad 
were victimized: ‘I had a friend who left Chechnya in 1990 (…) he sold his 
house and left quickly, he says they really oppressed the Russians, they threw 
things at them when we were on the bus leaving, saying things like, “we should 
kill all the Russians, we have never liked them”’ (Denis (41) Journalist, NN). The 
principle of ‘unfairness’ was often referred to in how thing unfolded after the 
collapse: while ‘some were lucky and had apartments in Nizhny, others had 





family and all that is yours starts falling apart and everyone runs away’ (Vera 
(43) IT Project Manager, NN). This emotive narrative is replete with the powerful 
imagery of tragic exodus. Recalling his own family’s stories of leaving 
Kazakhstan, a younger respondent underlines the nastier elements of the 
period, where his uncle was only able to leave the house under the escort of 
‘friendly Kazakhs’. The clear theme is the oppressive anti-Russian atmosphere: 
‘you would wake up and see graffiti written on the building opposite your 
window: “Russians don’t leave! We need slaves and prostitutes.” And so it is 
no surprise they all left en masse’ (Dmitri (28) Actor, SPB). 
A sense of feeling together with the people of the Near Abroad, which was 
observed in attitudes to Eurasian integration above, is found here as well. 
Among these respondents there was a clear preference for treating the 
‘Russians of the Near Abroad’ (russkie v blizhnem zarubezh'ye) as ‘our people’ 
that should be looked after. Much of this sentiment made little reference to 
Russian ethnicity but more implied there was a mass of people in the former 
republics that still felt themselves to be Russian.  One common sentiment was 
to encourage the ‘return’ to Russia of ‘those 20-25 million from the former 
republics’, who ‘live in poverty’ and are ‘oppressed’. The sentiment here is for 
Russia to open her arms to their ‘people in the Near Abroad’:  ‘We need a 
special state programme to support them, especially as we have lots of land, 
we can give them start-up funds, a million roubles or so. There are so many 
abandoned villages, we could have them there’ (Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB). 
These feelings are shared by a significant number of respondents, mainly 
among older people that still carry the torch of ‘Soviet internationalism’ and 
imagine that a large part of the populations living in post-Soviet countries are 
still ‘our people’.  
In contrast, a large group of respondents took the opposite stance, and rejected 
the idea that the ‘Russians of the Near Abroad’ are ‘our people’. Two key 
themes emerge in this. Firstly, these respondents relied on a civic conception of 
Russianness that claims in order to belong to and be worthy of access to the 
country’s resources one must be a citizen and hold a Russian passport. These 
views were common in the younger generation and may represent a transition 





lived there for so many years and have another passport from that country, 
then I don’t think they need anything from Russia, we don’t have responsibility 
for them’ (Eva (26) Unemployed, university graduate, NN). Moreover, a common idea was 
these people have ‘had the chance to get a Russian passport and they probably 
can still do this. (…) if they haven’t take advantage of this chance and decided 
to remain there’ then Russia does not ‘have any responsibility’ (Boris (22) Computer 
Programmer, NN). This trend reinforces the findings of chapter five, where we 
found more a civic-based identity membership of the nation to be dominant, 
one that views citizenship (grazhdanstvo) as more important than national 
group (national’nost’): ‘ If they live there, that means they have good reason 
to, they have family and work, for example. I think Russia shouldn’t support 
them. This is a question of citizenship. They should be supported by the country 
of which they are a citizen’ (Ksenia (22) Law student, NN). 
The second strongly observable tendency, which crossed both younger and 
older respondents, was the appeal of a certain ‘put Russia first’ sentiment in 
this question. Here the main focus was on the large sums of money being spent 
on ‘foreign citizens’, which could instead be used to improve the less than 
impressive living standards in Russia itself. One respondent claimed ‘we 
maintain ourselves more poorly here than those abroad’ and referred to the 
fact that Russia still pays pensions to non-citizens in the CIS countries: ‘we pay 
them pensions (…) Here the pension age is rising but we still pay them abroad. 
Some Ukrainian, for example, leaves their country, cunningly keeping their 
apartments there, and then returning here, where we put them on a pension. 
What a nightmare! (Elisa (58) Director of Sports Centre, SPB). Older respondents often 
showed less empathy with the ‘plight’ of the Russians in the Near Abroad due 
to the feeling they were seeking some kind of ‘hand-outs’:  
If things aren’t working out for you, don’t cry about it, just do something. 
Don’t hope for a kind uncle to do everything for you (…) at the end of the 
day you aren’t an invalid. They should come here and take advantage of the 
opportunities. But they don’t want to, those ‘non-citizens’112 in the Baltics…  







In some ways this populist ‘our country first’ approach is one that opposes 
grand supranational initiatives and demands priority for ‘our citizens here’. 
Resistance to helping the Near Abroad is strongly founded on the sense that the 
Russian Federation has ‘enough of its own problems’ in terms of healthcare, 
infrastructure, housing, employment and education. Therefore, even if ‘in 
human terms’ one may ‘sympathize with those people’ and ‘want things to be 
good for them’ the problem remains that: ‘We are in such a state ourselves. We 
don’t have enough for the budget (…) if we give more to them we will probably 
be without money ourselves (…) I pay taxes and want these funds to be spent 
on our children, on the old folk here’ (Natalya (50) Accountant. NN). 
This ‘put our people’ first sentiment is clearly a form of dissent toward 
government policies that fail to stimulate economic growth or better living 
standards. It is also a partial rejection of interventionist policies in Ukraine. 
Interestingly, resentment toward state policies for ‘foreign citizens’ could 
extend to the ‘Ukrainian refugees’ entering the country in 2014. While state 
media tends to portray Russian citizens as welcoming these unfortunate 
‘refugees’ with open arms, the sentiment among families with limited income 
may be very different:  
There is all this ‘humanitarian aid’ with those enormous trucks and, very 
often, people my parents’ age (…) and those relying on state benefits (…) 
get really mad because we don’t help our own citizens but we do offer it to 
those from Ukraine. (…) They show it on the news, they give medical 
treatment to some little boy in Ukraine, fly him over in a plane (…) that just 
causes anger here because we have so many sick children waiting years for 
treatment.  
Katya (22) Student Politics, NN 
Above we have explored how Russia’s role in the post-soviet space remains 
rather ill-defined. Overall, justifications for Russia’s new ‘imperial’ role in the 
Eurasian space do not appear to be well-developed, there is a great deal of 
fuzziness and lack of familiarity with foreign policy concepts in the post-Soviet 
space. On the one hand, an important proportion of respondents are clearly 





‘control’ this vast space. Overall, it would appear the Eurasian integration and 
russkii mir concepts, which attempt to give substance to Russia’s ‘role’ in the 
post-Soviet space, have not gained wide traction. On the other hand, to a large 
number of respondents Russia’s leading role in the region remains so obvious 
and natural it does not require much elaboration. The lack of articulation over 
Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space is in stark contrast to how Russia’s role 
vis-à-vis the West is expressed. It can be argued that this is because the latter 
role is integrated far more into emotional narratives in ways with which large 
numbers of diverse social groups can identify. 
Part three: The power of events  
In this final section we examine how two external events, the Maidan protests 
and the collapse of the Ukrainian government (Winter 2013-14) and the 
absorption of Crimea (March 2014), activated certain visions of Russia and the 
outside world. Interestingly, this activation is clearly more connected to the 
points made in part one of this chapter (the normal great power and the 
emotional narrative about the West) than those of part two (ideological 
constructions such as Eurasianism or russkii mir). Instead of any ‘ism’ or 
elaborated ideology, what is far more important is a widely shared set of 
emotions and normative standards, which act as important instruments in 
unifying (at least temporarily) the fractured national body. In other words, the 
emotional narrative of struggling for ‘normal’ status is far more appealing than 
the abstract ideas of Eurasian integration or reintegrating the russkii mir. The 
two events considered in this section provoked contrasting emotions: whereas 
Maidan caused fear, anxiety and disgust, Crimea brought elation, confidence 
and a feeling of vindication. Yet, despite the contrasting emotions, both events 
work toward the same direction: geopolitics ‘from below’ connects with efforts 
‘from above’ to consolidate support for the existing system.  
Maidan 
The Maidan event is important on two levels. On the one hand, it is an 
excellent example of how events can bolster social conservatism and 
encourage a ‘rallying round the leader’ effect. It also demonstrates how myths 





references to a historical longue durée and also to recent lived experience 
(1985-1999) and memories of state disintegration, economic hardship, rising 
nationalism and potential civil conflict. In chapter six, I examined a roughly 
three-way division among respondents in their attitudes to the state of Russian 
‘democracy’ and the Bolotnaya protests of 2011-12. While, the first group was 
critical of the state of Russian democracy and showed much solidarity with the 
protests, the second group held far more ‘statist’ positions, rejecting criticism 
of Russian democracy and showing hostility to oppositional forces as ‘fake’ or 
‘dangerous’ to Russia’s interests. The third and largest group sat between these 
two poles, employing a rather pragmatic stance to politics and preferring the 
status quo. What was interesting was how responses to Maidan seem to bring 
the third group closer to the second group and, in many cases, encourage 
partial loyalty in the first group. Thus, all three groups are brought together in a 
conservative stance that views upheaval and revolution as the worst possible 
outcome, and is antipathetic to any social or political activity that risks internal 
stability. The recent disastrous example of Ukraine is deployed as the main 
exhibit in this argument. This can be viewed as a kind of ‘negative 
conservatism’ that seeks to retain the status quo at any cost. It appears to suffer 
from certain emptiness as it lacks positive values; in contrast to the new 
horizons offered by conservative figures in the 1980s such as Thatcher or 
Reagan, this is no call for positive change. Instead the ‘call to arms’ is to hold 
firm, see the crisis through and lose as little as possible.  
Yet, the power of Maidan goes further than this. I encountered several 
respondents who reversed their moderately anti-Putin stances post-Maidan. 
Thus, it appears Maidan also encouraged people from group one to shift their 
stances to a more pro-Putin position. This may reflect success in how the event 
was managed ‘from above’; pro-Kremlin media interpretations of Maidan 
presented it in terms of a binary choice between ‘order’ and ‘chaos’. Below we 
can find an illustrative example of how two brothers experienced a rapid shift 
in their political positions in response to Maidan. Beginning with mildly 
oppositional views, they describe some of the dramatic feelings provoked by 
the Bolotnaya protests of 2011-2012. According to their version, the era of 





by the standing president and prime minister. This created a ‘wave of anger’ 
due to the sense that ‘an usurpation of power’ had occurred. However, when 
the Ukraine crisis erupted these brothers switched to a pro-Putin position: their 
anger toward the ‘regime’ and sympathy for protests largely evaporated, and 
was replaced with a desire to support the President in this vital struggle: 
It seemed that it was something new, (…) the situation changed rapidly. Our 
worldview, actually I think the worldview of many Russians (rossiyan) 
changed towards Putin, especially when the situation in Ukraine started, we 
sensed the enemy was at our gates, we felt this and understood that, after 
all, we are not living in a world of fairy tales. In fact, it is a world with 
teeth.  
Vlad (26) Marketing, NN 
Thus, Maidan revealed the existence of a hostile and threatening external 
world. The ensuing chaos and bloodshed in Ukraine led many to 
retrospectively approve of how Putin handled the Bolotnaya protests as this 
‘clever and rational policy’ ensured Russia did not end up like Ukraine. The 
story of Ukraine after the removal of Yanukovich shows how rapid political 
change can bring appalling consequences: ‘the pressure of the crowd on the 
authorities does not lead to anything good. They lost Crimea, they have pretty 
much lost Novorossiya, they have led the country into a difficult economic 
situation. One problem after another. However bad Yanukovich was, I think 
they lived better with him’ (Viktor (22) International Relations Student, NN).  
The images produced by Maidan provoke fear and repulsion towards the 
violence unfolding on Russia’s doorstep: ‘They showed this on TV, I saw it on 
the internet (…) I saw clearly that this represented a danger (…) this would 
destroy everything, it could initiate processes leading to a real civil war.  (…) 
when everything there blew up, it really was frightening’ (Andrei (51) Computer 
Programmer, SPB). The idea that a violent rabble of protesters can bring a state to 
its knees is precisely the message state media propagates, underlining the 
‘lesson’ of Maidan: gradual and careful evolution is always better than sudden 
violent upheaval. This lesson is spelt out in a respondent with otherwise pro-





conditional support for the current president. In his view the event of Maidan 
means the prospect of democracy is put on hold as Russia is now in emergency 
mode, and Putin is the best man to guide the country through these difficult 
waters: ‘It is better if changes occur when society itself takes form and 
becomes smarter… not when people try to raise hell with street protests. If a 
Maidan started here, Russia would have it ten times worse than what Ukraine 
has now. It is better to stick with Putin’ (Mikhail (24), IT support, SPB).  
Thus, Maidan is, in terms of future possibilities for the country, perhaps the 
worst-case scenario for the average Russian. In some ways, it was an event that 
replayed some of the memories of recent lived experience (1985-1999). For 
many respondents Maidan is a word that encapsulates an entire narrative of 
disaster that is very familiar to people with lived experience or transmitted 
memory of the nineties. Maidan is understood to have caused economic 
disaster, territorial losses, brought new uncouth people into the political 
leadership, weakened the country on world stage and led to chaos and disorder 
in social affairs, such as the mass disruption of wages, pensions and a spike in 
inflation. The parallels in these narratives with what happened in Russia post-
1991 are unlikely to be coincidental; one reason for the successful propagation 
of this version of Maidan is its congruence with pre-existing memories of the 
wild nineties in the population as a whole.   
Furthermore, for a significant segment of respondents (especially those male 
over forty), the events of Maiden are connected to the historical longue durée 
of Russia’s struggle with a hostile West. In this case Maidan as an event taps 
into the anti-Western sentiment described in part one of this chapter, providing 
indisputable evidence of the West’s dastardly and subversive efforts to reduce 
Russia to submission and reduce her influence in world affairs. As the 
respondent below indicates, Maidan was a ‘dress rehearsal’ of something 
planned for Russia:  
It is only thanks to Putin at the moment this attempt has failed. I think it will 
happen again and very soon. It’s just that a lot of politicians have come up 
with ideas how to destroy Russia, how to break her into pieces. (…) The aim 





Ukraine now (…) I don’t know why the West needs it, (…) what makes them 
try to destroy us, to eliminate us? 
Ivan (55) Retired miner, SPB 
Thus, Maidan serves to powerfully consolidate support for the current 
leadership and confirm the sense that Russia is locked in a geopolitical war of 
nerves with a powerful adversary that is ready to use underhand tactics to gain 
the upper hand. Images of the Maidan event are a call for order at home; the 
narrative of a Ukraine’s woeful post-Maidan experience shores up a negative 
kind of conservatism, one that is hostile to social and political change but does 
not offer much in the way of a positive future development path. This stands in 
contrast to the absorption of Crimea, an event that, as we will see below, 
produced more euphoric feelings. 
Crimea  
As with Maidan, respondents did not tend to view the Crimea event within any 
ideological framework for Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space, be it along 
Eurasianist or russkii mir lines. Instead, it is far more linked the way Russia’s 
rivalry with the West is imagined. Three main lines can be distinguished in 
explaining support for Russia’s actions in Crimea: (i) strategic and pragmatic 
geopolitical concerns; (ii) support for national self-determination as a 
justification for Crimea detachment from ‘alien’ Ukrainian rule; (iii) emotional 
euphoria and pride. In the first two points, what is noticeable is that a large 
number of respondents accept, internalise and reproduce much of the reasons 
offered to them by the political leadership of the country via state media.  
Turning to the first point, respondents often couched their concerns in terms of 
the strategic and geopolitical importance of the peninsula vis-à-vis Russia’s 
rivalry with the West. This paints the event as ‘a correct geopolitical step’ to 
forestall the ‘possible stationing of foreign military bases there’. This rational, 
realist position views Ukraine as ‘just a pawn in a geopolitical game’. In other 
words: ‘before the country was under the jurisdiction of Russia, a year and 
half ago she decided to be under a new one. (…) but what is going on there 





are just bargaining chips (…) in a long-term game of geopolitical chess’ (Lev 
(46) Programmer Developer Oracle, SPB).  
Those focusing on geopolitics and strategy claimed Crimea was not part of any 
wider expansionist policy: ‘There should not be a policy of “let’s absorb all 
the land that we had in the past”. Crimea was about the military aspect. 
Sevastopol is a naval base (…) it became really important, it was going to end 
up with either us or NATO’ (Grigori (49) Computer programmer. NN). In addition, 
Ukraine’s sudden shift in orientation made action necessary: ‘when Ukraine 
took this clear pro-American position, which was clearly aggressive in intent, 
we realized we would never make an agreement with them. As a result, Putin 
took this step and just took Crimea for us. And he did it all very beautifully, 
pulled it off well’ (Vlad (26) Marketing, NN). In its most elaborated form, Russian 
actions in Crimea fit into a long-term strategy of action in geopolitics: when a 
neighbouring state takes a pro-Western stance, Russia intervenes to create a 
new zone of instability that acts to bar their potential entry into the EU or 
NATO:  
I understand more about geopolitics now. Why do we need the Donbass?  
Just to make sure Ukraine doesn’t go anywhere. Donbass is a breeding 
ground of instability, and as far as I know they don’t take countries with 
these problems into the EU or NATO. Therefore, Moldavia has 
Transdniester, Ukraine has the Donbass, Georgia has Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. There is not much hope for them, they must know that. This is 
what big-time politics means. I agree we are not behaving well, but we are 
just like the rest in this regard. Yeltsin tried to bend over backwards for 
everyone, but what was the point?    
Anton (52) ex-officer, small business owner, SPB 
The respondents above tie in well with the findings of Mikhail Suslov (2014:  
598), who, in examining Russian Internet sites, uncovered, ‘a geopolitical 
master-narrative helps users distance themselves from morality and the law of 
nations when speaking about the annexation of Crimea’. Strategy and 
geopolitics successfully combat liberal and humanist accusations of Russian 





‘game to be played’, the attributes of a winner include flexibility, steely 
pragmatism and ruthless decisiveness. Despite the Machiavellian elements of 
this ‘geopolitical game’ played for relative gains, respondents are also able to 
share the excitement of being on the winning side when the West is 
outmanoeuvred or left ‘carrying the can’. This also relates to the sense of the 
collective self-esteem, as outwitting the West over Crimea emerges as a source 
of pride.   
The second main line in defending Russia’s actions in Crimea refers to the 
theme of national self-determination. Here the basic argument is that, given the 
backdrop of Maidan and looming catastrophe, the vast majority of Crimeans 
viewed desperately wanted to ‘return’ to Russia and this, on its own, is 
sufficient justification for Crimea’s entry into the Russian Federation: ‘90% of 
Crimeans do not want to return to Ukraine. Firstly, they speak Russian and 
they are Russian. Many have Ukrainian passports. (…) Now they have Russian 
citizenship, which is correct. There is a slogan ‘We are coming back to Russia’ 
(«vernemsya snova k Rossii»). I agree with this wording’ (Nadezhda (30) nanny, SPB). 
In many cases respondents reproduced this state discourse on ‘the return of 
Crimea’. The President described the ‘return of Crimea’ as a ‘reunification,’ 
reversing the foolish actions of Khrushchev, who signed it away to the 
Ukrainians. In his 2014 Presidential address, Putin (2014a) referred to Crimea 
as ‘native Russkaya soil’ and Sevastopol as a ‘native russkii town’.  
This use of russkii instead of rossiyanin or rossiyskii when justifying the 
addition of Crimea throughout 2014 has led some to view this as a shift 
towards repainting Russia as the nation-state of ethnic Russians (Teper 2016; 
Blakkisrud 2016). However, as was discussed in the literature review of this 
thesis, the term russkii is often used by Putin to recall Russia’s imperial past, 
conjuring images of the unity of the Eastern Slavic peoples.113 In using the 
adjective russkii with Crimea, respondents offered a range of ideas, such as 
‘Crimea has always been russkii land’ (Oleg (49) Construction site foreman, SPB), ‘the 
russkie went there and built everything’ (Elena (29) Accountant, Dzershinsk, NN) or 








(Vladislav (28) Postdoctoral researcher Middle Eastern Studies, NN). In these examples, russkii is 
used to refer to the imperial past and the historical unity of the peoples living in 
this empire. But it is important to underline that this use of russkii is not clearly 
expanded on by respondents in ideological terms, such as the need to protect an 
ethno-cultural spatial entity such as russkii mir. Instead we find a reference to a 
more vague and undefined imperial space.  
Respondents were more divided on whether Crimea represented some new rule 
in international affairs or just a ‘one-off’ extraordinary event. Very few 
respondents were prepared to adopt self-determination as a new guiding 
principle for the future. Some were alarmed by this prospect as a ‘negative 
precedent’ of territorial redistribution: ‘this is dangerous and, well, the same 
thing could happen with us in Tatarstan or Chechnya’ (Alexei (25) Assistant to deputy of 
Local Assembly, SPB).  Others talked of the ‘shock factor’: they could not believe 
that Russia could do something that ‘from the point of view of international 
practices, law and interaction (…) complete does not fit in with the behaviour 
models of normal countries (…) leading to a confrontation with the whole 
civilized world’. (Igor (26) English language teacher, SPB). It would appear many allay 
such concerns by viewing the Crimea absorption as a special case and not a 
new long-term trajectory or for full-scale revision of the 1991 borders: ‘Crimea 
is something special, I am not saying it should be like this everywhere. It was 
just a manifestation of popular feeling (…) but we can’t do this everywhere, as 
this could led to (pause), well it needs to be done gradually’ (Leonid (45) Religious 
history lecturer, NN).  
This idea of Crimea as a ‘manifestation of popular feeling’ brings us to the 
third main line: the emotional response to the ‘return of Crimea’ as a unifying 
event. This is something that is deeper and more profound than geopolitical 
strategizing or subscribing to the principles of national self-determination. The 
‘Crimean event’ released a surge of positive emotions and is an excellent 
example of how ordinary people interact with an event, which nationalises 
public discourse and enters everyday life. Here people are not merely 
reproducing state discourse, but experiencing and participating in Crimea as an 
event. In personal and family contexts, we can trace how the nation is ‘lived’, 





nation. Crimea is a part of many Russians’ childhood, a place with real 
meaning in terms of personal memories. This event seems able to unite 
different generations of Russians around the feeling of pride and delight, and 
we can observe how, when small groups of Russians come together in front of 
the TV screen to experience a crucial event, people experience the joys of 
national triumph:  
My reaction was very positive (….) because this is my childhood. Yes, 
hooray, hooray (shouts) I visited it as a child, all of this is mine. Sevastopol 
is a Hero-City, the town of Russian sailors and then, boom!, it’s no longer 
ours. It was really hurtful when it stopped being ours. I thought “what the 
hell?!” In childhood I thought, how is it possible? (…) Then Crimea 
returned to us and horray, hooray, how great! (…) my children were so 
happy about this, they shouted ‘Horray’, they couldn’t get enough of the TV 
reports, they thought Russia had shown everyone, super! My parents were 
also glad as this was also about their history, their life. 
Vera (43) IT Project Manager, NN 
Thus, for many respondents the Crimea event is not so much about ‘strategic 
geopolitical thinking’ or national self-determination or even fighting the West. 
Instead, it ‘was probably the proudest moment I have had as a Russian (…) 
when I saw people after the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, they were 
truly happy (…) I was glad for their happiness, it was like a human moment’ 
(Nadezhda (30) nanny, SPB). Much of this sentiment seems to have much in common 
with how countries respond to national sporting triumphs. The difference here 
is that this victory is not limited to sports enthusiasts; as a chapter in the story 
of a nation taking positive action in an international crisis it is something all 
members of the national community can enjoy.  
However, one of the downsides, at least from the point of view of the Kremlin, 
to this ‘event-based’ dynamic is these emotional effects can begin to wear off 
with time. Current quantitative polling shows only a gradual depreciation in 
support for the Crimean action.114 However, it seems fair to say that, in the 








same effects. In the case of the Crimean event, the early euphoria did not last in 
many respondents. Below, even for someone who had ‘never been to Crimea’ 
and did not ‘care about it as a place’, the joy of being a victor, when 
‘something that used to be yours is returned’, was strongly felt: ‘I think for the 
first month almost everyone was glad, if you asked anyone “what do you think 
about Crimea” they would all reply “Cool! I am so happy that I am Russian 
(russkii), I really love Putin.” But then, when you start to think things through, 
when the prices rise…’ (Katya (22) Student Politics, NN).  
One interesting finding from the discussions on Crimea was the how, for some, 
the addition of Crimea, from the point of view of the ‘nation’, is not all good. 
This brings us back to use of ‘us’ and ‘them language and hints at the existence 
of a ‘put Russia first’ populist discourse. As with discussions on Chechnya in 
chapter five or the Russians in the Near Abroad above, the central idea is 
interventions in Ukraine means more of ‘our’ tax money is spent on ‘other’ 
regions rather than on ‘us’. The term ‘feed’ (kormit’), used in chapter five to 
describe the funding of the North Caucasus, was also employed with regards 
Crimea. In this context, Crimea is added to a list of ‘things we have to pay for’, 
including Tajik migrants and Chechnya: 
I thought, now they have added Crimea, the authorities will start to try and 
appease the Crimeans (zadabrivat’ krymchan). But who will pay for this? 
The Russian citizens. (…) we will have to maintain them (nam ikh kormit’). 
We maintain Tajiks, Uzbeks, Gastarbeiter. We maintain Chechnya even 
though we won the war there, and now we will maintain Crimea, all at our 
expense. I don’t want it.  
Denis (41) Journalist, NN 
Thus, attitudes to Crimea can harden with time, especially in the context of 
continuing difficulty in the Russian economy. One respondent discussed 
Crimea in the context of a recent decision to reduce the minimum wage 
(promezhutochnii minimum). Meanwhile impressive amounts continue to be 
spent on Crimea, despite the sense that, after the euphoric emotions of victory 





They (the authorities MB) think we live so well and the economy is doing so 
wonderfully that they can lower this (minimum wage MB). Naturally, they 
are lowering this so they can spend more on Crimea (….) but we get 
nothing out of it. We help them (the Ukrainians MB) but they just hate us 
more and more. (…) taxes are on the rise, everyone is starting to realize 
that things are not so rosy after all. It turns out we have to sweat for 
Crimea. And it is like, many start to wonder, what the hell do we need it 
for?  
Katya (22) Student Politics, NN 
It would appear this is a well-developed counter-narrative and, as emotional 
euphoria over Crimea drifts into the background, new scepticism may move 
into the foreground. This is a shift that will not be visible in state speeches or 
Russian media, but may, all the same, occur in the kitchens and living rooms of 
the many ‘from below’. Perhaps an important element of this dynamic is the 
apparent failure of any ideological construct to spread across the population 
that could help people conceptualise the need for sacrifice, suffering and 
hardship. For the vast majority of respondents neither the Crimean nor the 
Maidan ‘event’ belong to any wider framework for explaining Russia’s role in 
the post-Soviet space, be it Eurasianism, preserving the russkii mir or some 
irredentist revisionist geopolitical vision.  
If anything the Kremlin’s intervention appear to have been disastrous to the 
prospects of Ukraine joining Eurasian integration and have resulted in 
unprecedented hatred and violence within the russkii mir between Russians and 
Ukrainians, who many understand to be ‘brother peoples’ (bratskie narodi). 
Thus, the Crimean and Maidan events are not connected to a wider ideology 
but service a kind of emotional great power nationalism, which, as we saw in 
part one, is largely connected to Soviet frames of normality, emotional 
narratives about Russia’s struggle with the West and, as we have seen in this 
section, the power of events that allow people to ‘cheer on’ the nation and 
participate in the struggles of the derzhava. The problem for Russia’s political 
leadership is the risky challenge of finding the next set of events that will 






Thus, in this chapter we have explored the vitality of geopolitics ‘from below’ 
as a way of ‘living’ the nation. In many ways, this popular geopolitics 
resembles a kind of great power nationalism that is strongly informed by 
Soviet traditions, propped up with emotional narratives and shorn of any 
elaborate ideological foundations. Part of this is a return to pre-revolutionary 
Slavophile traditions in viewing Russia as fundamentally different from both 
East and West, ending a period of uncertainty over Russia’s role in the world 
that has arguably gone on since the start of perestroika all the way up to the 
Ukraine crisis. Again it should be underlined that very few respondents 
elaborated on any ideologically driven discourse on ‘Russia as a unique 
civilization’; instead more practical grounds were found. Three key lines 
interlink in Russian geopolitical identity and explaining Russia’s unique path: 
(i) the need to hold the world’s largest state together, avoid state disintegration 
and the view only a strong leader can achieve this; (ii) the sense of being 
locked in a battle for equality with the Western powers where failure is not an 
option (iii) the sense that Russia, due to her huge size, will be a special kind of 
‘great power’ that cannot ‘join’ the West. As we have seen in this chapter, 
Russian exceptionalism is understood to natural and unavoidable; she has no 
choice but to be this kind of power as this is what Russia has always been. This 
is a vital constituent element of the current hegemonic nationalist discourse and 
is absolutely central to the way the state authorities are able to legitimise 
themselves as the right people to lead the nation.  
As well as these deeper traditions, we find that certain normative standards, 
derived from the late Soviet period, still have a strong influence. The image of 
a mighty derzhava, one that holds its own in the world, both in political, 
military and economic terms, retains its appeal among the many. It remains to 
be seen whether alternative concepts of a ‘normal power’, such as those taking 
the ‘successful countries of the twenty-first century’ as their benchmark, will 
become more dominant, especially during generational change. At the moment, 
it appears that withstanding Western sanctions and successfully intervening in 
Syria are taken as evidence of Russia’s restore normality to her global role, one 





traditions. It is important, however, that we examine the replaying of Soviet 
frames of normality alongside the existence of powerful anti-Western 
sentiments in popular geopolitics. There is a strong line of ressentiment to 
memories of humiliation and betrayal over the way the West treated Russia 
after 1991. Powerful emotional imagery of the West treating Russia as 
‘second-class’ or ‘servants’ abound. Approval for the current course revolves 
around the quest for equality and respect, the right for Russia to be recognised 
as an equal great power.  
The above reveals how people engage with geopolitics in ways that do not 
always correspond to state-driven rhetoric. In this case, most do not adopt any 
of the ‘isms’ promoted by the state, be it Eurasianism or russkii mir concepts. 
No clear consensus for a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy can be found. 
Instead, the territorial boundaries of the 1991 settlement are generally accepted 
by young and old. When we consider how Russia’s role in the Near Abroad is 
conceptualised, there is little evidence that ideological concepts are very 
popularly understood. Part of the reason for this may well be that Russia’s 
leading role in Eurasia is so obvious and natural to not need elaboration.  
On the other hand, a clear ‘Put Russia First’ sentiment was observable that 
emphasises the country’s internal development in terms of looking after ‘our 
own citizens’. This may have potential as an anti-hegemonic nationalist 
discourse, especially given the current context of increasing economic 
difficulty and stagnating or worsening living standards. While the short-term 
appeal of Putin’s geopolitical vision lies in rebooting Soviet-inspired power 
images and playing out a new chapter in the narrative of struggle with West, 
the failure to connect an ‘ism’ to Russian geopolitics may leave Putin exposed 
over time. 
Thus, Putin’s success is built on a great power nationalism that reactivates 
images of Soviet-style ‘greatpowerness’ and deploys emotional narratives of 
conflict, frustration and betrayal. It can be argued that external events such as 
Maidan and Crimea, serve as substitutes for ideology in as far as they offer 
real-time on-going illustrations that the struggle with the West is real and 





moments when ordinary people ‘experience’ and ‘live through’ the nation, 
mainly through the feeling certain common emotions, responding to the 
messages of the state and interacting with fellow citizens to create a commonly 
credible popular geopolitics. The power of the event-based dynamic, regardless 
of whether it produced negative or positive emotions, is in consolidating 
people and reaffirming loyalties. What is less clear, particularly in the case of 
Crimea, is what will occur after these events start to fade from the forefront of 
people’s minds. It may be that old questions will resurface, such as ‘how will 
we pay for Crimea?’ ‘When will living standards improve in our town/region? 
‘Do our leaders really care about improving our lives?’ These questions shift 
the national focus away from the current interest in ‘What should Russia’s role 
in the world be?’, ‘What relationship should she have with Europe?’, ‘How to 
retain great power status?’ and ‘What should be done to regulate international 
‘hot-spots?’ It remains to be seen if those opposing the incumbent in the 
upcoming Presidential elections of 2018 employ this kind of shift in focus in 






















This thesis has focused on revealing the current equilibrium in Russian national 
identity and mainstream nationalism, as well as highlighting the key ways it is 
contested. It has done this through employing a qualitative approach, thus 
hoping to remedy a dearth in the field of Russian studies, which remains 
dominated by quantitative large-scale surveys. The ethnographic fieldwork 
used in this research has unearthed certain ‘thick descriptions’ of how the 
nation is imagined, revealing the micro-level picture. Using a grounded theory 
helped give ordinary Russians agency in determining the questions of 
importance to them. The thesis has highlighted some of the key components of 
Russia’s hegemonic nationalist discourse, as well as how they are internalised, 
reproduced and challenged or contested. In treating nationalism as a set of 
discursive formations that make essential claims about the nature of the social 
world, this thesis has unpacked some of the ways nation-ness appeals to 
ordinary people of very diverse backgrounds. This contributes to the field of 
nationalism studies by accounting for national identity and nationalism in the 
specific context of post-Soviet Russia, revealing how emotional narratives 
(myths) and visions of what is natural and expected (normality) play a vital 
role in how people talk about themselves as a ‘nation’. The thesis also makes a 
contribution to post-socialist literature by underlining some of the important 
ways Soviet legacies still play out in Russian national identity.  
This thesis has viewed ‘the nation’ as a largely discursive entity that is 
internalised, reproduced and transmitted across social boundaries and 
generational lines. In tracing this process of reproduction and transmission it is 
extremely challenging, if not impossible, to capture the multiplicity and 
diversity involved in a population of over 180 million people. Nonetheless, this 
thesis has argued that, for a nation to survive, it must reproduce itself in the 
minds of the many. To achieve this, it must be put into a legible form that is 
congruent with the hopes, aspirations, fears and anxieties of ordinary people. 
Part of the appeal of the nation is the wide range of claims it makes in 
answering a central question: ‘who are we as a people?’ These claims cover an 
enormous amount of ground, and involve sub-questions such as ‘where did we 





kind of leadership should we follow?’ and ‘what relationship should we have 
with other peoples?’ Searching through the responses of around one hundred 
respondents, what has been uncovered is a coherent and interlinked set of 
answers, which can be termed a hegemonic nationalist discourse. It is 
‘hegemonic’ in that it is agreed upon by many ‘from below’ and reinforced 
‘from above’ resulting in consensus. It is ‘nationalist’ in as far it is made up of 
a set of claims about the nation. Finally, it is a ‘discourse’ because it is made 
up of talk and words; a series of narratives, myths and normative standards.   
In this thesis, I have argued there are extremely close links between the 
Russian national identity and the mainstream ‘nationalism’ of the country. I 
have taken national identity to be a way of talking about oneself as part of a 
‘nation’, which is grounded in memories, previous habits and continuing 
everyday life. Mainstream ‘nationalism’ is the set of claims that, when taken 
together, tap into the reservoir of national identity to construct a coherent 
nationalist discourse that resonates with as many citizens as possible. Actors 
‘from below’ and ‘from above’ interact in this dynamic, ensuring the dominant 
or hegemonic nationalist discourse is always evolving. At the same time, anti-
hegemonic discourses exist outside of the ‘mainstream’ that, with time and 
changing conditions, can emerge as a threat to the existing set of claims about 
the nation. In the Russian context, with limited space for public political debate 
or protest, state management of the media and electioneering, it is easy to 
assume a hegemonic discourse on the nation is somehow easier to secure 
across the population. However, as this thesis has shown, quantitative polling 
showing eighty to ninety percent support for President Putin does not reflect 
the serious discursive fractures within the nation.  
Historically speaking, this thesis has attempted to situate the current 
equilibrium in Russian national identity in the context of longer historical and 
cultural trends. As outlined in the literature review, the Stalinist period 
provided the foundation of the modern Russian nation and resembled the 
modernist notion of the nation in as far as it was based on universal literacy, 
mass urbanisation, new forms of communication and a powerful discourse on 
the ‘Soviet Motherland’. Stalinist nation-building arguably leaves its marks on 





self-sufficient and mighty world power, as well as identification with a strong 
leader and rejection of political opposition and factionalism. At the same time, 
what made Stalinist nation-building highly unorthodox was the virtual absence 
of any free spaces where the nation could be articulated outside of official 
propaganda sources. When Stalinist controls were eased, two elements of 
Russian national identity soon resurfaced. Firstly, the Westerniser-Slavophile 
debate appeared in the thick journals, returning to the old questions of ‘what is 
Russia?’, ‘Where does she belong?’ and ‘How is she unique?’. These re-
emerged under Developed Socialism and continue to be of importance today. 
Secondly, the split between the ‘intelligentsia’ and the masses of Russia, who 
lived in different worlds and were not encouraged by the state to communicate 
or interact, was again apparent.  
The emergence of the Soviet person under Stalin was continued through into 
Developed Socialism. Homo Sovieticus was increasingly expected to leave 
politics to the Party and get on with personal life. The strong paternalistic state 
provided citizens with everything they were required; they were not expected 
to actively participate or challenge the political and socio-economic status quo. 
In reviewing post-Soviet trends under Yeltsin, it is clear that, among other 
errors, he underestimated the resilience of Soviet legacies. This thesis has 
argued that President Putin has been far more adroit in his handling of the 
‘Soviet’ in the Russian Federation today. Apart from curtailing the anti-Soviet 
narratives of the Yeltsin years, he has shown more continuity with Soviet 
legacies in a range of areas, from social policy and patriotism programmes, to 
nationalities policy and the Eurasian Union initiatives. Yet, in all this, Putin 
proceeds without a clear ideology; his essentially pragmatic style is also in 
keeping with the way post-Soviet Russians have grown tired of utopian 
promises and mobilising for a cause. Putin has pandered to a pre-existing 
conservative sentiment, offering a renewed social contract that bears 





Constituent elements of Russian national identity  
(i) The memory of 1988-1998 
This brings us to the three key constituent elements of Russian national identity 
uncovered in this thesis. The first is the lived experience or transmitted 
memory of what occurred in Russia between 1988 and 1998. It is clear this 
period is a trauma still relatively fresh in the minds of both young and old 
respondents. This trauma is one reason why so many are concerned with 
‘stability’; they have access to either personal or transmitted memory of an 
‘abnormal’ phase of the country’s history, where the state fell apart, millions 
were impoverished, the few got rich and criminal gangs ran wild. Many clearly 
merge perestroika, the collapse and the nineties into one downward lurch in the 
nation’s history.  
Understandings of ‘why this happened to us’ influence attitudes to political 
change in Russia today. Much of what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is worked 
out with reference to this period as an ‘abnormal’ and ‘undesirable’ past. The 
key impact of memories of 1988-1998 is in supporting conservatism in the 
population. Many juxtapose the Putin period with the ‘abnormality’ of the 
nineties and support his leadership on rather simple grounds: he will keep 
things ‘in order’ and, while some improvements may or may not occur, most of 
all he is a guarantee that Russia will not return to the hell of the nineties. 
People clearly ‘delegate’ sweeping powers to the hands of the President in the 
hope he will deliver stability, order and security, disciplining the state in order 
that it should provide citizens with an at least minimally functional system in 
which to live.   
In addition, it is clear that experience and memories of 1988-1998 are 
important to what kind of ‘useable past’ exists in Russia today. This can be 
seen in the reproduction of a longue durée view of history that portrays Russia 
as repeatedly falling into phases of smuta (chaos and disorder) due to the 
convergence of weak central leadership, hostile external forces and internal 
upheaval. The memory of 1988-1998 is important in giving the Putin 
foundational myth, with its focus on successfully ending smuta and the 





In all this, it must be underlined that this view of history does not contain the 
ideological component present in the Soviet period. Throughout this thesis we 
have seen how respondents tend to either reject or avoid strongly ideological 
positions, be it in foreign policy (russkii mir, Eurasianism), the neo-
traditionalist turn in social policy, in attitudes to the Western doctrines of 
liberalism and democracy, or even in the very limited ways in which Russian 
exceptionalism or uniqueness was articulated. This allergy to ideological 
constructions is arguably a legacy of the 1988-1998 period, when, once again, 
Russians were asked to endure and sacrifice in the name of a great ‘ism’.  
(ii) Soviet legacies 
Another key constituent element in Russian national identity today is Soviet 
legacies. In answering the pleas of the many to restore ‘normality’, Putin does, 
in many ways, meet the demands of Homo Sovieticus living in the unfamiliar 
and unhappy terrain of post-Soviet Russian capitalism. For many respondents, 
living ‘normally’ is often framed in terms of how the Soviet man lived in the 
Brezhnev period, when a person was sure of the future and free to turn his back 
on politics. In this, ideology is not particularly desirable; it is more just 
background decoration to the central arrangement: a powerful paternalistic 
state ‘looks after’ a passive and risk-averse people. In this, being inactive in 
politics, refusing to take risks or assume responsibility by participation, is 
considered ‘normal’. The essential conservatism of the late Soviet man has 
remained. This can be viewed in preferences for a Soviet-style patriotism that 
disdains political activism and ignores ideology while proclaiming deep love 
for the motherland and loyalty to the state’s priorities. This basic stance of 
conservatism and non-involvement suggest the habits and phobias of Homo 
Sovieticus live on in Russia to a significant extent. 
Soviet legacies also come into play when we consider the dominant view of the 
Russian nation today. This can be characterised as a Russocentric civic nation 
that incorporates important elements of Soviet nationalities policy rhetoric. 
This includes the rejection of ethnic nationalism as destructive, the idea that the 
Russians are a ‘special people’ that merge with other national groups, holding 





hierarchy of Soviet times appears to persist in the minds of many people, 
which brings us to what is meant by ‘Russocentrism’. It is clear in this research 
that rossiyanin has not succeeded in replacing the term ‘sovietskii narod’ as a 
central unifier for a supraethnic civic nation. Instead, russkii appeals in far 
more profound ways as a unifier, but not in an ‘ethnic way’. Instead, it 
combines Soviet-era practices of viewing russkii as a supraethnic category 
based on culture and language with the modern discourse of the civic nation 
made up of citizens with rights and responsibilities.  
While it is positive that most Russians lean towards the civic conception of 
nation than ethnic; Soviet legacies mean there is strong component of linguistic 
and cultural assimilation in this. Thus, while ordinary people across the board 
reject ‘nationalism’ and ethnic identities, there are important differences in 
generations. While older respondents were more likely to adhere to 
‘internationalist’ positions in seeing all the people of the post-Soviet space as 
one, younger respondents often revealed strong assimilationist demands 
towards those seeking entry into the ‘Russian nation’. While these demands are 
made in the language of the civic nation, their exclusionist ‘Russocentric’ style 
is still clear. This thesis has shown that how ‘Russia as a multinational state’ is 
understood today is strongly linked to visions of the ‘normality’ existing in the 
Soviet period. The Soviet-era ‘Friendship of Nations’ is viewed as positive in 
the way it kept most national groups remaining on ‘their own lands’ while 
allowing migration to occur in very controlled and limited ways. Soviet 
migration policy was remembered as only allowing those able and willing to 
learn Russian and to respect the culture and traditions of the majority to live in 
Russia. While non-Russians are free to retain their own languages and cultures, 
they are expected to happily assimilate into the wider Russian cultural and 
linguistic space. 
What makes the above Russocentric civic nation more problematic is when it is 
combined with a certain ‘imperial consciousness’. Common portrayals of 
Russia’s multi-ethnic past as peaceful and progressive indicate there has been 
little deconstruction of Russia’s imperial and colonial history. This appears to 
have effects on viewing Russia’s primacy in the Eurasian space as ‘natural’ 





Russian role in creating a happy ‘family of nations’ involves amnesia on 
certain elements. This ensures many Russians today view themselves as a 
‘state-forming’ people with a special role among the ‘little peoples’. Again, 
this is a continuation of Homo Sovieticus with one important difference: the 
Soviet ideological element to this has been jettisoned and, to all appearances, 
has not been replaced with anything substantial.  
Finally, the Soviet legacy looms large in visions of a ‘normal’ great power. The 
USSR’s image as a mighty state largely independent from the world economy 
and one half of a stable bipolar world order leaves important legacies in 
geopolitical identities. Many long for a derzhava capable of counterbalancing 
Western unilateral dominance, one that is self-reliant and self-sufficient. This 
way of understanding state power shows continuity with Soviet legacies in that 
it emphasises hard power in classic military and economic terms. This can also 
be found in longings for Russia insulate her economy from the shocks of world 
financial system, something that – even if it entails the loss of some consumer 
luxuries – will be for the good of the derzhava. Thus, Russia’s ability to 
withstand the current Western sanctions and successfully intervene in Syria 
suggest her greatpowerness is in order and more fitting with the normative 
standards of the Soviet state.  
(iii) long running pre-Soviet trends 
The final element in Russian national identity highlighted in this thesis are pre-
revolutionary trends which appear to have come back into focus in Russia 
today. First of all, this concerns the Slavophile-Westerniser debate that has 
swung in a clear direction. Part of this is a return to pre-revolutionary 
Slavophile traditions in viewing Russia as fundamentally different from both 
East and West, ending a period of uncertainty over Russia’s role in the world 
that has arguably gone on since the start of perestroika (1985) all the way up to 
the Ukraine crisis (2014). Claims it is ‘normal’ for Russia to be ‘different’ 
from the Western countries and play a ‘different’ role or have ‘special 
responsibilities’ are linked to pre-1917 narratives about Russia’s role in the 
world. In the current hegemonic discourse we find a clear neo-Slavophile turn 





distinct. This Slavophile turn is in response to certain eternal ‘big’ questions, 
such as ‘Is Russia a European country?’, ‘Can Russians have democracy of the 
Western type?’ or ‘Is Russia a normal country?’. These tend to focus on the 
country’s global status and comparisons with the West. As in the nineteenth 
century, the West is still a vital constituent ‘Other’ for Russia’s dominant 
nationalist discourse. Yet, as has been mentioned above, this neo-Slavophile 
turn is not built on strong ideological foundations. Claims to civilizational 
distinctiveness were not clearly part of the hegemonic nationalist discourse 
uncovered in this thesis. In fact, neo-traditionalism and Orthodoxy did not 
emerge as an important foundational element of Russian national identity in the 
data pool of this research. 
The other main pre-revolutionary element unearthed in this thesis was the age-
old story of alienation between ‘educated’ Russians (Europeans) and the 
masses, where the former views the latter as backward, passive, unreliable and 
inert. This is combined with a great fear among the former of a rebellion (bunt) 
bursting out among the latter. Thus, the gap between the intelligentsia and the 
masses persists. A vital part of this is the tendency to talk about Russians 
abstractly; ‘Russians are passive’, ‘they can’t do this or that’. Thus, many 
educated urban Russians display a certain hopelessness in dealing with this 
‘uncooperative mass’. This leaves some with the sense that the government is 
the only reliable instrument for managing a population in need of strong doses 
of authoritarianism to prevent disorder and the occurrence of what Pushkin 
famously termed ‘the Russian rebellion, pointless and ruthless’. 115  This 
sentiment plays into the general zeitgeist of conservatism in Russia today. 
The Hegemonic Nationalist Discourse in Russia today 
This brings us to an outline of the current hegemonic nationalist discourse in 
Russia today, which is composed of four essential components. Firstly, we 
have the demand for order and progress, stability and security to ensure Russia 
is a ‘normal’ country that is based on memory of Russia experiencing collapse 









conservatism that claims the need for strong centralisation and desire to retain 
status quo. This entails deep scepticism about civic participation, disinterest in 
politics or ideological constructs, support for pragmatic statist positions, as 
well as acceptance of the current social contract. This also includes 
conservatism towards territorial change, acceptance of the current holding 
pattern of Russia as large state and world power. In other words, this means to 
retain the imperial body intact, avoiding any loss of great power status but also, 
importantly, rejecting adventurism in world affairs. Thirdly, there is the 
recycling of key Soviet leitmotifs: the post-Soviet civic nation is non-ethnic 
and hostile to ‘nationalism’. Russians are ‘open’ people, they mix with other 
peoples, although their inclusivism is mixed with strong assimilationist 
sentiment. Russians are the state-forming people, and the adjective russkii is 
used to describe a multi-ethnic people that are united in culture and language 
and, of course, in commitment to Putin’s statist project. Finally, we have the 
salience of the West as the key external threat to the nation, demanding 
consolidation to hold its head above water and retain its great power status. In 
doing this, the nation is fundamentally defensive: the West is resisted and loss 
of influence or state breakdown in the Eurasian space is averted. The sense of 
fragility to Russia as a multinational state and fear of revolutions plays into this 
defensiveness strongly, as do emotional narratives about the West as a hostile 
anti-Russian force. 
Challenging the status quo: anti-hegemonic visions  
While the above mainstream vision of the nation holds traction with large 
numbers, it is clearly challenged by a significant minority. This thesis has 
shown those who contest the status quo generally take different markers of 
normality. Firstly, they do not consider the late Soviet period to be ‘normal’; 
instead they turn elsewhere, usually to the contemporary societies of the 
‘developed world’ in the twenty-first century. Secondly, they do not tend to 
frame the social world against the negative experience of Russia’s ‘wild 
nineties’.  Instead of anchoring one’s visions of normality on the nineties as a 
‘ground zero’ point, the epitome of ‘abnormality’, these respondents tended to 
look outside of Russia. Part of these different normative standards is a rejection 





with as a victim of a system that weeded out independent-minded people, but 
ultimately condemned as holding Russia back. This is a minority that 
fundamentally craves a new relationship between state and people, one where 
the people are more responsible, more active and can hold the state accountable 
and make it work for ‘them’.  
In all of this, there is strong potential for a different kind of longue durée to 
emerge, which could support this minority’s differing normative standards. 
This has a fundamentally anti-Soviet flavour; one that views authoritarianism 
and paternalism as holding Russia back, one that views seventy-four years of 
communism as wasting the human potential of the nation. What ultimately 
blocks the emergence of the above view on Russian history is the normative 
split across social and generational lines. This research has suggested the split 
is not so purely along age lines but also relates to social frames. This was 
revealed in the family biographies of participants. Those respondents who told 
stories of how their families benefited from the Soviet modernization project 
often had experience of hardship and loss post-1991. Conversely, those with 
relatives repressed in the Soviet period were more likely to view the end of the 
USSR, whatever problems this caused, as a good thing.  
The above normative split is very important in attitudes to state media in the 
Information War. Those respondents with divergent normative standards were 
generally far less likely to accept ‘state propaganda’ and often deconstructed 
state propaganda while lampooning the ignorance of the people (narod) or the 
heartland (glubinka). Criticism of Putin’s domestic policies was strongly 
articulated, as well as the awareness that foreign policy is used to distract 
people and produce an inflated sense of national pride. Thus, this anti-
hegemonic discourse rejects state media and abstracts the Russian people: 
‘they’ believe the propaganda, ‘they’ need Putin. The conclusion emerging 
from this is that it is the most backward, least educated Russians that follow the 
status quo. More research would be needed to draw firmer conclusions over 
how salient generational, social or cultural elements are to this question.  
The second anti-hegemonic discourse that was noticeable in this study rejected 





policy. The sentiment that resources should be spent on Russian citizens 
clashes with statist rhetoric. The refusal to accept the inclusion of labour 
migrants or the North Caucasus region also extended, for some at least, to the 
‘Russians of the Near Abroad’, who were also viewed as not worthy of state 
resources. The central image of this discourse is that Russia is a poor country, 
her towns and villages are impoverished, essential services are barely adequate 
and, to top it all off, money is draining out of the state coffers for dubious 
reasons. This discourse may have increasing appeal given the current economic 
malaise and may pose a significant challenge the current dominant discourse.  
The salience of geopolitics and greatpowerness in holding the 
equilibrium 
This thesis has argued that what ultimately holds the above anti-hegemonic 
discourses in check is geopolitics and greatpowerness. Statist and geopolitical 
priorities encourage people to swallow their dissatisfaction over inequality, 
unfairness and corruption and accept the priority should be peace, stability and 
securing Russia as a great power. Thus, a strong consensus on the West as a 
negative force in world affairs with anti-Russian tendencies is combined with 
the draw of great power nationalism. It must be underlined that this is not about 
reconstituting empire; as noted above there is little enthusiasm for 
ideologically motivated projects such as the Eurasian Union or ruskkii mir. 
This thesis has highlighted the primacy of emotions in popular geopolitics. 
Central to this is ressentiment towards the West and powerful emotional 
imagery of Russia being treated as ‘second-class’ or ‘servants’. Thus, the 
approval for the current course comes in positive terms: Russia is on a quest 
for equality and respect, the right to be recognised as an equal great power. 
This thesis has also underlined the mobilising effects of certain external events 
(Maidan and Crimea). These allow a geopolitical vision to assume a tangible 
form and for people to ‘live’ and ‘experience’ the nation’s struggles and 
triumphs. Ultimately, these events have resulted in consolidation and a 
reaffirmation of loyalties. The equilibrium that currently exists is heavily 
reliant on the sense that Russia must ‘hold the fort’ and not surrender. This 





disintegration; (ii) pursuing the zero-sum battle for equality with the Western 
powers, (iii) the feeling that Russia, due to her huge size, will be a special kind 
of ‘great power’ that cannot ‘join’ the West. Thus, such sentiments, along with 
emotional narratives and external events, help hold in check anti-hegemonic 
discourse.  
Final words 
As the decade draws to a close and we approach thirty years of Russia ‘since 
the USSR’, there is the sense that the post-Soviet phase is now, in many ways 
complete. The task before us is to adequately conceptualise what this period 
has left us with. For one, the ‘burden’ of Soviet legacies has not been 
‘overcome’; the forms, practices and legacies of the ‘Soviet man’ live on in 
mutated forms in the minds of many Russians. The ‘posting’ of socialism did 
not produce the result hoped for by those expecting Russia’s transition towards 
Western models. Instead this transition has been heavily shaped by Russia’s 
pre-revolutionary traditions, Soviet legacies and the experience of the post-
Soviet transition (1988-1998).  
At the same time, Russia is still in transition with regards to ‘imperial 
consciousness’ and great power nationalism. Russia’s post-imperium still 
reproduces and retains much of the Romanov and Soviet heritage minus a 
clearly elaborated state ideology. This has occurred in conditions where the 
end of the Cold War ‘three worlds system’ has not resulted in Russia’s 
inclusion into the ‘first world’. Instead, the three-way division of the Cold War 
has rather quickly been reconstituted into ‘the West’, the BRIC countries and 
the ‘rest’. Ways of conceptualising the world, reinforced over decades of the 
Cold War, have proven far more resilient than many expected.  
Ultimately, this thesis cannot predict the future course of Russian identity. 
Instead, its main goal has been to outline its current condition and explain why 
people adopt certain positions. A larger data set would be needed to explore 
whether the normative split in respondents is prevalent across Russia or merely 
in this urban, ‘European’ part of Russia. More work is also needed to test the 





discourses people absorb and reproduce. Over the longer term, it remains to be 
seen whether the experience of 1988-1999 will lose salience and if, as Soviet-
born people die off one by one, the transmission belt of Soviet legacies will be 
disrupted. The conclusions of this thesis would suggest it is unrealistic to 
expect the extinction of Soviet forms, practices, legacies. Instead, they will 
mutate and evolve, ensuring their survival. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the current reliance on geopolitics and the 
struggle with the West is a highly unstable course. The sense that this struggle 
is ‘done’ or ‘has run its course’ would destabilise the equilibrium. The failure 
of any ‘ism’ to take root may cause problems for the current status quo in the 
longer term. Ultimately, we must wait for time to take its course to discover 
how the Putin-era status quo will develop. It is hoped this thesis has shed light 
on the need to account for the picture ‘from below’. Further work on the appeal 
of the ‘nation’ in the twenty-first century must take into account the emotions, 
myths and visions of normality prevailing within a given community in a given 














Appendix 1: Elite Interviews (Summer 2014, Winter 2015, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg) 
 
Georgy Filimonov, Professor in the Department of the Theory and History of 
International Relations, Founding member of Anti-Maidan Movement (Moscow)  
 
Igor Chubais, Historian and Writer (Moscow)  
 
Lev Gudkov, Head of Levada Centre (Moscow)  
 
Stanislav Vorobyov, Head of Russian Imperial Movement (SPB)  
 
Dmitri Demushkin, Leader of Russkie (ethno-nationalist party), (Moscow)  
 
Konstantin Krylov, Party Secretary of the National Democratic Party, (Moscow)  
 
Sergey Markedonov, Director of the Department for Problems of Ethnic Relations at the 
Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, (Moscow) 
 
Prof. Alexey Miller, Historian (Moscow) 
 
Valery Solovei, Historian and Publicist, (Moscow) 
 
Maxim Kalashnikov, Journalist, Writer and nationalist activist, (Elite interview, 
Moscow) 
 
Andrei Savelyev, Nationalist politician and former Rodina party deputy, (Moscow) 
 
Emil Pain, Political Scientist, (Elite interview, Moscow) 
 









Appendix 2: Original pilot project interview questions for 
both age groups before starting fieldwork 
Note: This original set of questions were aimed at exploring which approaches and kind of topic would 
stimulate discussion. A large number of these questions were subsequently removed as they were either 
too ‘leading’, related to topics many did not think about or were too closed and led to yes/no/maybe 
responses  
 
View of Russian history 
• What do you feel are the most significant/negative/positive periods of Russian history in the twentieth 
century? 
• How did you feel about debates on the USSR in WWII and the threatened closure of TV Channel Dozhd? 
• What do you think is the main lesson to be learned from the Soviet era? 
• Who or what brought down the USSR in your view?  
 
Membership of the Russian nation 
• Do you agree with the constitution that Russians should be a multinational people?  
• Would you identify with the term ‘russkii’ or ‘rossiyane’? What do you think Russia should be a common 
home for many ethnic groups? Can one become Russian (Russkii)? 




• What is your experience of interacting with non-ethnic Russians on an everyday basis?  
• What do you think of the current state policy? What do you think about immigration and the demographics 
of Russia? 
• Are migrants well integrated into Russian society? 
 
Territorial boundaries of Russian nation 
• Are the current boundaries of the Russian Federation the ‘correct’ or ‘natural’ boundaries of the Russian 
nation? How could it be altered? 
• Some say funding of certain regions (North Caucasus) should be limited, your view? Must the Federation 
be held together at all costs? 
• What is your opinion on the possibility of uniting Russia, parts of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan? 
 
Russian role in world 
• What should Russia’s role in the world be? Does Russia have a unique path? 
• Is Russia part of Europe? Should she look for closer partnership with the EU? 
• What do you think about the Eurasian Union and Custom’s Union? Is this restoration of a new USSR-style 
entity?  
• Do you think it is important to be a ‘great power’? 
 
The best social, economic, political and cultural configuration for Russia 





• Have you heard the term ‘Managed democracy’? Is it a good thing?  
• What did the Sochi Olympics mean for you/Russians in general? 
• How did you feel about the protests on Bolotnaya in 2011-2012?  
























Appendix 3: Final version of interview guide (age group 
20-30) in Russian developed by September 2014 
Interviews for the current Post-Soviet generation (those aged 18-30 today) 
 
Давайте начнем с истории вашей семьи – не могли бы Вы кратко рассказать, откуда Ваши предки, 
где они жили, работали, служили? … Расскажите о себе – образование,  работа. Чем Ваши 
родители занимались в период перестройки? Какие у них взгляды на реформы и развал СССР? Вы 
выросли в 90-е, что вы помните о той атмосфере в семье, спорах и разговорах? Чья позиция было 
вам близка?  
 
Let's begin with your family's story – could you tell me about your parents, grandparents, where they 
lived/worked/served? Could you tell me about your background/education/job? What were your parents 
doing in perestroika? Did they have views on these reforms and the fall of the USSR? You grew up in the 
nineties, what do you remember of this period, discussions, arguments.. whose position was closer to 
yours? 
 
View of Russian history  
 
• Если смотреть на историю России ХХ века, когда, по Вашему, Россия была на 
правильном пути развития? Какие периоды были сами удачными или неудачными для 
России? Looking at twentieth century Russian history, when, in your view, was Russia on the 
right path of development? Is there a period you think was particularly successful/positive? 
• В вашей жизни, какие исторические событие были сами важными для России? In your 
lifetime, what historical events were most important for Russia? 
• Путин назвал развал 91-го года «геополитической катастрофой» Для других это было 
«победой демократии»?  - А для вас?   Putin called 1991 a 'geopolitical tragedy'. Others called 
it the 'victory of democracy' – what is it for you? 
• История России не простая – дважды случились развалы государства – были великие 
достижения и провалы – как вы считаете, каков главный урок ХХ века для России? The 
history of Russia is not straightforward – twice states have collapsed – there have been great 
achievements and failures – what do you think we might raise as one important lesson of the 
twentieth century for Russia? 
 
Membership of the Russian nation 
 
• Что для Вас означают слова – «Националист» и «патриот»? «Нация» и «государство» - 
есть разница? Как Вы относитесь к так называемым «русским националистам»? What do 
the words 'patriot' and 'nationalist' mean to you? What about 'nation' and 'state'? How do you 





• Если спросили ваших родителей в 80-х «кто вы» - возможно что они бы ответили «я 
советский человек» - а не «я русский» - было такое понятие что советские люди они 
многонациональные и работают вместе чтобы строить коммунизм – а если вас спросит 
«кто вы»? как вы отвечаете? ( «я россиян» или «я русский»? ) If I asked your parents in the 
1980's 'who are you?', they may have answered 'I am Soviet' – there was this sense of all being 
Soviet working together to build Communism – Today we don't have Soviet/Russian we have 
russkii and rossiyanin. If I ask you 'who are you' how would you answer? 
• Вы согласны с тем, что написано в Конституции: Россия – многонациональная страна то 
есть  «общий дом многих народов» или с этим что-то не так? Например, «Россия должна 
быть государством русских людей в первую очередь»? Do you agree with what is written in 
the constitution, 'Russia is a multinational country'? In other words a home for many different 
peoples? Or is there something wrong with this? Like for example, some say Russia should be a 
state for the russkii people in the first instance? 
• В советские времена – можно было просто выбрать национальность и стать «русским» в 
своем паспорте. «отец еврей, мать татарка – а я сам русский» А сегодня, что определяет 
«русскость»? In the Soviet times, a person could choose there nationality in their passport and 
become Russian, like the phrase 'My dad is Jewish, my mother is Tatar but I myself am Russian'. 
What about today, how would you define ‘who is Russian’? 
• В Латвии 80% латышей и 20% нелатышей – но никто не говорит, что Латвия – 
многонациональное государство – В России 80% населения – русские, но РФ - 
многонациональное государство – все в порядке с этом? In Latvia 80% of the country is 
made up of ethnic Latvians, 20% are non-ethnic Latvians. The proportions are similar in Russia. 
But the Russian Federation is a multinational country. Is this fair? 
• В 91-м году появилось новое государство – РФ – в этот момент, многие, которые считали 
себя советскими или русскими оказались за пределами РФ - Что Вы думаете о положении 
русских в ближнем зарубежье? Они часть Российской нации? У России есть 
ответственность за них? In 1991 a new state emerged, the RF, at that moment many who 
thought of themselves as Russians ended up outside of the RF borders – what do you think about 
the situation of the Russians of the near abroad? Are they part of the Russian nation? Does 
Russia have responsibility for them? 
• Были, конечно, советские ценности – довольно четко формулированные – а сегодня, что 
объединяет Россиян сегодня, какие ценности? There were certain Soviet values, pretty clearly 
defined. What about today, what unites Russians today, what values are there?  
• Как вы понимаете разницу между русскими и «западными» людьми? How do you 
understand the differences between Russian and 'Western' people? Are there differences? 
• Если сравнить ваше поколение с поколением ваших родителей – вы можете называть 
одну положительную и одну отрицательную разницу между вами? If we compare your 








• Раньше в СССР была политика «дружба народов» - люди разных национальностей 
должны были жить мирно – сегодня все по-прежнему? Back in the USSR there was a policy 
of 'Friendship of Nations' – people of different nationalities were to live in peace – is this still 
going on today? 
• Как Вы смотрите на нынешнюю государственную политику касательно иммиграции и 
демографии? Беспокоит ли Вас демографический кризис? What do you think of the current 
state policies on immigration and demographics? Are you worried by any demographic crisis? 
• Легко ли мигранты интегрируются в российское общество? Do migrants find it easy to 
integrate into Russian society? 
• Пора уже вводить визовый режим на все станы постсоветского пространства чтобы 
уменьшить поток мигрантов? Is it time to introduce some visa regulations between the Post-
Soviet states to reduce the migrant flow? 
• Что надо делать, чтобы укрепить народное единство в России? Чтобы люди разных 
национальностей чувствовали себя членами одной нации – то есть «мы все россияне» 
What should be done to strengthen unity in Russia? In order for people of different nationalities 
to feel members of one nation? 
• По вашим наблюдениям – что делается в Вашем городе для сохранения гражданского 
мира, межнационального и межрелигиозного согласия? What have you seen being done to 
preserve civic peace, interethnic and interreligious peace? 
 
Territorial boundaries of Russian nation 
 
• Нынешние границы РФ правильно отражают естественные границы российской/русской 
нации? Как, по-вашему мнению, они должны выглядеть? Do the current borders of the 
Russian Federation reflect the natural extent of the Russian nation? How should they look? 
• Как смотрите на вхождение Крым в состав РФ? Вы поддерживаете создание 
«Новороссии»? What do you think about the addition of Crimea to the Russian Federation? Do 
you support the creation of 'Novorossiya'?  
• Если республика Татарстана и нижегородская область получают разные субсидии из 
центра (особенно для развития татарской культуры) это правильно? Вы слышали лозунг 
“Хватит кормить Северный Кавказ?” If the republic of Tatarstan and Nizhny Novgorod region 
receive different subsidies from the centre ( to pay for the development of Tatar culture, for 
example), is this correct? Have you heard the slogan 'stop feeding the Caucasus'?  
• Что для вас означает «Русский Мир»? What does the term 'Russkii mir' mean to you? 
 
Russian role in world 
 
• Является ли Россия частью Европы? Должна ли она искать более тесное сотрудничество с 






• Некоторые говорят, что у России «особенный путь». Что приходит на ум когда вы это 
слышите? Some say Russia has a 'special path'. What comes to mind when you hear that? 
• Советский союз играл определенную роль в мире – глава социалистического блока, 
вторая сверхдержава - Какую роль Россия должна играть сегодня на мировой арене? The 
USSR played a particular role in the world – the head of the socialist bloc, the second 
superpower… what role should Russia play today on the world stage? 
• У России, кажется, всегда была какая-то миссия – «России нужен выход на море – России 
нужна новая столица – в СССР – надо строить коммунизм – полететь в космос – 
поднимать целину» какой может быть следующий мега-проект – или надо уже забывать о 
таких вещах? Looking at history, it seems Russia has always had some kind of mission – e.g. 
Russia needs access to the sea, a new capital, build communism, reach space, the virgin lands 
campaign. What could be Russia's next mega project? Or is it time to forget such things? 
• Как Вы смотрите на создание Евразийского союза и Таможенного союза? What do you 
think about the foundation of the Eurasian Union and Custom's Union?  
• Хотел поговорить о кризисе на Украине – в чем суть конфликт между западом и Россией 
– что хочет ЕС и США в этом -  Как вы считаете, что в первую очередь стоит за 
действиями российского руководства в отношении Крыма и Украины? Considering the 
Ukraine crisis, what do you think is at the heart of the conflict between Russia and the West? 
What does the EU and USA want? What motivates the Russian leadership here?  
• Что Вы думаете по поводу «информационной войны», которая якобы идет в 
информационном пространстве? What do you think of the information war that appears to be 
going on in the media? 
 
The best social, economic, political and cultural configuration for Russia 
 
• Почему Путин пользуется популярностью у народа? Как он отличается от других вождей, 
как Ельцин или Горбачев? Why do you think Russia is popular, how does he differ from 
previous leaders? 
• Вы слышали термин “управляемая/суверенная демократия”? Как вы понимаете 
политическую систему в России? Это не западная и не советская демократия ведь… Have 
you heard the term 'managed/sovereign democracy'? How to understand the political system in 
Russia – How does it compare to 'Western' or 'Soviet' versions of democracy? 
• Какое значение имели Олимпийские игры в Сочи для Вас и для россиян вообще? What did 
the Olympic Games in Sochi mean to you and Russians in general? 
• Как относитесь к протестам на Болотной площади конца 2011-2012 годов? Политическая 
оппозиция нужна для правильно функционирования политической системы? How did you 
feel about the protests on Bolotnaya 2011-12? Is a political opposition needed for a functioning 
political system? 
• Какие главные задачи стоят перед Россией сегодня? На что надо тратить ее ресурсы? What 






Appendix 4: Final version of interview guide (aged 18-30 
in 1991) in Russian developed by September 2014 
Давайте начнем с истории вашей семьи – не могли бы Вы кратко рассказать, откуда Ваши предки, 
где они жили, работали, служили? … Расскажите о себе – образование,  работа   
Чем занимались в период перестройки? Какие у вас взгляды были на реформы и развал СССР?  
 
Let's begin with your family's story – could you tell me about your parents, grandparents, where they 
lived/worked/served? Could you tell me about your background/education/job? What did you do during 
perestroika? What were your views on these reforms and the fall of the USSR?  
View of Russian history 
• В перестройке начались переоценки истории - Как Вы смотрели на дебаты о роли Сталина 
и Ленина в 1980-х годах? Perestroika witnessed re-evaluations of history – how did view 
debates on the role of Stalin and Lenin in the 1980's? 
• Когда Россия была в правильном направлении развития? Какие периоды были сами 
удачными или неудачными для России? Looking at twentieth century Russian history, when, 
in your view, was Russia on the right path of development? Is there a period you think was 
particularly successful/positive? 
• В вашей жизни, какие исторические событие были сами важными для России? In your 
lifetime, what historical events were most important for Russia? 
• История России не простая – дважды случились развалы государства – были великие 
достижения и провалы – как вы считаете, каков главный урок ХХ века для России? The 
history of Russia is not straightforward – twice states have collapsed – there have been great 
achievements and failures – what do you think we might raise as one important lesson of the 
twentieth century for Russia? 
 
The best social, economic, political and cultural configuration for Russia 
• В какие аспекты советской идеологии Вы верили/(или) не верили, принимали – отрицали? 
Есть ли у Вас опыт с организациями, которые поддерживали режим (комсомол и 
пионерия)? What aspects of Soviet ideology did you believe/accept/reject? Did you belong to 
any organisations supporting the regime? 
• Что Вы чувствовали, когда начиналась перестройка? Были ли какие-то явные недостатки 
в советском строе, которые Вы видели собственными глазами? What did you feel at the start 
of perestroika? Did you notice some defects in the USSR with your own eyes?  
• Как надо было проводить перестройку? Какие реформы нужны сегодня в России? How 
should perestroika have been done? What reforms are needed in Russia today? 
• Было ли больше/меньше солидарности, единства и коллективизма в обществе, чем 





more/less solidarity/unity/collectivism in society back then? Have Soviet values left/stayed in 
Russian society today? 
• Принимали ли Вы участие в каких-либо первичных политических организациях? 
(неформалы) Почему (нет)? Вы помните аргументы тех, кто был против (и за) реформ? 
Did you take part in any political organisations? Do you remember the arguments of those for 
and against reform?  
• Как Вы смотрели на путч августа 1991-го? Народ не победил, когда путч провалился? 
События в 91-ом были для Вас тогда «победой демократии»? Путин назвал развал 91-го 
года «геополитической катастрофой» - Вы с этим согласны? What did you think of the 
August Putsch? Did the people win when the putsch failed? Putin called 1991 a 'geopolitical 
tragedy'. Others called it the 'victory of democracy' – what is it for you? 
• Считаете ли Вы, что русские люди многое потеряли за последние 20 лет? Do you think the 
Russian lost/gained a lot in the last twenty odd years since 1991? 
• Принимали участие в политических группах в 90-х? Как работала демократия в 90-х для 
вас? Как насчет сегодня? Did you take part in politics in the nineties? How did this new 
democracy work in your experience? How about now? 
• Какие главные задачи стоят перед Россией сегодня? На что надо тратить ее ресурсы? What 
are the main goals for Russia today, what should she spend her resources on?  
Membership of the Russian nation 
• Что для Вас означают слова – «Националист», «патриот» и «национал-патриот»?  есть 
разница? What do the words 'patriot' and 'nationalist' mean to you?  
• Вы чувствовали себя больше русским или советским человеком? Были ли какие-либо 
противоречия в этих понятиях? На чем была основана “руcскость” или “советскость”? Did 
you feel Russian and/or Soviet? Was there any contractions in this? What was 
Russianess/Sovietness based on? 
• Вы согласны с тем, что написано в конституции: Россия – многонациональная страна то 
есть  «общий дом многих народов» или «Россия должна быть государством русских 
людей в первую очередь»?  Do you agree with what is written in the constitution, 'Russia is a 
multinational country'? In other words a home for many different peoples? Or is there something 
wrong with this? Like for example, some say Russia should be a state for the russkii people in 
the first instance? 
• В 91-ого года появилось новое государство – РФ – в этот момент, многие, которые 
считали себя советскими или русскими оказались за пределами РФ - Что Вы думаете о 
положении русских в ближнем зарубежье? У России есть ответственность за них? In 1991 
a new state emerged, the RF, at that moment many who thought of themselves as Russians ended 
up outside of the RF borders – what do you think about the situation of the Russians of the near 







• Помните лозунг “Дружба народов”? Как это работало для Вас на деле? Do you remember 
the slogan 'Friendship of Nations'? How did that work in practice?  
• Вы слышали в советские времена, что некоторые жители РСФСР чувствовали себя 
ущемленными или обиженными за состояние областей в России, и что якобы тратили 
больше средств на другие республики? «Россия должна кормить себя – не других за счет 
себя – Россия живет хуже, чем работает» Did you ever hear some residents of the RSFSR felt 
annoyed by the state of Russian regions, that too much money was spent on other republics? 
• Как вам кажется, говоря о междунациональных отношениях, мало/много изменилось с 
времен дружбы народов? When we look at interethnic relations, how much has changed since 
the days of Friendship of Nations? 
• Как Вы смотрите на нынешнюю государственную политику касательно иммиграции и 
демографии? Беспокоит ли Вас демографический кризис? What do you think of the current 
state policies on immigration and demographics? Are you worried by any demographic crisis? 
 
Territorial boundaries of Russian nation 
• Вы чувствовали, что РФСФР была “Вашей” республикой – примерно так же, как и 
Казахская ССР была для казаха? Did you feel that the RFSFR was 'your' republic, like say the 
Kazakh SSR was for a Kazakh? 
• Считаете ли Вы, что границы РФСФР совпадали с существующей российской нацией? 
Или какая-то часть российской нации была оставлена за их пределами? Сегодня? Do you 
think the borders of the RFSFR fit with the actual existing Russian nation back then and now? 
Should some extra part be included/excluded? 
• Что для вас означает «Русский Мир»? What does the term 'russkii mir' mean to you? 
• Как смотрите на вхождение Крым в состав РФ? Вы поддерживаете создание 
«Новороссии»?  
• Как Вы смотрите на создание Евразийского союза и Таможенного союза? What do you 
think about the foundation of the Eurasian Union and Custom's Union?  
Russian role in world 
• Какую роль играл СССР в Мире? Как Вы смотрели на переговори по разоружению, 
сближение с Западом? What role did the USSR play in the world? How did you respond to the 
improvement in relations with the West and disarmament talks? 
• Считали ли Вы себя “интернационалистом”? Какая реакция была у Вас к призыву 
“выполнить интернациональной долг в Афганистане”? Did you consider yourself an 
internationalist? What did you think of the intervention in Afghanistan? 
• Как Вы смотрели на растущий “национализм» в некоторых республиках? What did you 





• Является ли Россия частью Европы? Должна ли она искать более тесное сотрудничество с 
Европейским Союзом? Is Russia part of Europe? Should she seek closer cooperation with the 
EU? 
• Некоторые говорят, что у России «особенный путь». Что приходит на ум когда вы это 
слышите? Some say Russia has a 'special path'. What comes to mind when you hear that? 
• Советский союз играл определенную роль в мире. Какую роль Россия должна играть 
сегодня на мировой арене? The USSR played a particular role in the world – the head of the 
socialist bloc, the second superpower… what role should Russia play on the world stage? 
• У России, кажется, всегда была какая-то миссия – «России нужен выход на море – России 
нужна новая столица – в СССР – надо строить коммунизм – полететь в космос – 
поднимать целину» какой может быть следующий мега-проект – или надо уже забывать о 
таких вещах? Looking at history, it seems Russia has always had some kind of mission – e.g. 
Russia needs access to the sea, a new capital, build communism, reach space, the virgin lands 
campaign. What could be Russia's next mega project? Or is it time to forget such things? 
• Хотел поговорить о кризисе на Украине, в чем суть конфликт между западом и Россией?  
Что хочет ЕС и ШСА в этом? Как вы считаете, что в первую очередь стоит за действиями 
российского руководства в отношении Крыма и Украины? Considering the Ukraine crisis, 
what do you think is at the heart of the conflict between Russia and the West? What does the EU 






















Appendix 5: Message posted on Social media to attract 
respondents 
 
Друзья, я приехал в Нижний Новгород из Шотландии. Цель моей поездки – сбор 
материала для своей докторской диссертации о том, как меняется самосознание и 
самоидентичность людей в России в современную эпоху после стольких изменений в 
стране. В государственном строе, в идеологи, в национальной идее и в жизненных 
ценностях людей. Именно поэтому я ищу людей, с которыми я мог бы говорить об этом и 
узнавать их мнения, взгляды на свою жизнь и жизнь в стране в целом. 
Я провожу исследование в трех городах: Москва, Нижний Новгород и Санкт-Петербург. 
Мой подход – это сравнительный анализ двух поколений – первая группа – советское 
поколение (люди, которым было 18-30 в 1991) – вторая – нынешняя молодежь – люди, 
которым 18-30 сегодня. Я ищу самых разных людей, чтобы результаты были как можно 
более объективными. Обычно встреча длится около часа, но все зависит от вашего 
свободного времени. Это не опрос, а просто беседа, в которой вы рассказываете о том, 
какой вы видите свою жизнь и жизнь вокруг.  
Я готов встретиться с вами в любом удобном вам месте и в любое время. Успех моего 
исследования зависит от вашего интереса и готовности поделиться своим взглядом на 
мир со мной. Поэтому буду очень признателен, если смогу встретиться с кем-то из вас. 
 
Friends, I have come to Nizhny Novgorod from Scotland. The aim of my journey is to collect 
material for my doctoral dissertation on how identity and consciousness is changing in the 
current period after so many changes in the country. In the state system, ideology, national idea, 
and values of everyday people. That is why I am looking for people I can talk with about their 
views of life here and their opinions on the country in general. My research will take place in 
three cities: Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow and St. Petersburg. My approach involves a 
comparative analysis of two generations: the first is young people today (18-30), the second the 
last Soviet youth (18-30 in 1991). I am looking for people from all different backgrounds to 
make the results as objective as possible. Usually an interview would last around an hour, but it 
all depends on how much time you have. This is not a survey, but a conversation, in which you 
talk about how you see life and what is around you.  
I am happy to meet with you at any place and time that is suitable for you. The success of my 
research depends on your interest and readiness to share your views of the world with me. 






Appendix 6: Table of interviewees’ socio-economic data 
Name Place of 
Residence 
Education Employment Age at time of 
interview 
Viktor NN Higher Student, International 
Relations 
22 
Eva NN Incomplete higher Unemployed 26 
Pieter NN Higher Architect, state 
contracts 
29 
Vika NN Higher Chemist in State 
Company 
29 




Julia NN Higher Chemist in State 
Company 
29 
Boris NN Higher Computer Programmer 22 
Tanya NN Secondary Nursery Nurse 29 
Arkady NN Higher Computer Software 
Development 
27 
Nadia NN Higher Lecturer in Asian 
Studies 
26 





Ksenia NN Higher Law student 22 
Vlad NN Higher Marketing 26 
Inna NN, from Dzershinsk Higher (incomplete) Factory worker 28 





Elena NN, from Dzershinsk Higher Accountant 29 
Stanislav NN Higher Electrical Engineer 22 
Dina NN (from Sarov) Higher Student International 
Relations 
22 
Yaroslav NN Higher Student (IT) and small 
businessman 
23 
Katya NN Higher Politics Student 22 
Marina NN Higher Language Teacher 25 
Svetlana NN (from Tula) Higher Postgraduate researcher 
in sociology 
25 
Anastasia NN Higher Economics student 21 
Igor NN Higher International Relations 
lecturer 
41 
Ludmilla NN Higher (incomplete) Head of University 
Dormitory 
50 
Grigori NN Higher, Engineer in 
USSR 
Computer Programmer 49 
Vera NN Higher IT Project Manager 43 
Anatoly NN Higher History Lecturer 55 
Galina NN Higher Sociology Department 40 
Pavel NN Higher, engineer in 
USSR 
IT specialist 58 
Olga NN Secondary Factory Worker 55 
Nikita NN Secondary Ventilation System 
Salesman 
42 







Leonid NN Higher Religious History 
Lecturer 
45 
Denis NN Higher (incomplete) Journalist 41 




Yegor NN Higher (incomplete) Newspaper editor 44 
Ilia NN Higher Owner of import-export 
business 
46 
Artem NN Higher, engineer in 
USSR 
Computer Programmer 49 
Arseny NN Higher Sales in Oil Company 41 
Vitaly NN Secondary, served in 
army 
Retired businessman 42 
Valery NN Higher Business development 
in state company 
40 
Natalya NN Higher, electrical 
engineer USSR. 
Accountant 50 
Timur Moscow Higher Post Graduate 
researcher 
26 
Yuri Moscow Higher Sales Manager 45 
Roman Moscow Higher Journalist, Kommersant 28 
Julia Moscow Higher Human rights activist 24 
Zhanna Moscow Higher Journal Editor 43 
Zoya Moscow Higher Head of Cultural centre 49 
Mikhail Moscow Higher Actor 29 







former Nashi member 
Erik Moscow Higher Screenwriter 54 
Ruslan SPB Higher Computer Programmer 57 
Marta SPB Higher (incomplete), 
housewife 
Retired 54 
Anton SPB Secondary, Ex-army 
officer 
Small Business Owner 52 
Lubov SPB Higher Private Tutor 43 
Sergei SPB Higher Marketing 
Development 
40 
Julia SPB Higher (incomplete) Assistant in Film set 
production 
47 
Lev SPB Higher, Mathematics 
specialist in USSR 
Computer Programmer 46 
Elisa SPB Secondary Head of Sports Centre 58 
Semyon SPB Higher, ex-dissident, 
samizdat 
Psychologist 54 
Nikolay SPB Higher, Komsomol 
chairman 
Retired, ex-policeman 52 
Maxim SPB Secondary, black 
Market trader in 
USSR 
Shop owner 56 
Sergei SPB Higher Lecturer in Art History 53 
Ivan SPB Secondary Retired miner 55 
Andrei SPB Higher, Physics 
student in USSR 
Computer Programmer 51 







Kirill SPB Higher (incomplete) Ex-Stock Broker and 
political activist 
40 
Nadezhda SPB Higher (incomplete) Nanny 30 
Boris SPB Higher (incomplete) Radio presenter 25 
Olga SPB Higher Costume designer 26 
Igor SPB Higher Language teacher 26 
Alexandra SPB Higher Psychotherapist 30 
Evgeny SPB Higher Sales manager in 
construction company 
30 
Sasha SPB Higher Lecturer in History 28 
Dmitri SPB Higher (incomplete) Actor 28 
Marina SPB Higher Manager in Software 
Company 
29 
Mikhail SPB Higher IT admin 24 
Zakhar SPB Higher (incomplete) Manager in export 
company 
29 
Pavel SPB Higher Import-Export business 27 
Stepan SPB Higher Physics student 22 
Alexei SPB Higher Assistant to deputy of 
Local Assembly 
25 
Alexander SPB Higher Business development 
manager 
25 
Daria SPB Higher (incomplete) Events manager for 
local government 
28 
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